Monday, 27 August 2012

Debt, Society, History, Morality & Imperialism


David Graeber, Debt: the First 5,000 Years, Melville House, Brooklyn, New York, 2011, 534 pages

The main value of this book is to analyse debt as a social relationship, not simply as an amount of money one person owes to another, or some other obligation between two isolated individuals. It does this by examining the evolution of debt relations in a wide range of societies over the past 5000 years, from Africa and the Americas to Europe and Asia. Graeber’s anthropological and historical approach has many benefits for those brought up on the thin gruel of modern day economics. His book gives fascinating details that highlight the social character of economic relationships, with extensive footnotes for those who may wish to follow up particular issues. The book is a powerful antidote to the idea that the market is the natural arbiter for organising society. Unfortunately, however, it is not much use for giving us a view of contemporary debts, despite its aim to put the current crisis in a historical context.

Graeber uses a concept he calls ‘baseline communism’ to describe many forms of society where, at least among those who do not consider themselves enemies, some version of mutuality is at work on the principle of ‘from each according to their abilities, to each according to their needs’ (p98). He counterposes this fundamental social humanity to the relationships between people that can predominate when impersonal market or state-driven norms prevail. Rightly, he argues that market economics is not the basis for relationships and, in a striking phrase, says that ‘communism is the foundation of all human sociability’ (p96), a sociability not based on exchange or reciprocity, except in the sense of mutual responsibilities and expectations (p102).

It is in this context that he theorises the sweep of history, examining how social relationships change in the context of money and debt. Debt: the First 5,000 Years is very ambitious, as the title suggests, and he goes beyond a simplistic concept of debt to one that has links to morality, religion, family relationships, the state, slavery and notions of honour and degradation. This has disadvantages, however, because he is not able to dwell for long on what is specific about so many historical periods and societies. Successive examples he gives to make his case tend to jump around, with hundreds of years and thousands of miles between them. The examples given are interesting, but not necessarily convincing.

A bigger problem with his thesis is that he groups together broad historical phases and presents them as cycles of history. For Graeber, these cycles are driven by the alternation between a ‘bullion economy’ and a ‘virtual credit money’ economy’ (p383). The ‘Axial Age’, from 800 BC to 600 AD,[1] was characterised by wars and violence, the rise of materialist philosophy and peasant revolts. Markets and states grew together, with coinage, taxation, military spending and debt-bondage (Chapter 9). The ‘Middle Ages’, 600-1450 AD, was a more peaceful phase of history, with a greater role for religious authorities, a widespread movement to control or prohibit predatory lending (notably with Islam, but also with the Christian church) and a return to forms of credit money in Europe and Asia (Chapter 10).[2] The ‘Age of the Great Capitalist Empires’, 1450-1971, began with a turn away from virtual currencies and credit and going back to gold and silver. The latter development, he argues, was initially driven by China’s demand for precious metal as coinage after it abandoned paper money (as payment for trade and taxes) and by the Spanish plundering of Latin America (Chapter 11). From these beginnings, he traces the later developments of ‘impersonal credit-money’ and the replacement of ‘moral networks by the intrusion of the impersonal – and often vindictive – power of the state’ (p332). Now, post-1971, we are in another transition stage of history, since in August 1971 Nixon broke the link of the US dollar to gold (Chapter 12). Thus began the phase of free-floating global currencies and the massive accumulation of debt. The ‘world entered a new phase of financial history – one that nobody completely understands’ (p362).

This argument is basically idealist, as the dynamic for the historical periods is driven by his concepts of money, credit and debt. These concepts are common denominators of all periods, with not enough attention paid to the role they play in each. While Graeber examines their links to state policy, the market, taxes and war, this does not involve much discussion of their relationship to the different forms of social reproduction. In my view, it makes little sense to see money, credit or debt as the driving forces – or even as the organising concepts for the book’s thesis – when the role they play in society is derived from the way in which the relations of production between people are organised, as in feudalism, capitalism, etc. This is a particular problem for analysing today’s debt crises, because it cannot get to grips with analysing imperialism and to see what is at stake.

In his concluding chapter, Graeber notes the huge build up of debt in the US and that it has been financed by borrowing from foreign banks and governments, especially from China. He explains this growth of indebtedness largely as a function of US military spending, with higher consumer debt due to the stagnation of incomes. Yet Graeber then concludes his book with the point that ‘we are long overdue for some kind of Biblical-style Jubilee: one that would affect both international debt and consumer debt’ [my emphasis] and that nothing would be more important than to ‘wipe the slate clean for everyone, mark a break with our accustomed morality, and start again’ (p390-1). But, in voicing this opinion, he does not spell out who should bear the costs of this debt forgiveness - or debt renunciation – when the clear logic is that the bill for such a Jubilee party will be laid at the door of Asian creditors![3]

Part of this omission may be due to his argument on money. It would seem that because he has documented how money has been represented by a wide variety of tokens, how banks can create money as just another form of credit money, that he can declare that ‘money has no essence’, but is a ‘matter of political contention’ (p372). This ignores the fact that money, even token or credit money, is a claim on the produce of society and represents value.[4] To be sure, that claim may be devalued in various ways or even be declared null and void by the state. In the latter case, if the debtor renounces the claim, then the creditor will suffer. Graeber says that ‘paying one’s debts is not the essence of morality’ (p390), which is true. But what morality is there in a rich imperialist power repudiating its debts to poor countries?

The final chapter dealing with the post-1971 period is by far the weakest, but should not be allowed to detract from the historical insights and information on society contained in the rest of the book. The chapter nevertheless highlights that it is not possible to understand the issues facing the world today from a national perspective. If one views the US debt problem in isolation, even if noting how foreign creditors have financed US deficits, then this does not put the crisis in the correct context.

Key questions to answer are what led to the debt crisis in the first place, and what its ‘resolution’ implies. Graeber recognises in his global approach to history that this is indeed a world crisis, but he has no means of explaining it other than through suggesting that the crisis in the 1970s showed that capitalism had reached the limits of what it could offer the working class (p374). I did not expect to find an analysis of the origins of the world crisis in this book, but the anti-capitalist sentiment that the book generally expresses is severely lacking because it does not understand that under imperialism there is a basic split in the world economy between oppressor and oppressed countries. It is not just an opposition to capitalism in general that is needed, but a political recognition of which ruling classes are running the global system of oppression.

Graeber has to some extent singled out the US ruling class, but only from a narrow perspective of showing that their actions have been against workers in the US. He makes no mention, nor shows any recognition, of how workers in the US, as in other imperial powers, benefit from the oppression of other countries. When it comes to the ‘debt forgiveness’ question, in this book he has been ambiguous, to say the least, about where he stands on its resolution. Does he mean that the huge US debts, in a country where average incomes are more than 10 times those in China, should be subsidised/written off by the Chinese?! True, there are Chinese millionaires or billionaires who might bear the losses in practice, and who should be subject to a reckoning from their own workers, but the point remains: for someone in the US, especially, the enemy is at home. This is all the more necessary to see when the changing balance of economic power in the world is making the US more aggressive against a rising China.



Tony Norfield, 27 August 2012



[1] One interesting fact is that the main purpose of the text of the famous Rosetta Stone was to announce an amnesty for debtors and prisoners, declared by Ptolemy V in 196 BC (p219). This was one of the periodic ‘clean slates’ declared in the Axial Age, and at other times.
[2] Graeber notes that an opposition to usury did not constrain the growth of commerce or the ‘development of complex credit instruments’ in Islamic areas (p275). Investors received a share of the profits as a partner, not as interest on a loan. Islam combined commerce and the mosque, with the Prophet Mohammed on one occasion refusing to force merchants to lower prices during a shortage in Medina because ‘prices depend on the will of God’ (p279). Handshake deals and paper promises were common in Islamic business, with the mosque rather than the state acting as regulator/enforcer. Christians condemned usury, but needed loans. In 11th and 12th century Europe, Jews were excluded from most professions and many focused on money lending (though their role is often exaggerated). Christian princes or monarchs encouraged Jewish moneylenders and put them under their protection, until it suited the governing class to encourage anti-Jewish pogroms and persecution (p288).
[3] I don’t think I am being unfair here. Graeber gives no indication that he is talking about a debt amnesty for ordinary people that is borne by US banks or the US government (via a US taxpayer liability), even though he shows sympathy for the plight of highly indebted Americans and complains that the banks got bailed out while ordinary people did not. Neither does he indicate anywhere that his ‘international debt’ reference means cancelling the debt of poor countries. By a debt Jubilee, he may be referring to all countries. However, apart from such a proposal being absurdly utopian, that is not the sense one gets when reading his final chapter, which has an almost exclusive focus on problems in the US.
[4] On page 75 he notes that ‘money is almost always something hovering between a commodity and a debt-token’, which is fair enough, as is his brief discussion of the gold standard elsewhere. However, his theoretical view of money stresses the social acceptability aspect at the expense of its role as a representation of value, even if, as a token or piece of paper, it is not embodied value itself.

Sunday, 19 August 2012

Deep Crisis

The phase of the latest global crisis that began with some spectacular financial explosions in 2007-2008 is still with us. Now even the insect species has begun to get worried, as revealed in the latest Financial Times story headline: Caterpillar warns on global uncertainty.

To the best of my knowledge, insects receive neither pensions nor welfare payments. Nor do they have public sector jobs; nor do they depend upon the largesse delivered by the imperialist state in which they may reside. But you would have to be more dense than a 10-ton digger not to notice the intractable trouble.

Tony Norfield, 19 August 2012

Saturday, 18 August 2012

Tattoo Nausea

Summer in London is welcome, but for one thing: the multitude of tattoos visible everywhere. Walk down the street and you feel like you are in a horror movie entitled Plague of the Ink Vampires. Form is not divorced from content, and the ugly narcissistic display reflects badly on the consciousness and cultural level of the populace.

Tony Norfield, 18 August 2012

Tuesday, 31 July 2012

Olympic Imperialism

The London 2012 Olympics (here I am possibly breaching copyright, just using the term) offer the usual sporting rivalry that is mixed with a wide range of national prejudices. Most interesting is how major powers look upon the medals table as a signal of relative strength in the wider world, with all the risk that the ranking upsets their view of who is really in charge.

This is the backdrop to the western media attack on the 16-year old Chinese girl swimmer, Ye Shiwen, who swam 'too fast'. A US coach made a big point of doubting that her speed could have been achieved by normal training methods. The implicit suggestion was that there had been the use of performance-enhancing drugs, despite the fact that the Olympics now enforces strict testing and, in the latest (and previous) tests, she has been declared 'clean'. So then the UK media discussion turned to the possibility that the inscrutable and devious Chinese were using special drugs that had escaped the testing regime. This is an excellent ploy - the fact that you cannot find the drugs used only shows how devious they are! The lack of evidence is evidence. In the event that this ploy does not work, one news programme today on the BBC included a report suggesting that 'genetic manipulation' might have been used to enhance her performance, and this cannot be picked up by the tests on athletes currently used. Some sports commentators have pointed out that it is common for teenagers, like Ye Shiwen, to improve their performance dramatically over a year or two, given good training, but this gets little coverage.

In my view, this is another sign of imperial anxiety: by the US at China's rise, and by the UK because its fortunes in the world economy are tied very closely to US power. After the Beijing Olympics in 2008, the US media promoted the idea that they had won because they had won the most medals. This was true because the US had a tally of 110 medals versus China's 100, except for the awkward fact that China had won 51 gold medals versus 36 for the US. So far in London, China has the same number of medals, but still more golds. With the size of the Chinese economy now rivalling that of the US - depending on how you count the GDP! - it is not such a wonder that a 16-year old girl has become the focus of imperial propaganda.

Tony Norfield, 31 July 2012


Monday, 30 July 2012

The Rate of Profit, Finance & Imperialism


What role do banks play for the major imperialist powers? Everyone knows that the rich countries own the big banks, and that the big banks are in a powerful position in the global economy. Despite this, there has been little attempt to examine the relationship of finance to imperialism, still less to analyse the financial system as part of the every day operation of the imperialist world economy. Here I offer a framework for understanding this role of finance, which is part of a project that I am researching.

The points outlined are based on a paper I presented at the 5-7 July 2012 conference of the AHE/FAPE/IIPPE in Paris. Since that conference, I have revised and further developed the analysis, and here I present some of the results (I plan to get a full paper published). These summary points exclude the more detailed analysis, documentation and references. I welcome any comments.

I start with the standard formula used to represent the rate of profit on capital investment. By examining how this formula needs to be modified, if it is to reflect the workings of the capitalist economy, I show not only where the financial system fits into this formula, but also how the formula can be developed to highlight important aspects of the role of finance for imperialism.

First, a warning! Running through a series of definitions and equations can be a little dull. I have not yet figured out how to do this with witty literary allusions, nor by using cartoon characters, but I hope that the content of what is being explained is engaging enough to offset the dry form of presentation.


1. From the ‘basic’ rate of profit to a system rate of profit

The familiar expression for the rate of profit on capitalist investment that is taken from Volume 3 of Marx’s Capital is:




where S is the total surplus value produced, C is the constant capital advanced (on machinery, raw materials, etc) and V is the value of the variable capital advanced on living labour power.

However, strictly speaking this expression refers only to the rate of profit for productive capital, excluding any allowance for non-productive expenditures. Neither does it allow for the rate of turnover of the invested capital. Both these factors can have a big influence on the rate of profit for the capitalist system as a whole and below I will incorporate them into an expression for the system rate of profit.

Investment that is productive of value and surplus value extends beyond purely industrial activities and the production of physical goods. However, for simplicity I shall call productive capitalist operations those of ‘industrial’ capital. Expenditures that are not productive of value or surplus value may be broken down into expenditures made by the state or government and non-productive expenditures made by private capital. State expenditures have become very important for the capitalist economy, but are excluded from this analysis because I wish only to focus on the role of private capital. Private capital’s non-productive activity is in what Marx called the ‘sphere of circulation’. Here there is no production of any new value, but only a change of the form of value (the buying M-C, or selling C-M, of commodities), the borrowing or lending of money, or the trading of financial claims. For simplicity again, I shall call the buying and selling of commodities an operation performed by ‘commercial’ capital and the remaining functions those of ‘financial’ capital or ‘banks’.

The non-productive expenditures of private capital might indirectly boost productive capital. For example banks could provide funds for investment, or commercial capital could buy or sell commodities more quickly or in a less costly manner than the productive capitalist could do on its own. However, even if the total value and surplus value produced in a year increases as a result, this is a function of the value produced in the productive sphere only. The costs incurred by the non-productive sphere still have to be accounted for as a capital advance, and as an expense to be deducted from total surplus value produced.

On the second issue, the turnover time of capital investment, this describes how quickly the value of capital advanced returns back to the capitalist after the periods of circulation and production. Marx distinguishes for productive capital two types of capital employed when he analyses turnover: fixed and circulating capital. Fixed capital (machinery, tools, buildings, etc) lasts for more than one production process and gives up its value to the product in a piecemeal fashion; circulating capital (the value of labour-power employed, raw materials, etc) adds or transfers its value in full in one production process. Only a portion of fixed capital is used up in a year, but it all has to be advanced at once – you cannot work with half of a machine. Circulating capital will usually be turned over several times per year, so the total capital advanced to buy circulating capital at any one time will be less than the total used in a year.

These distinctions are used in what follows. A further note is that, for capital advanced by both commercial and financial capital, while only the depreciation of their ‘fixed assets’ needs to be set against the total surplus value produced, all of their ‘circulating costs’ in the year represent a deduction from surplus value.


2. The rate of profit including commercial capital

The rate of profit, taking into account both productive and commercial capital, can be derived by considering firstly the total value of the commodities produced in a year and the surplus value contained in them. Then this surplus value is measured against the total capital advanced in the year by both industrial and commercial capital.

In this expression for the rate of profit, the terms are defined as follows:

FC       the total advance of fixed capital by productive capitalists, with β being the proportion that depreciates in one year

CC       the advance of circulating capital for one period of production

V         the advance of variable capital to hire productive workers for one production period

B          the advance of money capital by commercial capitalists to buy commodities from and sell to industrial capital (this element of capital is not a cost that needs to be deducted from surplus value, because it is returned on the sale of the commodities)

K         the advance of capital by commercial capitalists for fixed assets, with β being the proportion that depreciates in a year

L          the total circulating capital costs of commercial capital in a year

S          the surplus value produced in one period of production

n          the number of turnovers of circulating capital employed by productive capital in a year

Using these terms, the formula for the rate of profit that includes both industrial and commercial capital is then:



Clearly, the system rate of profit now looks much lower than that implied by equation 1, since it has to allow both for a deduction from surplus value of the annual costs of commercial capital in the numerator and for the extra costs of capital advanced in the denominator. In Marx’s exposition in Capital Volume 3, these extra deductions and costs are not always evident, although it is noted that a faster rate of turnover (a higher value for n) will increase the mass of surplus value produced in a year.


3. The rate of profit allowing for financial capital

In order to show how financial capital can be included in our calculations of system profitability, it is necessary to define some additional variables. Let E be the value of bank equity capital, or ‘shareholders’ equity’ and let D be the value of customer deposits and other borrowings. It is important to note that these deposits include not only the surplus cash resources of industrial and commercial companies. They will also be boosted by the banking sector’s own creation of money.

The value of D plus E is used to fund the bank’s total assets, which I will designate as A. In standard accounting terminology, the bank’s total assets equal its liabilities plus its equity capital, so the next formula is:

      A = D + E

I shall assume that, of the bank’s total assets, a value equivalent to E covers the bank’s fixed and circulating capital costs (buildings, technology, infrastructure and salary costs, etc) and its core reserve capital. This is a reasonable simplification, and it leaves a value equivalent to D to be lent out. The lending can be to industrial and commercial companies, or to other financial companies (including buying any financial assets in the secondary market). This value D can then be divided into D1, where it is lent ‘internally’ to other financial companies, and D2, where it is lent ‘externally’ to industrial and commercial companies (I exclude households and the government in this analysis).

If the average interest rate paid on deposits is iD, and the average return on bank loans is iA, the bank’s net interest income (before deducting other, non-interest costs) can be written as:

      D(iA – iD)

The sum D2 represents the funds for investment that industrial and commercial companies have borrowed from banks. These funds are for their extra investments in constant capital, variable capital, plus a proportion of commercial money capital advanced and a proportion of the fixed and circulating costs of commercial capital. For the total constant fixed capital, FC, this can be broken down into FC1, advanced by the industrial capitalist directly, and FC2, that portion borrowed from the bank. Hence

      FC = FC1 + FC2

similarly,

CC = CC1 + CC2

V = V1 + V2

and likewise for the commercial capitalist,

B = B1 + B2             and so on

Since, by assumption, all the borrowed funds equal one portion of the total deposits of banks, then:

      D2 = FC2 +CC2 + V2 + B2 + K2 + L2

The logic behind these formulations is straightforward and it can be developed to derive some interesting and intuitively reasonable results.

Firstly, total surplus value remains nS, as noted before, but the surplus value is not only shared between industrial and commercial capitalists and the financial sector. For both the latter two sectors, their depreciation costs of fixed capital outlay for buildings, technology, etc, and their personnel and other circulating costs are not transferred to the values of commodities. Hence these latter costs must be recovered from the total surplus value produced in society. If we assume that the depreciation of the fixed assets of financial capitalists in one year is equal to γE, and that the total circulating costs in a year (including wages paid) amount to M, then the total profit appropriated by the three sectors is lower still than in equation (iii) above. It is expressed as:

      nS – L – βK – M – γE

The total capital advanced by all three sectors can be given as the sum of that belonging to the industrial and commercial capitalists, the funds they have borrowed from the financial sector plus the financial sector’s own equity (which here we assume also covers their circulating costs M). Hence the rate of profit on total social capital can now be written as:



While a little unwieldy, this result highlights the impact of the commercial and financial sectors on the total system rate of profit. It shows in particular how the rate of profit is much lower than suggested by simply looking at the ratio of the total S in one year to the C + V advances of productive capital. I believe this kind of formulation to be original. Although some elements of this type of formula have been discussed in the literature, it is notable that in Volume 3 of Capital Marx only discussed the division of the surplus value accruing to industrial and commercial capital between ‘profit of enterprise’ and interest. Marx did not discuss the rate of profit of the system as a whole once the costs of commerce and finance had been included, and neither did Hilferding in Finance Capital.

The methodology used here excludes financial assets from the calculation of the capitalist system’s rate of profit, except to the extent that the value of these assets reflects investments in the operations of industrial, commercial and financial companies. In those cases, the assets may be considered as capital advanced, whether or not the funding goes to productive or unproductive (commercial or financial) capitalist enterprises. Otherwise, the large volume of assets recorded by financial companies will simply reflect a potentially huge sum of value that is based on loans made (largely based on deposit creation by the banks), or financial securities and derivatives purchased. The only common element between the former invested assets and the latter assets is that they will, in general – except for derivatives – accrue interest or dividend payments. But while all such payments remain deductions from the total surplus value produced by the capitalist system, only the former assets can be considered as real capital advanced.


4. The profitability differences between banks and other companies

It can be shown (as explained in the main paper) that the system rate of profit described here drives the movement of some important profitability targets of industrial and commercial companies such as the ‘return on equity’. As the system rate of profit trends higher or lower, so will the industrial and commercial companies’ return on equity.

However, the relationship between the system rate of profit and the return on equity for banks is far more tenuous. This is because the banks can expand their assets dramatically through their ability to create deposits. These assets are multiplied by the interest rate differential (and fees) that they gain, boosting their profitability. Banks are at the centre of the capitalist financial system, able to gain access to far easier sources of funding than other companies, both from other private banks and from the central bank’s liquidity operations. As a result, it is considered ‘normal’ for them to have a leverage ratio of 20, whereby their borrowings are 20 times their equity base. Other types of company normally have leverage ratios of less than one. This creates a different dynamic for the return on equity for financial companies compared to that for industrial and commercial companies, and there is no clear mechanism for the equalisation of such a profit measure between banks and other companies.

Another issue arises from the fact that bank costs and profits are a deduction from the surplus value produced by the system as a whole. This should place a constraint on how far the banking sector can grow, but that constraint appears in a different way for different countries. If a country is an imperialist power with a strong financial system, then it can derive surplus value from other parts of the world, enabling its financial sector to grow dramatically and nevertheless remain a profitable area of business!


5. Imperialism and finance

The UK stands out in this respect. Not only is it a major imperialist power with a GDP in the top 10, but it has a banking sector that has liabilities more than five times national GDP.[1] Surprisingly, this simple point receives no coverage in the Marxist literature. But this omission is consistent with that literature analysing neither why the UK financial sector is so big, nor how the financial sector operates as a functional part of imperialist economic power.[2] It is not open to every country to establish a major international banking and financial network. The growth of the UK financial sector is based on its status and privileges in the world economy, one that has been promoted by successive UK governments, in particular from the late 1970s and in cooperation with the US.

There are three important ways in which the financial sector can play a key role for the economic livelihood of an imperialist power:

(a) By drawing on (relatively low cost) funds from abroad to lend to domestically based capital and to the state: this happens largely via the FX reserve role of the dollar in the US’s case, and via the London-based banking system in the UK’s case.

(b) By financing the foreign operations of domestic corporations, whether from domestic or from foreign funds, so that they can exploit foreign labour: this can happen via bank finance or via the stockmarket enabling the centralisation of capital. across national borders.

(c) By taking a share of globally produced surplus value: this takes place through the banking centres providing loans and other ‘financial services’ to foreign businesses and governments.

Each of these financially derived benefits for the imperialist power concerned depends on a privileged relationship with other countries, one that it is determined to protect. Hence the attitude of the UK and US governments to any measures to constrain the financial sector beyond what they might also agree is necessary to prevent further damaging excesses.


Tony Norfield, 30 July 2012


[1] See ‘Imperialism by Numbers’ on this blog, 1 May 2012, for more information on imperialist country rankings.
[2] An exception to this rule is David Yaffe, although I disagree with his analysis of the role of finance. See his article ‘Britain: Parasitic and decaying capitalism’, Fight Racism! Fight Imperialism!, 194, December 2006-January 2007, http://www.revolutionarycommunist.com/

Saturday, 21 July 2012

Global Working Class

Here is a chart produced by John Smith that sums up the changes in the global industrial workforce from 1950 to 2005. It was produced as part of his PhD thesis, completed in 2010, and illustrates in a striking fashion the way in which, since the late 1970s, the distribution of the global working class (defined here as industrial workers) has changed.

The key features are the absolute decline in the industrial workforce in the 'more developed regions' since the early 1980s and a persistent and dramatic rise in the size of the workforce in 'less developed regions'. By 1980, the absolute size of the latter exceeded the former, a development exacerbated by the absolute decline of the industrial workforce of the developed countries (indicated by the dashed line) from the early 1990s.



The source of the thesis is given in an earlier note on this blog ('Imperialism and the Law of Value', 3 December 2011), and this chart is on page 141, together with notes on where the data came from.

The working class does not simply consist of industrial workers, but these figures give a clear indication of where the bulk of workers producing value for, and being exploited by, capital is located.

In the past three decades, developments in the imperialist world economy have seen the centre of gravity for capitalist production shift towards the poorer countries. Now we have a situation where most products consumed in rich countries are made in poor countries, by super-exploited labour. Any working class movement in the rich countries fighting against austerity measures imposed on them needs to confront this cardinal fact, both in order to be taken seriously as opposing capitalism, and to be in a stronger position to oppose imperialism and the role their own states play in the global system of exploitation.


Tony Norfield, 21 July 2012

Thursday, 19 July 2012

Loving Lehmans

The following quotation is taken from a Lehman Brothers press release in April 2004. This was the occasion when Gordon Brown, then UK Chancellor, officially opened the new Lehmans European HQ in London.

Brown's remarks on the event are quoted next. They are nauseating on so many levels that I will leave them for you to ponder:

"I would like to pay tribute to the contribution you and your company make to the prosperity of Britain. During its one hundred and fifty year history, Lehman Brothers has always been an innovator, financing new ideas and inventions before many others even began to realise their potential. And it is part of the greatness not just of Lehman Brothers but of the City of London, that as the world economy has opened up, you have succeeded not by sheltering your share of a small protected national market but always by striving for a greater and greater share of the growing global market."

I had forgotten about this particular event until a recent press report reminded me. However, the sentiments expressed by Brown about the wonders of the financial markets reflected the appreciation shown by all spokesmen (and women) of British imperialism. Today it is embarrassing for them to be reminded of what they said in the years when the financial bubble was still being inflated. Yet the economic interests of British imperialism are closely bound up with the fortunes of the City of London, as articles on this blog have explained. So, while today's UK politicians will hesitate to be so fulsome in praise of finance, they will continue to protect the status of the City of London.


Tony Norfield, 19 July 2012