Showing posts with label Switzerland. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Switzerland. Show all posts

Wednesday, 4 May 2016

Tax Havens in the Imperial Network *


“We don’t pay taxes. Only the little people pay taxes.” Leona Helmsley
The motto of the ineffable billionairess came to mind with the publication of the Panama Papers. This huge set of files leaked from a Panamanian law firm, Mossack Fonseca, documented the tax haven dealings of the world’s richer denizens. While the law firm’s name sounds like a toxic cocktail, the information revealed in its files has also been toxic for Iceland’s Prime Minister Gunnlaugsson, who had to resign. So far, there have been no other scalps, but there have been sleepless nights for many and plenty of work for their PR companies.
I would venture to predict that there will be no more casualties from the revelations. Although there will doubtless be more expressions of anger from those who believe an influx of previously elusive tax revenues into the national pot might cushion the iron heel of austerity, this elaborate tax haven-offshore network is entrenched in a capitalist system that most critics do not venture to criticise.

Avoidance and evasion

There is an important distinction, of which many people are unaware, between tax ‘avoidance’ and tax ‘evasion’. Tax avoidance is legal; it just means you arrange your affairs in a way that lowers how much tax you have to pay. However, that also includes putting money in a tax haven, having your revenues accounted for there, and paying their lower tax levels. Evasion, on the other hand, is illegal. It involves not paying the taxes due to the authority in the relevant jurisdiction, for example, not declaring that you have an income to the government and so not paying the tax on it. The distinction between avoidance and evasion can be complicated. Making sure you have the correct set up involves expensive advice, afforded only by the rich, and this is a source of income for tax lawyers like Mossack Fonseca. But this is not the only rationale for the existence of tax havens.
Tax havens rose to prominence largely in the post-1945 period, when income taxes in major countries were often very high for the rich. Havens offered lower rates of tax and, as a result, a flood of rich people from around the world began to park their financial assets, and the income flowing to them, in these welcoming climes, even if they did not move there themselves. This was often done by setting up shell companies that owned the assets. Directors of the shell companies may have been residents of the particular haven, but they were usually acting on instructions from the real owners of the assets and recipients of the income. It was not long before capitalist corporations began to see how they could also play the game, for example, by channelling revenues from the rest of the group that appeared as their ‘costs’ paid into a special company set up in a haven where little or no tax is paid. The subsidiaries doing the channelling could then argue that their ‘costs’ meant they earned little or no profit in the higher-taxed countries in which they were based.
These havens were not necessarily islands or ‘offshore’. Although many were islands, since this was a way for a one-dimensional economy to branch out, when it was otherwise dependent upon seasonal tourism or a single crop or mineral, there was also Monaco, Andorra and Luxembourg in the heart of Europe, plus Ireland and others, including Delaware in the US. In Switzerland, for example, the tiny lakeside canton of Zug is reputed to host 27,000 companies, about one for every four inhabitants! No, Swiss people do not have an unusually high degree of entrepreneurial spirit; this was many foreign people and companies taking advantage of local tax laws. The havens get important revenues – from financial fees paid to the local government, as money paid in the employment of locals who would be ‘directors’ of these companies, and in other ways, including the business generated by a rich elite who might like to go shopping, sail in a yacht or stay in a nice hotel.

Rich people, but powerful companies

Essentially, tax havens are a commonly used release valve for the burden on the revenues of rich people, and companies, from the costs of maintaining the state and public services financed from taxation. In more recent decades, especially from the 1980s as international financial flows became less regulated by the key powers, these offshore and other centres grew dramatically in size, attracting vast volumes of funds. In 2004, when the US Congress passed a Homeland Investment Act that gave corporations a tax break if they repatriated funds held overseas, nearly a thousand US companies later repatriated more than $300bn of cash! This is one indication that the individuals named in the Panama papers are really a side issue: big corporations are the main holders of the international funds.
Ironically, Panama, at the centre of the latest revelations is a relatively small-scale offshore centre. A good measure of size is given by the volume of funds going into and out from these centres. Panama, with $106bn of funds outstanding in 2015, is less than a twentieth of the size of the largest one, the Cayman Islands, which has $2,610bn of liabilities plus claims. This stupendous sum for the Caymans is made up from roughly $1,300bn coming in as liabilities (or deposits and other lending from overseas) and $1,300bn going out as claims (or loans and other investments outside the Caymans). This reflects the fact that the money is doing more or less nothing in the Caymans itself – apart from the hotel and shopping bills and paying some fees to the government and a small proportion of the population of less than 60,000 people. As you might expect, the locals do not actually own the $800bn or so of US equities and bonds that are registered in the name of Cayman Island corporate entities.
Another interesting detail of the Cayman Islands is that this is the main offshore location to which the UK banking system sends a net volume of funds, amounting to $53bn at the end of 2015. While the UK-based banking system obtains around a net $100bn from its own local offshore islands – Jersey and Guernsey, especially – it also plays a big part in redirecting funds to other locations. A theme song of the movie Cabaret, ‘Money makes the world go around’, very much applies to the role that tax havens/offshore centres play in the global capitalist system. The UK-based banking system is at the core of this international network and, not surprisingly, the UK economy accrues big revenues from doing the in/out deals involved.

God Save the Queen

The location of the Cayman Islands in the Caribbean Sea might make one think that they have little or nothing to do with far away Britain. Nevertheless, at official occasions they sing ‘God Save the Queen’, although, as far as I am aware, it is not a widely downloaded itunes song and has never won any music awards. The reason is that the Caymans, while not technically being part of UK territory, are given a special status by the UK authorities as a British Overseas Territory. Similarly, other offshore islands are members of the British Commonwealth (the Bahamas) or are British Crown Dependencies.
UK officials do not like to talk about them very much and, at most, only propose measures that would have little effect on the tax avoidance/evasion taking place, such as calling for a ‘central register’ of who owns the more than two million companies and partnerships registered in these havens. The proposal is not expected to make much difference. The UK has been heavily involved in establishing this financial network. UK-linked havens, particularly the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas, Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man, not only sing the same national anthem, if added together they would rank as the sixth largest international banking centre, just behind Germany, despite their minuscule populations. Why should the UK bother to do anything about this, when the US and many other European countries are also involved in the same kinds of deals, and when all the capitalists benefit?
All offshore centres are closely linked to the interests of the major capitalist powers. Britain has the closest links with the largest number. My experience of working for London-based banks included several business trips to Jersey, and some contact with other centres. When it comes to hanging out as a member of the rich elite, Jersey has some way to go in competing with the ‘offshore’ centres in the Caribbean and Central America. Nevertheless, like other centres, it plays an important role in allowing the capitalist class to do what it likes. Such is the exercise of their freedom. They have been free to exploit the working class worldwide. Surely they should also be free to do what they want with the proceeds?

Who are you?

Another feature of these havens is that the identity of who owns the funds is usually hidden. Interestingly, that is not necessarily to avoid tax. For example, one of the individuals cited in the Panama Papers is King Salman of Saudi Arabia. Presumably, he has no reason to avoid taxes set by the rules of the government he controls. The rationale here was instead to use the offshore accounts as a means of hiding the fact that a Saudi-owned company was doing a particular investment. So ABC Corp registered in Offshore Island X, but owned by the ruling Saudi family, would be a shareholder in a major US, European, or Asian, etc, corporation, but nobody would be any the wiser.
The publication of the Panama Papers has been amusing for the embarrassment they have caused to usurpers of wealth, in particular to those whose hypocrisy is shown by their former public pose. But little or nothing should be expected to change in society if people are critical only of individual excesses, and not of the more systematic crushing of the life chances of those oppressed by capitalism, in which tax dodging is a relatively minor issue.

Tony Norfield, 4 May 2016

* This article puts in a broader context some points made previously on this blog. A copy of this article first appeared in the New York journal, BrooklynRail, in the Fieldnotes section. Further details of the role of tax havens in the international financial system are given in my new book, The City: London and the Global Power of Finance.

Thursday, 22 January 2015

Europe Gets Even More QuEasy


Today the European Central Bank did what financial markets had expected, after lots of leaking of the policy moves. They announced they would buy securities in the asset markets, at a rate a little higher than had been expected of €60 billion per month, from March 2015. The policy will continue until inflation looks like getting closer to 2%, which, with the slump in energy prices, will be a while yet. In all likelihood, this extra asset buying (there has been some before) will amount to a bit over €1 trillion and last until September 2016, maybe longer. For comparison's sake, the new policy is around 10% of euro area GDP, compared to the US and UK policies of 'quantitative easing' that have amounted to more than 20% of GDP.
This policy move is the latest in a series that indicate there is no way out of the crisis. How can anyone believe that this policy, essentially making government bonds have even lower yields, can do anything for the economy when 10-year government borrowing costs were already less than 1% in Germany and France and less than 2% in Italy and Spain, the euro area's biggest economies?
The central bank's notion is that this will feed into private sector borrowing costs being lower, but there are some difficulties here. One is that there is very little demand to borrow to invest, given the dire economic outlook; the other is that banks would not to lend at anything like the sub-1% or 2% numbers to private investors, and the level of interest rates is not the problem. The problem is that there is no profitable avenue for large-scale capital investment, or any investment that does not depend upon government subsidy, tax dodging or some form of financial trickery. Even the countries that claim they have done better than the euro average - especially the US, but also the UK and Switzerland - are now faced with higher currency values against the ones that are under the market's cosh. Last week, the Swiss National Bank's made a dramatic move to abandon its 3-year attempt to stabilise its currency against the euro. This was done largely in anticipation of this week's action by the ECB and so far the euro's value has fallen 18% against the Swiss franc. Unsurprisingly, the euro fell another 1-2% today.
The ECB made a concession to German worries about the new policy. They said that 80% of the risk of the new purchases would be borne by national central banks, because central banks in the euro area might buy rubbish and face a loss. In its press releases today, they did not explain who would buy what, or how much. Because the scale of the buying, if it is not directed, would evidently be concentrated on the better risks - Germany, especially - a proviso was included: only up to one-third of a country's outstanding debt could be bought in this way, and the debt had to have a maturity of 2-30 years. Germany has around €1.1 trillion of debt outstanding, with less than this in the 2-30 maturity range. So these, the 'safest assets', will not be able to use up more than about a third of the new programme. German government securities out to a maturity of 5 years also have a yield that is zero or negative. So, presumably, this is good news for the government securities of France, Italy and Spain, the other countries with large bond markets.
The ECB's hope is that the lower yields will force investors to take on more economy-boosting risks. Instead, the likelihood is that there will be a continued reliance by capitalists on 'making money' through financial investment, something that further stretches the gap between value creation and financial accounting. On occasion, that gap is narrowed by a slump of financial market prices for bonds and/or equities, but the ECB has signalled that it will gamble for a while longer on trying to push the gap still wider.

Tony Norfield, 22 January 2015

Tuesday, 3 June 2014

Robots and the Organic Composition of Capital


This week, London's Financial Times has decided to get back to what it is good at and report on some interesting economic developments: robots. The articles in this series promise to have much more value for those analysing the world than the FT's editorial line on Ukraine, Russia, Syria, Iran and other issues; opinions that simply reflect the discomfiture of the Anglo-American elite about things that are moving outside their control.
Robotisation of manufacturing processes has been under way for many years, but it seems to have accelerated recently. In the case of Foxconn, already reported on this blog, one pressure for robot innovation was the rise in wages among assembly line workers. However, in an effort to cut costs a number of production processes require not only a speed and accuracy that manual labour cannot achieve, but also a physical scale of operations that only robots can manage. Try carrying a 2.5 metre glass panel used for producing LCD displays that is only 0.5mm thick without breaking it. Or try to measure to an accuracy of 0.05mm. There is also a development in lightweight 'collaborative' robots that are used more directly by workers, and that are less likely to crush their human counterparts.
Here are some key points:
  • South Korea had the largest number of robots per manufacturing employee in 2012: 396 per 10,000. Japan's figure was 332, Germany's 273 and China's only 23.
  • Japan has the most industrial robots in total with more than 310,000 in 2012. The US had 168,000; Germany, 162,000; South Korea, 139,000; China, 96,000; Canada, 18,000; UK 15,000; India, 7,800; Brazil, 7,600.
  • China is growing fastest, however, with robot sales increasing at an average annual rate of 36% from 2008 to 2013.
  • The automotive industry accounted for some 70,000 of the overall 179,000 robot sales in 2013, followed by the electronics industry (35,000) and food (6,200).
  • Lightweight robots cost around $35,000 each; the big guys cost more like $100,000 or above.
  • Robotics companies from Japan, Switzerland and Germany dominate the market, with some important companies also based in the US, UK and Denmark.
One implication of these developments is an increase in manufacturing productivity. Another is the increase in what Marx called the 'organic composition of capital': where there is not only a rise in the mass of machinery and raw materials compared to labour power employed, but also a rise in the value of such machinery and raw materials compared to the value of that labour power. The result in recent years has been evident for South Korea, as shown in the following chart, taken from a McKinsey Global Institute report.


From 1995-2010, Korean output grew dramatically, at more than 7% per annum, but productivity grew still faster, at more than 9%, so that employment actually fell. Korean companies, like others, also shifted their operations overseas to take advantage of lower wages elsewhere.

Tony Norfield, 3 June 2014

Thursday, 1 November 2012

Imperialism by Numbers - Amendment


This is an update to the chart on the ‘Index of Imperialism’ published on this blog six months ago, on 1 May. The change made here is that I use another set of data to account for the international banks in major countries; otherwise the five factors in the ‘Imperialism index’ remain the same. To recap, these were made up from: nominal GDP, military spending, the stock of foreign direct investment, the size of international banks based in a particular country and the global use of that country’s currency in international foreign exchange reserves.

As noted previously, any set of data has its limitations. However, the earlier data I used for banks were based on a country’s ownership of the top 50 international banks and this only covered 14 countries. The new numbers are based on BIS data for the relative size of international assets and liabilities of banks operating in particular countries. They are not limited by the number of banks and cover 19 of the 20 countries in the chart. The BIS also gives figures for bank assets and liabilities by the nationality of the bank. However, these data are for only nine countries, so I did not use them (in any case, they show a similarly ranked pattern to the bank-location data that is used here).

With these new data for international banking, the rank and index value of some countries changes significantly, but in a way that I think better reflects power relations in the world economy. The US is no longer top in all categories; it falls into second place as a centre for international banking, behind the UK . But this still leaves the US as top power, with the UK a distant second. Germany moves up to position 3, China jumps to position 4, now ahead of Japan, and France falls to position 6 from position 3 that it had before. Italy, Switzerland and Canada fall back in their ranking; Netherlands moves up to position 7.

(The chart has now been changed from when first published, with corrected ISO codes for Canada, CA, and Belgium, BE)


Chart: The Imperial Pecking Order



Notes: The height of each bar is given by the country’s total index value, which is then broken down into the respective components. Countries are identified by their two-letter ISO code. Take care, because CH is Switzerland, not China (which is CN), and SA is Saudi Arabia, not South Africa (not shown, as it was ranked number 26).

I would reiterate that the position of an individual country can only properly be understood by looking at its relationship to the imperialist system as a whole, not simply by examining whether its index value is higher or lower than another’s. It would be foolish to say that a particular index number means a country is imperialist, while one that is a certain amount smaller shows that it is not. The index components summarise only particular dimensions of the system. Different measures would produce different results, and any index measure would have a problem grasping the dynamics of the system. However, the chart I use clearly indicates that a very small number of countries are head and shoulders, and elbows too, ahead of all the others in the world. Most other measures of international power would show similar results.


Tony Norfield, 1 November 2012