Showing posts with label Trump. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Trump. Show all posts

Thursday, 18 June 2020

Race, Unemployment & US Elections


What role does race play in US presidential elections? It may not be the decisive factor, but it is one that has an important influence. Just look at Trump’s continued pandering to his core, white working class vote. This question can be examined by looking at race and unemployment.
Economics is often seen as the key to winning elections. If the economy is doing well, then the incumbent party usually expects to prevail; if not, then it risks losing. Of course, a statistic like GDP might be on the up, but if you have lost your job, then you are not likely to feel good about that. A more relevant economic number for elections is the unemployment rate, and that is the focus of this piece.
Some 70% of the US population is white, while around 13% is black, and the US keeps records of the unemployment by racial identity. As everyone should know, given the many decades of segregation and discrimination after the period of slavery, blacks are in a generally worse economic situation than whites. This is very clear in their relative unemployment rates.[1]

US Unemployment Rates in Black & White


The chart indicates that when recession hits and unemployment rises for whites, it rises much more for blacks. In fact, at all times black unemployment is higher, although the margin narrowed sharply from around eight percentage points in 2011 to around four percentage points by late 2016, and further, to just two points, by end-2019. In recent months, the COVID-19 crisis has seen both rates jump up in the US. The white unemployment rate rose to 14.2 in April 2020, then fell back to 12.4 in May. But the black rate soared to 16.7% in April and was higher still in May, at 16.8%.
Could the sharply narrowing margin of higher black unemployment to the end of 2016 have had an impact on Trump’s Presidential victory that year? The white unemployment rate hardly changed in 2016, and this might seem an odd thing to speculate upon. Yet, there is plenty of evidence that white racism gets fuelled when whites feel they are not getting as good an economic deal as blacks.
A recent book by Jonathan Metzl, Dying of Whiteness, highlights this very point. He shows how many poor whites are happy to vote for welfare cuts, even those that badly affect themselves, just to make sure that those they think do not deserve welfare payments – mainly blacks and hispanics – do not get them. So the relative improvement in the position of blacks in the labour market could have played a part in Trump’s success.
I do not claim that race or racial resentment can explain everything about US election outcomes. I am also aware that Trump did not get the most votes in 2016, and that he was just better at playing the Electoral College game than were the Democrats. Yet when the record of white and black unemployment rates is examined, interesting patterns emerge.

 US Presidential elections & unemployment changes by race, 1992-2016

Note: * average % unemployment rate from August-October minus average unemployment rate January-March, for the year of the Presidential election campaign up to November’s election.


The previous table sets out details of changes in the unemployment rates for whites and blacks, together with any change in ruling party – Democrat or Republican – since Clinton first took office in January 1993. I assume that the relevant thing to look at is not the level of the unemployment rate, but whether it has gone up or down in the months leading up to the regular early November election time. Specifically, I look at the average unemployment rate for August, September and October, the months closest to the vote, and see how much that is higher or lower than the average for January, February and March of the same year. The averaging evens out any blip there might be for a single month. I do not allow for any other factors, such as wars, the perceived threats from other countries, moral panics, or the supposedly charismatic or particularly useless political leaders vying for the top job.
For the past seven presidential elections in the US, the table shows that:
a) White unemployment going up during election year means that the incumbent party loses the election. This is not surprising, given that whites are by far the majority of the electorate.
b) However, when the white unemployment rate was unchanged in 2000, the incumbent party, the Democrats, still lost. Notably, in that year the black unemployment rate went down. In 2000, white unemployment stayed very close to a low 3.5%, while black unemployment fell from 8.2% at the start of the year to 7.3% just ahead of the election.
c) Trump and the Republican Party was helped by these earlier trends in 2016, because both white unemployment rose a little and black unemployment fell. White unemployment was in a narrow range of 4.2% to 4.4% during 2016 and nothing exceptional, while black unemployment fell from 8.9% in March to a low of 8.0 in August.

Conclusion

The previous data support the idea of there being a racial dimension to US elections. That is not much of a revelation, for the US or for many other countries, but the evidence also suggests another angle which people are far less likely to have considered. A fall in black unemployment, with the associated improvement in black peoples’ livelihoods, seems to be a factor influencing white voters (the biggest electoral group) to protest about the incumbent party in government and either not to vote or to vote them out of office.
With the economic disruption from the COVID-19 crisis, it will be difficult to apply this simple analysis of unemployment rates to the forthcoming election in November, where Trump will seek a second term. Nevertheless, it is likely that racial oppression, discrimination and police brutality are going to remain big issues in US politics. The deciding factor will be how far white voters stay with Trump. They are not only the biggest group of voters, they are usually also the group with the highest voter turnout.[2]

Tony Norfield, 18 June 2020


[1] A recent Reuters report gave a quick summary of racial economic inequality in the US, looking at unemployment, home ownership, net assets and stock ownership here
[2] Pew Research Center estimates that in the 2016 US Presidential election 65.3% of whites voted, 59.6% of blacks (down from over 65% in 2012, and ahead of whites for the first time), 49.3% of Asians and 47.6% of Hispanics.

Tuesday, 9 June 2020

Viruses & Imperialism


The coronavirus pandemic highlights many features of imperialism today. But people often misunderstand what is happening and can easily end up giving a reactionary response.[1] For example, if modern capitalist production methods, especially in agriculture with factory farming, are seen by some to have caused or at least exacerbated this pandemic, how is it that viral outbreaks most commonly start in less developed capitalist countries? Or if, as some ecologists suppose, the pandemic is a sign of ‘nature’ responding to human intrusion, what are we to think of programmes to eliminate mosquito-borne malaria? This article begins with relevant facts about viruses, and then looks at developments in China, the US and the UK.
Appendices to the article discuss the ‘R’ reproduction number for a virus and the report on potential virus deaths that influenced UK government policy. Technical details and sources are given in footnotes.

Viruses

Contrasting with the global mayhem it has caused, a virus can be seen as just a submicroscopic infectious particle. It can replicate itself only within a host cell – of a plant, an animal or a human being, and it can sometimes transfer from one type of host to another. It may cause serious disease and death, or be relatively harmless. How problematic it might become depends upon the social and economic context.
Scientists estimate that about three-quarters of new human diseases originate from existing viruses in animals:
“Animals that harbour and can transmit a particular virus but are generally unaffected by it are said to act as a natural reservoir for that virus. For example, the H1N1 virus that caused the 2009 flu pandemic[2] … was likely passed to humans from pigs; for this reason, it was originally called ‘swine flu’.”[3]
There are around 150 animal viruses that affect humans, and there are possibly half a million more that could potentially do so.
The virus causing Covid-19 disease is thought to have come from a bat, which then passed on the virus to another animal and then it was passed onto humans. Along the way, this virus, like others, can mutate as it gets reproduced in the host’s cells, which can make it more, or perhaps less lethal to humans. The first outbreak of the disease was in Wuhan, capital city of Hubei province in China, and the most widely suspected original location was a ‘wet market’ in Wuhan that was selling freshly killed animals for meat.
Despite conspiracy theories, there is no evidence whatsoever that the virus was manufactured in or escaped from a laboratory, in China or anywhere else. Such accusations ignore how easy viral transmission can be when other factors come into play.
What made the new virus, SARS-Cov-2,[4] frightening was that it was roughly 10 times more deadly than the regular seasonal flu virus and that it could be transmitted more readily, since many who were infected and who could pass it on had no symptoms themselves. Even those who ended up having severe, life-threatening symptoms would usually only develop these after more than a week or so, giving the virus plenty of time to spread to family, friends and accidental contacts.
But the real issue for zoonotic viruses – the ones infecting humans that come from animals – is the animal-human connection.[5] The cells in all animals, including humans, are more similar than one might think. While many animal viruses have not been known to infect humans, there are still plenty that might. If a virus particle exists in a cow, a pig, a chicken, a bat or wherever, then there is also a chance that it can attach itself to particular cells in the human body. The more that animals and humans interact, the greater the chance. Equally, some viruses infecting humans can be passed on to animals.

Nature & society

In economically developed countries, most animals are kept away from people – apart from household pets that have not been found to be a threat to health. The risks of infection in livestock farming, etc, are also generally known and are kept under control with hygiene measures and vaccinations, although there have still been outbreaks. Some people may not like the capitalistic, large-scale farming of animals, but in this respect they tend to work well.
The risks of zoonotic viral epidemics have been far greater in the poorer countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. In these countries, markets are more common where live animals – not only ‘exotic’ animals, but also ducks and chickens – are slaughtered and sold for meat. These can raise the risk of human infection from viruses, including providing a forum for originating new viruses, especially if the trading is not strictly regulated and the markets are not kept sufficiently clean.
So, while the virus particles provide the potential for viral epidemics, that potential is only realised in particular social-economic contexts. An important context was brought out by a 2017 study of emerging infectious diseases globally. It argued that such diseases, and almost all recent pandemics ‘originate in animals, mostly wildlife, and their emergence often involves dynamic interactions among populations of wildlife, livestock & people within rapidly changing environments’.[6] Among the factors involved were large land-use change programs such as logging and mining concessions, dam building, and road development.
The risk of new infectious diseases emerging is clearly a global problem. As the chart taken from the 2017 study brings out, the risk spans every continent, although to different degrees in each country.

Estimated risk of emerging infectious diseases by location

Source: https://nature.com/articles/s41467-017-00923-8.pdf. Note that the projection used in the map diminishes the area of countries closer to the equator and increases that of regions nearer the poles.

These development-driven environmental changes have been going on for centuries, also pre-dating modern capitalism. What makes them more problematic now is the greater integration of the world economy, with more opportunities for travel, the expansion of urban areas and the shift of populations from the countryside to towns, especially if some former peasants wish to continue their previous ways.
But this does not imply that economic development should stop, or that travel and global integration are bad things that should be reversed. We do not need to adopt The League of Gentlemen’s ‘local shops for local people’ approach. Development gives evident benefits for humanity, not just in economic terms, but also by improving social connections, knowledge of the world, science and health. To take just one example of public health achievements: average life expectancy was less than 50 years before 1900, even in the richer countries; today it is more than 60 years even in the poorest and up to 80 years in the richest. Unless you believe in an afterlife and would be pleased to meet your maker at the earliest opportunity, that has to be a good thing.
Humanity has made progress by understanding, modifying and channelling nature to meet human needs. One should not think that the reckless way capitalism treats the environment is something that is inherent in all possible forms of economic system. The latter view would call a halt to development, despite 10% of the world still being in extreme poverty, and it would support the reactionary idea that ‘nature’ is a barrier that should be left alone. Viruses and other diseases have been dealt with in the past, and can be dealt with again. But, as the following sections will show, imperialism today creates many barriers to achieving this.

Capitalism & disease inequality

Capitalism will not readily minimise the risk of diseases emerging, since it costs money to do so. But an epidemic is still bad for business, and might also affect the ruling groups. So governments in rich countries will usually impose some health measures, promote widespread vaccinations and find other ways to stop or limit the spread of disease. Such measures mean, for example, that smallpox, measles, polio, malaria and cholera have been almost eliminated.[7] These things also apply to capitalist agriculture and animal farming, where big efforts are made to keep animals free from disease. If infected meat got into consumer products, food production companies would see their business collapse. Witness what happened to the demand for British beef after the outbreak of BSE, or ‘mad cow disease’, in the late 1980s!
By contrast, poorer countries have fewer sources of funds to deal with disease, and less scope for doing this when capitalist exploitation is less restricted. Dominated by the rich powers and their companies, they can do little to thwart the capitalist objective to screw out as much profit as possible. Poor countries are also more burdened with dangerous levels of pollution – often based on their dealings with the rich – and many of their population groups do not even have easy access to clean drinking water. The social and environmental changes brought about by the ruthless, capitalist one-sided development of poorer countries have destructive consequences, but that is an argument to stop this destruction, not to stop development itself.

China & the latest virus

Substantial evidence links the emergence of Covid-19 to a ‘wet market’ in Wuhan that sold fresh meat, fish and other perishable goods. Animals were also slaughtered for meat on customer demand. These types of market are common in many developing countries, particularly in Asia and Africa, but they are not unknown in richer countries, for example fish markets selling live fish, crabs, lobsters, etc. The earlier comments made about the possible transmission of disease clearly imply that such markets should at least be tightly regulated. But China’s authorities have been concerned that closing the markets would encourage these practices to continue outside of a formal market setting, which could make things worse.
In many respects, the problem comes down to consumers not being happy that the meat is fresh, unless they see the animal killed. That in turn reflects a worry both about the quality of shop-bought meat and a desire to do things the old, trusted way as in traditional livestock farming and in more rural communities. These traditional ways will not easily disappear until safer, new methods gain acceptance, but it is very likely that China’s government will take stronger measures against wet markets in future.
The Chinese authorities had been slow to act on the outbreak in late 2019, and censored the initial warnings from medical personnel. However, they then acted quickly and decisively, including locking down Wuhan and other cities in the Hubei region on 23 January, thus affecting over 50 million people (other regions came shortly after). Detailed information on the new virus was given to scientists internationally by early January 2020. An English language article was also published on 24 January in the prestigious medical journal, The Lancet, warning about the risk of human-human infection.
China’s state is authoritarian and can sometimes seem to act in a paranoid manner. However, this country has a history of being dominated by major powers in Europe, by Japan and also by the US. That history, added to the more recent hostility of the US, gives plenty of material to support such a political response: they really are out to get me! Note that the US has military bases around China – including in South Korea and in Okinawa Island, Japan – and it is the major supplier of weapons to Taiwan, an island province that China rightfully claims.[8] China has no military bases around the US.

One Flu Over the Cuckoo’s Nest

US President Trump has used the latest virus pandemic to increase hostility to China, attacking the World Health Organization for being too ‘China-centric’ and stepping up the pressure on US allies to impose economic sanctions on the country’s major companies. This anti-China stance is a common theme in all US political thinking, worried as it is about the rise of China as a rival power.
Trump blames China for ‘covering up’ the virus in its early stages, thus setting the stage for a pandemic. There may be some validity to that view, but even if so, there are no grounds on which to criticise China’s subsequent actions. The allegation of a cover up does not excuse the delayed reaction of the US authorities when the virus was widely known about. It also has to answer reports on US mainstream media that the US intelligence agencies (the CIA) knew of a viral outbreak in China in November 2019. Of course, the CIA’s main concern was that it might affect US forces in Asia![9]
POTUS#45 has distinguished himself in this pandemic, easily exceeding any stupidity measure of which his critics might have thought him capable. From comparing the virus to a normal, regular flu epidemic, to promoting a drug, hydroxychloroquine, used for other conditions that was untested and possibly dangerous for Covid-19, to even suggesting that somehow injecting or ingesting household bleach might be a way of fending off the virus, his statements have stunned most observers, including the administration’s medical advisers.
Still, an egomaniac might easily become distracted by the fear that economic damage from the Covid-19 crisis, and now the protests against racist violence by the US police, could undermine his hopes for re-election as president in November. Who could expect any coherent strategy for dealing with the virus?
I will not deal with those economic outcomes of collapsed output and employment, which are easily found in daily news reports. But it is worth noting that in recent years severe cutbacks in funding to federal and state agencies responsible for dealing with such crises will have hindered an effective anti-virus policy in the US. For example, in 2018 the Trump administration ‘streamlined’, as the euphemism goes, the Global Health Security and Biodefense team, and put it into a more general directorate combining arms control and non-proliferation, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and global health and biodefence. At the same time, maintenance contracts on stockpiled ventilators lapsed and there was an insufficient stockpile of medical equipment. All this added to the confusion caused by the president’s own absurd statements.
To crown all these achievements, on 29 May President Trump terminated the US relationship with the World Health Organization, following up his previous decision to suspend US funding for it. His rationale was the previously alleged Chinese culpability and, for good measure, adding to his anti-China policies, he has also announced that in future Hong Kong would no longer have special trade and investment relationships with the US.

The English Patient

The US tops the world in the number of Covid-19 cases and in the number of fatalities from it, the latter passing the 100,000 mark just after US Memorial Day. But at least the US has a population of 328 million; the UK with its 67 million has no such size excuse for having the second highest number of virus deaths on the planet.
There are many parallels between the UK and the US handling of the virus impact. For example: the lack of specialist medical and personal protective equipment that would, in former times, have been seen as a necessary stockpile for emergencies; a too long delayed, confused and halting ‘strategy’ by the government to deal with the crisis, and a political leadership that tried to bluff its way through a pandemic and push back any criticism with an escalating series of half-truths and outright lies. One could also cite the narcissism of both Trump and UK Prime Minister Johnson as the reason they always have something else on their minds than dealing with the pandemic.
Johnson claims to be following the recommendations of his scientific advisers. This gives him cover for any decision his government makes that goes wrong. More than that, the scientists concerned have basically colluded with the government. Here is the editor of The Lancet, Richard Horton, recently criticising the somewhat less than independent role of many UK scientists:
“Every day a cast of experts – led by the chief scientific adviser, Sir Patrick Vallance, and the chief medical officer, Chris Whitty – lends credibility to this government by annealing their reputations with those of ministers. …
“The failures within the scientific and medical establishment do not end with government experts. The UK is fortunate to have an array of scientific and medical institutions that promote and protect the quality of science and medicine in this country – royal colleges, the Academy of Medical Sciences and the Royal Society. Their presidents have been elected to defend and advance the reputation of medicine and medical science. And yet they have failed to criticise government policy. Why? Surely their silence amounts to complicity.
“ … When advisers are asked questions, they speak with one voice in support of government policy. They never deviate from the political scripts.”[10]
In the UK, available resources for managing the pandemic were focused on the National Health Service, to the detriment of care homes. The sharply rising death toll in UK care homes was ignored for weeks until accumulating news media reports forced a modest change in government policy. It would clearly have been straying too far into the political arena for the main medical advisers to point out this problem in public.
Probably the most egregious policy error of the UK government was to have ignored for several weeks what was going on in Italy. That country’s health system was quickly in a state of collapse as infections and the death toll from Covid-19 soared. At least Italy had some excuse of being surprised at how quickly the virus could spread; the UK did not.
The first, outrageous policy response from the government was to go for ‘herd immunity’. The rationale was this: no vaccine was available for the new disease, it looked like the death rate among those infected was ‘only’ around 1%, so letting a large number of people get it and then recover would provide a buffer of immune people in the population – assuming, of course, that one could not get infected again later.
How disastrous this policy could turn out to be should have been obvious from the start. A rate of 1% for deaths might sound low, but not when the herd was judged to include 50-80% of the UK population! It would have implied anything from 300,000 to 550,000 deaths in total. Yet it took another two weeks or so for the implications to sink in. The bias of policy finally changed the week after a report from Imperial College, published on 16 March, spelled out to the government the potential scale of deaths under different scenarios, from no measures taken to a complete lockdown and suppression of the virus.[11]

Government policies

Lockdown policies in many economies to contain the new virus led to a slump in economic activity, output, employment and incomes. To some extent, richer countries were able to offset the disaster caused for people’s livelihoods by offering subsidies for wages, increasing grants and cheap loans to companies and reducing the cost of borrowing. The scale of the extra spending and liabilities taken on has been truly colossal.[12] Poorer countries were, as usual, in a much worse position, with their populations facing penury or facing risks of being infected with the virus if they continued working.
The global spread of the virus has nevertheless been very uneven. Some countries have so far been relatively lucky to escape from a big impact, whatever may have been the response of their governments. Others have had experience with previous epidemics and were well prepared to deal with this one. However, countries with right-wing, populist leaders – notably the US, UK and Brazil – have tended to be much worse at implementing an effective anti-virus policy.
The advantages enjoyed by richer countries in their virus-crisis spending plans are brought out by the very low, even negative yields they pay on government debt issues. But it is naïve in the extreme to assume that such high borrowing will have no cost. Interest rate costs on the debt may be minimal, but the extra debt itself has to be paid back and will be an economic burden – via taxation or spending cuts – in future years. That debt is added to already high levels compared to GDP. Among other reports about this issue on this blog, see here.
Some debts owed by companies, eg short-term low interest loans, might be paid back fairly quickly if the collapse of business activity stops and is partially reversed in the next six months. Yet that still leaves them with a net loss of revenue and far worse prospects than they had assumed before the crisis. In the UK’s case, the Bank of England has forecast 2020 GDP at minus 14% in 2020. While it projected a hard-to-believe bounce back of 15% in 2021, even that would still leave 2021’s GDP lower than in 2019.[13] Similar down/up hopes and guesses will apply to all countries in the rest of 2020 and in 2021. The Bank was also optimistic because private banks now have much better capital ratios than in 2007-08, so they are better able to bear losses from loans not repaid. But that is not saying much compared to that disastrous episode.

Viruses & Moribund Capitalism

From the point of view of ruling elites, viruses along with many other diseases are usually seen as being a little too indiscriminate. They can infect or kill anyone, rich or poor, so it makes sense to have public health systems in place to deal with them or to limit their damage, both to the national population and in economic terms. This particular virus has, however, been far more global, far more quickly and with a far greater impact than any other in recent memory.
The big, rich countries were well aware of the risk of pandemics, often had specialist teams of scientists to study and monitor them, and also supported international health institutions. This should make shocking the British and US delays and incompetence in dealing with the latest virus. But it is not much of a surprise when you examine the political leaderships in each country. And if you ask how did such people ever get into positions of responsibility, that question is answered by the fact that very large numbers of people voted for them. It is not in the nature of these ugly beasts to be prepared for a public health crisis, especially when there are other political objectives in mind, whether that is a Brexit fantasy or re-election.

The imperial grinding machine: what goes in, what comes out


In previous articles I have covered many aspects of imperialism, looking at how the major countries have exploited the world and wreaked havoc. One image I have used is of the imperial grinding machine, where the resources of the world available to meet humanity’s needs end up in crises, poverty, racism, war and oppression. The latest virus episode throws a different light on these topics, one that shows how they are not even good at protecting the more vulnerable in their own populations. While the major powers can handle the economic costs, or postpone the economic impact, this contrasts with many other countries where local populations are faced with the choice of losing their livelihoods or risking death.
Health risks and viruses are clearly global issues, but these cannot be dealt with effectively in the imperialist world economy. Even the international bodies set up to manage health are poorly funded and cannot work well to contain disease. Trump cutting funds to the World Health Organization is bad enough, but there have also been moves from the US to prevent future vaccines and medicines for Covid-19 from being ‘public goods’ available to all countries and not bound by patent rights. The UK also backs the US approach.[14] Both the US and UK governments are providing huge sums to their own pharmaceutical companies, and want them to benefit from any vaccine or treatment breakthrough by the patent protection of such ‘intellectual property’. In March, Trump even attempted to get exclusive rights to a potential vaccine from a German pharmaceutical company![15]
Every day the capitalist economy answers the question of what life is worth by asking back: how much can you pay? The world’s resources are monopolised by the major countries, but they still screw it up. Unable to run the economy without threats, violence and terror, we now see clearly that they cannot even save their own citizens’ lives.

Tony Norfield, 9 June 2020


Appendices:

a) Talking out of their Rs?

It is difficult to estimate how many people have been infected with a virus when there are few tests carried out, as is still the case in most countries. Full population tests may not be necessary for an accurate view of infections, since representative samples, as in opinion polls, might be sufficient. But with regular opinion polls, for voting preference, etc, there is usually already a good population-based estimate of voters, by age, gender, social circumstances, previous voting choice, likelihood to vote, and so on. This helps a pollster build a representative sample to reflect the population; the larger the sample, the more accurate it is. With this new virus, however, it is not possible to get many of the same kind of key, relevant data items, and without large scale testing, judgements on the course of the infection will be far less reliable than most opinion polls. In the absence of data, models for predicting the virus make many assumptions based on little evidence.
Early in the outbreak, recorded hospital deaths indicated that older people were more vulnerable to Covid-19, especially those who also had other diseases that led to difficulties breathing. It also seemed that younger people, especially children, were far more likely to develop only mild, or even no symptoms, even if they had been infected. But each of these assumptions is being at least partially revised as more evidence accumulates. One other unexplained feature of the virus is that the non-white section of the population seems to be more vulnerable to developing bad symptoms and dying. This seems to be the case even when factors such as socio-economic status and occupation are taken into account. All this makes estimates of the potential impact of the virus very uncertain.
Yet one virus parameter commonly promoted is its ‘basic reproduction rate’ R0 (or R in the usual discourse, and in what follows). This parameter reflects the degree to which one infected person will infect someone else, and is critical for the future path of the virus in a population.[16] If the R number is two and that person goes on to infect another two people, and they each do the same, and so on, then there is a doubling of the numbers in each round of infection, which may be every couple of days. This leads to an exponentially rising number of infections.[17]
An R number remaining less than 1.0 means the virus will diminish and eventually die out; the lower the number, the more quickly. A number that stays above 1.0 means that infections could grow until more or less everyone is impacted, and grow more quickly, the bigger the R. So, governments would like to promote any reports of R < 1.0 from scientists in order to get out of the lockdown that is damaging economies.
But the reports of various R numbers in the media, no matter which scientists they are from, need to be read with caution. To put this in a fuller perspective, it is worth reading a critical article on such calculations from the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, published in January 2019. Its main point is that ‘many of the parameters included in the models used to estimate R are merely educated guesses; the true values are often unknown or difficult or impossible to measure directly’.[18]
Without mass testing, it will be difficult to get a good estimate of the virus reproduction rate, let alone the percentage of the population that has been infected. Of course, if the number of new cases diagnosed in tests trends lower, then one can argue that the R number has dropped, but all that is really being said is that the number of new cases is lower!

b) The Imperial College virus model

The media reports of Imperial’s projected UK deaths from the virus – from around 250,000 to 500,000 – had the salutary effect of making the UK government wake up. Three months on, those numbers seem crazily pessimistic, even though the reality of around 50,000 at present is no cause for celebration and the impact of the virus is far from over. Yet the report made a very well argued case in favour of suppressing the virus, to prevent both an extremely high death toll and the collapse of the health system.[19] A closer look at the report also qualifies the headline numbers.
One of Imperial’s scenarios did project 510,000 deaths, but that was if the R number for the virus were 2.4, and it was in ‘the (unlikely) absence of any control measures or spontaneous changes in individual behaviour’.[20] Mitigation, with some measures, was projected to result in 250,000 deaths, even assuming all patients could be treated in hospital (which was not very likely). So their recommendation was that much firmer measures would be needed to suppress the virus. In the most extreme range of measures they considered, schools and colleges being closed, social distancing, household quarantine and home isolation of cases, then, on various scenarios about the R value, total deaths from the virus could probably be reduced to less than 50,000. Interestingly, they did not consider any economic lockdown scenario in the 16 March report, but they noted that the effects on the economy would be profound.
I think the only criticism that can be made of the Imperial report – apart from my scepticism about being able to calculate R numbers with any precision – is that its extreme scenarios for deaths were pretty unlikely to come about. The ‘spontaneous changes’ in behaviour it noted were possible would have been inevitable if people began to see a high number of fatalities from the virus. Even with the low death toll in the UK in the early stages, people were ahead of the government in curbing their activity well before the government’s lockdown measures on 23 March. Some usually busy shopping streets, for example, were already becoming deserted by early March.



[1] Critics of capitalism can be reactionary too, as Marx and Engels explained in the Communist Manifesto, especially Part III. See here.
[2] First recorded in Mexico and the US. Regarding the H1N1 virus name, the H and the N refer to two proteins on the surface of the virus particle, hemagglutinin and neuraminidase, which help the virus attach to a target cell. The numbers refer to the form of those particular proteins, so you can also get H5N1, H9N2, etc, for different viruses.
[3] Campbell Biology, Pearson, 2018, p428.
[4] This name when expanded means Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus number 2, after the first viral outbreak of this type seen in 2002-04. That episode had a death rate of close to 10%, but less than 10,000 cases in total. The term ‘coronavirus’ describes the crown-like shape of the glycoprotein spike on the surface of this type of viral particle that enables it to attach to certain receptors in the host cell. Covid-19 means the Coronavirus disease of 2019, with the relevant symptoms, and the first cases have been traced back to November-December 2019.
[5] Examples of other animal origin viruses of recent years that have been passed on, helped by the proximity of humans to the animals concerned, including eating them, are: Avian flu 1997-, 2007-, 2013- (chickens, ducks, geese), Nipah virus 1998- (bats, pigs), SARS 2002-04 (bats), Middle East Respiratory Syndrome 2012- (camels), Ebola 2013-20 (bats, monkeys), Zika 2007- (mosquitoes). Bats and poultry have been such a common channel for human viruses that it is surprising that horror films about zombies and devastating viruses fail to mention them. Note that viruses are far from being the only problem; bacterial infections can also be widespread and deadly.
[6] See Allen et al, ‘Global hotspots and correlates of emerging zoonotic diseases’, Nature Communications, 24 October 2017, here.
[7] Viruses cause smallpox, measles and polio, malaria is caused by a mosquito-borne parasite and cholera is caused by a bacterium, usually through poor sanitation. Smallpox, a dreadful disease with a 30% death rate, killed up to 300 million people in the 20th century, but has been eliminated worldwide since 1980 due to a global effort.
[8] China’s Communist Party is not known for its openness to criticism, but its paranoia index will also have been dialled up by protests in Hong Kong. Joshua Wong, one of the leading activists, has had discussions with US Senator Marco Rubio, known for his reactionary and interventionist policies; some have also called for US economic sanctions to be imposed on Hong Kong - which Trump has now done - and carried US flags on demonstrations.
[9] ABC news report of 9 April 2020.
[10] Richard Horton, ‘How can any scientists stand by this government now?’, The Guardian, 27 May 2020.
[11] A very good report on the timeline of UK government measures and the rationale behind them, including the medical advice given, is The Guardian, ‘The inside story of the UK’s Covid-19 crisis’, 29 April 2020. The Imperial College report is reviewed in the Appendix.
[12] US federal government measures, including spending, grants and guarantees, amount to some $3 trillion, in addition to vast new loans and securities purchases from the Federal Reserve. The EU is also planning a €750bn fund, in addition to individual country measures. The UK government will likely borrow more than £300bn, with up to some £80bn going on various income subsidies. I will not detail all these spending plans, but those interested could consult the European think tank Bruegel’s report covering 10 EU countries plus the UK and US here.
[13] Note that starting from 100 for GDP, minus 14% gives 86. Adding 15% to that only gives 98.9, lower than at the start.
[14] See the interesting report from Asia Times, ‘US declares a vaccine war on the world’, 28 May 2020.
[15] An article on the attempted deal in March is here.
[16] If the R value is high, it does not matter so much for public health if the spreading of the virus in a population gets stopped at an early stage by appropriate measures.
[17] I will not deal with the mathematics here, but note that media reports usually only focus on the total of new infections, on the 5th round, for example, not the total of all infections, including past ones, that is much higher, of course. In the case of R = 2, new infections are 32 by the 5th round, but all infections by then amount to 63.
[18] See Paul Delamater, ‘Complexity of the Basic Reproduction Number (R0)’, EID Journal, January 2019, here.
[19] Imperial College Covid-19 Response Team, Impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) to reduce COVID-19 mortality and healthcare demand, 16 March 2020.
[20] A similar projection for the US had a total of 2.2 million deaths.

Wednesday, 19 December 2018

Liberals, the Populist Right & the Politics of Imperialism


Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin, National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy, Pelican Books, October 2018

How to respond to the rise of national populism? The phenomenon is evident not only in Trump’s US but throughout Europe, as shown in this book’s comprehensive review of changes in mass opinion. The book also attempts to provide a solution to the problem, one that will defend democracy, but in doing so it inadvertently highlights the bankruptcy of the liberal outlook. They detail how, over the past two decades and more, new political forces have undermined support for the traditional political parties in the West, and especially for the social democratic parties of western Europe. Yet their ‘solution’ is to make concessions to reactionary views in order to ‘engage with’ the concerns people express in opinion polls. Like many liberal commentators, on the face of it they will have no truck with racism. But they seem to be fine with the nationalist mentality and an anti-immigration stance, and they persistently raise the question of ethnicity in national politics.
The book’s real value is in documenting how pervasive are reactionary opinions in the West. They show how the success of Trump, et al, cannot be put down to ‘angry old white men’, who will all die soon anyway, or simply to those who have lost out economically with ‘globalisation’, and who may then be attracted to a left-wing party’s plans for economic reform. The political problem in the West is far deeper, and more depressing. As they put it: ‘people who support national populism are not merely protesting: they are choosing to endorse views that appeal to them’ (p 39).

Four D national populism

Eatwell and Goodwin organise their work along the lines of what they call the Four Ds. This is how the ‘elitist nature of liberal democracy has promoted distrust of politicians and institutions’, how ‘immigration and hyper ethnic change are cultivating strong fears about the possible destruction of the national group’s historic identity and established ways of life’, how ‘neoliberal globalised economics has stoked strong feelings of what psychologists call relative deprivation as a result of rising inequalities of income and wealth in the west and a loss of faith in a better future’, and finally, the ‘weakening bonds between the traditional mainstream parties and the people, or what we refer to as de-alignment’ (pp xxi-xxiii).
If you are already finding your blood beginning to boil with a phrase like ‘immigration and hyper ethnic change’, then I recommend taking a few deep breaths because things get worse. Worse because of the reality they describe, not because the authors are closet racists hiding behind academic language – although in some of the things they write, they will come close to readers interpreting them that way. Towards the end of the book, they sum up the argument as follows:
“The ‘Four Ds’ have left large numbers of people in the West instinctively receptive to the claims being made by national populism: that politicians do not listen to them, even treat them with contempt, that immigrants and ethnic minorities benefit at the expense of ‘natives’, and that hyper ethnic change and in particular Islam pose a new and major threat to the national group, its culture and way of life.” (p 272)
I will deal with these D issues a little later, but first it is worth covering some of the characteristics of voters that the authors set out. In the end, these are the decisive people in a democracy.
Having paid a lot of attention to the social dimensions of voting, they note that the unemployed and those very dependent on welfare payments tend to vote less than average, that the youth vote also tends to be below par and that, at least in the past, white workers without degrees were under-represented in samples taken of popular opinion, which helped lead to the poll surprises of Trump and Brexit. In their view, it is the ‘middle educated’ who are most open to national populism – those who are not uneducated, but who do not have university degrees.
This middle group also tends to feel more vulnerable than others, being above the unemployed but below the middle class economically. In the UK, it was the group focused upon in the Conservative Party’s term ‘just-about-managing families’. However, this is not to say that better off workers did not vote for Trump or Brexit, or for populist causes in general, or that support only came from white (male) workers. They show that national populism also gets significant, if usually minority support from younger people, women and ethnic minorities.
One reason is that the national populists also address welfare issues. This helps undercut the traditional capitalist state-dependent approaches to national politics of more left-wing parties and groups. For example, the leader of the conservative, populist Sweden Democrats argued that ‘The election is a choice between mass immigration and welfare. You choose’ (p71).

Immigration, racism and nationalism

The authors are clear about their perspectives, which should help readers also to clarify what they think about these issues. Take the question of racism. I raise this question, because, when the authors do talk about racism, they appear to cross the line into endorsing what a United Nations Convention would call ‘racial discrimination’.[1] The UN defines such discrimination as being on the basis of ‘race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin’ and, in discussing popular political views, the authors write:
“We do not think that the term ‘racism’ should be applied solely because people seek to retain the broad parameters of the ethnic base of a country and its national identity, even though this can involve discriminating against outside groups” (p 75).
Unless the word ‘broad’ somehow lets them off, ‘retaining the broad parameters of the ethnic base of a country’ would indeed be racial discrimination according to the UN!
Are they only describing how such views exist, rather than endorsing or advocating them? I found the focus on ethnicity to be a strange one for these UK academics to spend much time on since, in the Brexit debate, for example, it was clear that race and ethnicity had little or nothing to do with the anti-EU case. Instead, popular views were much more concerned about competition in the jobs market from low wage, white East European workers – the ‘Polish plumber’. Of course, the coverage in this book is not just of the UK, and not just of Brexit. But the authors are not just describing how there is opposition to other ethnic groups. While they do not explicitly share these concerns themselves, they go out of their way to say that these are valid. For example:
“Too often the left view this immigration angst solely as a byproduct of objective economic grievances when it is in fact a legitimate concern in its own right and … is rooted in broader subjective worries about loss and relative deprivation.” (p 222)
and, on popular anxiety about immigration and ethnic change:
“While many of these fears are exaggerated – especially in the case of Muslims, who as a group are often damned for the sins of a very small minority of Islamists – we need to appreciate how people feel. Given ongoing immigration and rapidly rising rates of ethnic, cultural and religious change, it seems to us unlikely that these anxieties will fade.”
“It is important to try to engage with their concerns, particularly for those on the centre-left who, to avoid further losses, will need to make short-term concessions. Meeting the demand for tighter borders or modifying the type of immigration … is compatible with progressive politics.” (pp 281-2)
Basing their stand on the evidence from numerous opinion polls, they can correctly dismiss as mistaken the views of the established political parties and of the left that if workers can be given ‘more jobs, more growth and less austerity, then their support will return’. Yet that leads them to argue that policies should be adopted to address and deal with ‘people’s concerns about immigration and rapid ethnic change’ (p 261).
If the authors escape the charge of endorsing racism, they still remain guilty of accepting and working within a framework of nationalistic politics. The irony running throughout this book is that they have set up national populism as a political challenge to liberal democracy and then have taken on board the concerns of the national populists.

Imperial politics

The authors do not ignore capitalism in their analysis, or the wider political trends. They cover quite a lot of ground in a summary historical review of how capitalism has developed, the different forms of politics that emerged in the West that helped to endorse the system in the eyes of the population, and of earlier forms of populism. They also note the different phases of immigration into the US and the UK over the past hundred years or so, and the more recent trends in a wide range of European countries.
I was pleasantly surprised to find some brief mentions of the term ‘social imperialism’, describing how capitalist parties and governments in the late 19th and early 20th century countered the appeal of socialism and attracted support from workers by ‘a combination of welfare measures to help poorer people, such as the introduction of old-age pensions, and the celebration of national greatness and expanding Empire’ (p 228). But this remained only part of their historical review and did not seem to have much implication for their discussion of more contemporary trends.
It would have been more consistent for them to spell out how masses of people in the richer countries remain wedded to the social imperialist outlook. Welfare provision by governments in rich countries has grown far beyond what it was in the early 20th century, and it has been a key pillar of what is effectively a ‘social contract’ between the national working class and the capitalist state. In other words, workers will remain loyal to the capitalist system and the national state, including support in wars, as long as the state provides some basic economic security.
That deal has now been undermined by two important developments. Firstly, the growth of the global market, aside from its dysfunction and destructive tendencies, has also shown for capitalist business that there are cheaper ways to get things produced than depending upon welfare-supported workers in the richer countries. Employment conditions have been undermined by outsourcing, supply chains and worse labour contracts, with only some privileged areas remaining relatively unscathed, in high level engineering, technology and some other monopolistic sectors. Secondly, more stagnant economies over the past decade or so have thrown into sharper relief the accumulation of debts, and state spending deficits in particular. Accentuated by problems of an ageing population in many countries and capitalist pandemics like obesity, welfare provision is under pressure.
But these developments have not led the mass of people in richer countries to realise that the game is up and capitalism no longer works for them. Instead, they have turned towards reactionary politics. This can hardly be much of a surprise, since, as the authors themselves note, there have been longstanding racist and nationalist opinions. Liberal views were often more supported by the social strata that were made comfortable by the system, while the remainder kept relatively quiet as long as things were ticking over for them. Now that the capitalist markets supported by the working class have come back to bite them, they have spoken out.
This is the relevant background to the authors’ focus on ‘hyper ethnic change’. The popular reaction to a rapid influx of immigrants seen over the past few decades, and especially in the past 10-20 years (after 2004 in the case of the EU, following the accession of several new Eastern European members), reflects the worry of the ‘native’ masses about their social and economic welfare. They don’t stop for a moment to consider the many fires that their governments have started in and the destruction they have brought upon countries in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, nor of the collapse of living standards in many East European countries when they were incorporated into the western capitalist markets.

Culture and privilege

Privileges enjoyed by the mass of people in the rich countries are being taken away, so they blame Mexican or East European workers, Chinese and Asian goods, and they wrap that up in moans about the threat to their ‘way of life’ and culture, especially from the Muslim community. As the authors put it, using apologetic brackets to distance themselves: ‘most national populists see the quest for lower immigration and slower ethnic change as an attempt to stem the dwindling size of their group, to advance its interests and (in their eyes) avoid the destruction of their culture and identity’ (p 162). Let us consider this culture question for a moment.
I do not know whether any of the myriads of opinion polls cited by the authors have ever asked the question of whether Muslims, or other groups considered unwelcome in these polls, are believed to have a stronger sense of community than the anti-immigration respondent. The ‘native’ reaction is to a different group, whether that distinction is made visible by them using a different language, religion or something else. But it raises the question of what they are really protesting about.
‘Native’ working class culture has been disintegrating for the past 40 years or more in many western countries. Even before, it was nothing to brag about, and the latest decline has nothing to do with immigration, ‘hyper’ or otherwise. The protracted crises of the 1970s and 1980s dealt a blow to many traditional industries and forms of employment that were the centre of settled working class communities, from mining to manufacturing, from steel making to shipyards and transport, and the hollowing out of jobs in many areas. There have also been changes in technology and work practices, a reduction of trade union membership and the creation of many new service sector jobs less covered by trade unions. These and other, more recent developments, sometimes labelled the ‘gig economy’, did not come from immigration. Popular sentiment has nevertheless found immigration as something to focus on, since it was never far from a nationalistic and sometimes racist mindset in any case.
What is it about ‘culture and identity’ that popular sentiment wishes to save from ‘destruction’? The population has done little or nothing done to combat the capitalist market trends that have undermined them, and instead it has been absorbed by mass consumer culture. It is only now, when the economic foundations of an acceptable life are being taken away, that the pro-imperialist working class protests. It fights back by demanding that the capitalist state cuts or stops immigration. The authors say that even if more ‘jobs and growth’ were created then ‘tensions over perceived differences in culture and values will remain’ (p 152). But that is because a large section of the working class has chosen to try and defend itself by relying on ‘its’ state to take action against foreigners. The truth is that it is in no position to hold up anything in its own culture worthy of respect.

Political climate

This book gives a systematic overview of contemporary political opinion, especially that underlying the support for national populism. It helps to clarify the depth of the political problems faced by those who do not like what is going on, but the solutions offered by the authors end up endorsing the concerns of the reactionary populists! When the capitalist system is pissing down on everyone from a great height, they join in the argument about the distribution of umbrellas and raincoats, and wonder if immigrants should be given any if that risks the ‘native’ workers going without.

Tony Norfield, 19 December 2018


[1] The United Nations International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1966, of which Article 1 of the Convention defines racial discrimination as: ‘... any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life’.

Wednesday, 9 May 2018

Iran Sanctions, Imperial problems


Trump's anti-Iran move on Tuesday was deeply worrying for allies of the US. It is a blow for those countries, especially in Europe, that were hoping to build on the big expansion of trade with and investment in Iran after the July 2015 nuclear deal was signed. But it is more than just an economic opportunity under threat. As Germany’s Zeit Online commented ‘with nationalism and protectionism, Donald Trump is gradually eliminating the world order shaped by the USA’. Here I look at some implications of the latest US policy and the reasons for its timing.

Holy orders

The extent of the new US sanctions is at present unclear, although there will be some delay before full implementation. What worries the Europeans is that they are unlikely to apply only to US companies, like Boeing.
On past form, any company not doing as the US wishes could be liable to suffer financial penalties. They could also face problems of access to the US market and its banking system – the latter being necessary for all international companies that use the US dollar. This extra-territoriality of US sanctions, in the words of France’s Finance Minister, Bruno Le Maire, makes the US ‘the economic policeman of the planet’, and that is ‘not acceptable’.
Last October, the now ex-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson claimed that the US will not interfere in Europe’s business dealings with Iran. But the newly appointed US ambassador to Germany, Richard Grenell, has taken a very different tack. He followed up Trump’s statement with a threatening tweet: ‘German companies doing business in Iran should wind down operations immediately’.
It would be hard to top that as a sign of imperial arrogance, something that has become ever more embarrassing for US allies under the Trump regime. To have a smoothy like Obama advance US interests after a chat among ‘friends’ was acceptable. Now the veneer is off and the modus operandi of the nincompoop POTUS is to fart, blame someone else and carry on regardless.[1]

The little, big problem

Following the long years of sanctions, Iran is far from being a big economic partner for the major western powers. Last year it was only number 33 in the ranking of external trading partners of the European Union. Trade between the EU and Iran was close to €21bn, with a little over €10bn of both exports and imports, but this made up less than 1% of the EU’s total external trade. EU trade with India is four times bigger, and it is more than seven times bigger with Turkey. US trade with Iran is much smaller still, roughly $200m last year, which is barely a rounding error in the statistics.
Nevertheless, there had been rapid growth in trade for the EU in recent years, mostly imports of fuel from Iran and exports to Iran of manufactured goods, especially machinery and transport equipment. From 2014 to 2017, EU exports grew by nearly 70% and EU imports by nearly nine times.
Much more trade growth has been in prospect, together with attractive investment opportunities, for EU companies such as Renault, PSA Group, Airbus, Siemens, Total, Alstom and others. Iran’s half-wrecked economy offered a cornucopia of deals in the tens of billions to refurbish, resupply and rebuild.
All that is at risk with the new US policy. More important, however, is that the Iran deal was the result of a longwinded negotiation involving all the major powers, and now the US has walked away from it. This calls into doubt the status of more or less anything else the US has signed up for in the past, and also the status of the US as the unquestioned leader of the western powers.

Why now?

Why did former president Obama’s signing of the joint agreement with Iran look like the ‘worst deal ever’ for Trump? First, note that the US has sustained hostility to a country that dared to step out of line in 1979, when the Shah was overthrown, and has since not been cooperative enough. While the US has come around to accepting other miscreants – notably Vietnam, which beat it in a war – this is very rare and is, in any case, a very slow process. Similarly for Cuba. The irony in Iran’s case is that, aside from sections of the elite who make gains from managing the sanctions regime to their advantage, the country was overwhelmingly in favour of doing a deal with the west as a means of gaining access to technology and development. Nevertheless, despite signing the 2015 deal, Obama was not exactly friendly to Iran. Even afterwards, US political prejudice hindered American business prospects in Iran, with the Europeans much quicker to take advantage.
What seems to have scuppered the Iran deal now is the problem that US policy faces in the Middle East region. This is behind Trump’s long signalled change of course.
Apart from its own direct military intervention, the US has had two elements of control in the Middle East: Israel and Saudi Arabia. Each of these has become more unstable and problematic in recent years, causing trouble for western policy and some embarrassment when it comes to ‘human rights’ in family plutocracy Saudi Arabia and Palestinian rights in the racist gangster state of Israel. Yet the US has not been able to find alternative local tools. After the disaster of US policy in Iraq, another adventure, to replace Assad in Syria, and so to undermine Russia, has failed. This now leaves the US with two dysfunctional supports in a region scarred by imperialism, a mess that it cannot sort out.
The US inability to get rid of Assad has raised Saudi Arabian and Israeli paranoia about Iran. Worried about the stability of their own regimes, they see a long shadow from the bogeyman who does not necessarily do what the US wants and use this to disturb the US’s own discontent. This is neatly summed up in the invention of the so-called ‘Shia crescent’ of Iranian power and influence from Iran through Iraq, Syria and into Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. Saudi Arabia even sees Iran in Yemen, while Netanyahu starred in his own special anti-Iran video for Trump. In an inversion of reality that only someone of his powers can provide, Trump even outdid them with his latest comment that Iran backs al-Qaeda and ISIS.
Trump will tweet and things may change again. But it looks like the foundations of the world order are crumbling further.

Tony Norfield, 9 May 2018


[1] Apologies for lowering the tone, but the word ‘trump’ in colloquial English also means to break wind.

Friday, 19 January 2018

Worse Than You Think


Michael Wolff, Fire and Fury: Inside the Trump White House, Little Brown, 2018

This book is fun to read and a best seller. Everyone loves a gossipy book about someone they dislike. Fluently written, although not well written, it is built mainly on interviews with those in and around the Trump White House. Wolff takes us through the plots and screw-ups of this double-dealing menagerie with relish.
Much of what the book says will not be new to those following The Donald. Probably the most striking new point Wolff makes is that part of the reason for the political and administrative chaos is that Trump was not expecting to win the presidential election and become POTUS #45. The insiders on Team Trump were perfectly happy to lose, as long as the margin was not too big. Up to the last minute that was what they were betting on. Losing like that would have been a ‘victory’, especially because it would do wonders for the Trump family brand name. Winning for real would carry the risk of a closer examination of the Trump family’s finances and put all their schemes in the public spotlight.
However, Wolff’s journalistic approach does not get to grips with some fundamental issues. Wolff gives many amusing stories of Trump’s egotistical self-deception, mind-boggling inconsistencies and shameless invention of ‘facts’. Trump may think he is multi-tasking, but sitting on his bed eating a cheeseburger, watching three cable TV channels at once while making phone calls is more a signal of not being able to concentrate on anything at all. Such character traits have recently led to questions about Trump’s mental health, and also the hope in liberal quarters that this might be a means of getting him to resign. Yet these factors, while important features of his presidency, do not give the proper context for what is going on.
Trump is not the only president to have been a few sandwiches short of a picnic. In recent history, just consider Ronald Reagan and George ‘Dubya’ Bush. Or what about Barack Obama, the great black hope of liberal America, who in eight years failed to close Guantanamo Bay concentration camp and instead became drone-killer in chief, a Nobel Peace Prize winner up to his neck in covert operations? The point to recognise is that it does not matter much who is the president, the imperial machine grinds on.
Where Trump has been an anomaly is that he came from outside the political establishment. This meant that there were fewer pre-arranged ties into the networks of political force and influence, from Congressional interest groups and big business, to the CIA and the military. That Trump has been reliant upon a small group of trusted acolytes and chancers is not so unusual. That these have been made up largely from his family is more so, since with Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner he has gone several steps beyond Bill Clinton’s promotion of Hillary. This anomalous regime has produced some embarrassments for America’s self-image. Apart from the stream of reactionary consciousness tweets, there is the border wall with Mexico, pulling out of the Paris Climate Accord and much else besides.
The question is then: how could this have happened? Of course, Wolff recognises that Trump is an outsider. But he does not dwell upon how such an outsider could win the presidency, except to review the events in the 2016 election campaign. In other words, what were the social forces behind this anomaly occurring? Wolff’s coverage of the alt-right pundit and Trump ideas man Steve Bannon notes his financial backing from the billionaire Robert Mercer, but he does not discuss why the America First, anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, racist policies Bannon supports gained so many votes for Trump in the US electorate.
It remains uncomfortable for Trump’s critics that resurgent nationalism in an imperialist country looks so ugly when spewing unfiltered from Trump’s mouth. That is part of the reason to blame Russia for Trump’s election victory – if it was the Commies evil Russkies, then they can avoid facing the problem that a large part of the US electorate agrees with these policies.
It is depressing fact that in imperialist countries a squeeze on the economic lives of people usually results in political reaction. There may be brave dissidents and protests, but these are outweighed by mass opinion that calls upon the state to punish foreigners and any others they see as responsible for undermining their privileges. What has emerged from this cauldron of discontent is Trump, not a radical current that challenges imperialism.
For now, Trump’s sociopathic tweetarama will continue. But it is only a matter of time before the imperial machine takes back full control to limit disruption to the way US imperialism presents itself to the world, which can also have a big impact on business. In the interim, Trump’s tax cuts for the rich and for corporations are not a problem, and in late December the US Congress passed these plans.

Tony Norfield, 19 January 2018