Since 2008, the world’s major
central banks have adopted extraordinary measures to stop a slump in the
economy and to try and rescue the financial system from collapse. But while
ultra-low, even negative interest rates, and quantitative easing (buying
securities from the financial system) have stabilised the system for now, such
policies have done little to generate growth. The economy has managed to get up
from the floor, but is still staggering around and cannot climb the stairs.
Meanwhile, the monetary ‘medicine’ is generating its own problems for banks and
causing dislocation in the money markets.
Consider what, in recent years,
has been a little noticed feature of the financial system: the ‘velocity of
money’. This concept was key for simple versions of monetarist economic theory,
ones that tried to explain the growth in nominal output (the money value of
GDP, for example) by the growth in the money supply. I will leave aside
discussion of that theory here, and just note that the monetarists usually
assumed that the velocity of money was stable, in other words a given
percentage rise in the money supply would lead to the same rise in the value of
nominal output.[1] The
fundamental equation was:
MV = PT
where
M is the money supply, however
defined
V is how fast the given money
supply circulated in the economy (its velocity)
P is the average price level and
T is the volume of transactions.
So, if V is fixed, a rise or
fall in M feeds directly into the nominal value of transactions PT. The T term
is often also taken to be the volume of output or income.
Apart from other problems with
the theory – there are many – the biggest and most evident problem is that the
V term is not fixed. In fact, it has been declining steadily during the crisis
in all major countries! This indicates that rather than there being a stable,
functioning monetary system, instead it is one that has been seizing up.
The next chart shows the pattern
of moves in the velocity of money for the US, the euro area, the UK and Japan
over the past 16 years or so.[2]
Velocity is measured as nominal GDP divided by the most common definition of
money supply in each area. Different definitions give different ratios, so the
numbers have been standardised to equal 100 for each in Q1 1999.
In each area, the money supply
has risen over the period shown, but the nominal value of GDP has risen by much
less, so that the velocity measure has fallen. Japan’s nominal GDP did not even
rise at all between 1999 and 2016! Only in the UK has nominal GDP risen by more
than the money supply (since the end of 2009), but the velocity of money is
still 20% below its level in 1999.[3]
Velocity of Money (nominal GDP/M): US, euro
area, UK & Japan (Index Q1 1999 = 100)
The velocity of money is a
summary measure of many things that happen in the capitalist economy, since it
compares the aggregate of GDP, a measure of total output, with the aggregate of
diverse components of cash in circulation, bank deposits, etc. It is a useful
index, nevertheless, and the general decline in the velocity of money is a
clear sign that central bank monetary policy has less ability to have an impact
on the nominal growth of the economy, despite their efforts to ward off the
threat of deflation.
Tony Norfield, 1 November 2016
[1] The basic
monetarist idea was that a rise in money supply only led to higher prices, with
no lasting change in real output, and that nominal output rose only because of
the higher prices.
[2] Data for the
US are for M2, M3 for the euro area, M4 for the UK and M2 for Japan. Available
numbers only go up to 2013 for Japan, mid-2015 for the UK and early 2016 for
the US and the euro area.
[3] I’m not sure
why the UK velocity number has risen since 2009, whereas others have fallen,
and may look into it further.
4 comments:
Hi Tony could you please expand a little on the problems banks are facing and the "dislocations" in the money markets caused by central banks buying securities, to which you refer at the end of the first paragraph? Thanks
Reply to Biswadip: I did not say that it was central bank buying of (bond) securities which was causing the money market ‘dislocations’, although this does cause problems for pension funds, asset managers, the repo market, etc. The dislocations in the money markets are mainly exacerbated by central bank interest rate policy. Zero/negative interest rates obviously hit money market funds and the attractiveness of bank deposits, reducing money market liquidity and causing problems for the interbank credit market.
GREAT POST..
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