Showing posts with label Marx. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Marx. Show all posts

Tuesday, 25 July 2017

Capital.150: Marx's Capital Today

Here are details of the two-day conference in September, with the relevant links:

Location: London WC1E 7HY, Malet Street, Student Central (formerly ULU)
Conference attendance fee £10.
Date/time: Tuesday 19 September (11am-8pm) – Wednesday 20 September 2017 (10am – 4pm)
Registration URL: http://bit.ly/2uhukxO
King's College website details here

Tuesday 19 September

Crises (11am–1:30pm)
  • Guglielmo Carchedi – The old is dying and the new cannot be born: the exhaustion of the present phase of capitalist development
  • Rolf Hecker – Marx’s critique of capitalism during the 1857 crisis
  • Paul Mattick jr – Crisis: abstraction and reality
  • Ben Fine, discussant
Imperialism (2:30pm–5pm)
  • Marcelo Dias Carcanholo, Dependency, super-exploitation of labour and crisis – an interpretation from Marx
  • Tony Norfield, Das Kapital, finance, and imperialism
  • Raquel Varela (& Marcelo BadarĂ³ Mattos), Primitive accumulation in Das Kapital
Mapping the terrain of anti-capitalist struggles (6pm–8pm)
  • David Harvey, Perspectives from the Circulation of Capital
  • Michael Roberts, Perspectives from the Accumulation of Capital

Wednesday 20 September

The future of capital (10am–12:30noon)
  • Alex Callinicos, Continuing Capital in the face of the present
  • Hannah Holleman, Capital and socio-ecological revolution
  • Fred Moseley, The rate of profit and the future of US capitalism
  • Eduardo Motta Albuquerque, Technological revolutions and changes in the centre-periphery divide
Labour and beyond (1:30-4pm)
  • Tithi Bhattacharya, Social reproduction theory: conceiving capital as social relation
  • Michael Heinrich, Communism in Marx's Capital
  • Lucia Pradella, Marx’s Capital and the power of labour: imperialism, migration, and workers’ struggles
  • Beverly Silver, Marx’s general law of capital accumulation and the making and remaking of the global reserve army of labour

Wednesday, 26 April 2017

Capital 150

On the 150th anniversary of the publication of Volume 1 of Marx's Capital, there is a two-day conference to discuss the importance of this work for understanding the world today. This international conference is held on 19-20 September 2017, sponsored by the Department of European and International Studies, King’s College London, and thenextrecession.wordpress.com blog.

Venue details: Student Central (formerly ULU), Malet Street, London WC1E 7HY

Speakers include:
  • Tithi Bhattacharya
  • Guglielmo Carchedi
  • Eduardo da Motta e Albuquerque
  • David Harvey
  • Michael Heinrich
  • Paul Mattick Jr
  • Fred Moseley
  • Tony Norfield
  • Lucia Pradella
  • Michael Roberts
  • Beverly Silver
  • Raquel Varela
The cost of attending is £10 for the two days. Other details including booking can be found here.


Tony Norfield, 26 April 2017

Wednesday, 1 March 2017

What is Marx’s Value Theory Worth?


At a recent talk I gave on imperialism, there was an interesting question raised on what I thought about Marx’s theory of value. This seemed to be prompted by my reference to Marx’s theory, while I spent little or no time using the terminology in Capital. So the logic of the question was: what is the point of Marx’s theory if one can do without it when explaining what is going on in the world?
Partly, the question is answered by saying that one does not always have to use specialist terminology to express ideas. For example, I have found it to be simpler in presentations to avoid Marx’s term ‘fictitious capital’, because that concept would take some time to explain properly and most people are not familiar with it. Even those who are commonly misunderstand it. Instead, I usually develop the same ideas more directly through discussing the role played by equities and bonds and their relationship to what the economy produces. However, the question needs to be put in a broader context.
Marx’s value theory analyses social labour under capitalism and the increasingly odd forms that it takes as capitalism develops: from being represented in the prices of commodities, to being the source of interest, profits, dividends, rents and tax revenues, to underlying, in an even more distorted fashion, the prices of financial securities. Marx’s theory shows how the capitalist market gives the system a particular dynamic, one that leads to the monopolisation of production and the creation of a world market as capital accumulates. The labour embodied in commodities may not tally directly with the prices they command in the market, but those (relative) prices remain strongly influenced by changes in social productivity. Furthermore, we get a longer-term process by which barriers to capitalist production are set by the tendency of the rate of profit to decline. Since the logic of capitalist production is to make a profit, this is the key underlying problem for capitalism as a social system. It is one that the (sometimes) well-meaning reformers of the system do not want to contemplate, so they exclude this from their analysis or go out of their way to deny this does, or even could, happen.[1]
These fundamental features of capitalism analysed by Marx remain in place, although the system has of course developed a great deal in the 150 years since Capital was written. The changing forms of capitalism have led many to argue that Marx’s theory is outdated or invalid today. But a proper Marxist analysis examines the dynamic of the system and the new forms that evolve out of the old, rather than simply to judge whether contemporary capitalism fits completely with an earlier conception of it.
In Capital Volumes 1, 2 and 3, Marx did not investigate relationships between countries in the world market. Some of this was done outside the three volumes, and plans for later volumes included a more systematic coverage of the state, foreign trade and the world market. So, for example, in Capital there was no real discussion of colonies, just brief mentions, nor much on monopoly or national differences in wages.
Lenin updated aspects of Marx’s work in his 1916 pamphlet Imperialism, drawing on other analyses. He correctly put greater emphasis on the division of the world economy between oppressed/oppressor nations, the territorial division of the world between the major powers, the propensity to war, on monopolies, bank/industrial capital and a ‘financial oligarchy’. This was a key advance in the analysis, and consistent with the idea of Marx’s value theory as being a theory of the evolution of and barriers to the capitalist system – hence Lenin’s term ‘moribund capitalism’. Many aspects pointed out by Lenin remain relevant today, even though these century-old forms have, of course, also developed. There is now a largely post-colonial world, although most countries are still clearly underdogs in the imperial hierarchy. There remains a propensity to war, but now with many wars by proxy, sponsored by the major powers.
I have some differences with Lenin’s analysis, as explained in my book, The City: London and the Global Power of Finance, especially on his understanding of finance, which was taken largely from Hilferding. However, perhaps Lenin’s greatest weakness was his analysis of the ‘labour aristocracy’, the unconvincing notion of how a labour elite getting the benefits of imperial privilege influences the broader working class with their pro-imperialist views. Even in Lenin’s time it would have been more convincing to have taken into account how the mass of people in rich countries were patriotic for their own reasons, ones that had a strong basis in reality rather than a supposedly infectious ideology. They saw, and still see, their economic interests tied up with that of their own states, and they benefit in their wages and welfare conditions from this imperial privilege. That is another sign of how it is important to conduct a thorough analysis.
I rely on Marxist concepts as starting points for understanding the world today because they provide the best way to explain what is going on. However, this is not to say that one can find the detailed answers in a particular volume of Capital. To think so would be almost as bad as believing in the prophecies of Nostradamus. Instead, the significance of Marx’s theory is that it so clearly spelled out the dynamic of capital accumulation that, much more than one might think plausible, his analysis provides key building blocks from which to understand major features of the world economy today.
Whether I use terms from Marx’s value theory in my analysis, and which terms, depends on the context in which I make my argument and how much time there is to do so. In any case, Marx’s work is used as just described. His concepts, like Lenin’s, might need to be amended – perhaps even rejected – according to an assessment of how the world has developed since they wrote.
The observation that capitalism in various forms has been around for several hundred years is commonly seen as an argument that it will go on forever; that it is an eternal, natural system for organising the economy. While economic crises are an undeniable reality and sometimes bring protests, there remains little understanding or acceptance of the Marxist conclusion that capitalist social relations are an increasingly dysfunctional, reactionary way in which to organise the affairs of humanity.

Tony Norfield, 1 March 2017


[1] I have little confidence in being able to track movements of the rate of profit through official statistics, although one does get indications of the underlying movements from the behaviour of major capitalist companies and reports of investment that suggest a rising organic composition of capital. Official data are focused on an individual country, and do not fully allow for international influences, something especially important for the US. Statistical conventions for counting the ‘value added’ by the financial sector make things worse, as exemplified by UK GDP income data in 2008 showing a higher operating profit for UK banks when the company reports, and Bank of England data, showed a very sharp drop, often into losses! This is apart from the multitude of accounting tricks that large corporations use to relocate the origin of their profits, including through tax havens.

Saturday, 16 July 2016

Commercial Capital and 'Finance'

This note is to record an interesting comment on my new book, The City, and my recent blog post 'Value Theory, Finance & Imperialism' on 3 July 2016, and to give my reply that may otherwise be somewhat hidden at the end of that article.

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Comment from 'Kumiko':
You are on the right track generally as far as the theoretical framework goes. But I'd note that in Vol II, where the analytical assumption of the identity of individual with total social capital is still in place, Marx 1) divides the total productive capital into productive-, commodity-, and money-capital circuits, and regards each independently. Here Marx arrives at the conclusion that the commodity-capital circuit can be excluded from further consideration for the purpose of the analysis, that purpose being the determinations of the sources and destinations of surplus value, the source being found in production, the destination necessarily being found in money under capitalism. But Marx also notes the peculiarity of the commodity-capital circuit in that it is the only circuit of the three to both begin and end "bearing" surplus value. In practice that could give rise to various interesting arbitrage possibilities for independent commerce, once the assumption of identity is dropped.
And that brings me to Vol III Part IV. This is limited to the regard of commercial capital in independent form. Note also Marx's assumption that independent commercial capital is scheduled for extinction in the course of the development of capitalist industrial production. This may be true enough, but the question begged here concerns the *combined* forms of industrial, commercial and financial capital, these being the common social aliases for the three circuits mentioned above. You are correct to dismiss the traditional counter-position of "industry" with "finance" as if these still exist only in independent form. Further, one could go on to critique the classical Hilferding formula for "finance capital" that combines banking with industrial capital as perhaps only applicable to Germany in a certain historical period, as only a specific combination of the three circuits. Even if we agree that modern capital nearly always appears in combined form, we could go on to question the "balance" in the combination of the three circuits, where one or another "dominant", with that dominance also fluctuating with the other circuits over the course of history. And finally we can also question the "inevitability" of the rise to "dominance" of industrial capital, particularly in the three different cases of the United States, Britain and France. Otherwise we would not be speaking of "deindustrialization" today.
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My reply:
I agree with your remarks more than might appear at first sight. My focus in the book (and the logic of the book’s exposition as outlined in this blog post) was on how to understand ‘finance’ in a value framework. I saw this as necessary, given the prevalence of shallow, ‘radical’ critiques of finance that usually boiled down to a call for a regulated capitalism. In other words, I wanted to explain how to understand the evolution of the form of value and the key role of finance in the imperialist world economy. This was the subject of my PhD thesis, from which the book, after much rewriting and updating, was derived.
In the book, I do have a critique Hilferding’s concept of ‘finance capital’, both as being too Germany-centric and as a one-sided, nationally-based understanding of how the form of value evolves. I argue instead to analyse how finance develops in the world economy, in particular the role of financial securities and the banking system, to get a clearer view of how the world works.
I take your point that the ‘commercial capital’ aspect of modern capitalism is also a critical one. My priority in the book was different, but it has been on my mind for a while now that commercial capital deserves more attention. For example, major corporations like Apple, Google, Facebook and Amazon are more in the commercial than the industrial sphere. Most of their activities are buying/selling what other companies produce, or getting advertising revenues from these sales. This is also linked to the financial and market power they are able to use. William Milberg and others have looked at this from a ‘value chains’ perspective; John Smith, in his new book Imperialism in the 21st Century, explains well how this amounts to ‘value capture’ in his focus on the globalisation of production.
The latter point also brings out how commercial capital still depends upon production, and how production companies can turn themselves into more commercial ones by getting others to do the producing in markets that are dominated by the powerful corporations. Even in the late 19th century, Britain was more the ‘warehouse of the world’ than the workshop of the world, with huge revenues from maritime transport, shipping, insurance, trade finance, etc, adding to those from its foreign investments.
Does that show how industry was not the ‘dominant’ force in capital accumulation? Not really. Industry (which Marx considered the main form of productive capital) conditioned the developing role of commerce and finance from at least the early 19th century, moulding it into a form that would suit industrial capital. However, it is true that other developments need to be considered. Marx was wrong if he thought that industry had to be the dominant form of capitalist enterprise, but this does not necessarily follow from the logic of his argument if one allows for the development of the world economy, which he had not fully analysed.
While a huge commercial capital sector (or financial sector) could not exist within a single economy taken out of its relationship with others, it is a different question when a small number of powerful capitalist countries dominate the world economy. Britain, for example, could have an outsized commercial/financial sector because Britain dominated world trade and its surplus value was sourced worldwide, not just from within the national economy. This example can be used to understand what has happened today, where domination of world commerce and finance benefits particular countries that, in value terms, produce relatively little themselves. This is explained more fully in my book regarding finance; analogously this is true of commerce as well today, when others do the producing.

Tony Norfield, 16 July 2016

Sunday, 3 July 2016

Value Theory, Finance and Imperialism


The following text consists of notes from a lecture that I gave in London on 27 June at an IIPPE conference on ‘Imperialism Today’. This set of notes is in the form of bullet points, ones that I elaborated on in the talk and discussion. To that extent, they will not necessarily be completely clear to new readers. But I do not plan to extend these into a full article. Instead the notes are a summary of the underlying value logic that is part of what is explained more fully, discursively and straightforwardly, with examples, in my new book The City: London and the Global Power of Finance. I hope these notes will help as a concise summary of my developed argument, and also give some guidance points for others interested in drawing links between Marx’s theory of value and contemporary financial developments.

Tony Norfield, 3 July 2016
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1. What is Imperialism?

Marx showed how capitalism develops a world economy.
‘Imperialism’ describes a stage when particular countries cannot be understood outside of their world relationships.
Focus of analysis: examine how social relations are shaped by the capitalist world economy.
Example: the US$ is ‘world money’, given the international power of the US economy, not just the local US currency.
Lenin also formulated how economic and political perspectives must change with the emergence of imperialism.
Marx’s analysis of imperialism?
- Marx analysed world developments, but only in a limited way in Capital Volumes 1, 2 and 3
- Vol 3 analysed ‘many capitals’, and their different forms, but not relationships between countries in the world market
- Later volumes planned to cover the state, foreign trade and the world market more systematically
Hence, in Capital there is:
- No real discussion of colonies (just brief mentions)
- Nor much on monopoly, national differences in wages, etc
Obviously, the world also developed further from the 1860s!
‘Imperialism’ as in Lenin’s 1916 pamphlet: 
- decisive role of monopolies in the world economy
- bank/industrial capital merges, producing ‘financial oligarchy’
- capital export (and revenues from it) much more important
- territorial division of the world is complete among key powers
Implications:
- changes in division of world power increases propensity to war
- division of world into oppressed/oppressor countries, with the oppressors benefiting economically (his focus was on the ‘labour aristocracy’)
A century-old analysis still relevant?
Monopolies dominate world economy - yes
Bank/industrial capital & ‘financial oligarchy’ – not this form
Capital export – different kinds of international links today
Territorial division of the world – yes, but also changes
Implications:
Propensity to war – yes, although now many wars by proxy
Oppressed/oppressor country division – yes, some changes
Benefits of the oppressor – yes, but not just a ‘labour aristocracy’
Politics of imperialism:
Conflicts/rivalries between major powers by end-19th century
Wars began to involve the whole population, not just military
Social unrest with the growth of the working class
Ruling class gains loyalty of workers via welfare reforms, extra voting rights, etc (UK, France, Germany, especially)
By 1914, the main European socialist parties backed their own states in war
Implications:
Development of loyalist working classes in many rich countries that will fight to defend their nation state and their related privileges! So, it is not just a very small portion of the working class in these countries that becomes pro-imperialist. This is a major political issue today!
Summary definition of imperialism:
A division of the world that results from the exercise of monopoly power by corporations and their states.
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Big corporations may have economic advantages, eg better technology, but they have a powerful position in the world economy due to their links with particular states.
States back property rights (from expropriation by rivals, also via patent laws) & extend economic power in international trade and investment deals.
Economic power and ability to exploit is reinforced by these privileges, ones that also include access to finance.
The balance of power is not fixed. Relationships are likely to change with the different accumulation of capital and power-competition successes of different countries.

2. Imperialism & Financial Power

Financial markets show what the world economy allows!
Marx’s ‘law of value’ for commodities has evolved:
- Equity prices, bond yields, FX rates are critical for companies and governments
- For example, the US uses the $ as ‘world money’ to isolate non-favoured countries (eg Iran, Russia)
- Major companies dominate world markets, via stockmarket takeovers, ownership links, etc
- Access to capital occurs via major financial centres, especially New York and London
… in addition to trade/investment deals run by major states
This is a regular, daily mechanism, and does not rely upon crises to work, although such crises often give the major powers an extra ability to gain influence.

3. A ‘Real’ versus a ‘Financial’ Economy?

All big capitalist companies are tied into ‘finance’
- FX deals to buy imports / sell exports
- Borrowing for purchases, or to invest
- Use financial derivatives to insure against price moves
- Mergers & takeovers to monopolise markets
Financial operations are integral to modern capitalism, and it is a liberal, reformist delusion to make a big distinction between 'real' and 'financial' companies.

4. Theory of Finance - Overview

‘Finance’ is big because it is driven by governments, corporations, banks and other financial institutions.
- Value relationships take on a financial form, so ‘finance’ pervades the system as a whole and is a means of gaining wealth and power!
- Note the prominence of the US and the UK, and how the workings of the global financial system are of particular benefit to them.
-  This is not ‘complex financial dealing’ by dangerous speculators, who disrupt the otherwise solid workings of the capitalist economy.

5. Finance & Marx’s Value Theory

Marx’s theory of value is about the capitalist organisation of social labour.
It is an analysis of the forms that arise from capitalist production and the exploitation of labour, the tendency to crisis and the limits of this mode of production.
Capitalist finance in Marx’s theory:
- a means by which existing surplus-value is circulated
- ‘finance’ = money dealing + interest bearing capital
- interest bearing capital (and banking) create new forms of value, and appear also to create new value
Interest, banks, fictitious capital, etc, are dealt with first in Volume 3 of Capital. This is a ‘logical-historical’ development of the earlier analysis.
The first page of Vol 3 of Capital: Marx notes that Vol 1 analysed the immediate process of capitalist production ‘with no regard for any of the secondary effects of outside influences’. Vol 2 studied the circulation process of capital, which must be added to the immediate process of production to complete the ‘life span of capital’.
Vol 3 went beyond this synthesis to ‘locate and describe the concrete forms which grow out of the movements of capital as a whole’.
Vol 3 develops those forms of capital which:
‘approach step by step the form in which they assume on the surface of society in the action of the different capitals upon one another, in competition, and in the ordinary consciousness of the agents of production themselves’.
Vol 1 & Vol 2 do not examine how competition might affect different capitals, nor the forms of capital that arise from that process.
Vol 3 examines ‘many capitals’ and competition, but not in concrete detail. For example, Marx excludes the analysis of the world market, different values of labour-power, etc, except in occasional remarks.
Industrial capital, and its circuit of  M – C … P … C’ – M’, has almost complete attention in Vols 1 & 2:
‘Its existence implies the class antagonism between capitalists and wage-labourers …. The other kinds of capital, which appeared before industrial capital amid conditions of social production that have receded into the past or are now succumbing, are not only subordinated to it and the mechanism of their functions altered in conformity with it, but move solely with it as their basis ….’
But Vol 3, Parts IV & V are critical for an understanding of finance. These show how the ‘M’ and ‘C’ components of this circuit become transformed under the influence of industrial capital. In turn, they have an impact on the forms of value accumulation by the system as a whole.
a) The basic M – C … P … C’ – M’ circuit includes market exchange and changes of value form (M - C, C - M)
b) This circuit implies surplus funds, or demands for funds, arising for productive capital at different times. Merchant capital (commerce, etc) develops in this context
c) The form of value in the circuit changes not only between M, C and P (Vol 2). The forms taken by M also evolve.
d) A key stage in the analysis is where M is an advance of capital outside the basic circuit, as in M – M’. This is the basis of Marx’s concept of ‘interest bearing capital’.
Step 1: Distinguish M – C – M’ from M – C … P … C’ – M’
This is not simply a logical (or functional) separation, but one that develops in reality.
Buying/selling by merchant capital is separate from the part of the circuit of capital that produces surplus value.
The specialist buying/selling function can be done more efficiently by merchants. It shortens circulation time, lowers costs and allows more surplus-value production per year.
Merchant capital produces no value or surplus value itself, but enables more surplus value (per year) to be produced by others.
Step 2: Focus on specialist monetary aspects of merchant capital (eg FX deals or loans for operating capital which assist the circuit of industrial capital, promoting M–C and C–M).
This is ‘money dealing capital’ (MDC), distinct from the previous ‘commercial capital’ part of merchant capital.
Marx’s theory has productive, commercial and money dealing capital as separate, but related, parts of the original circuit of industrial capital dealt with in Vol 2.
Each part of MDC is involved in averaging the rate of profit, assuming each section of capital could move into other areas. Capital advanced for production may be advanced for merchant (MDC) functions, or vice versa.
Money dealing operations are only an advance of money to industrial and commercial capitalists - an exchange for a different form of money (as in FX) or for a security (eg advance money against bills of exchange that are redeemed later). They are not an advance of capital.
Step 3: Another form of capital develops out of this money dealing – Interest Bearing Capital (IBC)
Up to Step 3, Marx examined forms arising out of the circuit of industrial (or productive) capital.
With Step 3, there is a new form of capital, IBC, outside that circuit. It has its own special circuit: M – M’.
With IBC, money is advanced as money capital (by money capitalists) to the 'functioning capitalist' who later returns the money back to the owner with interest.
Marx includes both the merchant and industrial capitalists as potential recipients of IBC from the money capitalist.
In both cases, it is assumed that the loaned funds are invested as capital and (could) gain a surplus value.
Even if the funds are not invested profitably, then the money capital still has to be repaid with interest.
Marx's concept of IBC does not include all loans of money capital for whatever purpose. This is consistent with Vol 3 analysing 'the process of capitalist production as a whole'.
So, bank loans to workers, for mortgages, for personal consumption, etc, are treated differently, or not at all, in Capital. These are just advances of loanable money capital, not of IBC.
The latter loans are still paid back with interest, but the concept of IBC is determined outside this relationship.
However, in all cases, the interest is still a deduction from surplus value deriving from the productive sphere.
Key points on this topic
a) ‘Finance’ is not confined to the operations of banks; monetary advances and transactions pervade the whole capitalist system! ‘Industrial’ companies also conduct many financial operations.
b) For IBC in particular, the advance of money capital in the M – M’ circuit can also be performed in a number of different ways, and by different institutions.
c) This also means that other forms of ‘M’ can develop outside the M – C … P … C’ – M’ circuit.
d) This takes us on to fictitious capital and bank credit, key forms of capital, and of value in modern financial systems.
Bonds, Equities, ‘Fictitious Capital’
‘Fictitious capital’ (basically, the term means financial securities)
The prices of these securities do not represent any value created and are determined differently from commodities.
Bonds have a higher status than equities regarding terms of repayment; but a lower status, usually none, in ownership of corporate assets.
There is a legal differentiation of ‘pure’ money capitalists (bond owners) from owners of companies (via equities).
The securities are tradable, potentially translated into money. They can be used as collateral for loans. Equity securities are often used as a means of payment in takeovers.
Bond prices: the discounted present value of future coupon payments and the principal repayment.
Key plus/minus factors: risk of non-payment (credit risk);  interest rate level at which future payments discounted.
Prices move independently of value created. A bond ‘worth’ $1m need not relate to any sum of capital invested.
Equity prices: an equity represents a share of ownership and future company profits, and the price reflects that.
Key plus/minus factors: expected future profits; interest rate level at which future payments are discounted.
The prices of both kinds of security are also influenced by speculative buying/selling!

6. Economic power, financial securities and bank credit

Bonds
Creditors can set terms for company or government behaviour, especially in a crisis, when a question of writing off debt (privatisation, policy, etc) or access to new funds.
Equities
Ownership, of course. But voting rights on company decisions are not the same as the equity holding! Control of society’s resources via centralising capital and creation of monopolies.
Bank credit is a distinct mechanism of finance!
This topic has been very badly dealt with in Marxist theory.
A bank does not simply use existing sums of money from depositors to lend to borrowers, whether they are companies or individuals.
It does not act simply as a ‘go between’.
Banks can create new funds within the banking system: they grant loans to borrowers, who then use the funds (not usually as cash, mainly bank transfers) to buy things.
Banks make up any shortage of funds from other banks, or via the central bank. This credit creation can boost expenditures and demand from consumers and investors.
‘Stretching’ the law of value creation
The credit creation process is unique to banks. It depends on a (national) banking system and a central bank if it is to work well.
It also allows a bank’s ‘assets’ (loans) to grow far beyond its capital (funds due to shareholders). This can boost demand in the economy and also the potential for a crisis.
The ratio of assets/capital = leverage ratio.
When bank loans/credits run beyond the ability to pay back, a bank’s loan ‘asset’ becomes a loss! With high leverage ratios, a relatively small scale of losses can destroy a bank's capital and lead to bankruptcy.
(Note: Bank loans are not securities, but they may be ‘securitised’, as with Mortgage-Backed Securities.)

7. Conclusions: Imperialism and Finance

The role of ‘finance’ reflects the operation of the law of value on a world scale and the influence of dominating powers.
The form taken by social labour under capitalism (especially imperialism today) is not simply a ‘value’ form based on commodity production and socially-necessary labour time.
It is dominated by financial forms of value that accentuate the concentration of ownership and control of social wealth.
Financial securities (equities & bonds) and bank credits are the dominating forms of value today.
Equity and bond markets act as regulators of corporate decision-making and government economic policy.
Social resources are controlled via mergers & takeovers, assisted by the system of credit and trading in financial securities.
Major banks provide funds to the global economy, especially via the role of the US dollar.
This how capitalist economic discipline is imposed and value is appropriated by those countries and companies with privileged positions in the global capitalist market system!

Wednesday, 16 April 2014

Marx and the Princess


I thought I knew a lot about Karl Marx's life, having read several biographies detailing his genius, his carbuncles, his scrounging and procrastination. However, one event was reported in a book I have been reading recently that I had not come across before.
In 1879, Queen Victoria's eldest daughter was curious to find out more about Marx, the famous émigré living in London. Some reports suggest that she had even read Das Kapital. Rather than getting the police to drag him in for questioning, Princess Victoria used the subtle tactic of asking a British politician to check him out, the splendidly named Sir Mountstuart Elphinstone Grant Duff. An invitation for free drinks at the Devonshire Club in London was something Marx could not refuse, and they had a three-hour meeting on 31 January 1879.
It is hard to know how far Marx might have edited his views in such a discussion, although he was not particularly known for letting discretion be the better part of valour. Much of the talk concerned European politics, especially developments in Germany and Russia. This reflected not only Marx's interests but also those of British foreign policy. Duff reported back to the Princess the following day, noting that his impression of Marx was 'not at all unfavourable and I would gladly meet him again'. The letter is here.

Tony Norfield, 16 April 2014

Monday, 6 January 2014

Capitalist Production Good, Capitalist Finance Bad



Costas Lapavitsas, Profiting Without Producing: How Finance Exploits Us All, London: Verso, 2013, 352 pages


This book aims to provide a Marxist interpretation of the global crisis, putting it in the context of a new phase of capitalism, one that is characterised by 'financialisation'. There are many definitions and uses of this term, and the book's back cover claims that it is 'one of the most innovative concepts to emerge in the field of political economy in the last three decades, although there is no agreement on what exactly it is'. In Lapavitsas’s view, however, 'The transformation of the conduct of non-financial enterprises, banks and households constitutes the basis of financialisation' (p. 4). In this review, I will assess the arguments made in favour of such a definition and Lapavitsas’s view of modern finance, both of which are problematic.

Key theoretical issues
After opening with a brief chapter on the rise of finance, noting especially the explosion of derivatives trading, Chapter 2 of the book ('Analysing financialisation') discusses the literature of recent decades, both Marxist and mainstream. This is very useful for providing a review of diverse approaches to the topic while also indicating Lapavitsas's own perspective. His discussion of the Monthly Review School, which was among the first in more recent times to focus on the rise of finance, is interesting because it opens up his own theoretical position. He notes that Monthly Review basically has an under-consumptionist view of capitalist crises, similar to a Keynesian one, and that it sees the move into finance as a result of non-financial companies escaping from a stagnant productive sector (p. 17). His critique of this view is that it cannot explain the changed behaviour of non-financial corporations, banks and households from the 1970s and he suggests that this change of behaviour rests upon economic reasons (pp. 17-18). But then he only promises an examination of the three changed behaviours, not of the economic reasons behind these changes: 'the examination of non-financial enterprises, banks and households takes up much of the rest of this book' (p. 18). As will be discussed further below, this sidesteps identifying a causal explanation for the broad financial developments from the 1970s. It is also worth noting that it is odd to exclude a wide range of financial institutions outside the banks - pension funds, insurance companies, hedge funds, stock exchanges, etc - from his general definition of 'financialisation'.
Another indication of his theoretical stance comes when he criticises Arrighi, making the point that the world market is 'a creation of industrial, commercial and financial capitals that have become dominant in their respective national economies'. The latter statement is not the self-evident proposition it might seem, however, and would not account for those companies whose operations are based on the world market, rather than emerging from the national economy, as is the case for BP, for example. However, the bigger problem is when he turns this into an argument for saying that the 'logic of theoretical analysis ought to run from the national economy to the world market' (p. 19). Apart from being a non sequitur, it is an argument that also contradicts, without comment, the analyses of Marx and Lenin, and of the Marxist tradition more generally. Of course, Lapavitsas recognises that the world market has an impact upon national economies, and he also states that 'financialisation is inherently bound up with the US dollar operating as the dominant form of world money since the 1970s' (p. 19). But the issue is more fundamental: the world market is the platform on which global capitalism operates, and one cannot understand 'world money', for example, unless one starts from a world market perspective, not a national one.
In Chapter 2, Lapavitsas also rejects the idea that the development of financialisation has anything to do with Marx's law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, or that falling profitability in capitalist production was a key factor behind the rise of finance. Instead, he stresses that 'the processes of finance should be analysed in their own right' (p. 37). However, this is a strange counterposition of arguments. Analysing finance would be necessary whatever the underlying dynamic of developments might be, but analysing financial ‘processes’ does not necessarily reveal that dynamic. Having rejected the profitability cause, he has not furnished another one in its place and is basically left with a descriptive approach to the phenomenon: analysing the processes of finance. This lack of need for one or more causal factors might be justified in his view because 'historical and institutional variation is a necessary feature of financialisation' (p. 39). However, even the most concrete developments, especially ones that dominate society, are liable to have been driven by a more general and systemic social dynamic.
I have a more positive assessment of the book's Chapter 3, which deals with the rise of finance at the end of the 19th century and the response of key Marxists to these developments, especially Hilferding and Lenin. Lapavitsas discusses Hilferding's theoretical innovations in the examination of new forms of finance, while bringing out the limitations of his Austro-Germany centred analysis. This chapter is also used to note that some issues are different for today's global capitalism: for example, whereas Lenin argued that the rich imperialist powers lived off rentier incomes from their loans to other countries, today rich countries, particularly the US, are more commonly borrowing from poor countries (p. 67). That is a reasonable observation to make, but also one-sided. Lapavitsas does not discuss the broader issue of how such borrowing helps finance higher-yielding foreign investment from the US (and the UK), nor the fact that the US and other rich countries do still earn rentier incomes. In 2012, US gross investment income from abroad was $770bn, while the net figure after income payments was $232bn. Not bad for a country that has a huge net debt position! Neither does he pay much attention to the commercial power of the major countries in the world market. Chapter 4 on the 'monetary basis of financialised capitalism' is also a useful review, covering Marx's theory of money, fiat money, private credit money, state-backed central bank money and the US dollar's role as 'quasi-world money'.
Chapter 5 on 'finance and the capitalist economy' is a further discussion of theoretical issues, including mainstream theories of finance. He makes a key point that a financial system is 'a specifically capitalist phenomenon, although sophisticated financial practices can be observed in a wide variety of other social formations' (p. 109). For me, the points of interest in this chapter are Lapavitsas's discussion of Marx's concepts of interest-bearing capital (IBC) and loanable money capital (LMC), and the issue of whether capital invested in banking/finance would tend to have the same rate of profit as for industrial and commercial capitalists. There is a good discussion of IBC on pages 112-118, which clarifies that Marx's concept relates to a (money) capitalist advancing funds as capital to a productive capitalist for investment purposes. Here, the money capitalist gets a return in the form of interest, where the interest is a deduction from the surplus value produced from the investment. This is not to say that surplus value is necessarily always produced.
LMC is a more general concept that includes IBC plus the spare funds arising from the industrial-commercial circuit of capital and the idle funds of all social classes (usually deposited in banks). As Lapavitsas puts it, 'the money market is the site where loanable [money] capital is traded' (p. 131). Such trading will result in a rate of interest for the loaned funds, but this can give the impression that basically the same thing is going on with every deal, which is incorrect. Some transactions are advances of IBC, but others will come under the heading of money-dealing capital, where money is loaned to industrial and commercial companies as a means of payment. For Marx, IBC receives a distinct category of interest, one that is determined quite differently from the average rate of profit. By contrast, while the second transaction involves an interest payment, it is one that will tend to generate an average rate of profit for the money-dealing capitalist. These operations in banks are often combined in one business, but the conceptual distinctions are still important for Marxist theory.
Lapavitsas appreciates these points, but then proceeds to confuse matters. In a response to an article of Ben Fine's from the mid-1980s (p. 127, footnote 45), Lapavitsas seems to be arguing that the rate of profit for banks should be the same as for other capitalist companies. This was also Hilferding's view, but it is not present in Marx's analysis because of the distinct position of IBC compared to industrial and commercial capital. Fine argued that profitability for banks is different (using 'banks' as a generic term for capital engaged in finance), because banks are not liable to provide funds for new entrants into banking as they would into other sectors (banks being agents of competition elsewhere, not between themselves). Competition in banking/finance for Fine does not establish a normal, equalised rate of profit, but gives rise to interest as a claim on surplus value prior to the distribution of profit of enterprise. Lapavitsas misrepresents Fine's view on this question.[1] I agree with Fine that profitability for banks is conceptually different, but would also stress that the licensing system for setting up a new bank helps maintain a monopoly over access to deposits. This also leads to a different form in which both profitability and interest appear for banks compared to other capitalist companies.
This might seem to be a side matter, but it reflects a tendency in Lapavitsas's argument to gather a wide range of phenomena under the heading of 'financialisation' and in the process to obscure some important Marxist concepts that would otherwise throw more theoretical light on what is really happening in the world. This is true in Chapter 6 on 'financial profit', for example, a chapter that discusses topics rarely covered in any detail in other Marxist literature.

Financial profit
In Chapter 6, Lapavitsas begins his discussion by revisiting a term that he has used in other publications: 'profit from alienation or expropriation'. This is not the standard form of exploiting workers in capitalist production, but 'exploitation in financial transactions', which, in the case of workers, amounts to a 'direct transfer of value from the income of workers to the lenders' (p. 143). This is the basis for his notion that finance 'exploits' the working class, and not only the other capitalists, so that it 'exploits us all', as in the subtitle of the book. He has been criticised a number of times for this concept of 'financial exploitation' because the term exploitation has a particular meaning for Marxism, based on the appropriation of surplus value from workers in capitalist production, but he continues to use it here.[2]
The argument against the notion that finance exploits the working class by taking a share of wages can be put simply. If one source of financial profit is a cut out of workers' incomes, in interest payments, fees, etc, then there are two alternative implications. Either this implies that workers are receiving a net income below the value of labour power once these deductions are accounted for, or these deductions are part of the value of labour power, paying for the 'socially necessary' goods and services, some of which are delivered on credit. In the former case, where such deductions were persistent, this would imply that a lower value of labour-power was in place than otherwise. But, over time, this lower level would become the new norm. In the latter case, if workers are not being paid below the value of labour-power, then the cost of consumer credit, mortgages, etc, is a part of the regular wages that workers are paid. In neither case is there a systematic 'financial exploitation’ of workers. Instead, the financial profits are a deduction from the profits of productive capitalists.
While there may be instances of predatory lending that eat into workers' disposable incomes, if the interest payments, fees, etc, take the widespread, persistent and systematic form that Lapavitsas assumes under 'financialisation', then ultimately the deduction is from surplus value, not from the value of labour power. Lapavitsas attempts to justify this theoretical inconsistency with some citations from Marx's writings that have no direct relationship to the point of criticism, being based on a misreading of Marx or by a false analogy with rent (pp. 144-146).
The point Lapavitsas essentially makes is that 'financial profit … could also emerge from expropriating the income and money stocks of others through the operations of the financial system', and not just from a division of surplus value produced (p. 145). However, in particular for the working class, this confuses the form of payment with the value relations underlying the payments. He makes things worse by arguing that contemporary financial expropriation 'represents a throw-back to ancient forms of capitalist [sic] profit-making that are independent of the generation of surplus value' (p. 146), a statement that leads into five pages of tangential discussion of Aristotle's views on predatory finance! This completely misconstrues modern developments. Rather than today's financiers rediscovering old methods for gouging profit from the vulnerable populace, their operations have evolved alongside the demands of contemporary capital accumulation, from the euromarkets to financial derivatives, as will be discussed further below.[3]
After Aristotle, Lapavitsas discusses the important question of leverage. Here, a capitalist company might borrow funds from a bank, something that will alter its 'rate of profit of enterprise' compared to the average rate of profit, depending on the level of the interest rate (pp. 151-155). This is an issue often overlooked when considering capitalism and finance. The surprising thing, however, is that Lapavitsas does not discuss the fact that bank leverage ratios are a large multiple of those for industrial and commercial companies, based on the banks' position in the credit system.[4] That would have been a far more pertinent angle for the discussion of financial profit. The banks do not merely gather up society's idle funds and lend these out - they also create new deposits and loan assets, and can do so up to (and beyond) prudential limits. This fact stands in stark contrast to Lapavitsas's view, expressed later, that the 'owners of loanable capital as well as the institutions that handle its flows have a limited capacity to augment its magnitude through their own actions (p. 203).[5] Bank assets are commonly more than 20 times a bank's equity capital and the ratio can be expanded as required. Rising leverage ratios were a major boost to bank profits during the credit bubble, and bank profits collapsed as assets were written off (loan defaults, etc) when the bubble burst.
Lapavitsas also discusses 'trading financial assets' (p. 163), and how financial profits can be derived from fictitious capital values. The aspect he focuses upon is capital gains, as in Hilferding's conception of founder's profit. Here, shares in a company are floated on the stock market for a total sum that exceeds what is needed for investing in the company (assuming the rate of discount/interest is less than the company's rate of profit). The excess value is realised by the founders/owners when they sell shares to others, or can be accounted for as more wealth in the form of the higher fictitious capital value of their own shares. He follows up this basic example of founder's profit and argues that the process is essentially the same for all kinds of capital gains on financial assets, when the seller makes a profit in a rising market and the 'final buyer' obtains rights to the 'entire flow of surplus value from the project but at a greater expense than each previous owner of shares' (pp. 164-165).
When it comes to financial securities that are the liabilities of workers not capitalists, however, as in mortgage bonds or consumer debt, Lapavitsas returns to the notion that the source of this financial profit is (future) wages (p. 167). He also argues that the creation of mortgage bonds from mortgage payments means that the 'money revenue of workers is transformed into loanable capital' (p. 167). However, it is loanable money capital that is advanced to the workers, and the securitisation of the mortgage payments as a bond does not create loanable money capital. Secondly, while mortgage payments deducted from workers’ incomes do go to financial companies, in general these are not deductions from the value of labour power, as explained above.
A final point on financial profit is worth making here. Lapavitsas has built his exposition around capital gains on financial securities. While he mentions the fees and commissions that are part of the trading in such securities, he does not deal with the financial 'profits' that result from such trading. These profits result largely from bid-offer spreads for dealing in securities, currencies, etc, and from the privileged market-making position of bank dealers versus other dealing counter-parties. Such profits have no relationship to changes in the price of the security traded, as they do in the example of capital gains. Profits from financial trading are very important for the banking sector, especially in a major centre of global financial trading such as London.

Financial developments and data
Chapter 7 on 'financialised accumulation' introduces section 3 of the book, one that deals more closely with the empirical and historical features of financialisation. The underlying theme remains the altered conduct of non-financial corporations, banks and households, but Lapavitsas argues that it should not be a surprise if 'the form of financialisation varies greatly between countries' (p. 171). This statement is consistent with his theoretical approach of going from the national economy to the world market (see above). However, it means that he cannot explain the relationship between the world market and the forms taken by financialisation, since it is a country's position in the world market that will determine the financial options available to it. Chapter 7 is mainly a repetition of the common view in radical literature that financialisation was responsible for lower economic growth (at least, lower real wage growth) and rising inequality. In this chapter, Lapavitsas also notes a variety of other issues - from attacks on trade unions, to central bank policy, to the role of the US dollar, to measures of productivity - but it is not clear what relationship these developments have to his main arguments.
Chapter 8 examines the 'tendencies and forms of financialisation' over sixty pages. Here Lapavitsas discusses developments in four major capitalist powers, the US, Japan, Germany and the UK, comparing and contrasting trends in the financial sector data and their relationship to the domestic economy. The value of this chapter to the reader depends on what the reader already knows, but that is not to say it is necessarily valuable for those with little knowledge of financial trends. One should be cautious about accepting a mass of empirical evidence as giving a good outline of the full picture: it may simply stress particular dimensions and exclude other important ones. Four examples are relevant here.
Firstly, Lapavitsas argues that financial profits have risen a great deal in recent decades as a share of total profits, but his charts are not very supportive. Figure 8 for the UK (p. 215) notes the profits of financial corporations as a share of total profits. But the line dips sharply from 1989 to 2000 before rising to a new peak by 2007-08. Figure 9 for Japan (p. 217) shows a slightly declining share between 1994 and 2007. Only the US chart looks like a longer-term upward trend.
Secondly, who receives the financial profit from financialisation? Lapavitsas notes that new social layers have been created, 'receiving finance-related income and bearing only a passing resemblance to the rentiers of old' (p. 217). However, he does not discuss who these people are. If they are not, or not only, a social stratum of the rich, moneyed capitalists living off interest, as depicted in classical Marxism, then who are they? Later, he notes that household assets have been 'a source of financial profit both in terms of fees earned by the institutions involved but also in terms of capital gains and transactions in financial assets for both intermediaries and final holders' (p. 243). This formulation avoids stating clearly the fact that a large number of households in rich countries - owners of financial securities and pensions - are also recipients of financial profit, either in the form of capital gains or as interest-related income. But then finance is supposed to 'exploit us all’.
Thirdly, despite the extensive data coverage for the four countries, Lapavitsas gives no data for the financial benefits each receives from other countries, neither in terms of foreign investment income nor on the financial services revenues that accrue to them. These are key issues for British imperialism, and also for the US, but they do not come into his coverage of 'financialisation'. At most, the benefits are noted summarily for the US, mentioning subsidies from dominated powers via the build up of foreign exchange reserves (p. 252). Furthermore, since 'finance exploits us all', there is no coverage of the huge property assets of many households in the rich countries. In the UK at least, these more than offset the total of mortgage debt liabilities to the banking system.[6] This is not to deny that many people have large mortgage debts that might exceed the value of their residential property, but the omission of these important assets is consistent with the absence of any consideration in Lapavitsas's work that a mass of people in the rich countries - not just financiers or capitalists - have economic privileges.
Fourthly, the view that 'financialisation' has gripped all the major countries may seem plausible, but it is not backed up by all the charts that Lapavitsas includes for the four countries covered. For example, commercial bank assets (pp. 234-235) in the form of household mortgages and loans to individuals did rise as a share of total assets in the US, but were still only around 25% of assets by the mid-late 2000s. In Japan, the share rose too, but only to around 10% of bank assets, while in Germany the share was flat at around 10%. In the UK the share of such loans fell from around 23% to around 15% in the decade to 2009. Not exactly a substantial or pervasive change.
A general problem with this approach to financial developments is that it leads to a very restricted view of what is going on in the imperialist world economy. This is also true when he discusses 'subordinate financialisation' among countries dominated by imperialism. His focus is on the incursion of foreign banks that, he argues, changed their domestic financial systems and mimicked selected trends in the rich countries, such as bank lending to households (p. 246). This perspective follows from his overall view of financialisation, but it hardly does justice to the real tribulations faced by subordinate countries. To give some appreciation of these, he does note a quite different point, that poor countries lent funds to rich countries (especially the US) at low interest rates via foreign exchange reserve accumulation (p. 252). But, while important, this fact does not fit into the theoretical framework that he has constructed about what is new in 'financialisation'.
Chapter 9, 'tending to crisis', begins with an interesting review of Marx's theory of finance and crises before moving on to how the financial form taken by capitalist crises is different in conditions of modern capitalism than in Marx's day. The objective of this chapter appears to be one where he wants to explain 'finance as a factor of capitalist crises' (p. 260), but as a factor that can operate separately from one or more fundamental causes. The subsequent discussion of the financial bubble and bust from 2001-2009 repeats the standard view that it was a sub-prime crisis emerging from the US. He does not discuss why the US Federal Reserve had kept interest rates so low in the early 2000s, except to see it as a policy response to the bursting of the dot.com bubble of 1999-2000 (p. 271). Nor does he discuss why the toxic mortgage securities emerging from the bubble were so easily distributed around the world, and whether this too might have had some relationship to problems of capital accumulation and low returns on investment. The key point emerging from the first half of this chapter is that Lapavitsas sees the crisis as resulting from a malfunctioning of the financial system (a 'Type 2' crisis, p. 271), rather than having any relationship to capitalist profitability.[7]
In the second half of the chapter, Lapavitsas focuses on the euro area financial crisis. This draws upon his other (co-authored) published work and makes some good points about the systemic problems faced by the euro countries.[8] Much of the ground covered is very familiar, but there is a nice turn of phrase summing up the euro sovereign debt crisis: the weaker countries had found that they 'had borrowed in a currency - the euro - which appeared to be domestic but was in effect foreign' (p. 298). My question, however, is why these developments should be considered a 'crisis of financialisation' in Lapavitsas's terms. Essentially what had happened was simply that the weaker euro countries had borrowed excessively at the low interest rates on offer, and had also lost competitiveness. When the credit bubble burst after 2008, they were left high and dry. Overall, his view is to look upon the euro project as having benefited German capital by providing it with a stable, internal market (pp. 290-291, p. 293). A better assessment would have put the euro project in the context of a longer-term attempt by the major European capitalist powers to meet 'le défi américain'.[9] The irony of more recent developments is that most of Germany's trade surplus now originates from outside the euro-17 countries (64% in 2012).

Controlling finance
The final Chapter 10 on 'controlling finance' draws together the previous themes, but it reaches a conclusion that is at first sight surprising for a book within a Marxist perspective. Yet, if one follows through the logic of the previous arguments, especially the view that the current crisis results from a malfunctioning of the financial system, then this is not so much of a surprise. Lapavitsas considers at length a number of mainstream and radical proposals on regulation to deal with the malfunctioning and then comes up with his own solution. He calls for the creation of a public sector bank! Not a demand for more regulation, since his analysis has shown that the financial system - and pervasive financialisation - will find ways around any new rules (pp. 323-324). Nor a simple demand for bank nationalisation, of course, because most of the equity of some big banks in the UK and elsewhere has already been taken into state ownership. Instead, he advocates ‘publicly managing the flow of credit to households and non-financial enterprises to achieve socially set objectives as well as to eliminate financial expropriation’ (pp. 324-325). He adds that these public banks ‘would be able to adopt a longer-term horizon in lending, helping to strengthen the productive sector and to reverse financialisation’ (p. 325).
I was tempted to compare these views with those of the Archbishop of Canterbury, who last year called for splitting up big banks and making them good for society. But it is more telling to give some further details of the Lapavitsas plan.
He admonishes the banks for their failure to monitor credit quality, so he decides to take the issue seriously in the case of his proposed public institution. After all, strengthening the capitalist productive sector cannot be achieved by giving cheap loans to dodgy prospects; that would waste social resources. So, there would be ‘publicly determined rates of interest’, varying among different borrowers, and public banks would ‘deploy the techniques of information collection for income, employment, and personal conditions, including credit scoring and quantitative risk management’ (p. 325). Thus, we can see how scientific calculation will overcome the evils of financialisation and capitalist markets!
As an exercise in utopianism, this is hard to beat. Let’s leave aside the fact that there is a global monopoly network of huge corporations that has control of distribution channels and supply chains, technology patents and product licences, quite apart from the backing they get for international trade and investment deals negotiated by their states. But this policy proposal shares the common superstition among radicals, one alien to Marxism, that the capitalist state is a neutral bag of tools that can be utilised in favour of the masses. Lapavitsas had already noted that large corporations do not really depend on banks for loans, so presumably he envisages offering loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises, ones that have not already been crushed by monopoly power and which often already depend on state support for their products and services. But one does not take a peashooter to a gunfight.
Lapavitsas also sets aside the fact that banks already monitor credit risks and so are reluctant to lend to such companies by arguing that they are not very good at it, confident that his proposed public bank would do a better job. He does not consider the fate of failed versions of his more 'social' banking, for example, the Spanish Cajas and the UK's own Co-operative Bank. In the next sections, I will discuss further some theoretical and empirical issues in the analysis that Lapavitsas has offered.

What is, and what led to, financialisation?
Earlier I noted that Lapavitsas's approach to the question of financialisation was essentially descriptive, leaving unclear the reasons behind the changes in financial markets since the 1970s. The explanation has many dimensions, but these are not to be found in the book. His description, based around the changed behaviour of the three elements of the economy he identifies, consists of the following elements:
·        Non-financial companies shifted from borrowing directly from banks and undertook their own borrowing from capital markets, in the process gaining financial expertise;
·        Banks responded to this by shifting business to more financial trading and to lending to households in various ways (mortgages, credit cards);
·        Households found that, after neo-liberal economic reforms, they were more engaged in providing for themselves pensions, health care and housing, all of which increased their involvement with financial markets.
I would query a number of these points. Firstly, large corporations have always, and especially in the US and the UK, depended for the bulk of their investment financing on internal funds, ie retained profits. Their relationships with banks have been most active in money-dealing services, including foreign exchange and short-term credit provision. Secondly, while it has been true that non-financial corporations have in recent decades raised more capital from bond and equity markets at the expense of long-term borrowing from banks, the banks have, in turn, made a growing business from floating these bonds and equities for a fee. The corporations do not sell their securities themselves. This has been one of the reasons behind many 'commercial banks' turning themselves into 'investment banks', or at least opening up an investment-banking arm. Thirdly, the data do suggest that there has been a growth of household mortgage debt and also more personal investment in private pensions, so increasing the involvement of households in financial markets. However, as argued earlier, this does not support Lapavitsas's claim that household incomes have been an ultimate source of financial profit.
Lapavitsas notes the important role of the state, saying that: 'As far as financialisation is concerned … the transformation of mature economies would have been inconceivable without the facilitating and enabling role of the state'. He then argues that there are three features of the state's role: the command over state-backed central bank money (especially since the break with gold from 1971); enabling the global spread of financialisation through command over world money (via the role of the US dollar); and by smoothing the path of financialisation by altering the regulatory framework for finance (pp. 192-193). These are the factors often included in accounts of capitalism since the 1970s, but he offers no causal dynamic to explain these changes. For example, he does not explain many governments' implicit and explicit support for financial deregulation from the 1970s when there had in previous decades been far more controls in place. Did governments spontaneously embark on this new policy? Or were there more fundamental trends to which they responded and which led to financial deregulation, etc?
More importantly, missing from Lapavitsas's account is an assessment of what drove the boom in financial transactions and other forms of 'financialisation'. I think there are two key factors here: an underlying problem of weak profitability and the particular financial form that this took.
In my view, the greater role of financial transactions and international flows of capital in the world economy over recent decades was not such a sharp break from the previous 1945-1970s period as many proponents of the 'financialisation' concept maintain, although these developments were, of course, accelerated after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods monetary system. But that breakdown was a result both of the changing balance of power in the world economy, as US hegemony weakened, and of the increasing difficulties faced by capital accumulation as profitability fell on a world scale. Even prior to the Bretton Woods collapse, there had been a dramatic growth of the euromarkets and other international financial flows from the late 1950s, based on the demands of major world corporations for finance.[10] These led many governments, particularly those under pressure, to complain about the increased 'hot money' flows, as with UK Labour politicians' attacks in the 1960s on the 'gnomes of Zurich' (a phrase that conveniently excluded the parasites of London). The law of value operating internationally - what are you producing and what is it worth in the world market? - which also led to the evolution of new forms of finance, was behind the collapse of Bretton Woods.
The stagnation-inflation turmoil of the early 1970s brought about further financial developments, including the removal of most of the international capital controls in the US, Canada and Germany, together with industrial restructuring, higher unemployment and austerity measures as governments and companies tried to deal with the crisis. This is the backdrop to what is termed the 'neoliberal' period from the late 1970s, epitomised by Reagan and Thatcher. The policy actions of the latter governments, including a sharp rise of interest rates after 1979 to control inflation, are more accurately described as further attempts to try and restore conditions for profitable accumulation rather than as shocking new developments. Still less can they be described as measures to support the 'ascendancy of finance' (p. 194), unless it is also admitted that the parasitic form of capitalism in the key powers also meant that the 'financial' option seemed a lucrative one when they had such difficulty in making domestic production profitable. The US and British states, in particular, boosted the financial sector as a deliberate policy to improve their ability to appropriate value from other countries, especially after 1979 but also before. Market pressures forced other countries to adapt to these moves from the major, financially oriented powers. This is the real substance of the phenomenon labelled 'financialisation'. In contrast to Lapavitsas, I would argue that problems of profitability and capital accumulation, particularly as these issues affected the US and UK, do lie at the root of what he calls financialisation.

Capitalist profitability and financialisation
Almost all measures of the rate of profit for major countries show a trend decline from the 1950s into the early 1970s. As a result, there is little dispute about falling profitability as the underlying cause of the 1970s economic and financial turmoil, at least among those who claim to base their views on Marxist theory.[11] For the period from the 1980s into the mid-2000s, the consensus in the literature is that the rate of profit was on a rising trend, at least as measured for the US. There is far from universal agreement that this is correct,[12] but the common view is that the crisis starting in 2007 in the rich countries was a result of financial excess, rather than having any relationship to a capitalist profitability crisis. The financial form of the latest crisis - a massive build up of debts, speculation, fraudulent deals, etc - has encouraged this perspective.
In line with this latter view, Lapavitsas characterises the latest crisis as emanating from a 'malfunctioning of the financial system', what he calls a 'Type 2' crisis, rather than one that originates in the industrial and commercial circuit of capital (p. 266, p. 271) or one that can be said to be an accumulation crisis based in any way upon profitability. In particular, he dismisses the opinion that treats 'financialisation as the flight of capital from a stagnating productive sector' (p. 18).
My views on the current crisis, the question of capitalist profitability and the growth of finance are different. On the question of data, I think it is not possible to get a good approximation for the rate of profit in the capitalist system as understood by Marx. Apart from anything else, there are problems of allowing for productive and unproductive labour, the impact of a monopolistic world market on value calculations, data inaccuracies, tax havens and the methodology of compiling the data.[13] Despite this, it is a natural urge for many, especially those analysts interested in Marxism, to use the available data to examine profitability trends. I sympathise with this effort, but remain sceptical about whether it is possible to make a good job of it. That said, I would agree that it would be odd if there were a major crisis, as we have today, and the available data showed that the rate of profit in the years ahead of the crisis had been relatively high. Some measures of US profitability do indeed show relatively high rates of profit ahead of the crisis and that would appear to give support to the 'financial malfunction' thesis of Lapavitsas and others. However, one does not need to accept the available data on profits uncritically, especially for the US.
I would note three factors that put any calculation of rising US profitability from the 1980s in a different light, whether one measures it for the overall corporate sector, or whether one tries to make a separate measure for industrial and commercial companies.[14] The first was the attack on working class living standards by the US government and business, the use of migrant labour and the marginalisation of labour unions. To some extent, this effect can be measured, although there are debates on what productivity, price, wage and benefits data to use, and this factor was probably significant. However, it was likely to have been more of a one-off factor, and most measures of US rates of profit show lower rates into the end of the 1990s.
The second factor has arguably been more important, but it does not directly appear in any US data: the impact of low cost products available to US capital through trading relationships with low wage countries, particularly China. These reduced the cost of living for most workers and also provided cheap inputs for business. Lapavitsas notes the so-called 'Great Moderation' (p. 194), the term used to describe the apparent success of US policymakers in achieving reasonable growth together with lower inflation. But he does not mention this crucial point that helped underpin that success, one that relied upon the introduction of many tens of millions of new, super-exploited workers into the world economic system from the 1980s. Some Marxists dispute this factor, implicitly assuming a similar rate of exploitation for all workers - otherwise, it might seem to be strange why capitalists invest in the richer countries at all, and why they do not fully migrate to the low wage areas. However, one should also consider the stratification of global production between rich and poor countries,[15] and the political factors behind immigration controls in rich countries, including working class support for these, something that has prevented an equalisation of rates of exploitation. Overall, this factor was a significant boost to global profitability, but its incremental impact will now be much less.
The third factor boosting US corporate profitability for industrial and commercial capitalists was progressively lower nominal and real interest rates.[16] This development was based on an unwinding of the previous very high rates that followed the tightening of Fed policy in the early 1980s, on the success of capital in attacking the US working class, on the low cost of imports and on Asian countries accumulating huge foreign exchange reserves (buying US securities and so reducing their yields) as an insurance against financial trouble after the crisis of 1997-98. The end result was a sharp rise in US consumer borrowing, a relative decline of interest income for the banks, a rise in the price of financial securities, more financial trading and credit-fuelled demand for the products of industry and commerce in the 2000s.[17] The problem now is that nominal US interest rates cannot really be pushed any lower.
This was the real world backdrop for the 'financialisation' phenomena. As these summary points indicate, financial developments are multi-faceted and their relationship to the rate of profit is complex. However, at the very least, one should not look upon any data showing credit-fuelled profit rates for the period up to 2007 as being a sign of healthy capitalism![18] It should also be noted that the recorded profitability of US companies (such as Wal-Mart and Apple) might not necessarily have much relationship to the profit arising from their domestic US operations. That would help explain the apparent paradox that US corporate profits might be high while (domestic US) investment remains weak.

Conclusion
Lapvitsas's book has raised many issues and gives valuable food for thought in coming to an understanding of the global crisis. The financial form of the crisis is a challenging phenomenon to unravel, but Lapavitsas’s approach is wrong on several counts. He rejects what he would judge as a simplistic, or simply invalid, ‘falling rate of profit’ explanation of the crisis and financial developments, but then only proceeds to describe the (autonomous) development of financial processes. Even here, as I have argued, there are serious gaps in his coverage. He also sets up the concept of ‘financial exploitation’, particularly of workers’ incomes. This is not only at odds with a standard Marxist understanding, despite his exaggerated claims to the contrary drawing upon usury. It is also used to make a distinction between the financial capitalists who exploit without producing and those capitalists who exploit in the process of production. The reader cannot come away without getting the impression that the latter is fine, or at least the lesser of two evils, especially when his conclusion is that 'public banks could support the provision of banking services to real accumulation as well as to households' (p. 324).
           Finance is not a simple, parasitical outgrowth of the 'productive' capitalist economy, as Lapavitsas has argued well when looking at the operations of big corporations and their relationship with the financial system. However, this insight does not prevent him from counterposing the two. His 'national to world economy' perspective has also led him to overlook important features of finance that would have elucidated the role of finance for the major imperialist powers, in particular the US and UK. Identifying different forms of capital, especially the financial ones, is important for understanding the workings of capitalism. But, despite the Marxist guise, this book ends up as yet another form of anti-finance populism that, despite being critical of capitalism, seeks to restore the health of the capitalist economy.


Tony Norfield, 6 January 2014


[1] Fine does not argue in that article that banks do not lend to each other as Lapavitsas claims, a point that would obviously be an absurd one to make. In addition, Lapavitsas seems to misunderstand, and misrepresents, Fine's argument from the earlier paper that banks/finance can combine different forms of capital in exchange together, something which Fine takes as key in understanding the notion of financialisation (in contrast to Lapavitsas's view of financial exploitation) as in a much more recent paper unacknowledged by Lapavitsas (see footnote 2).
[2] Ben Fine has offered the most telling critique, one argument of which is summarised in the next paragraph (see 'Locating Financialisation', Historical Materialism, 18, 2010). Lapavitsas does not refer to this article in his book. In two presentations of the book, made at SOAS in London in October and November 2013, Lapavitsas did not answer questions on this particular topic from the audience, including from myself.
[3] See, for example, the author's discussion of developments in financial derivatives as one response to problems of capital accumulation in 'Derivatives and capitalist markets: the speculative heart of capital', Historical Materialism, 20 1, 2012.
[4] For a brief discussion of this issue, see 'Bank profits and leverage' on this blog, 25 August 2011. A fuller treatment is in 'Value theory and finance', Research in Political Economy, 28, 2013.
[5] Lapavitsas does, on occasion, briefly refer to bank credit creation, but, as these points indicate, it has no role to play in his broader analysis. It is one of the paradoxes, rather failures, of Marxist discussion of the banking system and finance that the basic mechanism of bank credit creation, included in all mainstream economics macro textbooks, rarely gets a mention.
[6] Property assets are usually not included as part of financial assets in official statistics, but to exclude them leads to a distorted picture. UK data for 2008-10 estimate a total net property wealth (after deducting mortgage liabilities) of £3,375bn! [Correction, 19 January 2014: footnote 6 of the article when first posted incorrectly added that median household net property wealth was £340,000, however this figure was the median for the top 10% of households]
[7] His 'Type 1' crises, by contrast, are where monetary and financial crises are 'an integral part of industrial and commercial crises' (p. 165).
[8] However, the points raised about diverging competitiveness within the euro area and potential problems for central bank policy were included in many reports from banks in the City of London and elsewhere in the early 2000s.
[9] This is the title of a famous 1967 book by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, a French politician. Germany has obviously played a key role in the development of the euro project, but this project was based upon the coincidence of interests of several major European powers. Germany was actually one of the most reluctant to internationalise the euro. It is often ignored in radical denunciations of Germany's role, as also in this book, that Germany has subsidised other euro countries. For more on these topics see other article on this blog: 'The Imperial Balances' 12 September 2012, and, for a more general discussion of the euro project and its relationship to imperial rivalry, 'Cameron, Merkozy and Europe', 12 December 2011.
[10] Lapavitsas makes some similar points at the end of his book to the ones formerly mentioned in this paragraph (p. 311), but the thrust of his argument is to stress the novelty of the financialisation phase.
[11] This is not to say that there is no dispute about the reasons for the fall in profitability into the 1970s! There are basically two camps here: those who argue that profits fell because of higher wage settlements (usually welcomed as an attack on capitalism - how times change!) and those who argued it was based upon a rising organic composition of capital. I am in the latter camp, but note that the difficulty of getting more surplus value out of the domestic workforce was an important driver of the later trend towards 'globalisation' and the shift of production to low wage, more exploited workforces elsewhere.
[12] See, for example, the work of Guglielmo Carchedi, Alan Freeman, Andrew Kliman and Michael Roberts, among others. For a recent review of some profitability issues, see Michael Roberts' blog: http://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2013/12/19/the-us-rate-of-profit-extending-the-debate/
[13] This article is a book review, so neither will I discuss the additional headaches of considering questions such as historical cost versus current cost of investments, and of the relatively new official device of attributing the financial sector its own 'value added', labelled FISIM in the UK.
[14] In US statistics, comparable data exist for calculating an overall corporate sector profit rate (using a measure of profits versus fixed assets, as is commonly done). However, it is far trickier to get the necessary data for the non-financial and financial sectors separately.
[15] John Smith discusses this important point about North-North and South-South competition. See, for example, 'Southern labour—“Peripheral” no longer: A reply to Jane Hardy', International Socialism, 140, 7 October 2013.
[16] Financial capitalists managed to boost their profitability as interest rates fell in this period by raising their leverage, as noted earlier, especially in the US.
[17] See my article, 'Derivatives and capitalist markets', Historical Materialism, 20 1, 2012, for an examination of some of these trends.
[18] The more recent recovery in bank profitability is largely due to wider interest rate margins, backed by low central bank interest rates in many countries and an implicit or explicit state guarantee on their credit.