As we wait impatiently while the
Brits go through the interminable travail of Brexit, let us have a look at who
they are. Not directly in a social, cultural or political sense, but by
reviewing the data on UK employment. Work gives a foundation for people’s daily
lives and will, in turn, have an impact on society, culture and politics. The
employment numbers challenge the conceptions of many, especially those with a
narrow ‘industrial’ view of the British working class. They also highlight that
a surprising number of people, for various reasons, are not working at all, and
that UK residents originally from other European Union countries are more
likely to be employed than indigenous Brits.
Swamped?
According to the UK Office for
National Statistics, the total UK population was 65.6 million people in 2018,
with a couple of percent more women than men. Roughly 86% of these were born in
the UK. Poland and India were the countries of origin for the largest number of
others, each with 832,000. Pakistan (535k), Romania (392k) and the Irish
Republic (369k) were next in line as other countries of origin. Even for Poland
and India, their share of the total population was just under 1.3% each.
Calculations of people by their claimed nationality give only slightly
different data, and the overall picture is not simply that most people in the
UK were born in the UK, as one would expect, but also that there has been no
great influx of people from any one other country.
Even if the EU were taken as a
whole, UK residents born in the 27 other EU countries amounted to only 3.6
million people, just 5.5% of the UK population. That figure was a slightly
higher 5.8% in England, the major Brexit-voting country. Although this share is
about three times higher than in 2004, a rapid increase, the still low
percentage leads one to suspect that the anti-EU sentiment revealed in the
dominant English Brexit vote (53.4% for Leave) has been based on something more
than simply the scale of the EU immigration numbers.
A number of commentators have
argued that it was the rapid influx of EU migrants after the accession to the
EU of Poland and other countries in 2004 that led to worries on the part of
British people about their domestic culture and ‘way of life’ being undermined
by this development.[1]
A look at the UK’s employment data will suggest a different perspective.
What about the workers?
In mid-2019, there were about
41.3 million people in the UK aged 16-64, the prime age group for employment.
Of these, 31.5 million, or 76%, were employed, 1.3 million were unemployed and
8.6 million were ‘economically inactive’. Employed and unemployed are
reasonably straightforward terms – although with changing definitions – but the
latter one is worth examining further.
The ‘economically inactive’
category includes those who are students, those who are looking after the
family or home, the temporarily sick, the long-term sick, ‘discouraged workers’
and the retired. It also includes some other reasons for inactivity, but
basically means those who have not been seeking work in the past four weeks and
who are not available for work in the next two weeks. It does not include those
registered as unemployed.
At 8.6 million people, the
number of the ‘inactives’ is surprisingly high: 21% of the population aged 16
to 64. Nevertheless, the inactivity rate has fallen over the past five decades,
largely because of more women working. Over 40% of women were ‘inactive’ in the
1970s, but this has fallen to around 25-26% today. By comparison, the
inactivity rate of males aged 16-64 has risen a lot – from around 6% in the
1970s to 16% in 2001, and it was 16.4% in the latest period. This is one way
that the capitalist labour market, in its usual perverse manner, has tackled
gender inequality. It is also linked to how female earnings can still remain
below male earnings doing the same job, despite laws against such
discrimination.[2]
The surprise at the high number
is reduced when one takes account of 2.2 million students and another 2 million
people looking after the family or home included in the total. But that still
leaves another two big categories: 1.1 million who have retired before the age
of 65, and 2.1 million who are long-term sick. Only 1.9 million of the 8.6
million inactives are recorded as wanting to have a job.
In addition to the inactive
numbers, in mid-2019 there were also 333,000 people who had been unemployed for
over a year but were still looking for a job. They are counted in the
unemployment figures, which totalled 1.3 million, 3.9% of the workforce.
Economic activity divergence
There is a big divergence
between the proportion of UK-born people who are economically ‘active’ and
those who were born in other EU countries. In mid-2019, 76.3% of the UK-born
population aged 16-64 was economically active, a rate which has slowly
increased from a recession-hit 71% in 2010. By comparison, for those born in
the original group of EU member states, named the EU-14,[3]
the activity rate was higher, at 80.2% in 2019.
Much higher again was the
economic activity rate of those born in the EU-A8 countries, among the group
that joined the EU in 2004,[4]
and which contains the famous ‘Polish plumber’: it was 85.2%. For Romania and
Bulgaria, who joined the EU in 2007, the economic activity rate was highest of
all, at 86.2%.
Recent migrants will tend to be
the more economically mobile and more likely to be in the active workforce.
They will also include fewer students, fewer people who have retired before the
age of 65 and fewer long-term sick. These factors will tend to push the
economically active rate of that population group higher. However, at the same
time, there are other things, some less amenable to coverage in official
statistics, yet clear in numerous anecdotal reports, which also account for the
higher employment rate of the newer EU members.
For the EU countries that joined
from 2004, a BBC report
last year showed that these workers had hourly pay rates around 25% less than
for UK nationals. This was despite them having average skill levels higher than
for UK nationals. The skill-pay relationship only seemed to apply for workers
from the EU-14 countries: their skill levels were much higher than for UK
nationals, although they had pay rates only around 10% higher.
Many of those from the newer EU
members included in the British working class have done low-paid jobs that
British-born workers were reluctant to do, such as food processing and picking
fruit and vegetables in fields. However, they are also in more skilled
occupations, and not simply the skilled manual ones that led to the ‘Polish
plumber’ term.
Workforce breakdown
Turning back to the British
workforce, the following table gives a breakdown of the number of jobs in the
UK by sector in June 2019. These sectors are based on standard classifications
and are a bit broad. They can also be impacted by changes in the labour market
over time. For example, if I recall correctly, it used to be the case that
canteen workers in a workplace used to be counted in the total of people in
that particular workplace sector. But with the outsourcing of most canteen
services to outside companies, they would mostly be included instead under
‘accommodation and food services’. Nevertheless, the breakdown of the types of
jobs done in the UK does a lot to question the common ideas people have about
the relative importance of different jobs.
For example, while Britain may
not be a ‘nation of shopkeepers’, it turns out that the biggest sector of UK
employment has five million people in the wholesale and retail trades. The
large numbers in health, professional, education and administration will not be
a surprise to many, but each of these areas employs more people than the whole
of manufacturing industry, which itself is not that far ahead of accommodation
and food services. The much-maligned financial and insurance services sector
employs over a million people, not all of whom are in the City of London.
Another million have jobs in the arts, entertainment and recreation sector, and
there are ten times more people employed in estate agencies than in mining and
quarrying. A further detail is that more than 150,000 have ‘jobs’ in the armed
forces.
Table: UK Employment Breakdown, June 2019
Employment in sector
|
Number (000)
|
Percent
|
Wholesale, retail trade, incl repair of vehicles
|
4,997
|
14.0%
|
Human health & social work activities
|
4,538
|
12.7%
|
Professional, scientific, technical activities
|
3,156
|
8.8%
|
Education
|
2,970
|
8.3%
|
Administration, support services
|
2,968
|
8.3%
|
Manufacturing
|
2,729
|
7.7%
|
Accommodation & food services
|
2,470
|
6.9%
|
Construction
|
2,369
|
6.6%
|
Transport & storage
|
1,789
|
5.0%
|
Information & communication
|
1,620
|
4.5%
|
Public administration, defence, etc
|
1,510
|
4.2%
|
of which,
HM armed forces
|
152
|
0.4%
|
Financial & insurance services
|
1,113
|
3.1%
|
Arts, entertainment, recreation
|
1,053
|
3.0%
|
Real estate activities
|
572
|
1.6%
|
Agriculture, forestry & fishing
|
366
|
1.0%
|
Water supply, sewerage, etc
|
239
|
0.7%
|
Electricity, gas, etc
|
141
|
0.4%
|
Mining & quarrying
|
57
|
0.2%
|
Other sectors
|
1,010
|
2.8%
|
Total jobs in all sectors
|
35,667
|
100%
|
Note: Services sector total
|
29,766
|
83.5%
|
Note: The data count
the number of jobs in each sector and not the number of different people. The
total of jobs exceeds the total number of people in the workforce.
|
||
Source: ONS, Labour Market
Overview, UK: October 2019
|
Overall, services sector jobs make up nearly 84% of the
total number of jobs in the UK. This makes the common refrain from the British
left about ‘industry’ – let alone ‘manufacturing’, which got a special mention
in Jeremy Corbyn’s Brexit policy statement in Parliament on Saturday 19 October
– seem more than a little out of touch with the reality of contemporary
employment.
Conclusion
Many British workers voted for
Brexit in June 2016, and many were enticed by the ‘take back control’ argument
of the Leave campaign – a phrase that was a poorly disguised attack on
migration from the EU. The data show that although the number of EU migrants
into the British workforce rose fairly rapidly after 2004, it remained a
relatively small proportion of the total. The data also indicate that an
underlying problem for British-born workers was the much higher employability
of the more recent EU migrants, whether that was due to their higher levels of
skill or to their lower wage rates, or both.
Workers often react to labour
market competition in a reactionary way. The irony is that they usually support
the capitalist system and the capitalist labour market, but then complain if
how these operate does not turn out well for them. The result is that they call
upon the state to stop or control immigration. Far from any notion of ‘workers
of the world unite’, the sentiment instead has been ‘British jobs for British
workers’, something supported by the Labour Party and, implicitly, by sections
of the useless left.
A basic minimum demand for
anyone with a sense of justice is that all workers should get the same rights
and protections, ‘immigrant’ or not. That might be the most justice one can get
from a labour market based upon a capitalist system that oppresses workers and
destroys society.
Tony Norfield, 22 October 2019
[2] This point
excludes the other feature of the labour market, that many occupations are
dominated by one gender, and those with a preponderance of women often have
lower wage rates.
[3] The EU-14 is
made up from those countries who joined the EU before 2004, but excluding the
UK in these UK statistics of other countries. The 14 are: Belgium, Denmark,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Austria, Finland and Sweden. The latter three joined the EU in 1995.
[4] In 2004, 10
countries joined an expanded EU, but the EU-A8 definition excludes Malta and
Cyprus who also joined then, presumably because they were formerly British
colonies. The EU-A8 countries are: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
2 comments:
Your writing is great in explaining the power of the City, its reach via credit elasticity, into areas where the most sv can be extracted at the cost of our lives and the planet.
However, Marx surely was not just about economics but human relations of unequal power in myriad forms besides class eg religion, gender, race, the family, different social forms eg clans, feudalism, extended family, pre-capitalist communities surviving beneath dominant forms etc.
Two people on the same income can have huge differences in social conditions eg health (addiction, stress, trauma, insomnia); domestic/mafia/gang/communal violence; unlivable housing (state social or private considered as dead capital)due eg noise, harassment, pollution, bullying, politics, sexism, racism - all the problems within current human relations that can make one person's life unbearable and another's reasonable, both on the same net income.
Another point: these days racism cuts many ways. Clearly the general imperialist pattern is white domination but looked at one-sidedly ie from within a dominant city considered from a global dominant imperialist perspective - there are many nuances that are hidden beneath purely economic relations eg what some privileged here laughingly call "reverse imperialism" that, to them, justifies the bullying of powerless indigenous people in a Lord-peasant relation that's possibly imported - an arrogance that's fuelled Brexit instead of Lexit.
ps What do you make of Marx's concept of the fetishism of commodities? What do you conceive of as an alternative system to a dominating quantitative one?
Finally, what do you make of Marx's long quote on pp 752-3 in the 1981 Penguin ed of Vol 3 Capital?
To me this is a grand insight into imperialism, as well as all master-slave relations both within and without the spaces we can, or cannot, exist in as the numbers of homeless and destitute in London escalate.
All the best
I met workers from the Phillipines (sp?) here who do eg six month stints before visits home, then another x6 months ie no time with family and kids back home. Living/eating in cheap hostels communally ie able dominate/control rooms/facilities, they are able to build upper middle-class houses back home and send kids to private schools at the cost of not seeing their kids grow up. For Brit workers, the cost of a home or good schooling is far beyond our reach. The numerous unhuman contradictions of global capital.
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