Last week I did an interview with Aaron Bastani of Novara Media discussing my new book and issues arising from it. The link is here and I believe the next broadcast will be on Resonance radio at 104.4 FM on Monday 2 May.
Topics covered in this wide-ranging interview include British imperialism today, militarism, Iraq, the US, technology and commercial monopoly, the origins of the welfare state, the historical evolution of finance and Brexit. The recording lasts 58 minutes, and it should be available to download at some point.
Tony Norfield, 29 April 2016
Friday, 29 April 2016
Monday, 25 April 2016
Economic Power and Corruption
In an aphorism often quoted,
Lord Acton remarked that “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts
absolutely”.[1] But what if
it turns out that, in the world economy today, the greater the power, the less
the corruption, and vice versa? Lord Acton was talking about the
exercise of power in particular countries, but the inverse of his aphorism is
more accurate today when one takes an international perspective. It should not
be seen as a perverse result that richer, more powerful countries often tend to
be less corrupt. Instead, it should be seen as a sign that these countries find
that the capitalist economy works for them more straightforwardly, rather than
their elite groups having to overly depend upon patronage, nepotism, bribery
and gangsters. Richer countries also use such methods, but, according to
common observation, not so much as the others do so domestically. They are
happier to depend upon the laws of the capitalist market that they have made,
and from which they benefit, although they are happy to engage in corruption
when doing foreign deals.
Of course, power and corruption
are difficult things to measure, if this is at all possible. Transparency
International (TI), a non-governmental organisation based in Berlin, produces a
commonly used index of corruption, a Corruption Perception Index (CPI).[2]
While capitalist establishment organisations and companies fund TI, so its
‘independence’ might be questioned, its reports have also embarrassed many. For
example, it argues that no country is corruption free and it cites cases where
countries that look to be ranked highly in terms of having little corruption domestically
are nevertheless the headquarters of corporations that are heavily involved in
bribing other countries: “half of all OECD countries are violating their
international obligations to crack down on bribery by their companies abroad.”
Research produced by TI suggests
that richer countries are the ones least corrupt. Lord Acton was not suggesting
that economic wealth or income was an index of (political) power, but there is
some common sense logic to there being such a relationship. I have taken
figures from the OECD for the median household disposable income in a country
as a measure of ‘average’ income. The median level is where half the population
are above and half below that measure of income, so the higher the median, the
richer the people in the country.[3]
The chart shows a scatter
diagram of the relationship between median income levels and TI’s corruption
index. In TI’s index, a higher number means less corrupt, a lower number more
corrupt, with the range from 0 to 100. Denmark has the highest score in its
latest 2015 report, with 91, a decent amount below 100. I have standardised the income
measures for 36 countries measured by the OECD in a 2015 report so that the one
with the highest median income of $41,355, the US, gets an index number of 100,
while Brazil, for example, with barely more than a quarter of that level gets
an index number of 28.
For the statistically minded
among readers, the correlation coefficient is positive and 71%. In other words,
a higher income is very closely linked to a lower level of corruption.
Correlation does not necessarily mean causation, but the long-established rich
countries have a legal, political and business culture that is often not
noticed, or taken for granted. That ‘good’ domestic business culture may not
extend to outside dealing. Weaker countries are more easily corrupted by the
economic power and influence of the stronger, something that, ironically, will
also make the former countries look more corrupt than the richer ones.
This is perhaps a simplistic
exercise, one that uses a flawed economic measure of well being against a
measure of how corruption is ‘perceived’. This measure of corruption will also
pay little attention to the influence and power of money in the media and in
election campaigns (don’t mention the US!), and seems to be oriented to how
‘clean’ are the possibilities to engage in capitalist business. Such a
perspective leaves out of consideration that a capitalist way of organising the
world economy is, how to put it nicely, very far from ideal.
Country Household Income and Levels of Corruption, 2015
Note: 2 letter ISO codes
identify the countries shown.
Nevertheless, the pattern of
countries being richer and also being less corrupt is clear from the chart. So,
Russia (RU), Mexico (MX), Brazil (BR) and Turkey (TR), for example, are not far
off the bottom (bad end) of the corruption index and also have among the lowest incomes,
or less than half the US level. There are few surprises there, given recent
media stories. By comparison, the rich Anglo countries are among the least
corrupt, along with other rich Europeans. I have not detailed all countries,
but the general pattern is clear and, for countries, contradicts Acton's observation.
Tony Norfield, 25 April 2016
[1] See a fuller quotation at: http://history.hanover.edu/courses/excerpts/165acton.html.
Also note that it is rarely mentioned, for obvious reasons, that, in this 1887
letter to an Archbishop, Acton said: ‘if what one hears is true’ then Elizabeth
I and William III instigated murders and they should have been hanged!
[2] Transparency International
Index available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015
[3] The median figure is less
distorted than the mean by the very high incomes of the very rich. Figures are
taken in terms of current US dollars at ‘purchasing power parity’ terms. OECD
data are from its Better Life Index, 2015 Edition, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=BLI
Labels:
Brazil,
Corruption,
income,
Lord Acton,
Mexico,
power,
Russia,
Turkey
Friday, 22 April 2016
Fundamentals
Just imagine. Here you are, an accomplished capitalist exploiter of the working class 'making' loads of money. You decide to avoid/evade taxes on your voluminous revenues by placing them beyond the normal reach of the relevant national tax authorities. Then, damn it, some politicians get embarrassed by what you and others have done. There might even be an unseemly intrusion into your personal dealings in tax havens, and a risk that some laws get changed. Not much of a risk, but it's possible.
Still, no real need to worry.
In the furore, nobody has seen fit to question where you got the money from in the first place. Your exploitation is perfectly OK, as long as you pay your taxes. And as long as that exploitation is unchallenged, the system you benefit from can go on much as before.
Tony Norfield, 22 April 2016
Still, no real need to worry.
In the furore, nobody has seen fit to question where you got the money from in the first place. Your exploitation is perfectly OK, as long as you pay your taxes. And as long as that exploitation is unchallenged, the system you benefit from can go on much as before.
Tony Norfield, 22 April 2016
Wednesday, 20 April 2016
Going Underground
I was interviewed about my new book on RT television in their regular programme 'Going Underground'. The video is on Youtube here, and my bit is from the 19 minutes mark.
Tony Norfield, 20 April 2016
Tony Norfield, 20 April 2016
Monday, 11 April 2016
Book Launch
The City: London and the Global Power of Finance
Join author Tony Norfield, Anastasia
Nesvetailova, Alfredo Saad-Filho and Ben Fine to discuss the themes of the book.
Thursday 19 May at 5pm, Khalili Lecture Theatre, SOAS, University of London, WC1H 0XG
It is free to attend, but tickets
should be obtained from here.
More details about the book, which is published on Tuesday 12 April and is available on Amazon and on Verso's website, can be found here.
This event is supported by the IIPPE
Financialisation Working Group and by Verso Books.
Friday, 8 April 2016
A New Crisis Acronym: Brexit
What are the Brits doing?* On
June 23 they will vote in a referendum on whether to remain in the European
Union, an organisation of European countries to which they have belonged since
1973. It is rare for a marriage of more than forty years to break up,
especially by the decision of the partner that had asked twice for betrothal.
Of course, these are relationships between countries, not people. Yet the
UK-European relationship will be affected even if the UK votes ‘Remain’ rather than
‘Leave’, just as if a partner had decided to sleep in a separate room in the
same home. To examine the UK decision, this article reviews some key events in
the historical relationship and the unusual position of the UK as a European
power.
Many writers in Britain have
considered UK Prime Minister Cameron’s decision to call a referendum on EU
membership to be simply his way of dealing with dissidents in his Conservative
Party. After all, big business opinion, which all major parties in the UK
follow, is largely in favour of the status quo, even if many
Conservatives hate the EU. Referendums on any issue, let alone a major foreign
policy question, are also rarely held in the UK. Normally, Parliament makes the
decisions and this is a convenient set up for the ruling groups. The decisive
part of Parliament is staffed by those voted in by the public (the House of
Commons), but the elected candidates are almost all chosen by the ruling
parties, who are in turn influenced by the established interest groups and by
corporate lobbying. In addition, there is the common feature of modern
democracy: in the 2015 general election, the ruling Conservative Party was
voted for by barely a quarter of the full electorate – just 37% of the 66% of
those eligible to vote who put their mark on the ballot paper.
A referendum on Britain’s EU
membership has the advantage of being a popular vote. But the reason a possible
British exit from the European Union has become a referendum question, not
something to be determined alone by the Mother of Parliaments, is that there is a big
enough, although still a minority, dissident opinion among British elites that
sees continued EU membership as a bad idea. So the decision will be guided by
the collective ‘wisdom’ of the masses – who are guided in turn by the cajolery
of the rival Remain or Leave factions. Each of these factions, ironically,
includes both supporters of trade union rights and proponents of untrammelled
business exploitation.
A key issue at stake in the
referendum is the position of Europe in a crisis-stricken world. Losing the UK,
the second largest EU economy accounting for 16% of the area’s GDP, would be a
blow to longstanding European plans to build a bloc that could compete with the
US and others. It would add to the many self-generated problems of European
capitalism and could also encourage others to head for the exit, since the UK
would have set a precedent. Lieutenant-General Ben Hodges, head of the US Army
in Europe, has even said he was worried about a potential risk to NATO: the EU
could start to unravel just when it needed to ‘stand up to Russia’. However, my
focus here is on the rationale behind the UK vote and that comes down to
whether it is in the interests of the UK to maintain its current relationship
with other European countries. Nobody would suggest that on a Leave vote there
would be a collapse of UK-EU trade and investment deals. These are too
extensive to reverse. But, nevertheless, there is a question of where the
better prospects lie, inside the EU system or outside. I will assess how the UK
vote could play out, starting first with a historical overview UK-European
relationships.
Changing relationships
Readers might be surprised to
learn that Winston Churchill was in favour of a ‘United States of Europe’ in
1946. This view of a resolute British Empire loyalist is less of a surprise
when one realises that the proposed union did not include the UK! After
all, there was then an Empire to run and Churchill was mainly concerned with
getting some stability on the war-ravaged European continent. Even by 1957,
when the Treaty of Rome was signed by West Germany, France, Italy and the
Benelux countries, the six founding members, to set up the European Economic
Community (EEC), Britain took no real part in the discussions, being much more
focused on economic links with the Empire/Commonwealth. However, later the
Commonwealth faded in economic and political importance and British capitalists
became increasingly open to doing more deals with the rest of Europe.
Britain first applied to join
the EEC in the early 1960s. France’s President Charles de Gaulle vetoed this
application because he thought that Britain could not be trusted as a loyal
member of the new European (and, in some respects, anti-American) project.
Apart from de Gaulle’s annoyance with the Brits about frustrating some of
France’s earlier colonial plans, in Syria and elsewhere, he was most worried
about their US links, most visible in the Polaris nuclear missile deal in 1962.
Nevertheless, Britain’s interest
in the EEC did not diminish. It was encouraged by an attraction to a faster
growing market in Continental Europe at a time when its Commonwealth economic
relationships with former dominions and colonies were not paying off. By the
early 1970s, the time was right for another application to join, one that was
accepted as the other European countries had by then become more open to having
the UK as a partner. In 1973, the UK Parliament made the decision to join under
the Conservatives and, under the following Labour Government, a 1975 popular
referendum ratified this, by 67% to 33%. At that time, British radicals
denounced the EEC as a capitalist plot. Instead, many of them advanced the
‘alternative’ of restoring trade deals with the Commonwealth. They failed to
mention that this was just a different kind of capitalist plot.
Back in the 1970s, the British
economy was uncompetitive, crisis-ridden and dogged with high inflation, large
external trade and public spending deficits and a falling currency. In some
respects, plus ça change, etc. But then, by comparison, the EEC
looked like a shining beacon of prosperity. Well, at least the other six
members up to 1973 were generally doing better than Britain, although they were
also hit by economic crises. Being a more integrated part of a ‘European’
economy also looked likely to give a brighter future for the UK. Trade between
member countries was growing strongly and was likely to continue to do so,
given falling constraints on internal trade that would boost the internal market,
a common tariff on imported goods from outside the EEC and an expanding
membership. By 1993, the EEC had been renamed the European Union and had twelve
member countries, while others were waiting in the wings for accession to what
was the most attractive regional club.
More European holidays for the
Brits, helped by cheaper transport links and the introduction of some
interesting Continental food and drink into the questionable British diet (with
French and Italian wine now widely available on supermarket shelves!), helped
consolidate a less insular popular opinion and a more favourable British
attitude to the EU. This also affected the opinion of the labour unions and the
left wing of the Labour Party. In the early 1970s, they were anti-EEC. Under
what was to be four successive Conservative governments, with three dominated
by Margaret Thatcher from 1979, the unions and the left wing warmed to Europe.
A key event was when they applauded the labour-oriented rhetoric of the
President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, at the 1988 annual
conference of the Trades Union Congress.
Despite being an implacable
defender of British sovereignty, UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher,
nevertheless signed the EU’s Single European Act in 1986. The Act set out plans
for a single European economic market and at the same time codified closer
European political cooperation. British business liked the first part, and was
less happy about the second. But the two parts came as a package, so the deal
was done.
UK-European ‘cooperation’ went
further by 1991-92, but this time there were limits set by the interests of
British capitalism. This period was critical for establishing the later euro
exchange rate system, the economic and financial rules for becoming a member of
it, and the obligation of EU member states to eventually join the system. In
February 1992, the Maastricht Treaty set the foundations and the UK government
response was striking. It rejected many regulations that favoured workers’
rights, and made sure to get an ‘opt out’ from the social and employment rules
in the negotiations. Above all, it got an agreement whereby it was not obliged
to join the future euro single currency. (Some of the ‘social chapter’ opt out
was later amended by the 1997 Labour government, but the current dispute with junior doctors over hours worked and salaries indicates that not much had really changed.)
As an aside, it is worth noting
a little remarked upon deal that helped Britain secure its exemptions from the
Maastricht Treaty’s general rules. The UK agreed with Germany that the EU
should recognise Croatia as a political entity. This recognition of a German
area of interest exacerbated political conflict between Croats and Serbs in the
former Yugoslavia. It helped spark the ensuing Yugoslav civil war and was a
reminder of how the costs of deals between the major powers are often paid for
by others.
Break points
This closer, though still tense,
UK-EU cooperation was undermined by a political-economic upset. A turning point
was when the Conservative Government decided in 1990 to join Europe’s Exchange
Rate Mechanism (ERM). While EU politicians generally saw the ERM as a glide
path into the later euro system, Britain’s membership of it was quite clearly
only for tactical reasons. The British government’s aim was to use the ERM to
stabilise the value of sterling while at the same time it was able to cut domestic
interest rates to help stimulate the British economy. Less than two years
afterwards, a relatively weak UK economy put downward pressure on the value of
sterling in the ERM. Sterling was pushed to the lower limit of the system,
given the contrast between the UK and the strongly growing Germany economy,
which was still being boosted by the reunification of the West and East of the
country in 1990.
It soon became clear that there
was little political support among ERM members, especially Germany, to prevent
the value of sterling dropping below permitted levels. One big problem was that
the other ERM members had played no part in deciding those levels; the decision
on the exchange rate for sterling within the system was just announced by the
UK Treasury over a weekend. By contrast, most key decisions on running the
system had been made after agreements between the major countries. That point was related to me by an official of the Germany's central bank, the Bundesbank. As a result, the
UK government ended up spending billions from the UK’s foreign exchange
reserves to prevent a drop below the ERM limit and to defend its policy,
including raising interest rates sharply. It failed, and made George Soros
(in)famous in the news media as a successful hedge fund currency speculator.
Sterling left the ERM in September 1992 and slumped in value, but UK interest
rates were cut again.
Not long afterwards, the UK
economy recovered as did the value of sterling. The political lesson learned
was that Britain was better off outside a system dominated by other
European countries, where it would have more room to decide policy. These
events tempered the enthusiasm of pro-EU elites, encouraging those who came to
be called ‘euro sceptics’. This term encompassed not only those against the
UK’s possible membership of the euro exchange rate system, introduced in 1999,
but also those more fundamentally against the UK’s membership of the EU. No
longer was this latter group made up only of nostalgic Empire loyalists; it had
a wider following. Perhaps ‘Europe’ was not such a good economic-political
alliance for British capitalism after all.
Deciding to avoid a decision
By the mid-1990s, British policy
makers began to realise that they might have even bigger issues with the EU.
The 1957 Treaty of Rome included a pledge, capitalised as the objective to
achieve EVER CLOSER UNION. British government strategy was to avoid this
‘closer union’ dimension that would restrict its freedom of manoeuvre. In the
early period of the UK’s EEC membership, that did not seem to be much of a
problem. Such political dreams usually come to nothing. But it did become a
problem in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty and the unification of West and
East Germany. That was why the UK government worked hard to get its ‘opt outs’
from the Maastricht Treaty, but there were longer lasting strategic problems
too.
If the major continental
European countries were now to become ‘unified’, that would probably mean with
Germany as the principal power and deciding force. That would likely still be
true if the UK joined the euro system, since its ability to create a
counterweight in an alliance with France, or with other countries, was far from
certain, given the many rivalries between them. But if the UK did not join the
euro system, then the euro member countries might develop even more
independently and challenge British interests in trade and finance.
In such a dilemma, the classic
British compromise diplomacy came to the rescue under the Labour government
from 1997-2010. There would be no outright rejection of the euro, which
would have cemented the UK’s position as being outside the European project.
Instead, there would be a conditional agreement to join at some
indeterminate point in the future. This was summed up in the Labour
government’s ‘Five Economic Tests’ on whether joining the euro would be in
Britain’s interests. These tests were posed as an objective, neutral assessment
of the potential economic costs and benefits, ones that could change over time
and lead to a decision to join the euro system. However, they left plenty of
room for a political judgement, and it was clear that the fundamental political
decision was No.
European problems in a wider world
Membership commitments of the EU
and the euro are different, but related. The EU is the total 28-country
grouping, within which 19 countries are members of the euro exchange rate
system. From being a pole of economic and political attraction up to the 1990s
– Austria, Sweden and Finland joined in 1995 – there are few rich countries
lining up to join the EU today. This is not because the list of rich regional
countries has been used up; Switzerland and Norway are still available. It is
because only poorer nations, like Turkey, Albania and Serbia, would see
strategic political advantages in EU membership and also some likely funds from
its development programmes. The richer European countries who are not EU
members want to retain a degree of independence in their policy making. If they
chose now to join the EU that would imply putting themselves on course to join
the euro system. Given its recent disastrous economic history, such a decision
would make as much sense as walking across a six-lane highway with your eyes
closed.
Economic trouble – stagnant
growth and high unemployment – has strengthened anti-EU sentiment in many
countries. This has increased support for new political parties, such as the UK
Independence Party, and longer-standing ones, such as the Front National in
France. Adapting to these new challenges, the established parties in many
countries have also become more nationalistic and anti-immigrant. One of the principal
election pledges of the Labour Party in the 2015 vote was to impose more
‘Controls on immigration’. In the poorer countries, anti-EU views have often
reflected popular frustration at how what once looked like hopes of a better
future in the rich man’s club have been dashed by the economic crisis. The
refugee crisis, with many hundreds of thousands of people trying to escape
turmoil in the Middle East, North Asia and Africa, has added to the
nationalistic mood in Europe, especially in those countries directly impacted,
such as Greece and Hungary.
It is this kind of prospect for
Europe that has led British policy makers in recent years to shift their
attention elsewhere. This has opened up a more non-EU perspective. One
particular focus of UK interest has been China. In early 2015, the UK was the
first western power to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
This move annoyed the US government, but led several other US allies, from
Europe to Australia and South Korea, to do the same thing. Britain has also
made strong efforts to attract Chinese financial business to help boost trading
for the City of London, including making it easier for Chinese banks to set up
in London and, in October 2014, issuing the first Chinese renminbi-denominated
sovereign bond by a foreign government. In addition, Britain has been at the
forefront of attracting inward Chinese direct investment and also building up a
business in Muslim ‘sharia’ finance, further showing that there are interesting
prospects outside a stagnant Europe.
The UK’s Brexit vote
Opinion polls in the UK have
been treated warily since they badly predicted the outcome of the May 2015 UK
general election. Most polls showed a neck-and-neck race between the
Conservatives and the Labour Party, showing the likelihood of some kind of
coalition government including the smaller Liberal Party or the Scottish
Nationalists. In the event, the Conservatives won outright. Recent UK opinion
polls on the Brexit referendum have also been quite close, although with the
‘Remain’ option usually in the lead. Nevertheless, it is interesting that for
those actually betting money on the outcome, rather than responding to a
telephone or online poll, the probability of the UK staying in the EU has
recently been estimated at around 70%, although this has fallen back somewhat.
The majority of business
opinion, and the formal opinion of the major political parties, with only
minority dissension, is for the UK to stay as a member of the EU, despite most
of the parties complaining about the EU and wanting to see changes. In late
February, Prime Minister Cameron claimed to have secured the relevant changes
to prevent EU rules from constraining British ‘freedoms’ in long-winded, late
night negotiations with his European counterparts. His effort reflected a
concern of the British establishment that future European political decisions
could work against British interests. The bigger picture he fought for was to
try and ensure that the UK would not be bound to follow any moves towards
political union and would have safeguards against financial regulation being
imposed on the City of London by the euro group of countries (basically meaning
France and Germany).
That was a matter of big power
strategy. The smaller, more squalid, picture was based upon a more narrow,
nasty bias against migrants from the EU. It was to restrict in-work benefits
for new arrivals from the EU for up to four years and scale back child
benefit for workers whose children remain abroad. Cameron had initially wanted to
do this for all migrant workers, around one million in the UK, but faced
opposition from East European states, the source of most of those receiving
such benefits. These workers are often low-paid and British capitalism has
benefited handsomely from them in the past, both being heavily involved in
opening up Eastern Europe to exploitation and in attracting cheap labour, often
highly skilled, to work in Britain for low wages. But this episode illustrates
how even hard-line, ‘free market’ capitalist policies will adapt to popular
anti-immigrant sentiment. This has occurred, even though the political agenda
in Britain has moved on somewhat from any problems the low wage ‘Polish
plumber’ might be causing for the job prospects of British workers to the question
of a disaffected Muslim population.
British government immigration
policy often gets complaints from businesses that want to attract employees
from non-EU countries and who have to jump through more costly hoops to get the
relevant status. It has also limited the ability of British educational
institutions, which have become ever more commercial, increasingly resembling
expensive hotels that aim to attract foreign tourists, into the
English-speaking imperium. But there is nevertheless an upside from this restrictive
immigration policy. As in other major countries, it keeps national, patriotic
sentiment in line. We claim to protect you, so that you will fight for
and support us.
The Brexit referendum is erected
on this British establishment self-serving edifice. The vote is not about
people deciding their future; it is about the best strategy for British
business in a troublesome world. It will have no effect on the exploitation of
ordinary people, except perhaps on the particular form that it takes, not that any such form will be less onerous. British
policy, decided by successive British governments, has been prominent in undermining
workers’ rights, so it is especially absurd to cast a ‘Leave’ vote as being
somehow a progressive move against reactionary European policies – on austerity
or anything else. My view on the referendum is to abstain, and I have a vote.
This is not because I think the debate is irrelevant. On the contrary, this
article is a contribution to the debate. It is because neither of the ‘Remain’ or
‘Leave’ options offered in the vote represents a better alternative. It is a
delusion to pretend that they do. My view instead is to try and set a good
example and show that you do not have to accept what you are given.
*: This article first appeared in the New York-based BrooklynRail journal, in the Fieldnotes section on 6 April.It is an extended discussion of my earlier piece on this blog covering the Brexit vote.
Wednesday, 6 April 2016
Offshore? Tax haven? A Matter of Definition
The desperation of politicians is seen in their attempt to answer a question 'definitively' by using a particular definition that does not accord with a common sense definition. So it is with UK Prime Minister David Cameron, whose office has today denied repeatedly that he benefits from any 'offshore' trust or fund. Well, his deceased father's offshore account, Blairemore, from 2012 has been registered in Ireland. And Ireland is not defined as 'offshore' in the standard lists, so, indeed, the location for doing infamous tax deals such as the 'double Irish', is not an 'offshore' location!
These are the twenty two locations the Bank for International Settlements and the Bank of England define as being 'offshore': Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Curacao,
Gibraltar, Guernsey, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Jersey, Lebanon, Macao, Mauritius,
Netherlands Antilles, Panama, Samoa, Singapore, Sint Maarten, West Indies UK, Vanuatu.
No, I didn't see Ireland listed there either, nor even the British Virgin Islands. Nor Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Luxembourg, Delaware in the US or Switzerland or others.
But the omission of Ireland in Cameron's case was a distinction missed by many media journalists.
Tony Norfield, 6 April 2016
'Offshore' Centres and Tax Havens
Apart from naming some interesting names, the latest Panama files on tax dodging add little to what was already widely known. However, the media furore is fuelled by the desperate hope that getting back some ill-gotten, or non-taxed, funds into the national pot will cushion the iron heel of austerity.
It is worth noting that the term 'tax haven' is not as unambiguous as it might seem. Apart from the many, often small countries, principalities or islands that have low taxes, what about the complex rules on taxation that the wealthy can use in most countries, notably the UK, to avoid any embarrassment of their riches? Wikipedia has a fairly comprehensive coverage here and here.
Meanwhile, I consider it my civic duty to inform readers that Panama is a mere pimple on the arse of capitalism when it comes to being an 'offshore centre', another designation for tax havens. The chart below sums up the outstanding stock of international claims (basically lending to or investing in another country) and liabilities (borrowing from another country) of the main offshore centres. These are the latest data available, measured in billions of US dollars, for end-September 2015. I have marked out in red the centres that have a close link to the UK, the ones designated as 'UK offshore' such as Jersey, and also those whose citizens sing 'God Save the Queen' as their national anthem, the biggest one being the Cayman Islands.
Now isn't it interesting that the UK is tied up with most of these. Hong Kong and Singapore also have close UK links. These are among the issues covered in my new new book, out next week.
Tony Norfield, 6 April 2016
It is worth noting that the term 'tax haven' is not as unambiguous as it might seem. Apart from the many, often small countries, principalities or islands that have low taxes, what about the complex rules on taxation that the wealthy can use in most countries, notably the UK, to avoid any embarrassment of their riches? Wikipedia has a fairly comprehensive coverage here and here.
Meanwhile, I consider it my civic duty to inform readers that Panama is a mere pimple on the arse of capitalism when it comes to being an 'offshore centre', another designation for tax havens. The chart below sums up the outstanding stock of international claims (basically lending to or investing in another country) and liabilities (borrowing from another country) of the main offshore centres. These are the latest data available, measured in billions of US dollars, for end-September 2015. I have marked out in red the centres that have a close link to the UK, the ones designated as 'UK offshore' such as Jersey, and also those whose citizens sing 'God Save the Queen' as their national anthem, the biggest one being the Cayman Islands.
Now isn't it interesting that the UK is tied up with most of these. Hong Kong and Singapore also have close UK links. These are among the issues covered in my new new book, out next week.
Tony Norfield, 6 April 2016
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