Showing posts with label Putin. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Putin. Show all posts

Sunday, 18 March 2018

Nervous About Russia



Two weeks ago in Salisbury, less than 10 kilometres from the UK’s Porton Down chemical weapons establishment, a Russian and his daughter appear to have been poisoned. Sergei Skripal was a former Russian military intelligence officer who acted as a spy for the UK’s MI6. In 2006, he had been tried and convicted for high treason by the Russian authorities, but was released in 2010 as part of a ‘spy swap’ with the UK and settled in Britain. Skripal and his daughter remain in a critical condition, with medical staff reporting that they had been poisoned with a nerve agent.
The British government has claimed that the Skripals were poisoned with the nerve agent ‘Novichok’. But in the past two weeks it did not release any proof of this either to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), or to the Russian government that it blames both for producing the agent and for the attack. Alexander Boris de Pfeffel Johnson, UK Foreign Secretary and blathering embodiment of a power in decline, has just revealed that the OPCW will investigate from tomorrow.

Not to be taken: Novichok

Novichok is the name given to a class of extremely toxic nerve agents reported to have been produced by the former Soviet Union and Russia up to 1993. The production took place in several locations, and, with the break up of the Soviet Union, supplies of it and/or knowledge of how to manufacture it could also have been passed on to other countries. It is likely that Porton Down has such knowledge, since that would have been necessary for them to claim the attack on the Skripals was with Novichok rather than something else.

Who dunnit?

Claims that Russia initiated the attack rest on some shaky foundations. It is not clear why such a specialist method was used that would inevitably be linked to the Russian state. Or even why there would be an attempt at assassination at all, unless Skripal had continued to work for the UK intelligence services. However, one could argue that a Russian link was deliberately used to deter other Russian spies who might consider collaborating with the UK – with the message that ‘Eventually, we will punish traitors’.
Less plausible is the view that Putin needed this episode to marshal support in today’s presidential election that will likely result in his fourth term in office. Less plausible still is the Russian argument that the Brits did it to smear Moscow, although anti-Russian hysteria has a long history in Britain so that was a natural reaction.
One notable feature of the UK’s mainstream media coverage of this event was how there was an immediate and unanimous condemnation of Russia, with Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn denounced when he called for evidence.[1] Such is the operation of the ‘free press’.

Winding up

If Russian policy was to poison Sergei Skripal, then, apart from its role as a deterrent, that action could best be understood as a political wind up. The Salisbury location reminds people that the holier-than-though UK also deals in chemical weapons. The rationale for the timing is less clear; although in the wake of Brexit and Trump’s America First policy, the UK is in a weak position to do anything more to Russia than has already been implemented. NATO’s encirclement of Russia is more or less complete, but Russia has now developed new missile systems that undermine this threat. Effective economic sanctions against Russia have probably also reached a limit, because Europe does not want to cut off Russian energy supplies.
Russia can embarrass the UK, an anti-Russian stalwart of the Anglosphere, with little cost. Such an action would also demonstrate that it is not to be trifled with, as already shown by its actions in Syria. By comparison, the Brits have a more appropriate international ambassador than they might have thought in Boris Johnson.

Tony Norfield
18 March 2018


[1] Somewhat inconsistently, Corbyn also agreed with the UK Government’s expulsion of 23 Russian diplomats.

Wednesday, 15 February 2017

The Anti-Russia Syndrome


I normally cast aside explanations of events based on the psychology of the actors, but this has been hard to do in recent months. How else, apart from signs of paranoia, can one explain the never-ending stories in the mainstream media about the Russian menace?
A constant tirade against Russia emanates from television and radio channels, and from all the ‘quality’ newspapers and reporters. (See this Youtube video of Putin explaining that the BBC’s John Simpson has no ‘common sense’). Only the topic changes with the times. One early focus was Russia’s intervention in Crimea/Ukraine, which upset US and European strategy. The next was how Russia’s support for Assad in Syria unravelled and sidelined disastrous western policy. One of the latest is the election of Trump, billionaire-in-chief of the US hegemon. A shocked US political elite can only put down Trump’s election to the nefarious Russkies, not to domestic political reaction. Right on cue, a British ex-MI6 agent provided a dossier of ‘evidence’ to ‘demonstrate’ that Putin was in a position to blackmail Trump! If that were not bad enough to show how the commies were undermining western liberal democracy, new stories are about Russian support for Marine Le Pen’s Front National in France and other rightwing parties in Europe.
The anti-Russia syndrome reflects two things outside the realm of psychosis. Firstly, it is a sign of big power frustration with a permanent member of the UN Security Council that can veto US-led UN resolutions and which can also back up its policies with military firepower. Secondly, the chronic phase of the crisis persists, and this is straining the political infrastructure, as most clearly seen with the Brexit and Trump votes. ‘Anti-communism’ is one of the few comfort blankets that the western powers can cling on to in these troubling times and pretend that they are all still in the same gang.
Take the UK government, for example. No longer invited to any EU soirĂ©es, the UK has to grandstand at NATO. The UK Ministry of Defence today declared that one of its key objectives for this week’s NATO summit in Brussels was
“to ensure the Alliance continues to make progress on taking forward the ambitious agenda agreed at Warsaw, in particular on modern defence and deterrence towards Russia. On that front (literally), the enhanced forward presence of NATO battlegroups is deploying this Spring to the Baltic States and Poland, with the UK proud to be leading the formation in Estonia, one of our most effective Allies in the Helmand campaign.”
The anti-Russian strategy has been a hallmark of British imperialism ever since the October revolution of 1917, and it has helped shape, or has been used in, almost all of its other policies. From the late 1930s/early 1940s, Britain focused upon splitting India into two countries, so as to make the new Pakistan a bulwark against any Russian incursion into its interests in the Indian subcontinent and the Persian Gulf. Britain also feared Soviet involvement to stymie its attempts to re-establish its colonial empire (and those of other powers) in the late 1940s. Britain went out of its way to support Moslem fundamentalism in the Middle East and North Africa as a counter-weight to local demands for freedom from foreign domination, usually put forward by secular nationalists, and it justified this by using the fear of ‘communist subversion’, even when that was completely unfounded. Similarly, Britain used the Soviet threat as a way to get the Americans to back its policies, as with the US involvement in the 1953 coup that overthrew Mossadegh in Iran. There were many other such initiatives, as documented in Stephen Dorrill’s MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations.
Russia has completely embarrassed British and American political strategy at a time when Britain wants to hold on to its role as facilitator for that strategy in European and beyond. Now, post-Brexit, the Brits are high and dry, but Theresa May hopes to continue to hold hands with Donald Trump over NATO.

Tony Norfield, 15 February 2017

Friday, 16 December 2016

Trump and the US-Russia-China Triangle


Although it is the world’s major power, the US has found it difficult to impose its will in the past decade or so. From President Bush’s ‘mission accomplished’ speech about Iraq in 2003, to the continuing disasters in Afghanistan, Libya and Syria, from US policy in Ukraine also being upset by Russian intervention in Crimea, to how the Saudis and other Gulf states have destabilised the Middle East, the US has not been getting its own way and has been unable to impose settlements that would otherwise be expected of a hegemonic power. This puts the incoming US administration under The Donald in an interesting position.
Early signs suggest that POTUS-elect Trump is taking a softer line on Russia, one different from the still Cold War-inspired position of the Obama regime. Trump has stated that he expects the Europeans to pay more for their own NATO-related defence, which might make them less willing to finance an increased build up of military operations close to Russia’s borders. Trump has also rejected Obama’s rhetoric on Putin’s supposed involvement in Russia’s alleged cyber attack on Clinton’s emails. Perhaps most striking of all, Trump plans to appoint Rex Tillerson as US Secretary of State, that is to be the main person in charge of foreign policy. Tillerson is Chief Executive Officer of ExxonMobil, and is well known to have friendly relationships with the Russian government.
ExxonMobil opposed sanctions on Russia from its own business perspective, but one would have to agree that the aggression shown to Russia by the current US administration makes little economic or political sense. Russia is far from being a threat to US interests. Instead, Russia may have prevented the unravelling of Syria that was the direction of previous US policy, and which would have had a deleterious impact on the stability of the Middle East, with knock on impacts into Europe. For this reason, Trump’s likely Russian rapprochement makes sense, even if it will embarrass the Europeans.
All this, and more, is still to be determined, since the billionaire has yet to establish himself in the White House. However, it seems that while there is very likely to be a US-Russia rapprochement, the US political antagonism to China will continue under the Trump administration.
Under Obama and previous US presidents, Taiwan had remained in the limbo of being diplomatically isolated (it has not been a member of the UN since 1971, under the ‘one China’ policy) although politically and militarily supported by the US. But Trump took a call from Taiwan’s president, much to China’s displeasure, which saw the incident as an implicit recognition of Taiwan. This also makes sense from a US perspective. China is both a political and an economic threat to US interests, one that has been recognised in numerous US Congressional reports. China’s economic power has seen it gain influence in Africa, Latin America and Asia, often giving governments in these regions an alternative to the US-dominated world financial and economic system.
More pointedly for the current political climate, it is China, rather than Russia or anywhere else, which is being singled out as the country that is being ‘unfair’ in trade and taking American jobs. An anti-Chinese political stance makes far more sense for the US on many more levels than the anti-EU stance does for the UK, since it not only appeals to the latest domestic populism but also coincides with longer-term US strategic interests.
Trump’s election is one more sign of a shift in the tectonic plates of the imperial world economy. It will impact not only US relationships with Russia and China, but also the position of Europe, and even the acceptability of Russia outside Europe. Interestingly, in the past day or so, Russian President Putin had a meeting in Japan with Japan’s Prime Minister Abe on the Northern Territories/Kurile Islands, an area of dispute between the two countries since the end of World War Two. No resolution was made, and no peace treaty agreed on this, but there were 80 documents signed, including 68 on planned commercial deals between the two countries.

Tony Norfield, 16 December 2016

Tuesday, 25 February 2014

Ukraine & the EU


Deputy Wendell, reviewing the crime scene: 'It's a mess, ain't it, Sheriff?'

Sheriff Ed Tom Bell: 'If it ain't, it'll do till the mess gets here.'

'No country for old men', Coen Brothers, 2007

(This is a guest article)

Ukraine, a country of 45m people, is not divided into a western ‘pro-European’ camp and an eastern ‘pro-Russian’ camp. Ukrainians are generally anti-Russian, but will be ‘pro-Russian’ when it suits their business interests. Some westerners are ‘pro-European’ as a form of optimism, but recognise their dependence on the industries of the east.
The eastern and southern part has an important heavy industry and manufacturing sector. It is barely competitive by international standards, but benefits from a relationship with the Russian economy. It needs cheap Russian energy sources to be viable. So this part of the economy tends to value its Russian connections, although that does not make it ‘pro-Russian’. The western half of Ukraine has no such facilities and so tends to be pro-European, but this is not a realistic economic interest. It is just a desperate hope.
Ukrainian agriculture is a potentially very rich resource. It can produce a wide range of products to rival EU agriculture. But this needs capital investment. The problem is that the land is in public ownership and has had little investment. Privatisation would require a small but painful revolution, which no one is willing to undertake.

Politics and the state

Russia today is virtually a dictatorship, although it is primarily oriented towards national defence and development rather than exploiting the masses. Russia's economy is based on:
- State control of the energy sector, which provides the funds to finance social provision and keep the oligarchs in check.
- A relationship with the oligarchs who cooperate with the state. The state cannot by itself ensure national economic development.
There is no real market economy, no bourgeois class and no real state authority in the sense of a capitalist constitutional authority.
Ukrainian politics is even worse since it does not even have an absolutist central authority! Politics is entirely dominated by the shifting interests of the oligarchs and business cliques, including the improbable heroine Yulia Tymoshenko. This means there are no real political parties, which is why the Kiev protests have been 'led' by disparate groups, including some militant 'nationalists' with no political programme, only reactionary prejudice.
There is no real state authority in Ukraine. Corruption has to be total since the only sensible policy is the pursuit of self-interest. That is why state control in the western areas (Kiev and Lviv) collapsed so quickly and even the police and army are looking for a way out.

Ukraine is broke

The top rate of tax is 19%, which means that the Ukraine is a state without the funds to be anything more than a caretaker covering only basic functions. It has no popular legitimacy, nor a base of popular support.
Another indication that things are not well is given by the data for the biggest foreign investor in the Ukraine. It is Cyprus … home to Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs, living in the sunny tax haven. They had $12.1bn invested in Ukraine at end-2011, compared to just $7.3bn for Germany, in second place, and $4.9bn for the Netherlands, in third. The western investments do not look sufficient to sway their governments' policies in favour of generosity towards Ukraine. The more recent 2013 Shell deal to invest in shale gas is in its early stages, so again it is not a vital interest.

EU membership?

There is no prospect of EU membership for Ukraine in the foreseeable future, nor probably in the more distant future. It is not only that the EU has no development funds available to help bring Ukraine up to the level necessary for EU membership. Perhaps more importantly, its membership would threaten to destroy the agricultural sector in France and several other EU countries!
The so-called EU trade agreement, which Yanukovych refused to sign in late 2013, had no real economic significance. It was just a political gesture. 

EU diplomacy

The EU will nevertheless need to keep the Ukraine from falling apart, even if this means negotiating with Russia. The disintegration of a large country on the EU's eastern border means that what looked like a cheap tactic for undermining Russian power could turn out to be very expensive indeed. Putin has now pulled the plug on $15bn for bailing out Ukraine, and will need persuading otherwise. The UK has cynically declared that the IMF is 'best placed to provide the financial support and technical advice to Ukraine' (ie not the UK directly) and EU policymakers will be cursing the costs of an ill thought out political strategy.

Pete Tchaikovsky
25 February 2014