Showing posts with label Goldman Sachs. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Goldman Sachs. Show all posts

Tuesday, 23 January 2018

Warren Buffett & Imperial Economics


Warren Buffett is one of the wealthiest people in the world. He is also Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer of Berkshire Hathaway, a huge US investment conglomerate. Looking at Berkshire’s investment policy reveals some important features of the economics of imperialism today and the role of money capitalists. Buffett’s public image as a kindly old gentleman – the Sage of Omaha – who favours increasing taxes on the rich and donates to charitable causes, does not sit well with evidence that he is a predatory gouger of profit. But these are the times in which we live.[1]

Berkshire’s nondescript name belies the fact that it is the fifth or sixth largest publicly quoted company by market capitalisation, at more than $500bn. It owns an extraordinarily wide range of companies, from insurance and banking, to specialist engineering, consumer electronics, news media, real estate, energy, railroads and airlines. Berkshire has more than 240 subsidiaries, but in addition to these it has large and small equity stakes in many other companies. Some are enterprises that few have heard of; others are household names. Six big companies account for nearly 70% of its $180bn portfolio of equity holdings: Apple, Coca Cola, Kraft Heinz, American Express, Bank of America and Wells Fargo bank.
Warren Buffett’s business strategy has not always been successful. He has made a number of duff investments, not least an early one in the textiles business that gave his company its name. Subsequent failures include investments in IBM and Tesco, and he was quite late into the boom in ‘technology’ stocks, having viewed these with a traditionalist’s scepticism. But his fund has nevertheless registered dramatic returns over a long period, well above those that would have been gained from investing in a broad index of companies. Like some other companies reviewed on this blog, Berkshire Hathaway does not pay dividends to its investors, instead relying upon an increasing share price to keep them happy. So far they have been content: from close to $100,000 in early 2010, the share price had risen to more than $300,000 by early 2018, to become the most expensive share in history.[2]
As one might expect, Berkshire Hathaway uses its financial strength to negotiate deals to its advantage. There are two guiding themes for its investments. Firstly, Berkshire looks for companies with brand loyalty and potential or actual monopolistic positions that are likely to keep future profits secure. Secondly, as far as possible, it wants only to allocate money capital and not to get involved in business operations.

Monopoly sectors and Berkshire investments

The market power of a monopolist is a wonderful thing – if you are the monopolist. There is rarely only one supplier unchallenged by rivals. But being one of very few suppliers, or having a government contract that guarantees high prices for your product, or using advertising and brand recognition to cement market domination, or building a commercial barrier to limit what competitors can do, or using patents to stall their development, are all means of building a favourable position in the market. These are the kinds of company, big and small, that Berkshire Hathaway seeks.
On the big side is Apple. Although he was late to the party, Buffett started jumping into Apple’s shares in 2016, after its price had fallen over the previous year. By late 2017, Berkshire had accumulated more than $20bn in Apple shares, some 2.5% of the company. The rationale for this investment was that Apple had an ‘ecosystem’ and level of brand loyalty that meant consumers were not very sensitive to the exorbitant charges it makes for its products, particularly the iPhone – as revealed in Apple’s confidence when putting a premium price on the iPhone X.
Other large companies include not only the well-known ones like Coca Cola and Kraft Heinz, noted above, but also those that usually remain out of sight. Take energy distribution, for example.
Berkshire owns 99% of Berkshire Hathaway Energy. In addition to its businesses in the US and Canada, this subsidiary owns two of the fourteen ‘distribution network operators’ in the UK. Each of these UK operators is a regional monopoly; there are five other holding companies owning the remaining twelve. Berkshire’s are managed by its Northern Powergrid company, with operations in Yorkshire and the North East of England.
When people complain about high costs of gas and electricity, it is usually the energy producing companies that get the blame, not the distributors. But the latter are often responsible for something like 25% of a household’s energy bill through the distribution prices they charge the producers. In 2016-17, Northern Powergrid (Yorkshire)’s total revenues were £417m and a high proportion of those, nearly half, were its operating profit of £199m.
Berkshire also invests in many smaller companies, often those in a strong niche position. Examples are Precision Castparts (metal components and castings), IMC Group (tungsten carbide metal cutting tools) and Lubrizol (specialist chemicals). These are an important component of the holding company’s returns.
Berkshire’s funds come from its direct subsidiaries and from its portfolio of equity investments and interest bearing securities. Its many investments give a claim on revenues from all areas of the economy, both nationally (in the US) and internationally.[3] This is shown by the breakdown of its $25.9bn earnings (profits) before taxes in 2016. Insurance underwriting brought in $2.1bn, with an additional $4.6bn of earnings from the portfolio investments of its insurance division. BNSF, its railroad freight division, brought in $5.7bn, Berkshire Hathaway Energy $3.0bn, its manufacturing subsidiaries $6.2bn, and the remainder came from a variety of other businesses and investments.

Being a money capitalist

Many big corporations today do as little production themselves as they can get away with. Instead they monopolise design, technology patents and marketing, while the producers of the goods and services they control become part of their ‘value chains’. Owning many producing, transport and servicing companies, Berkshire Hathaway would not seem to be doing this. But it has its own way of working, as spelled out in its latest annual report:
operating businesses are managed on an unusually decentralized basis. There are essentially no centralized or integrated business functions (such as sales, marketing, purchasing, legal or human resources) and there is minimal involvement by Berkshire’s corporate headquarters in the day-to-day business activities of the operating businesses.”
In other words, Berkshire may buy out a company and allocate extra capital for investment, but, although it may choose the Chief Executive of the operating business, the holding company stays clear of directly managing anything. This shows Berkshire’s role as money capitalist, even for its operating businesses, quite apart from those companies in which it just holds a portfolio stake.
The funds for Berkshire’s investments are mainly held by its insurance division – a large volume of mostly US dollar-denominated cash, cash equivalents and US Treasury Bills, which amounted to $71bn at end-2016 (total cash, etc, available was $86bn). A portion of those funds may be required to meet payments on insurance and reinsurance policies. More importantly, this is also a store of cash to use for the opportunistic gouging of other capitalists, especially in times of crisis when cash is king.
Berkshire has often acted as a lender of last resort to selected companies in trouble. They are willing to pay a premium cost for its funds, not only because they have little choice, but also because backing from a big, well-known investor helps restore some financial market confidence in their business. In this type of investment, Berkshire has purchased ‘preference shares’ paying a high fixed rate of interest and which can only be bought back by the company at a premium, usually around 10%. As part of these preference shares, the company may also issue Berkshire long-dated options to buy the company’s stock at very favourable prices.
Examples of such deals include Berkshire investing $5bn in the preferred stock of Goldman Sachs back in 2008. This stock yielded an annual interest rate of 10%. Goldman bought it back in 2011, but had to pay $5.5bn. Berkshire also gained from the stock options it received. Similarly, Berkshire bought $5bn of Bank of America’s preference stock in 2011, although market conditions were not quite so bad and the yield was 6%. Other companies that have been through this Berkshire process include General Electric, Dow, Wrigley, Kraft Heinz and Home Capital.

Buffett and the law of value

Berkshire Hathaway’s business is an example of how a big corporation is often much bigger than you think. Its fortunes derive from the operation of hundreds of companies it owns directly and from its myriad of investments that stake a claim on the value produced worldwide, even though most of Berkshire’s business looks US-based. Its mode of operation also responds to how the imperialist world economy works today. Do not just look for a ‘good company’ to invest in, but find the ones with a more protected niche in the market. Do not just lend to a company with ‘good prospects’, but wait to pounce on those with a future that are desperate enough to accept your terms.
Warren Buffett is quite abstemious and gets a relatively small salary for being the Chairman and CEO of a major corporation. Nevertheless, he is one of the top 10 richest people on the planet, with a large income from his personal investments as well as the wealth represented by his Berkshire holdings. Buffett owns some 18% of Berkshire Hathaway’s shares and, like some of his plutocrat peers, he has also organised the company’s shareholdings so that his voting power is higher than this, at nearly 32% of the total.[4]
He has many fans and receives the kinds of accolade that would go to a sports team with a great track record. But this is not a game. It is the world economy, and Buffett’s fund is a prime example of the power of parasitism today. Berkshire ‘puts money to work’ by relying upon the work of others, and it siphons off the product of social labour into the fortunes of private investors.

Tony Norfield, 23 January 2018


[1] This review of Berkshire Hathaway extends the list of corporations covered on this blog. Earlier ones were: Apple, Alibaba, Amazon, Facebook and Alphabet/Google. I do not plan to give a comprehensive overview of Berkshire’s operations, for which see Wikipedia and other Internet sources. Here I want to focus on key points that illustrate the nature of imperial economics today. Information cited is mainly from Berkshire’s accounts.
[2] This is the price of the main Class A shares. See footnote 4 for further details.
[3] When looking at the details, I was surprised that little of Berkshire’s revenue seems to come directly from non-US sources. A lot of Buffett’s attention seems to have been spent scouring the nooks and crannies of the domestic US economy for profitable openings and to buy into cheapened assets. Berkshire owns stakes in airlines, regional newspapers, real estate brokerages and automobile dealerships, among other things.
[4] Berkshire’s Class A shares are the ones that are priced around $300,000 each. The company also has Class B shares that are priced around 1,500th of the A shares, but have only one 10,000th of the voting power. There are 1.65bn Class A shares authorised and 3.225bn Class B shares.

Wednesday, 28 June 2017

'Open Sesame' on Alibaba


China has been the ‘workshop of the world’ since the late 20th century, providing cheap products to global markets, especially to the richer countries. Alibaba is now becoming recognised as an important addition to China’s economic prowess, although in the sphere of commerce rather than in production.
Alibaba’s business has been focused domestically upon the huge and growing Chinese market. It has been able to fend off Google and eBay, important US competitors. It has also benefited from funding by Goldman Sachs and Yahoo – who both provided much-needed cash in its early days – while managing to avoid their control of its operations. Now Alibaba is in a strong position to expand into other countries. So, rather than being prominent only as a big player in one big (Chinese) market, Alibaba could become a major global player too. When commerce is the core of a company’s business, then huge volumes are critical for generating revenues. Alibaba has been able to get these, helped by being based in China, a country with a strong government and also with the largest national population.
Here I do not plan to discuss all of Alibaba’s operations or its historical development.[1] Instead, I want to use the example of Alibaba to weigh up China’s economic challenge to the established order, when imperial economic power today takes on a much more commercial and financial form.

Millions and billions

Alibaba’s operations can most easily be summarised as a combination of Amazon, eBay and Paypal. But that understates the scope of its business as it expands into other areas. Nevertheless, the limit on seeing it as a global giant is that more than three-quarters of its commerce-based revenues derive from China, as does basically all of its profit. Its newer segments of business – including cloud computing, digital media and entertainment – are running at a loss, subsidised by the China commerce revenues.
In terms of stock market capitalisation, the main company, Alibaba Group Holding, was worth $365bn on 26 June. This was not so far behind Amazon’s $475bn value, especially if one also includes the separately managed Ant Financial arm (formerly known as Alipay) estimated at around $60bn. Alibaba’s profitability was also much higher than Amazon’s in the latest financial year, at $6.0bn versus Amazon’s $2.4bn for net income after tax and net interest payments.[2]
Alibaba started out as a business-to-business middleman, facilitating buying and selling, but this failed to generate much revenue. Now retail business (business-to-consumer) dominates its commercial operations. Hundreds of millions of Chinese use its systems to shop online, sell goods and make online payments. Alibaba has two retail sites: Taobao, selling products sold by smaller scale Chinese-based companies; and Tmall, which has attracted three-quarters of the world’s top 100 brand-names to sell into the huge Chinese domestic market. Although China is a poor country, 1.4 billion people and a growing middle class consumer base make it an attractive market for all global corporations.
Merchants on Alibaba’s Taobao site get a free listing; on Tmall, these bigger sellers pay an annual service fee, plus commissions on their sales ranging from 0.4% to 5.0%, depending on the product. However, revenues from these sites derive mainly from companies buying extra marketing services that Alibaba’s system provides, including its analysis of consumer activity to target advertisements. In this respect, it follows what other established companies do, like Amazon, Google and Facebook.
In the year to 31 March 2017, Alibaba had a huge volume of business: 454 million active buyers on its retail platforms and, in March 2017, 507 million active users of its mobile services. This potential for economies of scale is fundamental for a commercial operation, and one that helps Alibaba’s expansion into other countries.
The relatively low retail revenue per buyer deflates the importance of these numbers, and reflects low average Chinese incomes: just $36 per active buyer in retail revenue per year and $26 per person from mobile-based services. Nevertheless, a growing revenue per person multiplied by a very large and increasing number of buyers and users in China leads to big and rapidly rising total revenues. Alibaba’s China-based commercial revenues rose by 40% in the year to March 2017, reaching some $18 billion.
Helped by this position in a market US business would like to penetrate, Jack Ma, the principal founder and the controller of Alibaba, was the first foreign businessman to meet US President Trump in January this year. Playing up to Trump’s ‘America First’ policy, Ma promised that he could add one million jobs in the US if its small companies joined its commercial platform, Tmall, to sell their products into the Chinese market. This no doubt appealed to Trump, but it would also help Alibaba boost its revenues outside China, when its foreign revenues have so far been largely dependent upon regional Asian countries.

Ownership and financing

The ownership and control structure of Alibaba is murky or, more charitably put, difficult to pin down. The Alibaba Group Holding company was registered in the Cayman Islands in June 1999, and there is, in addition, a system of contractual links between its many subsidiaries. Good luck in working your way through its 303-page 2016 annual report, with 74 of them giving ‘Notes to consolidated financial statements’.
Jack Ma started out by being moderately generous with his offering of a (very) small stake in the fledgling company to the initial group of employees, but had later to divest a much larger share of it to important early backers and suppliers of funds. More or less the first was Goldman Sachs, which lent Alibaba $3.3m and later sold its stake very profitably for around $22m, although much too early to realise dramatically higher returns. Sometimes you just cannot be greedy enough.
Another important supplier of early funds was Yahoo, which still maintains a stake after later reducing its holding. The biggest backer of Alibaba, however, was Japan’s Softbank, which has built an important share. According to the 2016 annual report, Jack Ma owned 7.8% of Alibaba Group, other directors owned 4.7%, Softbank had 32% and Yahoo had 15.4%. However, this understates Ma’s position.
At first sight, the ownership numbers would imply that Jack Ma has little control over the company. However, this conclusion is questioned by an important deal, one ostensibly made to get around Chinese government restrictions on foreign ownership of non-financial companies. This was when Ma took control of Alipay.
In the early 2010s, almost all of the payments made through the Alibaba commercial system were transacted through its subsidiary Alipay, which handled $700m per day in transactions. Alipay had an ‘escrow system’ for security of payment, whereby funds were transferred to the seller only after satisfactory delivery of goods to the buyer. This payment system proved very attractive to users, especially given inefficient Chinese bank payments and the low use of credit cards in China, since it improved the chance of getting your money back after being delivered poor quality goods. Although Alipay itself did not necessarily make any charges directly, and so was not an important source of funds to the main company, it was nevertheless a key part of the Alibaba operation, important for keeping the buying/selling/services business model ticking over.
In 2011, news emerged – buried in a quarterly Yahoo earnings report – that Jack Ma had taken control of Alipay in the previous year or two and had transferred it out of the Alibaba group. The price paid by the company owned by Jack Ma was roughly $51m for a business that was seen as then being worth around $1 billion. This was done through a so-called Variable Interest Entity (VIE) structure, something that other companies have also used to get around China’s regulation of foreign ownership of companies licensed to operate payment systems in the country. However, whatever the motivation behind the deal, it meant that a VIE company largely owned by Jack Ma would now control a key Alibaba-related business.[3] After its expansion into other areas, Alipay is now Ant Financial. Today it is estimated to be worth very much more.
Such deals may have been a reason for Hong Kong’s stock exchange to reject the initial public offering (IPO) of Alibaba shares on the public capitalist market, although it appears that the most important issue was the favoured voting positions of Alibaba’s founding shareholders that were seen as being detrimental to new shareholders in an IPO. The New York Stock Exchange nevertheless accepted the deal, no doubt encouraged by the potentially lucrative transaction fees. In September 2014, the IPO sale of some shares in Alibaba Group Holding (ie minus Alipay) raised a record $25bn, with reported fees amounting to some $300m.

Alibaba and Ant Financial

Alipay was renamed Ant Financial in 2014. Based on its 2016 round of fundraising, which brought in China’s sovereign wealth fund and other state institutions, it has been valued at $60bn, but there is no detail of costs and revenue flows in Ant Financial’s 2016 report. Nevertheless, it is certainly big. Ant Financial performs more than 150 million payments per day, 10 times the volume for Paypal; it is the world’s third largest cash management service, lends money to small businesses and offers insurance services.
Alibaba’s own annual report shows the following key fact: 37.5% of Ant Financial’s pre-tax income is due to Alibaba (although I have not been able to find what that income might be!). There are also many other flows of income between the two groups, with Alibaba paying Ant Financial for bank processing costs and operating costs – roughly $760m in the 2016 financial year – and the latter paying Alibaba royalties, fees for software technology and for other services. The impression given in one table of transactions is that Alibaba pays Ant Financial more than it receives, roughly a net $350m in the 2016 financial year, but that will probably exclude the share of pre-tax income Alibaba gets from Ant Financial. More information on the latter’s business will be published when it eventually lists its shares on a stock exchange, an event expected to happen by 2019. In the meantime, both companies are continuing to expand into other markets and other countries with acquisitions and cooperation deals, including in the US and Europe.

Alibaba and global corporate trends

The company’s name comes from the story of Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves, one of the ‘Arabian Nights’ tales. The hero, Ali Baba, finds out the command ‘Open Sesame’ for the cave in which the thieves have hidden their stolen treasure. Jack Ma chose the name as something that would both be recognisable in global markets and encourage consumers to think that they too could find treasure. In the same way, the name of one of the company’s original sites, Taobao, means ‘searching for treasure’ in Chinese. But the company name is more revealing than might have been intended about Alibaba’s business.
In economic terms, Alibaba is not itself stealing or receiving stolen goods, although through its powerful mechanism it is taking a cut from the commercial transactions taking place, including through selling its advertising services. In this, it is at one with key developments in the world economy over the past few decades: don’t produce anything; instead take a share of the value that others have produced by managing the markets in which they operate!
Monopolisation of commercial relationships has been a fundamental feature of global corporations, so much so that most of the leading companies by stock market capitalisation these days are ones that have a strong commercial power, rather than being powerful producers. For example, Amazon is now worth more on the stock market than ExxonMobil, and so is Alibaba. Apple Inc, the world’s largest company in these terms, has the largest capitalisation of a private company, but does very little production itself and relies on its domination of supply chains for assembly and its consumer market power – one should also note its use of the financial system.[4] Alibaba’s business model fits with these important trends and it could well develop into another of these powerful global companies, supported from its strong domestic base in China.

Tony Norfield, 28 June 2017


[1] For more detail on these I would recommend Duncan Clark’s book, Alibaba: The House That Jack Ma Built, Ecco, 2016, and this article by Louise Lucas, ‘Alibaba bets on do-it-yourself globalisation’, Financial Times, 23 May 2017.
[2] Alibaba does not have Amazon’s system of warehouses for delivering many of its online ordered goods, which saves it some costs. Instead, it delivers most goods within China through the ‘warehouse and delivery network partners’ of its 47%-owned affiliate, Cainiao, which employs 1.7 million delivery personnel and operates in more than 600 cities in China.
[3] See Duncan Clark’s book, pp219-224.
[4] See my review of Apple’s business here.

Tuesday, 15 July 2014

BRICS Building


Nobody wants to be one of the PIIGS, but membership of the BRICS is highly valued. Both acronyms were devised in the City of London, the former by analysts describing a group of crisis-hit euro countries, the latter by Goldman Sachs in a 2001 paper that identified several countries that had come to prominence in the global economy. The Goldmans formulation came at an opportune time: slower growth in the major capitalist powers was being outpaced by developing countries that also appeared to have brighter economic prospects. Its author called for including Brazil, Russia, India and China more formally in global economic decision making (South Africa was added later), and this was an adept investment bank marketing tool to attract business both from and into the relevant emerging powers, ones that craved recognition.

The BRICS are evidently diverse countries, geographically, socially, economically, politically and in terms of their potential power in the world economy. However, they share some common interests that the original Goldmans formulation did not anticipate. Rather than them all simply wanting to be included in the current hegemonic structure of global decision making - being included in forums like the G7, for example - what has happened over the past decade is that they have recognised that the game is rigged against them. So, instead, they have made halting attempts to set up another game.

The latest move is the new BRICS development bank, finally agreed in Brazil on 15 July. After much negotiation, and the usual scepticism from the western press that a deal could be agreed, the new bank will have its headquarters in Shanghai and the first president for the bank will come from India. This reflects the relevant economic power distribution, with China and India having both the largest GDPs and populations among the BRICS, but with China in first position. The first president will have the position for five years, followed by a Brazilian. However, the real money will be advanced by China, some 40%.

Initial reports suggest that the new bank will have $100bn of starting capital, plus a 'contingency reserves arrangement' of the same size. The latter will help developing nations avoid 'short-term liquidity pressures, promote further BRICS cooperation, strengthen the global financial safety net and complement existing international arrangements'. This is a major challenge to the IMF- and World Bank-dominated system of country support and reflects a desire among these up-and-coming countries to assert their position versus the established imperialist powers.

This is one of the most important economic challenges to the position of the major powers since 1945, in particular to the US and its domination of IMF and World Bank policy. As outlined in an earlier article, the US has already faced important competition from China. This new institution will likely offer many trade and investment deals that are outside the orbit of the Anglo-American system, ones that do not depend upon using the US currency. In May, Russia and China did a bilateral deal whereby Russia will supply China with oil and gas over many years for hundreds of billions of dollars, but it is reported that the transaction will not be settled in the US dollar. Over the past 18 months, the Chinese government has also set up swap deals with central banks in all the major financial centres that will make the Chinese renminbi a far more important currency for international transactions and trade finance.

The end result is that the BRICS will likely end up being a mechanism for the evolution of China as a major world power, not necessarily a single group of alternative powers jointly challenging the existing structure. Just note the levels of 2013 nominal GDP and population, in particular with China well ahead of India's GDP, despite having a similarly large population (the BRICS are in bold):

                        GDP (US$, trillion)             Population (millions)

US                   16.8                                            318
China                9.2                                          1367
Japan                 4.9                                            127
Germany            3.6                                              81
France               2.7                                              66
UK                     2.5                                              64
Brazil                2.2                                            203
Russia               2.1                                            146
Italy                   2.1                                              61
India                 1.9                                          1247
Canada              1.8                                              35
South Africa      0.4                                             53

These developments put the position of China in quite a different perspective from that offered by Panitch and Gindin in their recent book, The Making of Global Capitalism. Their view is that China is so ingrained in the post-war US hegemony as to be more a supplicant than a challenger. They dismiss China as a potential rival to the US by arguing that it is embedded in the US-designed system, for example by owning a huge volume of US dollar-denominated debt in its foreign exchange reserves that effectively cannot be sold. They question whether China has 'the capacity to take on extensive responsibilities for managing global capitalism' (p. 336), as if that were the issue at stake! The real issue, as Lenin noted a century ago, is one of the changing balance of strength among the key powers. As the new BRICS bank indicates, there are changes under way.


Tony Norfield, 15 July 2014