US president Obama has today assured the word of his intention to launch missiles at Syria for its alleged use of chemical weapons, but he has also decided to make the action dependent on the decision of the US Congress to vote for blood. Such is the nature of imperialist democracy. This could delay the attack for a week or so, something that the warmongering news media are mightily frustrated with. It may also not be a foregone conclusion that Congress votes for its
additional war, even though Obama, like UK prime minister Cameron, promised to
constrain its scope to a 'one off' punishment. Cameron's defeat by a parliament sceptical of what value lay in another war (ie an overt military action, rather than just supporting the so-called rebels) and worried about potential blowback could find an echo in the US.
That is problematic enough for Obama and for US policy. However, what if no evidence emerges that the Syrian regime was responsible? The danger of a debate (even in Congress) is that you have to present some evidence. Even worse, what if there is some evidence that the Saudi-supported opposition to Assad were responsible?!
One report explicitly claimed this yesterday, but has (so far) received no widespread coverage - partly because it embarrasses the stance of the western media, partly because it will cause a major crisis in imperialist policy. However, the report is co-authored by an AP journalist with good credentials, rather than being the ramblings of a dissident blogger. The story is entitled: 'Syrians in Ghouta Claim Saudi-Supplied Rebels behind Chemical Attack'. This is the link to it.
Let's see how this plays out.
Tony Norfield, 31 August 2013
Saturday, 31 August 2013
Friday, 23 August 2013
The Australia-Hong Kong War of 1994
Life imitates art, as shown by the following link to an excellent satire on TV news, The Day Today, first shown on British TV in 1994.
The scene is all too appropriate for the Anglo-American news media's warmongering today.
The link to the YouTube video, roughly 4 minutes, is here.
Thursday, 22 August 2013
Understanding the Syrian Situation
(Here is a guest article on a key issue for imperialism
today)
Most radical thinking on Syrian is convinced that the West,
and particularly the US, Britain and France, are keen to create a situation in
Syria that will justify Western intervention so that the major powers can take
over the country - as in Iraq and Afghanistan - isolate Iran, and help Israel’s
ailing position in the Middle East.
This is a serious misreading of the situation. The dominant
Western powers are forced to adopt a policy position on anything that happens
in the world because they must constantly remind the international community
who is in charge. That does not mean, drawing out the purely logical conclusion
of these public policy positions, that they necessarily have any real intention
of getting involved or of intervening in any particular conflict. It is
important, when judging world events, to avoid the simplistic radical
counter-propaganda model and to examine what is really going on.
The conflict in Syria is being driven by Saudi Arabia and
the Gulf States. These countries all have either large Shia communities or
majority Shia populations. In addition, the ruling elites in these countries
are a tiny minority within the minority Sunni population. It is only a matter
of time before democratic and demographic realities impose themselves. Iran has
made it clear that it does not want to use its Shia influence in the region to
destabilise these regimes. Indeed, Iran has made it clear that what it wants is
a strategic but respectful relationship with these Sunni states - particularly
as Western sanctions bite more and more. Iranian commercial elites need these
Sunni states to prosper.
Nevertheless, these Sunni states, and particularly Saudi
Arabia, are not comforted by such Iranian assurances. In a way, they are right.
What they fear is not Iranian backed subversion, of which there is very little
evidence, but that the struggles of their own Shia communities will inevitably
drag Iran in, whether it wants to or not. This is sound reasoning. Iran cannot
ultimately remain aloof from Shia struggles that flare up despite its
conservative foreign policy.
So, the Saudis and the Gulf States are extremely anxious to
deal Iran a knock out blow. Fostering regime change in Iran has shown itself to
be a total failure. Iran is a relatively compact and orderly society and any
attempts to undermine its internal cohesion do not prosper. A large part of the
population hates the rule of the mullahs, but, if the country is attacked, all
Iranians close ranks.
In any case, the policy of the Saudis and the Gulf States
is too primitive to run the kind of sophisticated strategy needed to undermine
Iran internally. The only international politics they know is to offer huge
bribes, which is not enough in this case. That’s what happens when you have too
much money and you do not have to work or think for a living. Your brain goes
to mush. When the Saudis or the Gulf States need to play a more intelligent
game, they always get the Israelis to do it for them.
The eruption of the Syrian civil war has created the
illusion in the minds of the Saudi and Sunni elites that by financing regime
change they can deal Iran a severe blow by isolating it in the region. This is
more wishful thinking born of desperation than geopolitical understanding. It
is what really fuels the fighting in Syria and why the West does not want to
get involved. The Saudis and Qataris are pouring in billions of dollars – but
all their money is able to buy is an undisciplined rabble of jihadist head-bangers
who could never form an alternative political leadership and which the West
does not want to touch with a barge pole.
So, why is the West making ominous war-like noises that
sometimes sound very much like the run up to the Iraq war? Actually, carefully
analysis shows that, despite surface similarities, there is a marked difference
between Iraq and Syria. Every statement that the US, the UK and France has made
in the last two years has indeed been full of hype and hot air – but has also
been self-limiting and vague on detail and timetable. There is no build up, no
momentum, no traction to this phoney war effort. Now, General Martin Dempsey,
chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and Barack Obama's chief military
adviser, has made it clear the US is not going to get involved.[1]
If the West continues with this phoney war it is only
because its close allies, the Saudis and the Gulf States, have got themselves
into a huge jam and need to be shored up diplomatically. If the Syrian regime
manages to hang on, and all indications are that it will, it will be a
strategic disaster for the Saudis and their allies and, for them, a disastrous victory
for the Iranians who will tell the world: 'You see, these dumb Saudis, they
have all the money, they can buy anything they want, they have all the power of
the United States and the West behind them, and yet they are useless. They are
not fit to be leaders of the Islamic world.'
Western politicians must be hugely relieved to have the
excuse of Putin ostensibly stopping them from intervening!
[1] 'US "will
not intervene in Syria as rebels don't support interests", says top
general', Daily Telegraph, 21 August 2013.
Labels:
Gulf states,
Iran,
Israel,
Saudi Arabia,
Shia,
Sunni,
Syria
Wednesday, 21 August 2013
The Economics of Spying
The UK's Guardian newspaper has had a good run of scoops based on US-fugitive Edward Snowden's revelations about the scale of spying activity by the American government, and its connections with British and other government spy agencies. Until Monday evening, 20 August, however, it had denied itself another scoop - that UK government officials came to its London offices in July to demand the leaked US National Security Agency files. In the event, they agreed with these officials to destroy the copy the Guardian had in London, and yesterday published pictures of the relevant dismembered hard drive. It is not clear why there was such a delay in reporting the July visit, but one suspects that it might have been due to the 9-hour detention of David Miranda, partner of the main story reporter, Glenn Greenwald, by the Brits. The latter is likely to provoke Greenwald into more embarrassing revelations and this would make the Guardian's continued silence on its own treatment by the UK government also a little embarrassing.
Much of the coverage of official spying activity has been in terms of the potential loss of personal privacy on the Internet, in phone calls and emails. By contrast, the state response has been to stress the need for such actions in the fight against 'terrorism'. When officials sense that might not be enough to assuage liberal concerns, they sometimes also mention how it is needed to combat 'serious organised crime'. The much more plausible rationale for the huge extent and cost of this surveillance, however, is that it makes good business sense!
Far from trawling through zillions of gigabytes of data to uncover the latest plot, the intelligence agencies are much more likely to be monitoring a select subset of the communications, the ones that really interest them. As the Guardian itself reported two months ago, the UK's GCHQ has intercepted communications at G20 summits. Less politically charged, more mundane, but much more profitable surveillance of key corporate communications about business deals, strategy and innovations will also take place on a regular basis. Any problem they might have with continuing this activity is the main 'threat to national security'.
I'm just a little surprised that the UK government has not had the sense to explain this to the public. I am sure they would understand, given the consensus that exists on doing what is good for the country.
Tony Norfield, 21 August 2013
Much of the coverage of official spying activity has been in terms of the potential loss of personal privacy on the Internet, in phone calls and emails. By contrast, the state response has been to stress the need for such actions in the fight against 'terrorism'. When officials sense that might not be enough to assuage liberal concerns, they sometimes also mention how it is needed to combat 'serious organised crime'. The much more plausible rationale for the huge extent and cost of this surveillance, however, is that it makes good business sense!
Far from trawling through zillions of gigabytes of data to uncover the latest plot, the intelligence agencies are much more likely to be monitoring a select subset of the communications, the ones that really interest them. As the Guardian itself reported two months ago, the UK's GCHQ has intercepted communications at G20 summits. Less politically charged, more mundane, but much more profitable surveillance of key corporate communications about business deals, strategy and innovations will also take place on a regular basis. Any problem they might have with continuing this activity is the main 'threat to national security'.
I'm just a little surprised that the UK government has not had the sense to explain this to the public. I am sure they would understand, given the consensus that exists on doing what is good for the country.
Tony Norfield, 21 August 2013
Monday, 19 August 2013
Monopoly #2
Why waste words when the numbers speak for themselves? However, a little explanation may be useful in this case. *
The numbers in the table below are taken from a study of some 43,000 international companies in 2007. That means some of the information is now a little dated, with the demise of Lehman Brothers being one example. However, the broad picture remains and it is one showing that the top 50 companies 'controlled' (ie had ownership of 50% or more of the equity in) some 40% of the network of 43,000. US monopolists account for nearly half of the entries in the table, but the UK is second in line.
Analysing these relationships is complicated since it must take into account the common fact that company A owns a share of company B; B also owns a share of company C, and C may also own a share of the equity in A and B. Such relationships are open to network analysis, however, and the results show the concentration of power in a core group of companies, of which these are the top 50.
Most of the corporations listed are in the financial sector, a fact that illustrates both how equity markets enable the centralisation of ownership through cross-shareholdings, mergers and takeovers, and how financial companies are at the centre of this relationship nexus. I have some qualms with the view that this means actual control, however. There may be an accumulation of relatively small shareholdings by a wide range of subsidiaries and loosely linked companies, so that implementing control may prove to be difficult, even if it were attempted. Furthermore, if 20 separate financial institutions owned 60% of a particular company's equity, they will not necessarily act as a group. Nevertheless, this does not change the picture of monopolistic ownership of the world's companies.
A different issue that could upset the calculation either way, and I do not think this was (or could have been) allowed for in the study, is that owning 1% of the equity does not necessarily give 1% of the voting rights. It may give more, or even zero, voting power, depending on the type of equity. Take Facebook's Zuckerberg as an example: he is reported to own 18% of the company's shares but has more than 50% of the voting rights.
The original study giving the method behind the analysis and some more information on the work done is found here.
For those who may frustrated with the way that mathematics is often used to obscure economic relationships, let this stand as one of the rare examples where it elucidates them!
Rank
|
Company name
|
Country
|
Cumulative % network control
|
1
|
Barclays
Plc
|
GB
|
4.1
|
2
|
Capital
Group Companies, Inc
|
US
|
6.7
|
3
|
FMR
Corp
|
US
|
8.9
|
4
|
Axa
|
FR
|
11.2
|
5
|
State
Street Corp
|
US
|
13.0
|
6
|
JP
Morgan Chase & Co
|
US
|
14.6
|
7
|
Legal
& General Group Plc
|
GB
|
16.0
|
8
|
Vanguard
Group Inc
|
US
|
17.3
|
9
|
UBS
AG
|
CH
|
18.5
|
10
|
Merrill
Lynch & Co
|
US
|
19.5
|
11
|
Wellington
Management Co LLP
|
US
|
20.3
|
12
|
Deutsche
Bank AG
|
DE
|
21.2
|
13
|
Franklin
Resources Inc
|
US
|
22.0
|
14
|
Credit
Suisse Group
|
CH
|
22.8
|
15
|
Walton
Enterprises LLC
|
US
|
23.6
|
16
|
Bank
Of New York Mellon Corp
|
US
|
24.3
|
17
|
Natixis
|
FR
|
25.0
|
18
|
Goldman
Sachs Group Inc
|
US
|
25.6
|
19
|
T
Rowe Price Group Inc
|
US
|
26.3
|
20
|
Legg
Mason Inc
|
US
|
26.9
|
21
|
Morgan
Stanley
|
US
|
27.6
|
22
|
Mitsubishi
UFJ Financial Group Inc
|
JP
|
28.2
|
23
|
Northern
Trust Corp
|
US
|
28.7
|
24
|
Société
Générale
|
FR
|
29.3
|
25
|
Bank
Of America Corp
|
US
|
29.8
|
26
|
Lloyds
TSB Group Plc
|
GB
|
30.3
|
27
|
Invesco
Plc
|
GB
|
30.8
|
28
|
Allianz
Se
|
DE
|
31.3
|
29
|
TIAA
|
US
|
32.2
|
30
|
Old
Mutual Plc
|
GB
|
32.7
|
31
|
Aviva
Plc
|
GB
|
33.1
|
32
|
Schroders
Plc
|
GB
|
33.6
|
33
|
Dodge
& Cox
|
US
|
34.0
|
34
|
Lehman
Brothers Holdings Inc
|
US
|
34.4
|
35
|
Sun
Life Financial Inc
|
CA
|
34.8
|
36
|
Standard
Life Plc
|
GB
|
35.2
|
37
|
CNCE
|
FR
|
35.6
|
38
|
Nomura
Holdings Inc
|
JP
|
35.9
|
39
|
The
Depository Trust Company
|
US
|
36.3
|
40
|
Massachusetts
Mutual Life Insurance
|
US
|
36.6
|
41
|
ING
Groep NV
|
NL
|
37.0
|
42
|
Brandes
Investment Partners LP
|
US
|
37.3
|
43
|
Unicredito
Italiano Spa
|
IT
|
37.6
|
44
|
Deposit
Insurance Corporation Of Japan
|
JP
|
37.9
|
45
|
Vereniging
Aegon
|
NL
|
38.3
|
46
|
BNP
Paribas
|
FR
|
38.6
|
47
|
Affiliated
Managers Group Inc
|
US
|
38.9
|
48
|
Resona
Holdings Inc
|
JP
|
39.2
|
49
|
Capital
Group International Inc
|
US
|
39.5
|
50
|
China
Petrochemical Group Co
|
CN
|
39.8
|
Source: Vitali S, Glattfelder J B, Battiston S 2011, ‘The Network of Global Corporate Control’, PLoS ONE 6(10): e25995. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0025995
Notes: 'Home countries' of the corporations are shown by their 2-letter ISO code. Note that CA is Canada, CH is Switzerland and CN is China.
Tony Norfield, 19 August 2013
* Clarification note, 20 August 2013: Vitali et al's document makes a clear distinction between ownership and control. To clarify, the table above gives figures for control, not ownership. The control estimate is based on owning 50% or more of the equity and thus having control over a company's decisions. In an extreme case, owning 50.1% of equity would give 100% control. Hence, the measure of control will overstate the actual figure of ownership. So these top 50 companies do not own nearly 40% of the network of corporations, although, by their measure they control nearly 40% of them.
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