Showing posts with label leverage. Show all posts
Showing posts with label leverage. Show all posts

Friday, 26 August 2016

Rate of Profit, Rate of Interest


The rate of profit and the rate of interest are at the core of capitalism’s dynamic, but there is a huge amount of confusion in what is written on these matters. This article aims to clarify some key points. I outline the relevant aspects of some theories of profit and interest, but focus on how to understand profit and interest rates from the perspective of a Marxist understanding of capitalism. Underlying these abstract concepts are the realities of class and power in the world economy.

Rate of profit calculations
Profitability is obviously important for capitalism. Paying attention to the rate of profit, not just the amount, also makes sense, since this gives the amount of profit per unit of capital advanced, and the more the better. But this simple point hides two important complications.
Firstly, the calculation must be timed. Commonly, calculations are for the rate of profit per year, so that the amount of profit in a year is measured against how much capital is advanced at any one time to achieve it. Other things equal, this also means that the shorter the time period between advancing the money capital, buying the necessary means of production, producing and then selling the commodities at a profit, the greater will be the rate of profit per year. This can make shortening the buying/selling process also appear to be a source of value and profit, not just the production process itself. A quicker method of buying/selling will speed up the circulation process for the producer, raise the amount and rate of profit per year and allow a greater profit to be shared between the producers and the commercial capitalists who are more involved in this process.
Secondly, the rate of profit will be affected by how much of the capital advanced is from the company’s owners and how much is borrowed from banks or other money capitalists providing it with extra investment funds. If we assume a given, annual rate of profit of 10% for the company, then the return on its total investment will also be 10%. But if it has borrowed half its investment funds from banks at a rate of just 5%, or issued bonds with a yield of 5%, then the rate of profit on the funds that the company’s owners have advanced will be higher. For example, for 200 invested at 10%, the annual return is 20. But if the company’s owners have invested only 100 of their own money plus an extra 100 they have borrowed, the company then gets as its profit the 20 total minus the 5 it needs to pay on its borrowings, etc. The result is that its rate of return will be higher: 15 (20 – 5) over the 100 invested, or 15%.
This extra profitability depends on the rate of interest paid on the borrowings being lower than the underlying rate of profit on the total investment. That is not always the case, but it shows how profitability calculations for capitalist owners will tend to change when borrowing funds is taken into account.
What rate?
A company’s borrowed funds raise an ambiguity, one that has not been dealt with well by Marxist theory. If the money is borrowed via bond issues or bank loans, then the payment for the borrowing falls under the heading of interest, so the previous calculation will hold. But if the extra funds come from new money advanced by money capitalists buying any new equity the company issues on the stock market, then how should these extra funds be treated and what is the form taken by the deduction from profits?
If the money capitalists have put their funds into the company’s new equity issue, or even just bought previously issued equity from others, then they own part of the company, just as much as the original owners. To that extent, they will receive a share of the profits in the form of dividends on the equity they own, just like the others. However, there are some distinctions to take into account.
As newer entrants, unless the new equity buyers become big shareholders, they will have fewer claims on the company’s resources through the large salaries they might otherwise get by becoming executives and directors, with special bonuses or other payments. Small-scale equity owners also have little voting power in company decisions, and some of the equity sold and bought may even be devoid of voting rights on these decisions. Insofar as they are in this latter camp, the equity dividends for them are not so different from the interest payments on the company’s bond or bank loan borrowings. But they are still in a different economic situation from bond holders or bank lenders. They benefit from any rise in the price of the equity, and may suffer a loss from a collapse of equity prices. They have none of the usual debt holder or bank lender protection of being first in line for payments, if the company gets in trouble, and their dividends might be zero or very high, while interest and coupon payments are determined at a market level or fixed in advance.
Aside from any possible director benefits, the return on equity for the companies’ owners can be taken to be not only the dividends paid on the value of the equities purchased, but also on the change in the price of the equity itself. So, holding a company’s equity that pays zero dividends may be better than holding one with high dividends, if its equity price has risen far enough above the investor’s purchase price. For example, buying shares in a company at 100 and receiving no dividend for two years will be disappointing for money capitalists. But the outcome will nevertheless look attractive if the company’s share price rises to 150 over those two years, because a large capital gain has been made.
This is accentuated further by the way in which all equity prices (and, indeed, bond prices) tend to rise as interest rates fall, and vice versa, due to the lower, or higher, rates of discount on future earnings by money capitalists. Such calculations show how far capitalist views on what it a profitable investment can become divorced from a measure of the company’s actual return on capital or its underlying profitability.
Company reports usually standardise data with annual rates of profit, and also distinguish the profit due to shareholders after interest on borrowings and other special factors. These commonly lead to different rankings of companies, not necessarily only by their reported profits, but also, especially in recent decades, by the volatility of the returns they get. Extra borrowing usually leads to extra volatility of returns. These are other factors that influence the choices made by money capitalists, and thus the allocation of capital, but they do nothing to change the actual profits produced.

Rate of interest
At first sight, the rate of interest is more easily observable than the rate of profit on industrial or commercial investment. After all, the central bank’s key interest rates are published daily or intra-day, as are the yields on 3-month Treasury bills, 5-year or 10-year government bonds or rated corporate bonds. Nothing similar really happens for measures of company rates of profit. While there are many rates of interest – interbank borrowing rates, government Treasury bill or bond yields, corporate bond yields, borrowing rates for consumer loans or mortgages, etc – they are publicly observable in ways that a rate of profit on corporate investments is not.
How is this problem of many rates of interest dealt with in economic theory? Mostly, not at all. Instead, a sacred ‘rate of interest’ is often used in mainstream economic theory, with few, or no questions asked as to what kind of interest rate is meant. Financial theory may, for practical calculations, distinguish a corporate bond yield or government-borrowing yield, in order to determine the relevant price of a financial security, but there will be no serious investigation as to why this is at a particular level and not at any other. Instead, tautological assessments of ‘risk’ are offered, which make the banal observation that a more risky investment will probably have to offer a higher interest yield. But this does little to get around the problem that much mainstream financial theory, especially for financial derivatives, is based on the idea of there being, at bottom, a ‘risk-free’ interest rate, one that exhibits a zero, or negligible credit risk of not getting repaid by the borrower.
What rate is ‘risk free’? Usually this is assumed to be a government security yield, ignoring the inconvenient fact that governments have also been known not to repay in full. In the case of the US government’s security yields, the nec plus ultra of ‘risk free’ in financial theory, it is conveniently ignored that on several occasions the US government has run close defaulting on its debt repayments, owing to political turmoil in Congress. How far government yields can be seen as objective arbiters of the rate on ‘risk free’ debt is also questioned by a significant bias lower for this rate, especially in financial markets dominated by the major powers. Structural demand for the key government securities, from the domestic banking system, from international investor demand for the global currency security, and sometimes from their taxation policies (for example, exempting capital gains from tax), produces lower yields than would otherwise be the case.
The upshot is that ‘the’ rate of interest is as nebulous as ‘the’ rate of profit. Both sets of rates are determined in a chaotic capitalist market. Are there any laws determining these?

Relationships between interest and profit rates
A common view in mainstream economic theory is that the rate of profit and the rate of interest are either the same, or tend to equality over time. The logic is straightforward, but this logic also highlights the deficiencies of the argument. It is an example of the errors that arise when a focus on appearances is allowed to obscure the underlying processes of the capitalist economy. This happens when the social content of the relationship is ignored, with little attention paid to what the terms in an equation actually mean.
To illustrate this point, and even to make a mild concession to the argument, cast aside the messy reality that there are many rates of profit and many rates of interest, determined by all kinds of market pressures. Instead, assume that there is, in fact, one capitalist market rate of profit (r), available to industrial and commercial capitalists, and one market rate of interest (i) available to those putting funds into banks, buying bonds, etc. The basic case made by modern economics is that there is a tendency for r to equal i.
The rationale for this view is usually given from the perspective of the money capitalist. Let us call him (it is rarely her) Moneybags, and imagine him just sitting there with $1m in cash to play with. So what does Moneybags do with the cash when viewing the opportunities available?
            if i > r, just lend money in the market rather than invest directly in production
            if i < r, then invest in production rather than lend on the money markets
The actions of Moneybags supposedly tend to equalise the two rates, by investing or lending. How? The logic is rarely spelled out, but the mechanism assumed is as follows. If the rate of interest is above the rate of profit, the effect of offering more funds into the money market will tend to depress the rate of interest on loans towards the (lower) rate of profit. Alternatively, if Moneybags invested more in the higher rate of profit available on capitalist production, then that would tend to decrease the rate of profit on that activity towards the (lower) rate of interest on loans. Abracadabra, in a free market the rate of interest will therefore tend to equality with the rate of profit!
There is so much wrong with this argument, despite it often being taken as self-evident, or at least plausible. The problems can be seen in several steps.

Investment and ‘interest’
A money capitalist investor with funds of M can put them into a bank deposit, equity or bond investment, try to start up a business, or invest in someone else’s business. Assuming the investor is attracted by the relative yields, then this looks like a mechanism for equalising r and i, and the previous argument would hold.
However, that assumes there are diminishing returns on the M invested in industry and commerce, or in ‘financial’ ways, so that the flow of M into the different applications of funds will equalise the returns on the funds in each case. Rates of return may not initially move lower when M is applied a number of times to a particular type of investment, but eventually the extra supply of commodities produced, or of funds into an investment area, should presumably lower prices and reduce the rate of profit and also, in the alternate case, the interest return. Yet this seemingly valid logic ignores the nature of the investment that produces the return.
In one case, it is an advance of M to invest in means of production and labour-power to get a surplus value that results in a corresponding rate of profit. In the other case, it is an advance of M on the money markets, into bonds, etc, to get back a value of M plus interest. In the first case, the M may be advanced to expand the circuit of production. This could even raise the rate of profit if it boosted the productivity of a company versus its competitors, although, taken for the economy as a whole and over a period of time, probably not. The real problem for this proposed mechanism occurs for the advance of M for the ‘financial’ investment.
Moneybags wants to get back the invested funds, M, plus interest. But is Moneybags literally a bag of money hovering in the air, having no costs of investment that need to be deducted from the interest received? Also, what if Moneybags also borrows money from others to help fund the investment? Then the net investment return will depend on the difference between the borrowing and lending interest rates, as well as the deduction of his relevant costs. This means that the ‘rate of interest’, seen as a return on money capital advanced, is not as straightforward for Moneybags as the economists’ assertion of the letter i for interest would suggest.
Neither is the ‘r’ for the profit rate unambiguous. Industrial and commercial companies will borrow funds for investment as well as using their own funds. This means that their net profit is reduced by their interest payments; to give what Marx called the ‘profit of enterprise’. This latter profit is best measured over the money advanced by the industrial and commercial capitalists to get their ‘rate of profit’, but that will generally be a different number from the rate of return on the investment as a whole, as explained earlier.
The industrial and commercial capitalists will tend to borrow more, the lower is the rate of interest on borrowing versus the going rate of profit. They might also stop any extra borrowing when the rate of interest rises to equal the rate of profit that extra investment funds could generate. Yet, while that looks like a possible market mechanism for tending to equalise the rate of interest and the rate of profit, it is at best only a partial one. For example, companies would not borrow indefinitely with a lower rate of interest than the rate of profit. To do so would greatly increase their ‘leverage’ and expose them to the risk of having to service debt and pay interest even if the conditions of profitable production deteriorate. For such reasons, stockmarket investors usually frown upon highly leveraged companies.
In addition, there is the point, explained in my book, The City,[1] that the ‘profit rate’ of financial firms, such as banks who can create their own financial assets, or who depend upon attracting funds from other money capitalists and savers, such as asset managers, cannot sensibly be compared with the profit rate of industrial and commercial corporations advancing capital for their business. It is not comparing like with like.

Conclusions
In Marxist theory, there is no law determining the rate of interest, while profits are determined by the surplus value extracted from productive workers. That profit is measured over the capital invested, to determine a rate of profit for the system as a whole, and the profit remaining to the productive capitalists is determined after paying the amount of interest. [2] The only barrier to the rate of interest is that it cannot be sustained at a level that eats up all the profit of productive capital. In recent years, ‘real’ rates of interest have been negative (when compared to inflation levels), and have even been negative for some rates in nominal terms, but no statistician has so far claimed that corporate profitability has become close to zero or negative for the economy as a whole. This gives empirical support to the argument in this article that there is no equalisation of the rate of interest and rate of profit.
Developments in capitalist society mean that the 19th century picture of the industrial capitalist versus the money capitalist and, correspondingly, the rate of profit versus the rate of interest have taken on a new form today. While it is possible to identify capitalist entrepreneurs who have founded companies, from James Dyson (vacuum cleaners) to Mark Zuckerberg (Facebook), most of these have also evolved into being financial entrepreneurs, using borrowings from capital markets and financial operations to boost their market status and power. It is commonly the case that ‘entrepreneurs’ these days cannot readily be separated from ‘financiers’, given their often multiple shareholdings and other financial interests; still less can the initial investors in their projects from the financial elite be considered under the same heading as Marx’s industrial capitalists.
So there is not any longer, even if there once was in Marx’s time, a distinct class of ‘money capitalists’ versus the rest of the capitalist class. Individual capitalists will often have a portfolio of more important and less important holdings in companies, ones they pay more attention to and others, ones that are industrial, commercial or financial, together with the additional assets they hold in the form of government and corporate bonds, money market securities, bank deposits and so forth.
The activities of asset managers, insurance companies and pension funds complicate the situation further. In the rich countries, where financial operations are more prevalent, a significant proportion of the population indirectly owns a large share of corporate equity. No individual among these feels in control. Rightly so, since their monthly payments or accumulated savings are used to boost the corporate elite. But they nevertheless also benefit from and have a stake in the fortunes of the capitalist corporations in which they have invested. This has an impact on the politics of the populations concerned. But I do not cite this as the only political problem faced, since in the richer, imperialist societies the poorest will also commonly be among the most aggressive supporters of their state’s power.

Tony Norfield, 26 August 2016


[1] See here.
[2] Even this simple summary ignores the question of rent on land ownership, dealt with in the latter parts of Volume 3 of Capital. In this article, I do not cover the separate question of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. My book, The City, discusses how measures of the rate of profit are impacted by financial developments, state intervention and, especially, by the position of a country in the world economic system.

Sunday, 3 July 2016

Value Theory, Finance and Imperialism


The following text consists of notes from a lecture that I gave in London on 27 June at an IIPPE conference on ‘Imperialism Today’. This set of notes is in the form of bullet points, ones that I elaborated on in the talk and discussion. To that extent, they will not necessarily be completely clear to new readers. But I do not plan to extend these into a full article. Instead the notes are a summary of the underlying value logic that is part of what is explained more fully, discursively and straightforwardly, with examples, in my new book The City: London and the Global Power of Finance. I hope these notes will help as a concise summary of my developed argument, and also give some guidance points for others interested in drawing links between Marx’s theory of value and contemporary financial developments.

Tony Norfield, 3 July 2016
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1. What is Imperialism?

Marx showed how capitalism develops a world economy.
‘Imperialism’ describes a stage when particular countries cannot be understood outside of their world relationships.
Focus of analysis: examine how social relations are shaped by the capitalist world economy.
Example: the US$ is ‘world money’, given the international power of the US economy, not just the local US currency.
Lenin also formulated how economic and political perspectives must change with the emergence of imperialism.
Marx’s analysis of imperialism?
- Marx analysed world developments, but only in a limited way in Capital Volumes 1, 2 and 3
- Vol 3 analysed ‘many capitals’, and their different forms, but not relationships between countries in the world market
- Later volumes planned to cover the state, foreign trade and the world market more systematically
Hence, in Capital there is:
- No real discussion of colonies (just brief mentions)
- Nor much on monopoly, national differences in wages, etc
Obviously, the world also developed further from the 1860s!
‘Imperialism’ as in Lenin’s 1916 pamphlet: 
- decisive role of monopolies in the world economy
- bank/industrial capital merges, producing ‘financial oligarchy’
- capital export (and revenues from it) much more important
- territorial division of the world is complete among key powers
Implications:
- changes in division of world power increases propensity to war
- division of world into oppressed/oppressor countries, with the oppressors benefiting economically (his focus was on the ‘labour aristocracy’)
A century-old analysis still relevant?
Monopolies dominate world economy - yes
Bank/industrial capital & ‘financial oligarchy’ – not this form
Capital export – different kinds of international links today
Territorial division of the world – yes, but also changes
Implications:
Propensity to war – yes, although now many wars by proxy
Oppressed/oppressor country division – yes, some changes
Benefits of the oppressor – yes, but not just a ‘labour aristocracy’
Politics of imperialism:
Conflicts/rivalries between major powers by end-19th century
Wars began to involve the whole population, not just military
Social unrest with the growth of the working class
Ruling class gains loyalty of workers via welfare reforms, extra voting rights, etc (UK, France, Germany, especially)
By 1914, the main European socialist parties backed their own states in war
Implications:
Development of loyalist working classes in many rich countries that will fight to defend their nation state and their related privileges! So, it is not just a very small portion of the working class in these countries that becomes pro-imperialist. This is a major political issue today!
Summary definition of imperialism:
A division of the world that results from the exercise of monopoly power by corporations and their states.
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Big corporations may have economic advantages, eg better technology, but they have a powerful position in the world economy due to their links with particular states.
States back property rights (from expropriation by rivals, also via patent laws) & extend economic power in international trade and investment deals.
Economic power and ability to exploit is reinforced by these privileges, ones that also include access to finance.
The balance of power is not fixed. Relationships are likely to change with the different accumulation of capital and power-competition successes of different countries.

2. Imperialism & Financial Power

Financial markets show what the world economy allows!
Marx’s ‘law of value’ for commodities has evolved:
- Equity prices, bond yields, FX rates are critical for companies and governments
- For example, the US uses the $ as ‘world money’ to isolate non-favoured countries (eg Iran, Russia)
- Major companies dominate world markets, via stockmarket takeovers, ownership links, etc
- Access to capital occurs via major financial centres, especially New York and London
… in addition to trade/investment deals run by major states
This is a regular, daily mechanism, and does not rely upon crises to work, although such crises often give the major powers an extra ability to gain influence.

3. A ‘Real’ versus a ‘Financial’ Economy?

All big capitalist companies are tied into ‘finance’
- FX deals to buy imports / sell exports
- Borrowing for purchases, or to invest
- Use financial derivatives to insure against price moves
- Mergers & takeovers to monopolise markets
Financial operations are integral to modern capitalism, and it is a liberal, reformist delusion to make a big distinction between 'real' and 'financial' companies.

4. Theory of Finance - Overview

‘Finance’ is big because it is driven by governments, corporations, banks and other financial institutions.
- Value relationships take on a financial form, so ‘finance’ pervades the system as a whole and is a means of gaining wealth and power!
- Note the prominence of the US and the UK, and how the workings of the global financial system are of particular benefit to them.
-  This is not ‘complex financial dealing’ by dangerous speculators, who disrupt the otherwise solid workings of the capitalist economy.

5. Finance & Marx’s Value Theory

Marx’s theory of value is about the capitalist organisation of social labour.
It is an analysis of the forms that arise from capitalist production and the exploitation of labour, the tendency to crisis and the limits of this mode of production.
Capitalist finance in Marx’s theory:
- a means by which existing surplus-value is circulated
- ‘finance’ = money dealing + interest bearing capital
- interest bearing capital (and banking) create new forms of value, and appear also to create new value
Interest, banks, fictitious capital, etc, are dealt with first in Volume 3 of Capital. This is a ‘logical-historical’ development of the earlier analysis.
The first page of Vol 3 of Capital: Marx notes that Vol 1 analysed the immediate process of capitalist production ‘with no regard for any of the secondary effects of outside influences’. Vol 2 studied the circulation process of capital, which must be added to the immediate process of production to complete the ‘life span of capital’.
Vol 3 went beyond this synthesis to ‘locate and describe the concrete forms which grow out of the movements of capital as a whole’.
Vol 3 develops those forms of capital which:
‘approach step by step the form in which they assume on the surface of society in the action of the different capitals upon one another, in competition, and in the ordinary consciousness of the agents of production themselves’.
Vol 1 & Vol 2 do not examine how competition might affect different capitals, nor the forms of capital that arise from that process.
Vol 3 examines ‘many capitals’ and competition, but not in concrete detail. For example, Marx excludes the analysis of the world market, different values of labour-power, etc, except in occasional remarks.
Industrial capital, and its circuit of  M – C … P … C’ – M’, has almost complete attention in Vols 1 & 2:
‘Its existence implies the class antagonism between capitalists and wage-labourers …. The other kinds of capital, which appeared before industrial capital amid conditions of social production that have receded into the past or are now succumbing, are not only subordinated to it and the mechanism of their functions altered in conformity with it, but move solely with it as their basis ….’
But Vol 3, Parts IV & V are critical for an understanding of finance. These show how the ‘M’ and ‘C’ components of this circuit become transformed under the influence of industrial capital. In turn, they have an impact on the forms of value accumulation by the system as a whole.
a) The basic M – C … P … C’ – M’ circuit includes market exchange and changes of value form (M - C, C - M)
b) This circuit implies surplus funds, or demands for funds, arising for productive capital at different times. Merchant capital (commerce, etc) develops in this context
c) The form of value in the circuit changes not only between M, C and P (Vol 2). The forms taken by M also evolve.
d) A key stage in the analysis is where M is an advance of capital outside the basic circuit, as in M – M’. This is the basis of Marx’s concept of ‘interest bearing capital’.
Step 1: Distinguish M – C – M’ from M – C … P … C’ – M’
This is not simply a logical (or functional) separation, but one that develops in reality.
Buying/selling by merchant capital is separate from the part of the circuit of capital that produces surplus value.
The specialist buying/selling function can be done more efficiently by merchants. It shortens circulation time, lowers costs and allows more surplus-value production per year.
Merchant capital produces no value or surplus value itself, but enables more surplus value (per year) to be produced by others.
Step 2: Focus on specialist monetary aspects of merchant capital (eg FX deals or loans for operating capital which assist the circuit of industrial capital, promoting M–C and C–M).
This is ‘money dealing capital’ (MDC), distinct from the previous ‘commercial capital’ part of merchant capital.
Marx’s theory has productive, commercial and money dealing capital as separate, but related, parts of the original circuit of industrial capital dealt with in Vol 2.
Each part of MDC is involved in averaging the rate of profit, assuming each section of capital could move into other areas. Capital advanced for production may be advanced for merchant (MDC) functions, or vice versa.
Money dealing operations are only an advance of money to industrial and commercial capitalists - an exchange for a different form of money (as in FX) or for a security (eg advance money against bills of exchange that are redeemed later). They are not an advance of capital.
Step 3: Another form of capital develops out of this money dealing – Interest Bearing Capital (IBC)
Up to Step 3, Marx examined forms arising out of the circuit of industrial (or productive) capital.
With Step 3, there is a new form of capital, IBC, outside that circuit. It has its own special circuit: M – M’.
With IBC, money is advanced as money capital (by money capitalists) to the 'functioning capitalist' who later returns the money back to the owner with interest.
Marx includes both the merchant and industrial capitalists as potential recipients of IBC from the money capitalist.
In both cases, it is assumed that the loaned funds are invested as capital and (could) gain a surplus value.
Even if the funds are not invested profitably, then the money capital still has to be repaid with interest.
Marx's concept of IBC does not include all loans of money capital for whatever purpose. This is consistent with Vol 3 analysing 'the process of capitalist production as a whole'.
So, bank loans to workers, for mortgages, for personal consumption, etc, are treated differently, or not at all, in Capital. These are just advances of loanable money capital, not of IBC.
The latter loans are still paid back with interest, but the concept of IBC is determined outside this relationship.
However, in all cases, the interest is still a deduction from surplus value deriving from the productive sphere.
Key points on this topic
a) ‘Finance’ is not confined to the operations of banks; monetary advances and transactions pervade the whole capitalist system! ‘Industrial’ companies also conduct many financial operations.
b) For IBC in particular, the advance of money capital in the M – M’ circuit can also be performed in a number of different ways, and by different institutions.
c) This also means that other forms of ‘M’ can develop outside the M – C … P … C’ – M’ circuit.
d) This takes us on to fictitious capital and bank credit, key forms of capital, and of value in modern financial systems.
Bonds, Equities, ‘Fictitious Capital’
‘Fictitious capital’ (basically, the term means financial securities)
The prices of these securities do not represent any value created and are determined differently from commodities.
Bonds have a higher status than equities regarding terms of repayment; but a lower status, usually none, in ownership of corporate assets.
There is a legal differentiation of ‘pure’ money capitalists (bond owners) from owners of companies (via equities).
The securities are tradable, potentially translated into money. They can be used as collateral for loans. Equity securities are often used as a means of payment in takeovers.
Bond prices: the discounted present value of future coupon payments and the principal repayment.
Key plus/minus factors: risk of non-payment (credit risk);  interest rate level at which future payments discounted.
Prices move independently of value created. A bond ‘worth’ $1m need not relate to any sum of capital invested.
Equity prices: an equity represents a share of ownership and future company profits, and the price reflects that.
Key plus/minus factors: expected future profits; interest rate level at which future payments are discounted.
The prices of both kinds of security are also influenced by speculative buying/selling!

6. Economic power, financial securities and bank credit

Bonds
Creditors can set terms for company or government behaviour, especially in a crisis, when a question of writing off debt (privatisation, policy, etc) or access to new funds.
Equities
Ownership, of course. But voting rights on company decisions are not the same as the equity holding! Control of society’s resources via centralising capital and creation of monopolies.
Bank credit is a distinct mechanism of finance!
This topic has been very badly dealt with in Marxist theory.
A bank does not simply use existing sums of money from depositors to lend to borrowers, whether they are companies or individuals.
It does not act simply as a ‘go between’.
Banks can create new funds within the banking system: they grant loans to borrowers, who then use the funds (not usually as cash, mainly bank transfers) to buy things.
Banks make up any shortage of funds from other banks, or via the central bank. This credit creation can boost expenditures and demand from consumers and investors.
‘Stretching’ the law of value creation
The credit creation process is unique to banks. It depends on a (national) banking system and a central bank if it is to work well.
It also allows a bank’s ‘assets’ (loans) to grow far beyond its capital (funds due to shareholders). This can boost demand in the economy and also the potential for a crisis.
The ratio of assets/capital = leverage ratio.
When bank loans/credits run beyond the ability to pay back, a bank’s loan ‘asset’ becomes a loss! With high leverage ratios, a relatively small scale of losses can destroy a bank's capital and lead to bankruptcy.
(Note: Bank loans are not securities, but they may be ‘securitised’, as with Mortgage-Backed Securities.)

7. Conclusions: Imperialism and Finance

The role of ‘finance’ reflects the operation of the law of value on a world scale and the influence of dominating powers.
The form taken by social labour under capitalism (especially imperialism today) is not simply a ‘value’ form based on commodity production and socially-necessary labour time.
It is dominated by financial forms of value that accentuate the concentration of ownership and control of social wealth.
Financial securities (equities & bonds) and bank credits are the dominating forms of value today.
Equity and bond markets act as regulators of corporate decision-making and government economic policy.
Social resources are controlled via mergers & takeovers, assisted by the system of credit and trading in financial securities.
Major banks provide funds to the global economy, especially via the role of the US dollar.
This how capitalist economic discipline is imposed and value is appropriated by those countries and companies with privileged positions in the global capitalist market system!

Monday, 25 January 2016

The City: London and the Global Power of Finance


My new book, The City: London and the Global Power of Finance, will be published by Verso Books on 12 April 2016. Below I note reviews that it has received so far and give a full list of the contents. Details for ordering the book, which will be available both in hardback (price £20 or less) and as an ebook (around £14), are available on the Verso website and on Amazon.
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“Tony Norfield has provided a strikingly original take on the international financial system by placing it systematically within the world imperialist structure of power. He rejects the currently fashionable path of interpreting the ascent of finance by looking at how the leading financial sector agents, operating by way of banks, hedge funds, private equity firms, and the like, manipulate the political-economic game to increase their own personal wealth, while downplaying any useful economic functions they might be fulfilling. He insists, on the contrary, that finance be understood as a form of power deriving from the economic-cum political capacity to compete at the highest levels of global capitalism, which simultaneously endows a limited group of countries and corporations disproportionate access to the world s resources and operates as the system's indispensable nerve center. Norfield's unusual clarity as both an analyst and expositor is reflected in his ability to lay out for his readers an easy-to-grasp introduction to how finance works today in the process of offering a detailed historically-rooted account of the multiple hierarchies and privileged relationships through which global economic domination is constructed and reproduced. The City is a tour de force, which will soon be recognized as a formidable challenge to conventional wisdom and an essential contribution in its own right.”
Robert Brenner, author of The Economics of Global Turbulence

“This book does the seemingly impossible: rendering finance's mysteries transparent to the average reader, and at the same time delivering a penetrating analysis of the global economic system that will enlighten even experts. Tony Norfield has written a truly exciting and important book.”
Paul Mattick, author of Business as Usual

"It is not every day you read a book about global finance by a banker who quotes Lenin approvingly on page two. Unlike many of those who produce Marxist critiques of financial capitalism, Norfield writes from a position of experience: he has worked in the belly of the beast, and the book is the better for it... Just after the financial crisis, Rolling Stone magazine called Goldman Sachs the “vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity”. In this book, Norfield extends the metaphor to call London the “vampire’s blood bank”. In The City, he has done the research and pulled together the financial statistics that explain how the bloodsucking works.”

Brooke Masters, Financial Times*


“The City is a valuable addition to the critical analysis of the financialisation of our world. And Tony Norfield is an experienced and radical guide to London's role in this process. This book should be required reading for both bankers and activists alike.”
Joris Luyendjik, author of Swimming with Sharks: My Journey into the World of the Bankers



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface

Chapter 1            Britain, Finance and the World Economy
World economic and financial power
Britain’s invisible empire
Understanding finance and imperialism
Insights, conspiracies and policy contingencies
The ‘End of History’ revisited
History wakes up
‘New Deal’ and no deal
The system

Chapter 2            The Anglo-American System
British or American finance?
Anglo-American financial relationships in transition
Building beyond the Empire
New York versus London
The Anglo-American euromarket
British capitalism, finance and official policy
Eurobonds and London’s international role
Historical logic

Chapter 3            Finance and the Major Powers
Regime change
British imperial strategy and the pound
State policy on financial markets from 1979
Finance and the major powers
Gravity and the global system

Chapter 4            Power and Parasitism
Money-capitalists and financial institutions
Interest-bearing capital
Banks
Brokers
Asset managers
Insurance companies
Pension funds
Bank credit creation
Financial securities and economic power
The flexible noose
Finance and the rule of capital
Financial parasitism

Global parasitism, investment, trade and finance
Who reaps the returns?
Finance as a normal part of the system

Chapter 5            The World Hierarchy
The premier league
Capitalism and the state
The state and finance
Monopoly and imperialism
Monopoly today
World projection of power

Chapter 6            Profit and Finance
Return on equity and leverage
Comparing profits
Financial assets and derivatives
Financial revenues, surplus value and securities
Trading revenues
The rate of profit and capital’s limits
Outcomes
Profits, financial and global developments
Moribund capitalism

Chapter 7            The Imperial Web
Currency, trade and seigniorage
‘Exorbitant privilege’
Running the world banking system: US dollar power
Financial services exports
Equity markets, financial power and control
Carving up the market
The daily grind

Chapter 8            Inside the Machine
Number crunching
The surplus from City dealing
Global capitalism’s financial broker
UK financial account: FDI, portfolio flows and bank funding
UK assets, liabilities and returns
The City’s global network, tax havens and global finance
Nice work, if you can get it

Chapter 9            Eternal Interests, Temporary Allies
‘Open for business’
Economics and domestic politics
Islamic finance and the City
China, BRICS and the Anglo-American system
Finance and the rule of capital


List of Tables
3.1       UK, Germany, France – patterns of trade, 1980 and 90 (% of total)
3.2       Financial market shares of major powers, 1980-2001 (% of total)
5.1       Corporate control by controlling company, 2007
6.1       UK monetary financial institutions’ financial balance sheet
7.1       Financial services export revenues, 2000-2013
7.2       Equity market capitalisation and turnover, 2013
8.1       UK current account balance and components, 1987-2014
8.2       External positions of banks, end-2014
8.3       Foreign exchange turnover, 1995-2013
8.4       OTC interest rate derivatives turnover, April 2013
8.5       UK financial account net annual flows, 1987-2014
8.6       Net external position of UK MFIs by location

List of Charts
5.1       The global pecking order, 2013-2014
6.1       Leverage ratios of major international banks, 2007–2011
6.2       Leverage ratios of major UK banks, 1960-2010
6.3       US corporate rate of profit, 1948-2013
6.4       US Federal Reserve financial support stays in place
8.1       Key components of the UK current account, 1987-2014
8.2       UK net foreign investment stock position, 1989-2014
8.3       Returns on UK foreign investment assets and liabilities, 1990-2014


Tony Norfield, 25 January 2016

* note of the FT review was added on 8 May 2016

Thursday, 25 August 2011

Bank Profits & Leverage


There is something peculiar about banks. They borrow cash from people, companies and governments, and lend to people, companies and governments. They deliver ‘financial services’. But, in the process, the closest they ever come to producing anything is when they provide the funds for somebody else to do the producing. Despite this, they gain a great deal of profit. This article is about bank profits and the influence on profits of leverage.

The nature of banks

The modus operandi of banks has traditionally been to attract surplus funds from the broad economy, and to pay interest on these funds at a rate less than they will earn from investing these funds. In the past couple of decades, however, an increasing proportion of bank profits has come from financial activities beyond simple borrowing and lending. Banks might also take fees from companies when issuing their bonds or equities to other investors, or for giving advice on mergers and takeovers, or they might profit from their own dealing in currencies, interest rates, commodities and derivatives. Nevertheless, banks are in the business of financial market transactions, at most speculating on or taking a cut from what other people are producing, rather than producing anything themselves.

Banks do produce for themselves an often impressive profit, but that is based on deriving revenues from business undertaken elsewhere. Even when banks provide critically needed financing, or offer advice and deals that save a company money compared to what it might otherwise have done, the profit they make is based on the surplus that some other business has made. For the UK, the US and some other financial powers, this parasitic role is not seen as a disadvantage. In those countries, the banking system is seen as a key part of the strength of the domestic capitalist economy. This is because their banks can attract significant revenues from other countries. It doesn’t matter where the wealth is produced; it only matters where it is appropriated.

Profits & leverage

Compared to industrial and commercial companies, banks have a big advantage when it comes to making profit. They can use their privileged position in the financial system to borrow at relatively low cost, whether from individual savers, from companies, or from state funding via the central bank. Given the billions of transactions they undertake, they can also count on support from the state when things go wrong, especially if they are ‘too big to fail’. Trouble for the banks means trouble for the capitalist market system.

Bank profits derive from the difference between their borrowing costs and the earnings on their investments. Also, the more they borrow, the more earnings potential they have – via loans, trading positions, taking the risk of underwriting securities, etc. The only limit to such borrowing is when it looks ‘too high’ compared to the underlying investment, or equity, in the bank itself. More borrowing means that a bank can use the funds to buy more assets on which to make a return. This increases the bank’s ‘leverage’, the ratio of its total assets to its equity capital. But as the leverage rises, the bank risks losses on its investments that might eat into its underlying capital - eventually making it insolvent.

As for many other notions in finance, the definition of excessive leverage is a flexible one, determined by what is considered to be ‘normal’.[1] It turns out that a leverage ratio of up to around 20 for banks is considered fine, since this has not been associated with big losses in the past. The risk of loss increases when there is a lot of borrowing at a fixed cost of funds against assets that have a variable rate of return. Higher leverage means that a small drop in earnings on assets – especially through non-payment of debt or default - can wipe out profits completely, since the costs of the borrowed funds still have to be paid.

Leverage is used by industrial and commercial corporations, as well as by banks and other financial companies. However, the former have little ability, unlike the banks, to attract cheap funding, and in any case are more focused on production and distribution, rather than on financial transactions. Therefore they usually have much smaller leverage ratios than banks. Data for US manufacturing companies, for example, show that stockholders’ equity has been higher than corporate debt in the past decade.

To make the issue of bank leverage more clear, consider an example where a bank has $5bn of shareholders’ capital and it borrows another $95bn in the market to fund its total assets of $100bn. In this case, its ratio of total assets to equity, or leverage, is x20, because the assets of $100bn are 20 times higher than the shareholders’ capital. Things go well for the bank if its cost of funds is below the return on its assets. If it pays 4% for its funds, the interest bill is $3.8bn, whereas if it earns 5% on its assets, the return is $5bn. What looks like a small 1% margin of return generates a net income of $1.2bn, and this is measured against the $5bn of equity. So the return on equity is 24% (the $1.2bn divided by $5bn). It would be lower if the costs of its operations are included, but these are excluded in these examples to simplify the picture.

If the bank then expands its business by borrowing even more, it can potentially boost its returns dramatically. For example, if it borrowed $195bn then, with its $5bn of equity, it could fund $200bn of assets. The leverage ratio would now be x40. If the cost of funds were still 4%, it would have to pay a massive $7.8bn in interest on the $195bn, but it would receive $10bn in revenue if the rate of return on the $200bn were still 5%. This gives a net $2.2bn of revenue against the $5bn of equity, thus a return on equity of 44%. Here, the increase in leverage has worked and the return on equity has soared. But the risk was that the assets might not return as much as the previous 5%. Once the average return falls below 3.9%, not much of a drop, the bank starts to make a big loss.

This example of increased leverage might look extreme, but something like this, or worse, was going on in the speculative boom of the 2000s. Up to 2007-08, banks in all the major countries increased their borrowing from financial markets to fund more investments and boost their profits. This borrowing pushed their leverage ratios from around the x20 level to extraordinary heights. Chart 1 shows that in 2007-08, the average leverage ratio was x40 or higher in the US and Europe, with the assets of some large banks even reaching x60 or x100 compared to their equity.

Chart 1: Global bank leverage ratios, 2007-2011 *



Source: Bank of England

Notes: * The longer-term average leverage ratio is close to 20. LCFI means ‘large complex financial institution’ - essentially a big bank with diverse operations. Company accounts have been adjusted to make the data comparable between different countries.


This extreme leverage was an important dimension of the financial boom, and it accentuated the financial collapse once the delusions of ever-higher revenues were shattered. In 2008, at the height of the crisis, every major bank in the US, UK and the rest of Europe registered a plunge in profits, with the sector as whole in each region showing a loss.[2] Since 2008, banks have cut their leverage ratios sharply, by selling or writing off assets and by getting more equity capital investment. In early 2011, these ratios were much closer to their longer-term averages, though this is not to argue that the banks are by any means in a healthy financial position, given that they face rising levels of bad debts and still have huge volumes of dud assets.

Bank subsidies, post-crash

Bank profits were obviously hit by the crisis, and lower levels of leverage have now reduced their potential for ramping up profits. However, profits since the crisis have recovered to some degree, helped by state provision of close-to-zero interest rate funding in the US and UK, and by very low rates in the euro countries. Even where funds have not been directly provided by the state, explicit or implicit guarantees provided by governments have enabled many banks to get funding from the market at much cheaper rates than their real financial position would otherwise have allowed. The spread between banks’ borrowing and lending rates has also widened, increasing their interest income.

A senior Bank of England executive has done a useful estimate of the value of the ‘state guarantee’ subsidy to the major UK and global banks between 2007 and 2009:

‘For UK banks, the average annual subsidy for the top five banks over these years [2007-2009] was over £50 billion - roughly equal to UK banks’ annual profits prior to the crisis. At the height of the crisis, the subsidy was larger still. For the sample of global banks, the average annual subsidy for the top five banks was just less than $60 billion per year.’[3]

As his report put it, ‘these are not small sums’.

Imperial leverage

Previous articles on this blog have shown how declining profitability prompted capital to move away from productive investment into the easy profits of finance, leading to a credit-fuelled boom and bust.[4] The purpose of this article has been to highlight the important role of borrowing by the banks. Higher leverage ratios enabled banks to boost their profits in the upswing, but their extra assets were the debts of others. Now a lot of the debt cannot be repaid. The huge costs of the debt crisis are evident to all, and the shock to the system has led to government inquiries and proposals for reforming the financial markets. However, for the US and the UK, in particular, the financial sector is a key dimension of their economic power as imperialist countries. The US and UK financial systems play a major role in profitably financing the two chronic deficit countries. It is also, one might say, an important part of their ‘leverage’.[5] Anglo-American policy makers are not happy that the costs of the crisis are so high, but they will not do anything to undermine the position of their banks, even if they do decide to constrain some more reckless banking activities.


Tony Norfield, 25 August 2011


[1] There are different definitions of leverage, although each refers to some measure of assets versus capital. Different accounting standards also deliver different numbers. The overall trends up and down tend to remain the same, however. In this article, the basic definition used is bank assets divided by shareholders’ capital, which is the sum of the value of equity capital issued plus retained profits. Confusingly, some other measures of leverage express the ratio as the inverse of the one used here, with capital divided by assets, so a x20 leverage ratio is expressed as a 5% capital/asset ratio.
[2] See Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, June 2011.
[3] See Andrew Haldane, ‘The $100 billion question’, Bank of England, March 2010. This report is of interest for looking at the systemic costs of banking, and for calling the banking industry a ‘pollutant’ with ‘noxious’ by-products. This is from an Executive Director of the Bank of England, responsible for Financial Stability!
[4] See in particular, ‘Anti-bank populism in the imperial heartland’, 5 July 2011.
[5] The US has commonly used financial sanctions against disobedient countries, especially with regard to Iran. The UK has also made ample use of its financial influence, including, more recently, its control over Libyan funds based in London. For the role of finance for the UK, see ‘The Economics of British Imperialism’, 22 May 2011 on this blog. Some notes on the US are in ‘The Real US Debt Problem’, 26 July 2011.