Showing posts with label Ukraine. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ukraine. Show all posts

Tuesday, 2 October 2018

Murdering Europeans


Europe has a long history of violence. Against the advances in philosophy, science and the arts, one must weigh the prolonged episodes of war, massacres, pogroms, colonial terror and oppression. The latter do not look good, so there is often a convenient framing of events in Europe’s historical memory, one that finds no place for the bad stuff. For example, every European country has its own mythology about the Second World War. Although the myths usually cannot withstand the slightest collision with facts, they nevertheless continue as persistent reference points for the mass of people in a particular country.
The UK has a particular weakness for this, with images of how the Dunkirk spirit, squadrons of spitfires and Churchill’s wartime speeches saved the day and led to victory over Nazi Germany. For some reason the historical ‘memory’ does not consider how it was that British deaths in the Second World War numbered only some 300,000, less than 1% of the population, compared to more than 25 million killed in the Soviet Union, 14% of its population. In the biggest confrontation with Germany that turned out to be the turning point for the whole war – the Battle of Stalingrad from August 1942 to February 1943 – the Soviet Union suffered nearly 500,000 killed or missing.

The main course

A record of how many people died in a long and extensive war is difficult to pin down with any precision, but the following map gives an interesting picture of the order of magnitude for different European countries in the 1939-1945 period. Brackets below the totals for each country show another chilling statistic for the murders of Jewish people. The bulk of the figures are from Germany, Austria, Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but it is also worth comparing the absolute numbers with the sizes of the relevant populations to get an idea of the scale of the human destruction. While Poland’s number is large in both absolute and relative terms, six million dead (of which three million Jews) and around 17% of the population, Latvia’s and Lithuania’s figures are much smaller but still more than 12% of their populations. A Wikipedia tabulation here gives a fuller record.[1]

The dessert

With its topic being World War Two, the previously cited Wikipedia article and tables do not spell out that the human carnage in Europe continued until well after 1945. That is the focus of a book by Keith Lowe, from which the European map is taken: Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II (Penguin/Viking, 2004). To read Lowe’s review of post-war Europe is shocking, even if one first allows for the fact that it is unlikely that violence completely stops when formal hostilities cease.
Among other things, Lowe’s book details the continued attacks on Jewish people from 1944-45, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. Discussing the anti-Semitism and pogroms in Poland, he notes that
‘Poland was easily the most dangerous country for Jews after the war. At least 500 Jews were murdered by Poles between the German surrender and the summer of 1946, and most historians put the figure at around 1,500.’
It was not only murder, but also looting and theft:
‘In Hungary many peasants came into possession of decent clothes and footwear for the first time when the property of expelled Jews was shared out in 1944. In Poland, where the Jews had made up a substantial portion of the middle class, a new, Polish middle class rose to take their place.’
As you might imagine, any Jewish people returning home did not have much success in getting compensation.
But don’t think the violence was limited to anti-Semitism. The immediate post-war years had to deal with the aftermath of the destruction, with famine and millions of ‘displaced persons’ across the continent. Although some former collaborators with the German occupation found a way into the post-war establishment, they also risked humiliation or summary execution. Under the cover of revenge by resistance fighters, personal scores were settled. More importantly, there was a dramatic trend of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in the immediate post-war years.
In terms of numbers, the most striking development was the expulsion of over 11 million Germans from countries in Central and Eastern Europe. These were the so-called Volksdeutsch, the long-established populations of expatriate German speakers. Many also suffered forced labour in camps in Poland and Czechoslovakia.
Often the attacks on different groups were linked to their supposed role in the war. But the motive of revenge easily came to embrace all those in the ‘wrong’ community. Referring to developments in 1944-46, Lowe notes the tens of thousands killed in Poland and the Ukraine: ‘Poles and Ukrainians slaughtered one another and burned each other’s villages with an enthusiasm that far exceeded any of their actions against the German or Soviet occupiers’.
There was an attempted genocide of Serbs in Croatia, and Hungarians were expelled from Slovakia. Summing up on the Central and Eastern Europe dimensions, Lowe puts it like this:
‘These were the kinds of actions that were taking place all across Europe. Hungarians were also expelled from Romania, and vice versa. Albanian Chams were expelled from Greece; Romanians were expelled from Ukraine; Italians were expelled from Yugoslavia. A quarter of a million Finns were forced to leave western Karelia when the area was finally ceded to the Soviet Union at the end of the war. As late as 1950 Bulgaria began expelling some 140,000 Turks and Gypsies across their border with Turkey. And so the list goes on.’
‘As a result of all this forced population movement, Eastern Europe became far less multicultural than it had been at any time in modern history. In the space of only one or two years, the proportion of national minorities more than halved. Gone were the old imperial melting pots where Jews, Germans, Magyars, Slavs and dozens of other races and nationalities intermarried, squabbled and rubbed along together as best they could. In their place was a collection of mono-cultural nation-states, whose populations were more or less ethnically homogeneous.’
These events, barely 70 years ago, are something to consider when you observe the reactionary developments in European politics today.

Tony Norfield, 2 October 2018


[1] The Wikipedia article lists casualties from a wide range of countries, not just in Europe. Notable is the huge number of deaths in China, some 15-20 million and 3-4% of the population. China is little covered in films and books on the Second World War, but a good source is Rana Mitter’s Forgotten Ally: China’s World War II, 1937-1945, First Mariner Books, 2013.

Sunday, 20 July 2014

Ukraine, Gaza, Imperial Hypocrisy


Widely reported evidence suggests that pro-Russian rebels in Eastern Ukraine shot down Malaysian flight MH17 with a missile, resulting in the loss of nearly 300 lives. Even if that turns out to be true, nobody would claim that this was done on purpose. It was a stupid, incompetent by-product of a civil war. It was not a plan to kill tourists. This event results in western powers rounding on Russia, with resolutions tabled at the UN and all the major country media unified in condemnation.

Contrast this reaction with the past week's attack on Gaza by Israel's forces. Blasting children off the beach, widespread destruction of homes and hospitals, absurd orders from the Israeli military to 'evacuate' when there is nowhere to go - these events, resulting in the loss of far more than 300 lives, lead western governments to affirm Israel's right to 'defend itself'! No US, EU or UN sanctions counter Israel's genocide against the Palestinians, but nobody could claim that these murders are an accident.

The scales are set like this: one life lost that can be used in support of imperial policy weighs much more than hundreds whose recognition would be politically inconvenient.


Tony Norfield, 20 July 2014

Wednesday, 2 April 2014

Rational Paranoia

The old joke has it that you may be paranoid, but that doesn't mean that people are not out to get you. In Russia's case, a look at the historical map of the western side of the country, especially from 1999, would show a growing group of countries aligned with NATO. This is not the only explanation for Russia's intervention in Crimea, but it puts in context their opposition to the EU's (and the US's) overtures to Ukraine.

The table shows the current memberships of NATO and the EU, each coincidentally of 28 countries. Membership overlaps are striking. Twenty-two of the EU's 28 countries are formal NATO members, five others are part of NATO's 'Partnership for Peace' programme that was set up in 1994 (shown as PfP in the table). This means that they can cooperate with NATO 'on their own terms'. In Sweden's case, for example, it means taking part in 'peacekeeping' in Bosnia and Kosovo, and in advancing 'political and economic stability' in Afghanistan. Only Cyprus is in neither group. However, there is a British military base on Cyprus ...






Tony Norfield, 2 April 2014

Tuesday, 25 February 2014

Ukraine & the EU


Deputy Wendell, reviewing the crime scene: 'It's a mess, ain't it, Sheriff?'

Sheriff Ed Tom Bell: 'If it ain't, it'll do till the mess gets here.'

'No country for old men', Coen Brothers, 2007

(This is a guest article)

Ukraine, a country of 45m people, is not divided into a western ‘pro-European’ camp and an eastern ‘pro-Russian’ camp. Ukrainians are generally anti-Russian, but will be ‘pro-Russian’ when it suits their business interests. Some westerners are ‘pro-European’ as a form of optimism, but recognise their dependence on the industries of the east.
The eastern and southern part has an important heavy industry and manufacturing sector. It is barely competitive by international standards, but benefits from a relationship with the Russian economy. It needs cheap Russian energy sources to be viable. So this part of the economy tends to value its Russian connections, although that does not make it ‘pro-Russian’. The western half of Ukraine has no such facilities and so tends to be pro-European, but this is not a realistic economic interest. It is just a desperate hope.
Ukrainian agriculture is a potentially very rich resource. It can produce a wide range of products to rival EU agriculture. But this needs capital investment. The problem is that the land is in public ownership and has had little investment. Privatisation would require a small but painful revolution, which no one is willing to undertake.

Politics and the state

Russia today is virtually a dictatorship, although it is primarily oriented towards national defence and development rather than exploiting the masses. Russia's economy is based on:
- State control of the energy sector, which provides the funds to finance social provision and keep the oligarchs in check.
- A relationship with the oligarchs who cooperate with the state. The state cannot by itself ensure national economic development.
There is no real market economy, no bourgeois class and no real state authority in the sense of a capitalist constitutional authority.
Ukrainian politics is even worse since it does not even have an absolutist central authority! Politics is entirely dominated by the shifting interests of the oligarchs and business cliques, including the improbable heroine Yulia Tymoshenko. This means there are no real political parties, which is why the Kiev protests have been 'led' by disparate groups, including some militant 'nationalists' with no political programme, only reactionary prejudice.
There is no real state authority in Ukraine. Corruption has to be total since the only sensible policy is the pursuit of self-interest. That is why state control in the western areas (Kiev and Lviv) collapsed so quickly and even the police and army are looking for a way out.

Ukraine is broke

The top rate of tax is 19%, which means that the Ukraine is a state without the funds to be anything more than a caretaker covering only basic functions. It has no popular legitimacy, nor a base of popular support.
Another indication that things are not well is given by the data for the biggest foreign investor in the Ukraine. It is Cyprus … home to Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs, living in the sunny tax haven. They had $12.1bn invested in Ukraine at end-2011, compared to just $7.3bn for Germany, in second place, and $4.9bn for the Netherlands, in third. The western investments do not look sufficient to sway their governments' policies in favour of generosity towards Ukraine. The more recent 2013 Shell deal to invest in shale gas is in its early stages, so again it is not a vital interest.

EU membership?

There is no prospect of EU membership for Ukraine in the foreseeable future, nor probably in the more distant future. It is not only that the EU has no development funds available to help bring Ukraine up to the level necessary for EU membership. Perhaps more importantly, its membership would threaten to destroy the agricultural sector in France and several other EU countries!
The so-called EU trade agreement, which Yanukovych refused to sign in late 2013, had no real economic significance. It was just a political gesture. 

EU diplomacy

The EU will nevertheless need to keep the Ukraine from falling apart, even if this means negotiating with Russia. The disintegration of a large country on the EU's eastern border means that what looked like a cheap tactic for undermining Russian power could turn out to be very expensive indeed. Putin has now pulled the plug on $15bn for bailing out Ukraine, and will need persuading otherwise. The UK has cynically declared that the IMF is 'best placed to provide the financial support and technical advice to Ukraine' (ie not the UK directly) and EU policymakers will be cursing the costs of an ill thought out political strategy.

Pete Tchaikovsky
25 February 2014