Showing posts with label Japan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Japan. Show all posts

Thursday, 18 July 2019

Debt Update


For the first time in a decade, the ratio of debt to GDP fell back in 2018 for both advanced and emerging market economies. It nevertheless remains high, much higher than at the start of the 2007-08 crisis, and has also continued to rise in some major economies.
The first chart shows the global picture, broken down into the two main country groups counted by the Bank for International Settlements. The ‘advanced’ countries are basically 22 rich ones; the ‘emerging market’ economies are 21 others.* Note also that the data cover the outstanding credit advanced to the non-financial sector, including non-financial corporations, the government and households.

Data for the ratio of debt-to-GDP are given in the next table. It shows that Japan remains a basket case, and its debt ratio has continued to rise. France looks to be in one of the worst positions among the major capitalist countries, with its debt ratio also rising and going above 300% of GDP. While the debt held by the French government has held steady, it has grown among households and corporations. This will keep President Macron and the Gilets Jaunes busy. Elsewhere among the euro countries, the debt ratio has been falling, notably in Germany. 

Total credit to the non-financial sector, 2013-18 (% GDP)


2013
2015
2017
2018
Advanced economies
268.4
266.5
277.3
265.5
Emerging market economies *
153.3
171.2
191.8
183.2





US
247.4
247.2
250.5
249.8
Japan
363.4
362.0
370.9
375.3
UK
267.7
267.1
283.1
279.3





China
212.7
239.3
253.4
254.0
South Korea
220.3
232.0
231.2
238.2





Germany
192.3
185.2
178.3
175.7
France
281.9
300.8
310.0
311.0
Italy
253.5
270.6
259.7
252.6
Euro area average
264.0
271.3
262.8
258.2


Brexit Britain saw the debt ratio fall a little in 2018, but the odds must be for a further rise of indebtedness this year and next. If likely PM-to-be BoJo can waste so much money as London mayor – from water cannons to garden bridges, buses and a cable car – just think what an empowered narcissist’s plans could be!


China’s debt ratio has risen among the fastest in the past decade or so. Yet the total, at close to 250%, has stabilised in the past year or so and is now similar to that in the US. Ironically, the breakdown shows that ‘communist’ China’s government debt ratio at just below 50% is only half that in the ‘free market’ US, where it registers close to 100% of GDP.
China’s household debt is also lower than in the US, but its non-financial corporate debt is much higher. Nevertheless, around 100% is a common government debt ratio for major countries. Even Germany’s is only just below 70%. So these data would suggest that China has plenty of room, if it chose, to boost its government debt and bail out any corporates in trouble (quite apart from the ability to use its $3.1 trillion of FX reserves).


Tony Norfield, 18 July 2019

Note: * The BIS emerging market economies are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand and Turkey.

Monday, 15 July 2019

China & World Trade

Just in case you had forgotten that China is a major part of the global economy, here is a chart from the Bank of England's Financial Stability Report. It shows that China's share of the international trade in goods is bigger than others for South America and Asia (including Japan and Australia). It is nearly as big as total European trade with the US.

Annoyingly, Africa is left out of the chart calculations, but I suspect China is also biggest there.


This is a stubborn fact that Trump and friends will find it difficult to deal with as they attempt to bully and isolate China in the world economy. It is also one reason they are very likely to fail.

Tony Norfield, 15 July 2019

Monday, 5 November 2018

Japan’s SoftBank: Tech Parasitism


The two Sons shake on $45bn
Masayoshi Son faced a dilemma in October: should the Japanese businessman go to an investment conference in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia? The guy running that conference had promised Son’s Vision Fund $45bn – that’s not a misprint, that’s forty-five thousand million US dollars – so not showing up would look more than a little ungrateful. He was also the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, next in line for the Saudi throne, and a person not known for taking lightly any lack of due respect. Yet the same guy had just been implicated in the murder and dismemberment of a journalist he did not like. While you and I would let this go as being just one of those things, the media and the political class of some powerful countries had shown themselves to be unhappy with the event. If Son attended the conference it could put his investment company SoftBank, and its Vision Fund, in an unfavourable light.
It was all so unfair. Nobody of any importance had complained about Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s exploits in Yemen that were killing off a whole population! Why make a fuss about a minor journalist being disappeared in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul? It was evidently all a matter of big power politics, and who was allowed to do what to whom and when. But the dilemma was nonetheless real for Masayoshi Son, given the risk of negative publicity for his investments in projects for the tech-wonderland future. After much consideration, he decided on a diplomatic compromise. He travelled to Riyadh to talk to the oil oligarch, but did not attend the conference itself.
Most people will not have heard of the Vision Fund, or of SoftBank, not least because both names sound like they were suggested by a bored publicist suffering business cliché indigestion on a dull afternoon. But it is worth paying them attention for the light they throw upon today’s imperialist world economy and how innovation becomes entrapped by a parasitic machine. SoftBank itself does not rank highly in the list of global corporations, with a stockmarket capitalisation of just $82bn at end-October. Yet its Vision Fund is the world’s largest ‘venture capitalist’. It specialises in investments in the technology sector and is reported to have investment funds available of nearly $100bn – of which more below.



The rising Son

In 1981, Masayoshi Son founded SoftBank in Japan, but for many years the company was almost unknown outside the country. It began as a distributor of packaged software, also getting into computer magazine publishing and running business events. By 1998, it had become big enough to have its shares listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and in 1999 it became a pure holding company aiming to expand its presence in other areas of the Internet and mobile technology sector. From the mid-1990s, SoftBank did a number of very profitable deals in Japan with US web services provider Yahoo, including one with Yahoo Japan of around $9bn which gave SoftBank 43% of the company. It also bought Vodafone’s Japanese mobile operation for $15bn in 2006 and, from the late 1990s, it began to make its first significant deals outside Japan.
SoftBank’s most successful investment has been in Alibaba of China. In 2000, SoftBank advanced a mere $20m for a 29% stake in Jack Ma’s fledgling company, plus a modest later investment. The value of this holding soared to $60bn when Alibaba went public in 2014, and is now valued at around $100bn. Other major SoftBank investments have been in 2012, when it invested $23bn in Sprint, the fourth largest mobile network operator in the US, in 2016 with the $31bn takeover of ARM Holdings, a UK-based chip designer for smartphones, and in 2017 with the $9bn or so put into the US ride-hailing company Uber for a 15% stake.
None of these have gone anywhere near as well for SoftBank as Alibaba. For example, Sprint, 83% owned by SoftBank, after losing market share and subscribers is now in the process of being rescued by a merger with T-Mobile US, owned by Deutsche Telekom. If that goes ahead, SoftBank will own 27% of the new business.
There have been many reorganisations and name changes of companies in the SoftBank group. Its portfolio of holdings has also increased dramatically in recent years, with investments ranging from a complete or near-complete takeover of another company to deals that involve SoftBank owning perhaps only 5-10% of its shares. The prices SoftBank paid for these have not always been clear, since it has often been part of a consortium of other funds that have bid for a stake in the particular venture.
Given SoftBank’s promoted image, a natural assumption is that all of its investments are in the ‘technology’ sphere. This would suggest e-commerce, mobile communications, online services and so forth. But often the investments extend into other areas that have little or no connection with these and may be just an online application to contact a service. Although the latter is a pervasive feature of the economy today, it is not so far removed from telephoning a company to make a booking, rather than being a sign of ‘hi tech’. Notable in this respect is WeWork, a US company leasing out office space in which SoftBank (and its Vision Fund arm) has already invested more than $4bn, and the $300m invested in the US-based Wag, a dog walking service! I will not mention SoftBank’s investment in a Japanese baseball team, the Fukuoka SoftBank Hawks.
Elements of this remind me of the dotcom equity market bubble of the late 1990s. One anecdote from that time was that a laundry company saw its share price soar once it had changed its name to laundry.com or something similar. SoftBank is not the laundry company, but its share price had also boomed in that market bubble, to around ¥19,000 in early 2000, but by November 2002 it had slumped to just ¥300. Happily for Mr Son and his shareholders, SoftBank’s equity price has since risen and was at around ¥9,000 by end-October. But the vulnerability of the company to changing fashions is seen in the 20% drop through that month, partly prompted by the declining fortunes of another ‘son’, Mohammad bin Salman. Such volatility is not uncommon in the markets for financial securities, but an examination of SoftBank’s accounts, and the new Vision Fund, shows that there is a lot going on behind the headlines.

No, not this robot dog, a real dog!
---

Assets, debt liabilities, income

SoftBank’s annual report for the year to end-March 2018 gives the basic picture for its assets, liabilities and income that still holds today. Two features stand out. Firstly, the company’s cash revenues have derived mainly from its telecom operations in Japan and the US; secondly, it has a lot of debt.
The telecom operations have the advantage of generating an inflow of cash, with regular subscriber payments and sales of mobile phones, and in the annual 2018 report these accounted for just over 70% of net sales and over 90% of adjusted earnings before interest, tax payments, etc, for the group as a whole. This cash comes in handy for SoftBank’s appetite to invest in other companies, but most of SoftBank’s requirements are instead met by its loans from banks or its issue of bonds. This has led Softbank to accumulate an unusually high level of debt, amounting to $160.4bn by the end of March 2018.
Financial markets focus on a measure of how much interest-bearing debt that the company has outstanding and compare that to the equity investment of the company’s owners in the company itself. This ‘debt-equity ratio’ is one indicator of a company’s ability to pay back its debt liabilities if its operations get into trouble. Outstanding debt levels and also the debt-equity ratio will be different for different kinds of company, but industrial and commercial companies rarely have a debt-equity ratio above 1 or 100%. In other words, their outstanding debt is not greater than how much equity the owners have invested in the company.
The debt-equity ratio is not necessarily high for companies in the tech sector. Even startups usually get funds from equity investors, rather than depending much, if at all, on long-term bank loans and issues of bonds. For example, in 2017 Alphabet-Google’s debt-equity ratio was less than 3% while Amazon’s, although higher, was still below the 100% level at 89%. In 2015, the year before SoftBank took it over, ARM Holdings had no outstanding debt at all. By stark contrast, SoftBank’s own debt-equity ratio in March 2018 was 271%, and a still high 220% counting only the long-term debt of $130.1bn.
This level of debt is a problem for SoftBank because the funds have been used to invest in a wide range of tech (and not so tech) companies, as already noted. As their market value changes, so will the value of these assets on SoftBank’s books, which makes the company very vulnerable to a change in financial market sentiment on the outlook for these ventures. Meanwhile, the debt remains until it is paid off, and until then it has to be serviced. In the year to March 2018, SoftBank’s net income from continuing operations was $11.7bn, but this figure had been reduced by the interest paid on its debt of $5.1bn.
How could SoftBank continue to expand its investment in tech companies when it already had high levels of debt? One way was to sell off some existing assets as a means to raise cash. An example earlier this year was the $4bn sale of its holding in Flipkart of India to the US giant retailer Wal-Mart, registering a gain of some $1.5bn. Back in April, SoftBank also used its stake in Alibaba as collateral for a bank loan of $8bn. Furthermore, there is a plan for the public sale of some shares in SoftBank’s mobile business in Japan, hoping to get as much as $30bn, although that hope is undermined by Japan’s regulator forcing mobile companies to cut their charges by as much as 40%. But the real scope for expansion lies with the venture noted at the beginning of this article: the Vision Fund.

Double Vision: $28bn becomes $72bn

SoftBank’s Vision Fund was set up in 2017 after being announced the previous year. It is included in SoftBank’s reports as a division that aims to target ‘long-term investments in companies and foundational platform businesses that seek to enable the next age of innovation’. While there are many other hyperbolic statements with which the Fund describes itself, and details of its structure can be confusing, I would recommend keeping the following points in mind to clarify what is going on.
The logic behind the fund’s existence is the limit on expansion that SoftBank faced with its high level of debt. Otherwise there would have been little reason for SoftBank to make big efforts to attract outside investors. Related to this, an important aspect of the Fund is that it has now given Masayoshi Son huge resources from these outside investors over which he has complete control. Meanwhile, SoftBank has not limited itself from undertaking any investments it likes outside of the Vision Fund set up.
SoftBank’s investment in the Vision Fund is reported as $28bn, with the other, external investors providing $72bn, to make up the $100bn when all funds are committed. That makes a good headline, but all is not what it seems. Not simply because most funds are committed rather than having yet been allocated, and the number does not yet quite add up to $100bn anyway. Let us assume that all the commitments will turn up. Instead, the main issue to puncture the headline bubble is that more than $15bn of the capital, and perhaps as much as $25bn or so, is not a pile of new cash waiting to be invested. It simply represents the value of existing investments held by SoftBank that the company has transferred from its main accounts to sit now under the Vision Fund heading.
At end-September 2018, the value of Vision Fund investments was $35.8bn, with an acquisition cost recorded at $28.1bn. A big chunk of this, represented by acquisition cost, consists of previous investments made by SoftBank. For example, a little over $8bn for 25% of SoftBank’s ownership of ARM Holdings, $5bn from its stake in Nvidia, a couple of billion from its stake in WeWork and some smaller investments, including in Wag. SoftBank’s $9bn holding of Uber will also be transferred to the Vision Fund, but this had not happened by end-September.[1]
These SoftBank ‘investments’ in the Vision Fund are not new cash that it can use to invest in other things. So its firepower is significantly less than the $100bn number promoted in the headlines, although it is still clearly a big number. The key point, however, is that by establishing the Vision Fund, SoftBank can get control of up to around $70bn more from the funds committed by other investors.
Under refurbishment: Vision Fund London office

Vision investors, debt and equity

SoftBank’s 28% of the Vision Fund would appear to give a higher weight to the external investors, who have 72%. But there is another complication: whether the investors have an equity stake in the fund or whether they buy the ‘preferred’ units of the Vision Fund that will pay them an annual coupon, as if they owned a debt security. According to a Financial Times report in June, the Vision Fund set up is where the external investors have 62% of debt and 38% of an equity stake in the Fund for every billion they put in. SoftBank therefore has a majority equity stake in the Vision Fund, given that all its 28% investment is for equity.
External investors in the Vision Fund are of two kinds, and each has a different motivation that I will give myself the freedom to speculate upon.
The first kind is the Gulf investors with $60bn of commitments: $45bn from the politically-devalued Crown Prince, allocated from Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund, and another $15bn from Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala Investment Company. These are funds that aim to boost the wealth of the already rich Gulf states by investing in something other than the low-yielding government bonds issued by the major powers.
It is not difficult for the Gulf investors in this venture to feel they are smart money capitalists when all they have to do is get a better return than on US Treasuries. The Vision Fund will have looked an attractive option, one full of a high tech optimism that helps obscure the reactionary reality back home, and doing so with a promised high return – for details of which see the next section.
The second kind of external investor is a group of four companies not new to the world of tech exploitation – Apple, Qualcomm, Foxconn and Sharp . They will offer $5bn in total to the Fund. For them, the amount is trivial, but it may give a reasonable return and it will also give them a valuable overview and early insight into developments that could impact their businesses.

‘Eat yourself’ returns and SoftBank upside

So what is the return for investors in the Vision Fund? These investors, and SoftBank itself, get paid in different ways, and this highlights that it is called the Vision Fund for a good reason.
Those who have equity stakes in the fund get the relevant portion of the returns from the portfolio of investments made, but that is after money has been deducted to pay for the annual 7% coupon on the Vision Fund debt securities purchased by external investors. While this 7% coupon looks attractive compared to other debt securities in the financial markets today, it may have escaped the external investors’ attention that this coupon payment will also reduce the return they will get from their equity stake. If the Vision Fund debt component amounts to $44.6bn (62% of the external $72bn), then around $3bn per annum will be deducted from the profits made on Vision Fund assets to deliver the external investors their coupon payments. They look to be protected from any downside in the equity and revenue performance by their fixed 7% coupon, but that leaves the tricky question of who will pay them the coupon money if the Fund’s return is insufficient.
The external investors will have noticed that they are paying SoftBank a management fee of around 1% for the privilege of running the Vision Fund, which could be up to $720m per annum. SoftBank will also cream off 20% of any return on investment over 8%. In the world of ‘venture capital’ investment funds, however, these conditions are, if anything, low cost.
Overall, the Vision Fund gives SoftBank a vast amount to finance future tech investments, and it gets around some of the constraints posed by SoftBank’s high debt levels. If there are difficulties paying the fixed 7% coupon, then that may be a Vision Fund problem with its investors, not a SoftBank problem of default on its bond liabilities.
Another important point is that the Vision Fund’s investments have delivered it very little in operating profit. Its recorded ‘income’ from its assets is overwhelmingly made up from capital gains on their market value, including unrealised gains. In the six months to end-September 2018, the operating income from the Vision Fund was around $5.5bn, but $1.5bn was from the gain on the sale of Flipkart and another $4bn or so was from increases in the value of Nvidia and some other assets. This points to problems that Mr Son’s venture will have in generating enough income when the market turns down.

Parasitic vision

In an interview with TechCrunch in September, a Vision Fund managing director set out the Fund’s investment policy. He explained that it was a ‘late stage growth fund’. It did not aim to give early advice to tech startups, but instead wanted to see how far they could become a key player in the market. If they were happy with a company’s plans, they would invest a minimum of $100m to finance its growth.
This reveals perhaps more than he realised. Yes, the Vision Fund provides a tech company with funds, but only after it has passed the difficult, uncertain, early stages of growth when survival is at risk, and when it now looks like the only barrier to dramatic expansion is a lack of funds. This is not so different from what a regular bank would do, except that the Vision Fund will make sure that it has an equity stake in what it hopes will be a rapidly growing business, rather than a bank that simply sees good market prospects as giving it confidence that a loan will be repaid. Far from being the daring investor backing ‘the next stage of innovation’, the Vision Fund is more like a money capitalist bean counter that will first ensure that all its boxes are ticked.
Another aspect of the Vision Fund shows that it understands the nature of the imperialist world market today, at least as it applies to the technology sector. The minimum $100m investment is to finance a big increase in the scale of operations of its chosen tech companies, both within their national sphere and internationally. A key feature of businesses that have communications technology as a core element is economies of scale. Here, much the same cost infrastructure is needed to service tens of millions of customers as for tens of thousands, except perhaps the need for a bigger computer server and some better software. Costs per customer will tend to fall rapidly and net revenues can rise sharply.
This is also something that leads to monopolisation of markets. Companies that are backed with funds to invest and expand when they have no operating profit and, like Uber, may be running at a loss, can still invest to sideline competitors. SoftBank and the Vision Fund are involved in this process. One example is the likelihood that SoftBank will play a part in carving up the ride hailing market, given its stake in Uber and in a number of other companies in that area, notably DiDi of China, but also Ola in India and Grab in Singapore. Recent business media reports suggest that these companies, which are often rivals in the same markets as well as having stakes in each other, could decide to ‘cooperate’.

Tech in the machine

What we find today are many examples of technical inventions and innovation, but all of these get bound up in the monopoly machine of imperialist economics and finance. Rather than communications technology being developed to benefit humanity, any good outcomes that may result depend first upon whether the innovation can meet the machine’s demands.
Paradoxes also abound, highlighted especially by how some of the most reactionary regimes in the world put up many billions of dollars to fund ‘progress’. One acute observer of the tech world, Evgeny Morozov, speculated that the ‘disruptive innovation’ backed by Saudi Arabia would include killer robots and the ability to smoothly dispose of dissidents’ bodies. But one must not lose sight of how these regimes are also part of the imperial money-go-round, with full backing from the US and the UK.
The tens of billions of dollars allocated to SoftBank’s Vision Fund are only a small sample of the massive funds potentially available worldwide to address everything from debilitating diseases, to malnutrition and environmental destruction. Instead they are advanced with a beady-eyed parasitism to find the right profitable niche in the market and monopolise it. Even then, the decisions on how the world’s resources will be used rest with a small number of multi-billionaires and the states that back them.

Tony Norfield, 5 November 2018


[1] In 2016, Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund had already invested $3.5bn in Uber, which faced strong competition from one of SoftBank’s other ride-hailing investments, in DiDi (which eventually took over Uber’s China operation, but also gave Uber a stake in the merged company). It has been reported that to avoid Saudi embarrassment of funding a competitor to Uber when it put money into the Vision Fund, SoftBank made sure that the DiDi holding was kept in a separate fund. This is shown in SoftBank accounts as the ‘Delta Fund’, but DiDi is its sole component as a $5bn investment.

Wednesday, 29 August 2018

Another Day Older and Deeper in Debt …




The question of debt is often absent from media coverage of the progress, or not, of the world economy. But a troubling problem is that debts have continued to rise since the 2007-08 crisis. Compared to the size of the economy, the total outstanding debt of the non-financial sector rose from just over 200% of GDP at the end of 2008 to over 244% at the end of 2017, with a 10 percentage point jump in 2017 alone.[1] Given that world economic growth remains weak, this is not likely to be a sign that optimism about future prospects has led to more borrowing for investment and consumption. Some recovery was likely once the banking system had been stabilised, but the latest numbers are the highest on record.
High debt is a dull, but debilitating burden for corporations, consumers and governments who have built up their borrowing. But this liability is also an asset for those who have lent their money or bought the debt securities. The latter include not only banks, but directly or indirectly, many corporations and consumers, especially the rich and those whose pensions and other income relies on interest and debt repayments. So the debt cannot just be wished away with no consequence. For example, even if banks wrote off the debts owed to them, this would damage their finances and risk insolvency, with further repercussions throughout the financial system, as became clear in the wake of the 2007-08 crisis.

Data details

The latest data from the Bank for International Settlements show a worse picture for global debt than indicated in a note I made on this blog a few months ago (see also the article with country details two years ago). As remarked before, the burden of debt will increase not only with its level – indicating how much has to be repaid eventually – but also with any extra funding cost that comes from higher interest rates.
On the latest data, both the ‘advanced’ countries and the ‘emerging market’ countries as a group showed a rise of debt compared to GDP in recent years. The rise in emerging market debt was from a much lower base, but much more rapid. Pictures for different countries are mixed, however.
Among the advanced countries, debt ratios stabilised in the US, though they have remained at a high 250% of GDP. They have fallen in Germany to around 175%, down from near 200% in 2010. In France, debt ratios have now risen to just over 300% of GDP; Japan remains the basket case, with a rate rising to 373%.

In emerging market countries, for many the debt ratio has stabilised in the past year or two. China’s rose strongly in the previous decade to just over 250% of GDP, but may have now flattened out. Similarly for South Korea, which now has a debt ratio of around 230%. Brazil’s debt ratio is lower and has steadied at around 150%. India’s is lower still, and has been flat at close to 125% of GDP.

Tony Norfield, 29 August 2018


[1] The figures are for the more than 45 areas reporting to the Bank for International Settlements, a group that includes all the major ‘G10’ countries and also the principal ‘emerging market’ countries such as China, Brazil, India, Russia, Korea, Indonesia, Philippines and Turkey.

Tuesday, 24 July 2018

Indian Boots on the Ground



Britain’s exploitation of India up to Partition and ‘independence’ in 1947 went much further than extracting investment and trading revenues and dominating its economy. Just consider the British Indian Army, established under British government control in 1858 after it took over from the East India Company. Manned by colonial Indian subjects, this force was critical for British imperialism’s many battles. In wars large and small, especially those outside Europe, against national liberation movements, uncooperative populations and rival powers, Indian troops greatly boosted the numbers of those who would fight and die for it.[1]
Prior to 1914, British armed forces had largely been used to police the Empire. Since Napoleon early in the 19th century and the Crimean War with Russia in mid-century, there had been little or no direct conflict with other major powers. British policy was to depend upon alliances with others, rather than to maintain a large standing army itself. So it was important to be able to draw upon a force of colonial troops when needed, including for the policing of the British Raj.
Important though they were for British power, Indian troops commonly faced racial discrimination, were looked down upon by white officers and were often used as cannon fodder, while also being given worse grade arms and equipment than regular British troops. Attractive as a cheap military resource for the Brits, these men could nevertheless see enlistment in the army as a reasonable option. There was regular pay and regular food, something not always available in the Indian economy dominated by British Empire interests – as became brutally clear with the Bengal famine in 1943.

Extra battalions

At the start of World War One in 1914, British army regular forces numbered less than 250,000, but they had grown to 3.8 million by 1918, including reserves, helped by conscription after volunteers proved insufficient. Over the same period, the British Indian Army grew from around 150,000 to more than one million, of which some 700,000 served overseas, making it a valuable additional force. This latter army fought in Ypres, Loos, Neuve Chapelle and Gallipoli, and in Mesopotamia (roughly corresponding to Iraq today), Palestine, Egypt and East Africa.
Although troop numbers fell back in the 1920s and 1930s, the Second World War and its aftermath saw a further utilisation of Britain’s Indian Army. Battle locations during the war included in North Africa (Tunisia, Libya and Egypt) and Europe (Italy, especially). A good book on this period notes that, in early 1942, “264,000 Indian troops were serving overseas, including 91,000 in Iraq, 20,000 in the Middle East, 56,000 in Malaya and 20,000 in Burma.”[2] By later that year, the Indian army had recruited another 600,000 men, and by the end of 1942 it stood at almost 1.55 million. Another 280,000 were recruited in 1943. By 1945, it had grown to some 2.5 million. This compared to 3.5 million in the British army you will more commonly read about.
Indian troops were, of course, used by the British to push back Japan’s wartime incursions into India itself. But the downside for the Brits in the early 1940s was that many Indian prisoners of war (held by the Axis powers) were ready to switch sides and join versions of the anti-colonial Indian National Army. Japan, in particular, made efforts to attract these forces.
Ahead of India’s independence, the Brits had to be a little cautious, but that did not prevent them from using Indian troops to help put down anti-colonial movements in Malaya, Vietnam and Indonesia. These were efforts by the much-lauded ‘socialist’ Labour Government to restore not just the British, but also the French and the Dutch to their former status. To add to the outrage, Britain also used just-defeated Japanese troops for the same purpose!
Despite demobilisation after 1945, by April 1946, “the Indian army still had two brigades in the Middle East; four divisions in Burma; three divisions in Malaya; four divisions in Indonesia; one division in Borneo and Siam (Thailand); a brigade in Hong Kong; and two brigades in Japan.” A division comprised roughly 10-15,000 men, and a brigade roughly 1,500-3,500 men.
Oh well, that’s enough about soldiers.

Tony Norfield, 24 July 2018


[1] The points below focus on Indian troops, but one should note that the British also used African troops and Chinese labourers in their war efforts. France also made great use of its African colonies. A good book detailing these points for the First World War is David Olusoga’s The World’s War: Forgotten Soldiers of Empire, Head of Zeus, 2014.
[2] This, the later quotation, and most of the information on Indian troop numbers, are taken from Srinath Raghavan, India’s War: the Making of Modern South Asia, 1939-1945, Penguin, 2017. For the post-1945 period, also see Christopher Bayley and Tim Harper, Forgotten Wars: the End of Britain’s Asian Empire, Allen Lane, 2007. A good online source for the history is here.

Friday, 16 December 2016

Trump and the US-Russia-China Triangle


Although it is the world’s major power, the US has found it difficult to impose its will in the past decade or so. From President Bush’s ‘mission accomplished’ speech about Iraq in 2003, to the continuing disasters in Afghanistan, Libya and Syria, from US policy in Ukraine also being upset by Russian intervention in Crimea, to how the Saudis and other Gulf states have destabilised the Middle East, the US has not been getting its own way and has been unable to impose settlements that would otherwise be expected of a hegemonic power. This puts the incoming US administration under The Donald in an interesting position.
Early signs suggest that POTUS-elect Trump is taking a softer line on Russia, one different from the still Cold War-inspired position of the Obama regime. Trump has stated that he expects the Europeans to pay more for their own NATO-related defence, which might make them less willing to finance an increased build up of military operations close to Russia’s borders. Trump has also rejected Obama’s rhetoric on Putin’s supposed involvement in Russia’s alleged cyber attack on Clinton’s emails. Perhaps most striking of all, Trump plans to appoint Rex Tillerson as US Secretary of State, that is to be the main person in charge of foreign policy. Tillerson is Chief Executive Officer of ExxonMobil, and is well known to have friendly relationships with the Russian government.
ExxonMobil opposed sanctions on Russia from its own business perspective, but one would have to agree that the aggression shown to Russia by the current US administration makes little economic or political sense. Russia is far from being a threat to US interests. Instead, Russia may have prevented the unravelling of Syria that was the direction of previous US policy, and which would have had a deleterious impact on the stability of the Middle East, with knock on impacts into Europe. For this reason, Trump’s likely Russian rapprochement makes sense, even if it will embarrass the Europeans.
All this, and more, is still to be determined, since the billionaire has yet to establish himself in the White House. However, it seems that while there is very likely to be a US-Russia rapprochement, the US political antagonism to China will continue under the Trump administration.
Under Obama and previous US presidents, Taiwan had remained in the limbo of being diplomatically isolated (it has not been a member of the UN since 1971, under the ‘one China’ policy) although politically and militarily supported by the US. But Trump took a call from Taiwan’s president, much to China’s displeasure, which saw the incident as an implicit recognition of Taiwan. This also makes sense from a US perspective. China is both a political and an economic threat to US interests, one that has been recognised in numerous US Congressional reports. China’s economic power has seen it gain influence in Africa, Latin America and Asia, often giving governments in these regions an alternative to the US-dominated world financial and economic system.
More pointedly for the current political climate, it is China, rather than Russia or anywhere else, which is being singled out as the country that is being ‘unfair’ in trade and taking American jobs. An anti-Chinese political stance makes far more sense for the US on many more levels than the anti-EU stance does for the UK, since it not only appeals to the latest domestic populism but also coincides with longer-term US strategic interests.
Trump’s election is one more sign of a shift in the tectonic plates of the imperial world economy. It will impact not only US relationships with Russia and China, but also the position of Europe, and even the acceptability of Russia outside Europe. Interestingly, in the past day or so, Russian President Putin had a meeting in Japan with Japan’s Prime Minister Abe on the Northern Territories/Kurile Islands, an area of dispute between the two countries since the end of World War Two. No resolution was made, and no peace treaty agreed on this, but there were 80 documents signed, including 68 on planned commercial deals between the two countries.

Tony Norfield, 16 December 2016

Tuesday, 1 November 2016

Trouble in the Money Machine


Since 2008, the world’s major central banks have adopted extraordinary measures to stop a slump in the economy and to try and rescue the financial system from collapse. But while ultra-low, even negative interest rates, and quantitative easing (buying securities from the financial system) have stabilised the system for now, such policies have done little to generate growth. The economy has managed to get up from the floor, but is still staggering around and cannot climb the stairs. Meanwhile, the monetary ‘medicine’ is generating its own problems for banks and causing dislocation in the money markets.
Consider what, in recent years, has been a little noticed feature of the financial system: the ‘velocity of money’. This concept was key for simple versions of monetarist economic theory, ones that tried to explain the growth in nominal output (the money value of GDP, for example) by the growth in the money supply. I will leave aside discussion of that theory here, and just note that the monetarists usually assumed that the velocity of money was stable, in other words a given percentage rise in the money supply would lead to the same rise in the value of nominal output.[1] The fundamental equation was:
MV = PT
where
M is the money supply, however defined
V is how fast the given money supply circulated in the economy (its velocity)
P is the average price level and
T is the volume of transactions.
So, if V is fixed, a rise or fall in M feeds directly into the nominal value of transactions PT. The T term is often also taken to be the volume of output or income.
Apart from other problems with the theory – there are many – the biggest and most evident problem is that the V term is not fixed. In fact, it has been declining steadily during the crisis in all major countries! This indicates that rather than there being a stable, functioning monetary system, instead it is one that has been seizing up.
The next chart shows the pattern of moves in the velocity of money for the US, the euro area, the UK and Japan over the past 16 years or so.[2] Velocity is measured as nominal GDP divided by the most common definition of money supply in each area. Different definitions give different ratios, so the numbers have been standardised to equal 100 for each in Q1 1999.
In each area, the money supply has risen over the period shown, but the nominal value of GDP has risen by much less, so that the velocity measure has fallen. Japan’s nominal GDP did not even rise at all between 1999 and 2016! Only in the UK has nominal GDP risen by more than the money supply (since the end of 2009), but the velocity of money is still 20% below its level in 1999.[3]


Velocity of Money (nominal GDP/M): US, euro area, UK & Japan (Index Q1 1999 = 100)



The velocity of money is a summary measure of many things that happen in the capitalist economy, since it compares the aggregate of GDP, a measure of total output, with the aggregate of diverse components of cash in circulation, bank deposits, etc. It is a useful index, nevertheless, and the general decline in the velocity of money is a clear sign that central bank monetary policy has less ability to have an impact on the nominal growth of the economy, despite their efforts to ward off the threat of deflation.

Tony Norfield, 1 November 2016


[1] The basic monetarist idea was that a rise in money supply only led to higher prices, with no lasting change in real output, and that nominal output rose only because of the higher prices.
[2] Data for the US are for M2, M3 for the euro area, M4 for the UK and M2 for Japan. Available numbers only go up to 2013 for Japan, mid-2015 for the UK and early 2016 for the US and the euro area.
[3] I’m not sure why the UK velocity number has risen since 2009, whereas others have fallen, and may look into it further.

Sunday, 2 October 2016

Pictures of Trouble

Two charts from the Bank of England sum up interesting aspects of capitalism's problems today.

First, the decline in long-term government bond yields. These have been on a steady downward trend since 1990 (actually, for even longer, since the mid-late 1980s), as shown in the following chart which gives GDP-weighted average 10-year yields for the top 20 countries. It is not only that nominal yields have fallen alongside lower inflation, but 'real yields' have also fallen and are now negative. The estimate of real yields is only approximate, but the picture is clear enough.

Chart 1: 10-year government bond yields, 1990-2016




The drop in yields has been accentuated by central bank asset purchases under 'quantitative easing' (QE) policies, but not fully explained by them. Outside Japan, QE only got going from 2008. Lower yields are a problem for pension funds and other bond investors, while making the huge debts accumulated by borrowers (see earlier articles on the blog) somewhat easier to service and pay back. This delicate, unstable balance results from the difficulties the capitalist economy has had producing enough profit, or growing enough to produce anything extra at all.

Chart 2: Central bank balance sheets, 2006-2018



The second chart shows the shows the rise in central bank balance sheets as a percentage of GDP. This has come about as a result of QE policies, and the Bank of Japan (note that only Japan is measured on the left hand axis), the Bank of England and the European Central will add to their accumulated assets in the next few years. Only in the US has the share of GDP not gone up recently, and is not projected to under current policies. Even for the US, the absolute holdings of Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities are not likely to fall by much.


Tony Norfield, 2 October 2016

Friday, 9 September 2016

Shifting World Corporate Power

Those who like international comparisons that highlight the shift in global power will be interested in the following table. It is from research by Paul Kellogg, University of Toronto, published in 2015, and shows the geographical breakdown of the 2,000 largest public corporations, ie those whose shares are quoted on stockmarkets.

There is a striking decline of the US, Europe and Japan over this period, countered by a rise of the BRICS countries, but mainly China. To some extent, China's data will also have been boosted by the stockmarket bubble in 2014, which burst in 2015. But the underlying trend is nevertheless clear, and China's stockmarket in 2016 has since recovered to and beyond 2014 levels. As Kellogg puts it: 'In 2004 there were just 50 corporations from China on the full list of 2,000 (25 of which in Hong Kong). By 2010, the Hong Kong total had jumped to 49, the total in all of China to 162. In 2014 the Hong Kong total stood at 58, the total for all China at 207.'


My only quibble with the table is that he would have better shown only one decimal place in the numbers!

Tony Norfield, 9 September 2016

Sunday, 4 September 2016

The Debt Mountain

Financial debts are obligations to pay back the creditor. This may not happen, either because the debt is 'forgiven' (rarely) or because it otherwise gets written off in a deal to restructure future payment obligations in a way that looks more plausible to the creditors, who may be banks, insurance companies, pension funds or other private sector asset managers, or another government or public sector organisation. For the major powers, being in such a situation is a little tricky. They are meant to be on the disciplining, creditor end of the balance, even if they also happen to be in a lot of debt themselves. However, a recent set of data from the Bank for International Settlements indicates that, despite the much-vaunted recovery of the world economy from its acute crisis phase, debt ratios to GDP have generally gone up in recent years in the key countries. Even where the debt ratio appears to have fallen a bit, this hides a wide range of other, not-counted obligations (implicit debts) that may be hidden off budget, or are deep in the details of the relevant central bank accounts.

The following chart for five key countries shows the picture for the 2000-2015 period. Japan remains an outlier, with far and away the highest debt ratio of 388% of GDP in 2015. Having had such a long deflationary depression, even an earthquake and tsunami leading to dreadful nuclear radiation fallout from the Fukushima plant could not induce the comatose economy (and political class) to wake up.  The UK looks in a slightly better position, although its recent lower debt ratio ignores the run up of Bank of England liabilities, plus many other off-budget items. The US debt ratio has stabilised in the past five years or so, but this has been despite the supposed recovery of the economy, and also ignores the post-2008 accumulation of Federal Reserve 'assets', including nearly two trillion dollars of mortgage securities bought from banks. France's debt ratio has continued to rise. Germany's has fallen, helped by the stronger economy. But the latter calculation ignores the liability of Germany, at the heart of the eurosystem's finances, where endless volumes of dodgy 'assets' have been accumulated by the European Central Bank, whose main shareholder is the German state.

So, following my usual caveats about what data really cover and what is ignored, here is a chart of how the total debt ratio of the non-financial sector (including governments, households and non-financial companies) in five countries has developed in the past fifteen years:




Tony Norfield, 4 September 2016

Tuesday, 3 June 2014

Robots and the Organic Composition of Capital


This week, London's Financial Times has decided to get back to what it is good at and report on some interesting economic developments: robots. The articles in this series promise to have much more value for those analysing the world than the FT's editorial line on Ukraine, Russia, Syria, Iran and other issues; opinions that simply reflect the discomfiture of the Anglo-American elite about things that are moving outside their control.
Robotisation of manufacturing processes has been under way for many years, but it seems to have accelerated recently. In the case of Foxconn, already reported on this blog, one pressure for robot innovation was the rise in wages among assembly line workers. However, in an effort to cut costs a number of production processes require not only a speed and accuracy that manual labour cannot achieve, but also a physical scale of operations that only robots can manage. Try carrying a 2.5 metre glass panel used for producing LCD displays that is only 0.5mm thick without breaking it. Or try to measure to an accuracy of 0.05mm. There is also a development in lightweight 'collaborative' robots that are used more directly by workers, and that are less likely to crush their human counterparts.
Here are some key points:
  • South Korea had the largest number of robots per manufacturing employee in 2012: 396 per 10,000. Japan's figure was 332, Germany's 273 and China's only 23.
  • Japan has the most industrial robots in total with more than 310,000 in 2012. The US had 168,000; Germany, 162,000; South Korea, 139,000; China, 96,000; Canada, 18,000; UK 15,000; India, 7,800; Brazil, 7,600.
  • China is growing fastest, however, with robot sales increasing at an average annual rate of 36% from 2008 to 2013.
  • The automotive industry accounted for some 70,000 of the overall 179,000 robot sales in 2013, followed by the electronics industry (35,000) and food (6,200).
  • Lightweight robots cost around $35,000 each; the big guys cost more like $100,000 or above.
  • Robotics companies from Japan, Switzerland and Germany dominate the market, with some important companies also based in the US, UK and Denmark.
One implication of these developments is an increase in manufacturing productivity. Another is the increase in what Marx called the 'organic composition of capital': where there is not only a rise in the mass of machinery and raw materials compared to labour power employed, but also a rise in the value of such machinery and raw materials compared to the value of that labour power. The result in recent years has been evident for South Korea, as shown in the following chart, taken from a McKinsey Global Institute report.


From 1995-2010, Korean output grew dramatically, at more than 7% per annum, but productivity grew still faster, at more than 9%, so that employment actually fell. Korean companies, like others, also shifted their operations overseas to take advantage of lower wages elsewhere.

Tony Norfield, 3 June 2014