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Much has been written on Brexit,
stage 1 of which occurred on 31 January. But a key point has been ignored: the
UK’s departure from the European Union is due to a reactionary revolt by the
British (mainly English) working class. This went against the established
policy of the political elites, bourgeoisie, ruling class – call them what you
want – and will lead to many problems. As such, it represents the first time in
very many decades that the ‘popular will’ of a vote has contradicted capitalist
business interests. However, this is no reason for socialists to be happy.
In the UK parliament, most MPs
were in favour of remaining in the EU. Yet they had to watch their backs and
worry about the people who had elected them: 52% of the UK electorate had voted
for Brexit in the 2016 referendum and, more importantly, 64% of Parliamentary
constituencies had done so. The biggest bloc of ‘Leave’ voters was in England.
To show this was not a one-off decision, English voters rallied to the
Conservatives and their ‘Get Brexit Done!’ slogan in December’s General
Election. A survey showed that more than half of working class votes in Britain
were for the Conservatives or the Brexit Party. As a result, the Conservatives
now have the largest majority in Parliament since 1987.
It was no surprise that the
Brexit issue dominated the General Election, since it has featured in all UK
political discussion for years. Pro-Brexit sentiment grew in the aftermath of
the 2008 financial crisis, when British workers complained about the squeeze on
their living standards. They did not blame capitalism, or even UK government
policies. For many, the culprit was the EU, and especially the migration of
workers from the EU that was seen as putting pressure on jobs, housing and
social services.[1] In 2016,
when Brexiters chanted ‘Take Back Control’, what they meant was control of EU
immigration. This could be done only by leaving the EU.
This factor helped build a
successful political alliance between a large section of the British working class
and other longstanding critics of the EU. The latter were a disparate group.
They included Conservative ideologues, those nostalgic for the days of Empire
and who wanted to see ‘Great Britain’ operating more freely in the world, some
business people who were annoyed at EU market regulations, and even some on the
left who saw the EU as an evil capitalist plot and dreamed of a more
British-inspired (!) set of international relations. These diverse forces only
gained political momentum once the British (English) working class joined them.[2]
The Social Contract
Working class support for Brexit
was a protest. But it was a protest against how they thought the British state
was not doing enough to protect them – against immigration and the pressure on
living standards. So, economic arguments in favour of staying in the EU had
little effect, because they thought that getting out of the EU would encourage
the state to help them. The British working class has long had a loyal
commitment to the British state. As long as that state offered some economic
and social protection, it would not cause too much trouble. It was a kind of
‘social contract’. The immigration question became important in this context
because it helps to identify the national, British-based working class as the
legitimate recipient of state assistance versus the immigrants (or even
refugees) from other countries. In this political outlook, the issue of
inadequate housing, jobs and services delivered by capitalism becomes a moan
about the supply of housing, jobs and services taken by migrants. In earlier
decades, the moan was about blacks and Asians. In the past decade it has been
more about white (East) Europeans who had rights to move to the UK under EU
labour market rules.
By contrast, business opinion in
Britain was consistently against Brexit. However, companies had to be careful
in their public comments because they did not want to annoy half their
customers. It was only in the past year that they warned how Brexit would
disrupt supply chains, put important trading relationships at risk and damage
investment, but this had little effect on popular opinion. The capitalist
enthusiasts for Brexit were few, usually small companies wanting to avoid EU
regulations. They, and others, overlooked an inconvenient point that world
trade is already divided up among major trading blocs, especially in North
America, Europe and Asia. There is no big, free world market to join outside
the EU, and the UK will be stepping out of the deals that the EU has already
negotiated with other countries.
After Brexit Day on 31 January,
at first nothing much will seem to change for the UK. It will be excluded from
EU decision-making, and a number of EU-related outlets for British citizens
will begin to close down, such as employment and education opportunities.
Otherwise, Brits will see most EU-related things going on as normal, probably
up to the end of 2020. Even trade with the EU will not change abruptly before
then.
Nevertheless, the Brits will
still feel able to blame their woes on the EU. The Conservative Government’s
objective is to do what it likes after leaving EU membership, but to still have
trade access to the EU market as it was before. The remaining 27 countries of
the EU cannot agree to this, so there will be many disputes and plenty of room
for EU bashing in the forthcoming negotiations. There also remains a ‘divorce
bill’ to settle, whereby the UK is liable to pay the EU tens of billions after
it cancelled its previous membership commitments.
It is doubtful that the British
working class will turn against the Conservative Government as the dream of a
bright future outside the EU fades away. It may not take long before their
promise of more investment in poor areas of the country is exposed as a fraud,
but that does not mean there will be any progressive resistance. Instead, the
greater likelihood is that the working class will double down on aggressive
nationalism.
Tony Norfield, 3 February 2020
Note: * This is the English version of an article published on 2 February in the Spanish language journal Ideas de Izquierda, together with an article by Michael Roberts, here.
Note: * This is the English version of an article published on 2 February in the Spanish language journal Ideas de Izquierda, together with an article by Michael Roberts, here.
