Showing posts with label profits. Show all posts
Showing posts with label profits. Show all posts

Thursday, 24 November 2016

Financial Claims on the World Economy


François Chesnais, Finance Capital Today: Corporations and Banks in the Lasting Global Slump, Brill, Leiden, 2016
This book is well worth reading. It is written in a clear and accessible style and discusses key points about the limitations of capitalism and the role of contemporary finance. Perhaps its most important point is how the financial system has accumulated vast claims on the current and future output of the world economy – in the form of interest payments on loans and bonds, dividend payments on equities, etc. These claims have outgrown the ability of the capitalist system to meet them, but government policy has so far managed to prevent a collapse of financial markets with zero interest rate policies, quantitative easing, huge deficits in government spending over taxation, and so forth. The result is an unresolved crisis, a ‘lasting global slump’, in which economic growth remains very weak and vast debts remain in place.
There are two related points in his approach to the world economy and finance that distinguish Chesnais from many other writers, and for which he deserves to be commended. Firstly, he states clearly that we are in a crisis of capitalism tout court (pp1-2), not a crisis of ‘financialised’ capitalism – the latter being one that could presumably be fixed if only the evil financiers were dealt with by a (capitalist) reforming government. Secondly, he takes ‘the world economy as the point of departure’ for his analysis, although that is ‘easier said than done’ (p11). While he shows the central role of the US, he avoids the wholly US-centred analysis common to radical critics of contemporary capitalism, and instead highlights how the other powers also play a key part in the imperial machine.
Finance Capital Today helps the reader’s understanding of the realities of contemporary global capitalism by providing a wealth of material evidence. It also helps one to clarify views about what is going on by discussing the theoretical context. In this review I will highlight the key points raised in the book and also discuss where I have a number of differences with Chesnais. These differences are sometimes merely of emphasis, or what may look like simply an alternative definition of a commonly used term. However, poor formulation of an argument can also lead to theoretical problems.
Chesnais begins by outlining the origins of the 2008 crisis, arguing that this had been postponed since 1998 by the growth of debt in the US and elsewhere, and by the surge of growth in China. In 2008, ‘the brutality of financial crisis was accounted for by the amount of fictitious capital accumulated and the degree of vulnerability of the credit system following securitisation’. The backdrop to the latest phase of crisis was also one that has made this crisis a global one to a degree unknown to previous crises (p25). It involved a far more integrated world economy, following the break up of the USSR and the incorporation of many more countries into the world trade and financial system. The crisis is one characterised by ‘over-accumulation of capital in the double form of productive capacity leading to overproduction and of a “plethora of capital” in the form of aspiring interest-bearing and fictitious capital’. But major governments tried to prevent the crisis from running its course in the way that occurred in the 1930s (p35).
Within the global set up, Chesnais has an interesting view of China, which he characterises as not suffering national domination by the major powers (p43). He notes its subordinate position in the world division of labour, having offered its cheap labour workforce up to the world market, but includes this as part of the development of the world market rather than being a sign of its oppression in the Leninist sense. This reflects the mixed dimensions of China’s economic and political status, and one that I would also characterise as being in transition to the premier league of major powers (China is actually number three in my ranking of countries by global power).[1]
Chapter 3 is titled ‘The Notion of Interest-Bearing Capital in the Setting of the Present Centralisation and Concentration of Capital’. This is an important topic, but one in which Chesnais’s commendable approach is let down by his exposition. He starts by arguing that ‘the channelling of surplus value in contemporary capitalism, through both the holding of government loans and the possession of stock, by a single small group of highly concentrated financial and non-financial corporations and private high-income-bracket asset holders, requires that several features of interest-bearing capital that were treated partly separately by Marx now be approached in toto’ (p67). I would certainly agree with this, especially since the relevant section in Capital, Volume 3, is a complete mess, one that Engels found extremely difficult to edit and to try and salvage. However, Chesnais does little to develop the argument at this point, and he tends to keep it focused on banks. Only later in the book does he explain better how interest-bearing capital is a more universal phenomenon for modern capitalism. Even then, I would argue that the forms it takes, especially in proprietary trading, are not fully or well explained by taking interest to be the source of revenue, or, as he notes from Hilferding, by taking one speculator’s gain as a loss to another speculator.[2]
This chapter also contains a discussion of two issues of Marxist theory on finance. One is the difference of opinion between myself (and others) and Costas Lapavitsas on the question of banks ‘exploiting’ workers through the charging of interest on loans, etc (pp76-77). He correctly notes that this interest is, in any event, only a small portion of bank profits, not the big event claimed by the ‘exploiting’ school. However, citing Rosa Luxemburg, he comes down on the side of the view that these deductions are a reduction of the value of labour-power. I disagree, and not only because Luxemburg’s judgements in matters of economic theory, let alone political strategy, leave very much to be desired. My argument, which Chesnais cites, is that the charging of interest does not by itself suggest a lowering of the value of labour-power. If this interest deduction became a significant part of workers’ incomes, then wages would tend to rise to offset this, making it effectively a deduction from corporate profits. This is not to exclude that the value of labour-power can be forced down, but it is in the febrile imagination of the anti-finance populists that this process results from banks charging workers interest on loans.
A second issue of theory raised in Chapter 3 is on the question of bank lending. In contrast to many other Marxists, Chesnais recognises that banks can themselves create new deposit assets. However, he confusingly calls these ‘fictitious capital’ (p84). This is a relatively common perspective, as seen also in David Harvey’s The Limits to Capital, but it is not consistent with Marx’s definition. A bank loan can be created out of thin air by a bank, and is not dependent upon a ‘real’ deposit of cash, so in that sense it is indeed fictitious. But it should then simply be called a ‘fictitious’ deposit or asset of the bank. Fictitious capital, by contrast, can most easily be described as a financial security that is traded in the market and which has a price that is a function of interest rates and future expectations of returns to the buyer of that security.[3] That is not true of bank deposit or loan assets, which remain on the bank’s books. Only if the loan assets later became securitised – that is, when the loans are the basis for payments made to owners of a tradeable security – would they become fictitious capital This was the gist of Marx’s definition of fictitious capital, although one that was not clearly spelled out in Capital (and neither was his view of bank loans/deposits). To call bank loans or deposits ‘fictitious capital’ can only lead to confusion when analysing developments in contemporary financial markets.
Chapter 4 is my favourite of the whole book. Titled ‘The Organisational Embodiments of Finance Capital and the Intra-Corporate Division of Surplus Value’, it does not bend to media demands for a snappy one-liner, but it does provide the reader with valuable information and analysis. Chesnais discusses the different forms of the evolution of capitalism in today’s major powers, focusing on Germany, the US, the UK and France. He examines the relations between the state, private corporations, banks and imperial power. While noting the importance of pension funds from the 1990s as major equity owners of big corporations, he argues that ‘rather than bankers, it is industrialists with financial connections that form the core of the European corporate community’ (p108). Despite some views that there is an ‘international’ capitalist class, his view, with which I agree, is that the main groups of ‘finance capitalists’ are domiciled within single countries.
One important point he makes, and one that he could have developed more, is how in contemporary capitalism, by contrast to the views of Marx and Hilferding, merchant capital (essentially commercial capital and finance) is not subordinate to industry, although it is dependent upon industrial profit, (p113). However, he does discuss the role of large commodity traders and retailers. In my view, this reflects the way in which the major powers have used the financial/commercial system to consolidate their economic privileges, something that was true for the UK even from the mid-late nineteenth century. Today, as most people should be aware, it is the poorer, subordinated countries that do most of the producing, at least in the non-monopolised fields of production.
In Chapters 5 and 6, Chesnais covers global oligopolies and the operations of international companies. He reviews theories of monopolisation and how the development of the European single market was favourable both for European and for US corporations. There is some overlap in this material with that covered by John Smith’s book, Imperialism in the Twenty-First Century (Monthly Review, 2016), with a predatory appropriation of value by the ‘buyer-driven global commodity chains’ of the major corporations (p161). However, Chesnais disagrees with Smith’s earlier work on a number of points, and argues that China, India and Brazil are not in the classical position of being oppressed countries, having a different, and higher, status in the world market. On a separate, important point regarding data on the global economy, Chesnais notes UNCTAD’s estimate that about 80% of global trade is linked to the international production networks of international companies, and that it would be wrong to focus on foreign direct investment data as giving a complete picture of international investment. This is due both to the blurring of lines between FDI and portfolio investment and to the importance of offshore centres as the apparent location of the headquarters of many companies.
Chapter 7 discusses the globalisation of financial markets and new forms of fictitious capital. This is a useful review of the growth of financial markets, although it relies very much on secondary sources, so the data is already several years out of date, and his coverage of financial derivatives misleadingly characterises them as being ‘claims on claims’, when derivatives are better described as difference contracts based on the price of the underlying security to which they refer. The fundamental point he makes is nevertheless that the apparent diversion of investment to financial markets has been prompted by the decline in profitable investment opportunities (p174). The chapter concludes with a review of financial and (foreign) debt developments in Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina and South Africa, including the role of ‘vulture funds’ dealing in Argentina’s defaulted debt.
Chapters 8 and 9 discuss contemporary developments in financial markets, focusing on banking and credit. This is well-covered ground, but is useful for those who are less familiar with recent history, and especially so in explaining the development of mortgage-backed securities, ‘universal banks’ in Europe, the monopolisation of banking, shadow banking, etc. There is also a discussion of how ‘leverage’ – ie borrowing to fund the growth of assets – rose to extreme levels due to the decline in profitability among financial companies (pp221-). I would note, however, the publisher’s poor proofreading: ‘over-the-counter’ (OTC) securities dealing is described as ‘off the counter’ in Chapter 7 and here has the designation ‘ODT’.[4]
Chapter 10 highlights ‘global endemic financial instability’ and points out that there is a ‘plethora of capital in the form of money capital centralised in mutual funds and hedge funds, bent on valorisation through the holding and trading of fictitious capital in the form of assets more and more distant from the processes of surplus value production. Financial profits are harder and harder to earn’ (p245). I would go further and also note how asset managers, pension funds and insurance companies – far more important investors in financial markets than hedge funds or mutual funds – are now finding their mountain of assets unable to generate the returns they have, implicitly or explicitly, promised, although Chesnais does mention this later in the chapter.
The ‘plethora of capital in the form of money capital’ is related to the declining profitability of capitalist investment. Chesnais notes how official reports, from the Bank for International Settlements, for example, allude to this problem, but also how they also mix in a description of low productivity growth and low economic growth in general. He correctly makes the point that the fall in interest rates long preceded the ‘quantitative easing’ policies that occurred after 2008.[5]
It is difficult to spell out these relationships empirically, given the available data, and Chesnais does not try to do this. It is also important to distinguish the rate of interest from the rate of profit on capital investment, which are two different things. However, I would suggest a measurement of how much global financial assets have accumulated – meaning principally equities, bonds and bank loans – against some measure of absolute global profitability over time. This would measure how far the financial claims on social resources have grown, in the form of interest and dividend payments, compared to the surplus revenues available to pay off these claims. My initial work on this suggests a decline in the rate of return from 2007 to 2014, whatever the more distorted profitability figures available for the US alone might say, data that are often used by people wanting a ready calculation of the ‘rate of profit’. The rate of return I suggest is not a ‘Marxist rate of profit’, as traditionally understood, but it would better reflect the malaise of the global capitalist system, especially from the perspective of the major claimants upon its resources, the ones based in the rich powers!
Chesnais finishes his book with two themes. One is a lament on the lack of Marxist study in universities and the lack of journals in which Marxist studies of capitalism can be published. This is true enough, and I am glad not to have been an undergraduate university student in the past few decades! Even apparently radical journals such as the UK’s Cambridge Journal of Economics are basically rather conservative in outlook, and are dominated by a facile Keynesian approach that dismisses a Marxist perspective out of hand if it upsets their advocacy of ‘progressive’ policies for the capitalist state to consider. Repeating radical consensus nonsense will get a pass; revealing the imperial mechanism of power has to jump a hundred hurdles to be an acceptable journal article. Such is the almost universal climate in academia today, despite the evidently destructive outcomes from the system they claim to be analysing.[6] Ironically, this is why the most trenchant and incisive critiques of capitalism today – at least from a descriptive point of view – often come from analysts working in the financial markets. They have to tell their clients what is really going on!
Friends have suggested to me that the situation for critical academics is even worse in the US, something I find easy to believe. I have some knowledge of, and better hope for, the development of a more critical intellectual climate coming from outside the Anglosphere. This should not be too difficult to achieve.
The second concluding remark by Chesnais is the question of how a new phase of capital accumulation might emerge. There is the plethora of (fictitious) capital with its claims on social revenue that cannot be met, but which, on the other hand, has not been devalued in a crisis collapse, because the major governments have done their best to prevent it, fearing the consequences. Chesnais discusses technical innovation to some extent, but sees this as being overshadowed by capital’s degradation of the environment. One is left with the ‘notion of barbarism, associated with the two World Wars and the Holocaust’ (p267). That is a downbeat but telling point about the progress of opposition to imperialism today. In the main imperial countries, the answer to the question of ‘Socialism or Barbarism’ is biased in favour of the latter.
Finishing on a more general comment, my own preference is to avoid the term ‘finance capital’ completely, whereas the book is titled Finance Capital Today. The term is associated with Hilferding and used by Lenin, but the definition is too bound up with Hilferding’s notion that banks control industry. This was not a good description of the situation in the early 20th century, and is far less true today. Chesnais would accept this and instead defines ‘finance capital’ as the ‘simultaneous and intertwined concentration and centralisation of money capital, industrial capital and merchant or commercial capital as an outcome of domestic and transnational concentration through mergers and acquisitions’ (p5). He explains how the different forms of finance capital evolved in different countries, making an important distinction between the privileges of the major powers and the subordinate position of others. I would go along with this definition, but I would argue for putting fictitious capital at the centre of attention, not ‘finance capital’. This would show more clearly that what Marx called the ‘law of value’ is today mainly expressed, or at least expressed more directly, via the markets for financial securities, rather than in the markets for commodities, although the latter are of course important. A company’s ability to access funds and at what cost, via the equity market or bond market, or a government’s ability to borrow and spend, is each signalled by the markets for their securities. These markets show what is good, bad and acceptable in the imperialist world economy today.

Tony Norfield, 24 November 2016


[1] See my book, The City: London and the Global Power of Finance, Verso, 2016, p111.
[2] The City, pp144-147.
[3] For an explanation, see The City, pp83-92.
[4] The book is expensively priced, so order it for your library! The book will be cheaper when later published in paperback, however.
[5] See the note on this blog from a Bank of England report here.
[6] It works like this. Academic journals are graded according to their supposed value, and getting an article published in a highly ranked journal is the objective of all academics. Think what you like about the journal’s real worth, these grades are important for the scores achieved by contributors in the assessment they get from their universities, and, most importantly, in the assessment of their universities for government funding purposes. Over recent decades, this has led to a small group of mainstream, conservative, uncritical journals becoming the favoured destination for research articles, which in turn means that academics orient their work to what these journals will accept. It is a machine for generating very little worth reading, and also a system for maintaining a conservative status quo. That system is further maintained by a journal editorial board and a group of ‘peer reviewers’ with the same general outlook. A similar mechanism also leads academics to have absurdly long bibliographies and excessive citations in their articles, since citing their friends will encourage the return favour, and citations are another means by which academic value is assessed.

Monday, 25 January 2016

The City: London and the Global Power of Finance


My new book, The City: London and the Global Power of Finance, will be published by Verso Books on 12 April 2016. Below I note reviews that it has received so far and give a full list of the contents. Details for ordering the book, which will be available both in hardback (price £20 or less) and as an ebook (around £14), are available on the Verso website and on Amazon.
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“Tony Norfield has provided a strikingly original take on the international financial system by placing it systematically within the world imperialist structure of power. He rejects the currently fashionable path of interpreting the ascent of finance by looking at how the leading financial sector agents, operating by way of banks, hedge funds, private equity firms, and the like, manipulate the political-economic game to increase their own personal wealth, while downplaying any useful economic functions they might be fulfilling. He insists, on the contrary, that finance be understood as a form of power deriving from the economic-cum political capacity to compete at the highest levels of global capitalism, which simultaneously endows a limited group of countries and corporations disproportionate access to the world s resources and operates as the system's indispensable nerve center. Norfield's unusual clarity as both an analyst and expositor is reflected in his ability to lay out for his readers an easy-to-grasp introduction to how finance works today in the process of offering a detailed historically-rooted account of the multiple hierarchies and privileged relationships through which global economic domination is constructed and reproduced. The City is a tour de force, which will soon be recognized as a formidable challenge to conventional wisdom and an essential contribution in its own right.”
Robert Brenner, author of The Economics of Global Turbulence

“This book does the seemingly impossible: rendering finance's mysteries transparent to the average reader, and at the same time delivering a penetrating analysis of the global economic system that will enlighten even experts. Tony Norfield has written a truly exciting and important book.”
Paul Mattick, author of Business as Usual

"It is not every day you read a book about global finance by a banker who quotes Lenin approvingly on page two. Unlike many of those who produce Marxist critiques of financial capitalism, Norfield writes from a position of experience: he has worked in the belly of the beast, and the book is the better for it... Just after the financial crisis, Rolling Stone magazine called Goldman Sachs the “vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity”. In this book, Norfield extends the metaphor to call London the “vampire’s blood bank”. In The City, he has done the research and pulled together the financial statistics that explain how the bloodsucking works.”

Brooke Masters, Financial Times*


“The City is a valuable addition to the critical analysis of the financialisation of our world. And Tony Norfield is an experienced and radical guide to London's role in this process. This book should be required reading for both bankers and activists alike.”
Joris Luyendjik, author of Swimming with Sharks: My Journey into the World of the Bankers



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface

Chapter 1            Britain, Finance and the World Economy
World economic and financial power
Britain’s invisible empire
Understanding finance and imperialism
Insights, conspiracies and policy contingencies
The ‘End of History’ revisited
History wakes up
‘New Deal’ and no deal
The system

Chapter 2            The Anglo-American System
British or American finance?
Anglo-American financial relationships in transition
Building beyond the Empire
New York versus London
The Anglo-American euromarket
British capitalism, finance and official policy
Eurobonds and London’s international role
Historical logic

Chapter 3            Finance and the Major Powers
Regime change
British imperial strategy and the pound
State policy on financial markets from 1979
Finance and the major powers
Gravity and the global system

Chapter 4            Power and Parasitism
Money-capitalists and financial institutions
Interest-bearing capital
Banks
Brokers
Asset managers
Insurance companies
Pension funds
Bank credit creation
Financial securities and economic power
The flexible noose
Finance and the rule of capital
Financial parasitism

Global parasitism, investment, trade and finance
Who reaps the returns?
Finance as a normal part of the system

Chapter 5            The World Hierarchy
The premier league
Capitalism and the state
The state and finance
Monopoly and imperialism
Monopoly today
World projection of power

Chapter 6            Profit and Finance
Return on equity and leverage
Comparing profits
Financial assets and derivatives
Financial revenues, surplus value and securities
Trading revenues
The rate of profit and capital’s limits
Outcomes
Profits, financial and global developments
Moribund capitalism

Chapter 7            The Imperial Web
Currency, trade and seigniorage
‘Exorbitant privilege’
Running the world banking system: US dollar power
Financial services exports
Equity markets, financial power and control
Carving up the market
The daily grind

Chapter 8            Inside the Machine
Number crunching
The surplus from City dealing
Global capitalism’s financial broker
UK financial account: FDI, portfolio flows and bank funding
UK assets, liabilities and returns
The City’s global network, tax havens and global finance
Nice work, if you can get it

Chapter 9            Eternal Interests, Temporary Allies
‘Open for business’
Economics and domestic politics
Islamic finance and the City
China, BRICS and the Anglo-American system
Finance and the rule of capital


List of Tables
3.1       UK, Germany, France – patterns of trade, 1980 and 90 (% of total)
3.2       Financial market shares of major powers, 1980-2001 (% of total)
5.1       Corporate control by controlling company, 2007
6.1       UK monetary financial institutions’ financial balance sheet
7.1       Financial services export revenues, 2000-2013
7.2       Equity market capitalisation and turnover, 2013
8.1       UK current account balance and components, 1987-2014
8.2       External positions of banks, end-2014
8.3       Foreign exchange turnover, 1995-2013
8.4       OTC interest rate derivatives turnover, April 2013
8.5       UK financial account net annual flows, 1987-2014
8.6       Net external position of UK MFIs by location

List of Charts
5.1       The global pecking order, 2013-2014
6.1       Leverage ratios of major international banks, 2007–2011
6.2       Leverage ratios of major UK banks, 1960-2010
6.3       US corporate rate of profit, 1948-2013
6.4       US Federal Reserve financial support stays in place
8.1       Key components of the UK current account, 1987-2014
8.2       UK net foreign investment stock position, 1989-2014
8.3       Returns on UK foreign investment assets and liabilities, 1990-2014


Tony Norfield, 25 January 2016

* note of the FT review was added on 8 May 2016

Thursday, 25 August 2011

Bank Profits & Leverage


There is something peculiar about banks. They borrow cash from people, companies and governments, and lend to people, companies and governments. They deliver ‘financial services’. But, in the process, the closest they ever come to producing anything is when they provide the funds for somebody else to do the producing. Despite this, they gain a great deal of profit. This article is about bank profits and the influence on profits of leverage.

The nature of banks

The modus operandi of banks has traditionally been to attract surplus funds from the broad economy, and to pay interest on these funds at a rate less than they will earn from investing these funds. In the past couple of decades, however, an increasing proportion of bank profits has come from financial activities beyond simple borrowing and lending. Banks might also take fees from companies when issuing their bonds or equities to other investors, or for giving advice on mergers and takeovers, or they might profit from their own dealing in currencies, interest rates, commodities and derivatives. Nevertheless, banks are in the business of financial market transactions, at most speculating on or taking a cut from what other people are producing, rather than producing anything themselves.

Banks do produce for themselves an often impressive profit, but that is based on deriving revenues from business undertaken elsewhere. Even when banks provide critically needed financing, or offer advice and deals that save a company money compared to what it might otherwise have done, the profit they make is based on the surplus that some other business has made. For the UK, the US and some other financial powers, this parasitic role is not seen as a disadvantage. In those countries, the banking system is seen as a key part of the strength of the domestic capitalist economy. This is because their banks can attract significant revenues from other countries. It doesn’t matter where the wealth is produced; it only matters where it is appropriated.

Profits & leverage

Compared to industrial and commercial companies, banks have a big advantage when it comes to making profit. They can use their privileged position in the financial system to borrow at relatively low cost, whether from individual savers, from companies, or from state funding via the central bank. Given the billions of transactions they undertake, they can also count on support from the state when things go wrong, especially if they are ‘too big to fail’. Trouble for the banks means trouble for the capitalist market system.

Bank profits derive from the difference between their borrowing costs and the earnings on their investments. Also, the more they borrow, the more earnings potential they have – via loans, trading positions, taking the risk of underwriting securities, etc. The only limit to such borrowing is when it looks ‘too high’ compared to the underlying investment, or equity, in the bank itself. More borrowing means that a bank can use the funds to buy more assets on which to make a return. This increases the bank’s ‘leverage’, the ratio of its total assets to its equity capital. But as the leverage rises, the bank risks losses on its investments that might eat into its underlying capital - eventually making it insolvent.

As for many other notions in finance, the definition of excessive leverage is a flexible one, determined by what is considered to be ‘normal’.[1] It turns out that a leverage ratio of up to around 20 for banks is considered fine, since this has not been associated with big losses in the past. The risk of loss increases when there is a lot of borrowing at a fixed cost of funds against assets that have a variable rate of return. Higher leverage means that a small drop in earnings on assets – especially through non-payment of debt or default - can wipe out profits completely, since the costs of the borrowed funds still have to be paid.

Leverage is used by industrial and commercial corporations, as well as by banks and other financial companies. However, the former have little ability, unlike the banks, to attract cheap funding, and in any case are more focused on production and distribution, rather than on financial transactions. Therefore they usually have much smaller leverage ratios than banks. Data for US manufacturing companies, for example, show that stockholders’ equity has been higher than corporate debt in the past decade.

To make the issue of bank leverage more clear, consider an example where a bank has $5bn of shareholders’ capital and it borrows another $95bn in the market to fund its total assets of $100bn. In this case, its ratio of total assets to equity, or leverage, is x20, because the assets of $100bn are 20 times higher than the shareholders’ capital. Things go well for the bank if its cost of funds is below the return on its assets. If it pays 4% for its funds, the interest bill is $3.8bn, whereas if it earns 5% on its assets, the return is $5bn. What looks like a small 1% margin of return generates a net income of $1.2bn, and this is measured against the $5bn of equity. So the return on equity is 24% (the $1.2bn divided by $5bn). It would be lower if the costs of its operations are included, but these are excluded in these examples to simplify the picture.

If the bank then expands its business by borrowing even more, it can potentially boost its returns dramatically. For example, if it borrowed $195bn then, with its $5bn of equity, it could fund $200bn of assets. The leverage ratio would now be x40. If the cost of funds were still 4%, it would have to pay a massive $7.8bn in interest on the $195bn, but it would receive $10bn in revenue if the rate of return on the $200bn were still 5%. This gives a net $2.2bn of revenue against the $5bn of equity, thus a return on equity of 44%. Here, the increase in leverage has worked and the return on equity has soared. But the risk was that the assets might not return as much as the previous 5%. Once the average return falls below 3.9%, not much of a drop, the bank starts to make a big loss.

This example of increased leverage might look extreme, but something like this, or worse, was going on in the speculative boom of the 2000s. Up to 2007-08, banks in all the major countries increased their borrowing from financial markets to fund more investments and boost their profits. This borrowing pushed their leverage ratios from around the x20 level to extraordinary heights. Chart 1 shows that in 2007-08, the average leverage ratio was x40 or higher in the US and Europe, with the assets of some large banks even reaching x60 or x100 compared to their equity.

Chart 1: Global bank leverage ratios, 2007-2011 *



Source: Bank of England

Notes: * The longer-term average leverage ratio is close to 20. LCFI means ‘large complex financial institution’ - essentially a big bank with diverse operations. Company accounts have been adjusted to make the data comparable between different countries.


This extreme leverage was an important dimension of the financial boom, and it accentuated the financial collapse once the delusions of ever-higher revenues were shattered. In 2008, at the height of the crisis, every major bank in the US, UK and the rest of Europe registered a plunge in profits, with the sector as whole in each region showing a loss.[2] Since 2008, banks have cut their leverage ratios sharply, by selling or writing off assets and by getting more equity capital investment. In early 2011, these ratios were much closer to their longer-term averages, though this is not to argue that the banks are by any means in a healthy financial position, given that they face rising levels of bad debts and still have huge volumes of dud assets.

Bank subsidies, post-crash

Bank profits were obviously hit by the crisis, and lower levels of leverage have now reduced their potential for ramping up profits. However, profits since the crisis have recovered to some degree, helped by state provision of close-to-zero interest rate funding in the US and UK, and by very low rates in the euro countries. Even where funds have not been directly provided by the state, explicit or implicit guarantees provided by governments have enabled many banks to get funding from the market at much cheaper rates than their real financial position would otherwise have allowed. The spread between banks’ borrowing and lending rates has also widened, increasing their interest income.

A senior Bank of England executive has done a useful estimate of the value of the ‘state guarantee’ subsidy to the major UK and global banks between 2007 and 2009:

‘For UK banks, the average annual subsidy for the top five banks over these years [2007-2009] was over £50 billion - roughly equal to UK banks’ annual profits prior to the crisis. At the height of the crisis, the subsidy was larger still. For the sample of global banks, the average annual subsidy for the top five banks was just less than $60 billion per year.’[3]

As his report put it, ‘these are not small sums’.

Imperial leverage

Previous articles on this blog have shown how declining profitability prompted capital to move away from productive investment into the easy profits of finance, leading to a credit-fuelled boom and bust.[4] The purpose of this article has been to highlight the important role of borrowing by the banks. Higher leverage ratios enabled banks to boost their profits in the upswing, but their extra assets were the debts of others. Now a lot of the debt cannot be repaid. The huge costs of the debt crisis are evident to all, and the shock to the system has led to government inquiries and proposals for reforming the financial markets. However, for the US and the UK, in particular, the financial sector is a key dimension of their economic power as imperialist countries. The US and UK financial systems play a major role in profitably financing the two chronic deficit countries. It is also, one might say, an important part of their ‘leverage’.[5] Anglo-American policy makers are not happy that the costs of the crisis are so high, but they will not do anything to undermine the position of their banks, even if they do decide to constrain some more reckless banking activities.


Tony Norfield, 25 August 2011


[1] There are different definitions of leverage, although each refers to some measure of assets versus capital. Different accounting standards also deliver different numbers. The overall trends up and down tend to remain the same, however. In this article, the basic definition used is bank assets divided by shareholders’ capital, which is the sum of the value of equity capital issued plus retained profits. Confusingly, some other measures of leverage express the ratio as the inverse of the one used here, with capital divided by assets, so a x20 leverage ratio is expressed as a 5% capital/asset ratio.
[2] See Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, June 2011.
[3] See Andrew Haldane, ‘The $100 billion question’, Bank of England, March 2010. This report is of interest for looking at the systemic costs of banking, and for calling the banking industry a ‘pollutant’ with ‘noxious’ by-products. This is from an Executive Director of the Bank of England, responsible for Financial Stability!
[4] See in particular, ‘Anti-bank populism in the imperial heartland’, 5 July 2011.
[5] The US has commonly used financial sanctions against disobedient countries, especially with regard to Iran. The UK has also made ample use of its financial influence, including, more recently, its control over Libyan funds based in London. For the role of finance for the UK, see ‘The Economics of British Imperialism’, 22 May 2011 on this blog. Some notes on the US are in ‘The Real US Debt Problem’, 26 July 2011.