Showing posts with label war. Show all posts
Showing posts with label war. Show all posts

Sunday, 12 September 2021

Imperialism & the Working Class

 


 

Discovering Imperialism: Social Democracy to World War I is an anthology put together by Richard Day and Daniel Gaido, in which they translate many articles not previously available in English.[1] They also give valuable introductions to the authors and the political times in which they lived. Their book raises many issues arising from contemporary imperialism, and shows the political consequences of the different ways in which imperialism was understood. Lenin’s Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism, written in 1916, is not included in the book, but it is clear that this work, although the best, was just one of a large number of publications on the question.

Many articles and debates the book covers, from the 1890s up to around 1916, remain relevant today. This is especially true for those relating to nationalism and imperialism, even though the forms taken by imperialism have changed a lot in the past century. However, the book’s articles, and its editors, do not explore a critical feature.

How was it that the anti-imperialists often had the better arguments – and sometimes even won – but they were nevertheless beaten by social forces, both inside and outside the debating forums of social democracy? A devastating, murderous war was the result, in which the working classes of the major powers fought alongside their rulers. Only in Russia was there a practical, political and successful response to the outbreak of war – led by the Bolsheviks in the 1917 Russian Revolution.

Here I want to focus on one issue that arises from a quotation the book provides from Friedrich Engels in 1885:[2]

“The truth is this: during the period of England’s industrial monopoly the English working-class have, to a certain extent, shared in the benefits of the monopoly. These benefits were very unequally parcelled out amongst them; the privileged minority pocketed most, but now and then even the great mass had at least a temporary share. And that is the reason why, since the dying-out of Owenism, there has been no socialism in England. With the breakdown of that monopoly, the English working-class will lose that privileged position; it will find itself generally – the privileged and leading minority not excepted – on a level with its fellow-workers abroad. And that is the reason why there will again be socialism in England.”

Here, Engels notes the absence of any socialist movement in England, sensibly disregarding the largely irrelevant, small socialist groupings that were around at the time. Both Marx and Engels recognised that this absence needed to be explained, since England was the most capitalistically developed country in the world and had a large proletariat. Why was this proletariat not drawn to socialism by their experience of capitalism? Comments from Marx and Engels elsewhere did note the bourgeois politics of the English ‘labour movement’, but here Engels here pins down the cause.

The monopoly of England in the world economy went well beyond industry. It was also heavily backed up by domination in the areas of international commerce and finance – shipping, warehousing, trade finance, insurance, loans, etc. For example, from 1874-193, Britain actually had a deficit on its balance of trade amounting to around 5-6% of GDP per year: exports of goods were well below imports, though the latter were principally raw materials and foodstuffs. Massive revenues from services, particularly financial ones, and from foreign investments, offset this big deficit, and gave Britain a current account surplus of around 5% per annum.[3]

All these revenues, not industry alone, gave England its economic fortune and allowed relatively favourable conditions for the working class. While Engels notes that it was the more privileged sections of workers who benefited most from this, the benefits also extended to the mass of people. This is not to say that they were always having a great time. The point was that these – even potential – benefits acted as a dampener on anti-capitalism.

This is the critical issue. The usual argument from the left is that it is the trade union or labour movement/party leaders who corrupt the masses, compromise with the bosses and back capitalism. While the practice and political outlook of these leaders support such an assessment, it also ignores how the masses themselves can be open to being politically ‘corrupted’. Workers were not ignorant of wider developments in the country or where their immediate economic interests lay. In Britain, especially, the popular press was full of stories about the colonies, foreign markets and Britain’s status in the world.

The political problem is not this so-called labour aristocracy (though this mistaken argument was also used by Lenin); the problem instead is far more fundamental. It is one where the political and economic experience of the mass of people makes them see benefits in being loyal to the rich capitalist state to which they ‘belong’.

Popular loyalty to the state is expressed very directly whenever that state is under threat or challenged by others. That is because those threats or challenges are also threats and challenges to ‘our way of life’. People may not go on a march to call for war, but they will almost always agree with potential military action, overwhelmingly support military spending and extol ‘our boys’ when they go to fight.

Getting a popular endorsement for military aggression is fairly easy when there seems to be little risk involved. In the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, that country was not in a position to fight back. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was a little trickier for popular opinion, given stories that the evil dictator might have had ‘weapons of mass destruction’. If the opponent is a major country, then the build up of popular opinion in favour of action takes a bit longer. Still, as shown by the example of the British-German naval arms race in the early 1900s, there was enough support on both sides of the conflict-to-come to continue an escalation into war.

I would excuse Engels for his attempt in 1885 at revolutionary optimism, thinking that a future breakdown of England’s monopoly would once again lead to socialism in Britain. At least he took proper account of the current situation. If we did the same, we would be able to recognise what has happened to the mass of people in many richer countries – especially in the US, the UK and in the rest of north west Europe. It has not been a move towards socialism as their privileges in the world economy are challenged. Instead, a nationalist and pro-imperialist mentality has become more aggressive in defence of those privileges.

 

Tony Norfield, 13 September 2021



[1] Published by Brill in 2012. The book is over 950 pages; while the hardback is on sale for a ridiculously high price, the paperback edition is much cheaper.

[2] This text is taken from an article by Engels in the German Social Democratic Party’s Die Neue Zeit in June 1885, ‘England in 1845 and in 1885’. That article was originally published some months earlier in the English paper, Commonweal. The article is available in Marx & Engels’ Collected Works, Volume 26, p301.

[3] See P J Cain and A G Hopkins, British Imperialism: 1688-2000, Pearson 2002, p165.

Thursday, 16 June 2016

Political Fundamentals and the UK Brexit Referendum


What explains the desperation of British capitalism and Conservative Party in the lead up to the Brexit referendum on 23 June? Opinion polls have shifted in favour of a Leave vote and, while the accuracy of the polls is always in doubt, a shift towards Leave seems evident from widespread vox pop views in the media, in the panic of the Remain camp and in the financial market setbacks for sterling’s exchange rate. Equity markets have also been hit, and not just in the UK. As a sign of desperation, the Remain camp has even called upon the Labour Party’s lumbering has-been, Gordon Brown, to add his weight to what looks like a failing balance. Her Majesty has so far been allowed to stay above the dispute, just about. One can imagine that if the polls get any worse for Remain, then Downing Street could try to prompt a Royal appeal to her loyal subjects to do the right thing. Where has this revolt of popular sentiment come from?
My previous coverage of the Brexit referendum has focused on the situation facing the British ruling class in a world where its economic and political interests are clearly bound up with Europe, but where there has been a minority view that an alternative is possible ‘outside’, especially in a context of European economic crisis. But the significant support for Leave shows that this has underestimated a key point. What might otherwise be considered simply as popular disgruntlement with political elites – ‘vote Leave to teach them a lesson’ – is better explained as a widespread view that these elites have broken their pact with the people. The ‘Leave’ support, however disruptive it might be to existing power structures, is based on an appeal to the British state to restore the status quo ante. To understand this point, it needs to be put in context, one that will also confirm that this is not a debate in which one can take sides.
The World System of Power
No country’s politics, still less its economics, can be understood outside its relationships with the rest of the world. Since at least the early 19th century, the world economy has increasingly shaped the position of all countries within it. The world system as we have known it in recent decades has been based upon three elements: American dominance and supervision of capitalism, the European Union project and the relationship between America and Britain. These elements may have come under some threat, for example with the growth of China and the crisis in Europe, but this pattern of world power remains intact.
The dominant European states wish that Britain would be more European, and that it would do more to curb the xenophobic, anti-European drift of British popular culture. But Britain’s relationship with the US is in their interests, because Britain’s mediating, intermediary role helps keeps the whole structure of Western dominance intact, with America at its apex and Europe benefiting from it. The Europeans are worried about an increasingly unstable world that sees the rise of China, a more assertive Russia, all sorts of threats around the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and in Africa. They are concerned that a Brexit vote would begin to unravel their security network, or at least begin to call into question who is allied with whom, and how committed they are to a joint project.
The dominant European imperialist states could easily accommodate Britain’s refusal to join the euro zone, a central plank of European policy. Britain’s role with respect to the European Union is not so much the product deeply ingrained cultural attitudes (although these do exist); it is more an expression of its important role within the pattern of power and the dynamics of its mediating role on the world stage. This role allows, and calls for, the British state to operate at the same time both outside and within the continental European political and economic set up. For example, the British-based financial system is a worldwide one, brokering the US dollar, and the political and economic interests of Britain do not support its membership of the euro zone. But the British state also needs to have a say in the development of European policy to sustain its position and the workings of the world financial system that it has helped to create and from which it benefits. The US also wants Britain in Europe because it is vital to US-European relationships. Every time Britain has shown itself truculent over European membership, and especially now, the US has reminded it, in a firm but friendly way, that it would prefer no change.
A new series of bilateral arrangements between Britain and other countries, as envisaged by the Brexit camp, cannot replace this system. The point is not only why on earth it would make sense for Britain, one of the major world powers, to tear up longstanding agreements that it has helped to produce and try to start again. It is also that a country stepping outside an established system of power would not have much leverage to devise another one. The pro-Brexit calculation can only convince those who ignore, or do not understand, the structure of Western dominance and Britain’s vital role within it. Britain’s business media has reminded the Leave advocates both that Britain alone is a small share of the EU market and that exiting the EU would put at risk all the other relationships that give British imperialism status in the world, from permanent membership of the UN Security Council downwards.
The Working Class Brexit Vote
Nevertheless, British opinion polls show that Brexit looms. A broad section of the population, especially the working class, is now liable to go against the establishment consensus and vote Leave as a way to complain, especially when it sees its troubles as resulting from global economic trends that the establishment has embraced. The focus of complaint is immigration. While the claimed economic benefits of the UK staying in the EU have been the main argument for ‘Remain’, this has been submerged by immigration as the dominant anti-EU point in the referendum debate. Many Brits, perhaps most, including those who themselves or whose families may have been relatively recent immigrants, support tighter immigration controls, as was already clear in the 2015 UK General Election.
Immigration plays such a role because it touches on a key point in British working class consciousness, one that reflects its material interests: a loyal commitment to the British state. This longstanding commitment has given the working class social protection as part of a deal not to cause too much trouble, a kind of ‘social contract’. Now, the immigration question helps to identify the national, British-based working class as the legitimate recipient of state assistance versus the immigrants (or even refugees) from other countries. In this pro-imperial outlook, the issue of inadequate housing, jobs and services delivered by capitalism becomes a moan about the supply of housing, jobs and services taken by migrants. In previous decades, the moan was about blacks and Asians; now it is more about white (East) Europeans.
This is not to say that such a view is held by all working class people, but the fact that it is so widely held should not really shock those who have read any history. For more than a century, despite occasional trade union militancy, the British working class has supported British imperialism and its war efforts. From the First World War, even earlier, the British state had made concessions to workers with welfare measures, ones that were developed further in the late 1930s and into the Second World War, when more ‘sacrifices for the nation’ had to be made. Introducing future plans for comprehensive welfare spending in March 1943, the arch-imperialist and violent opponent of the 1926 General Strike, Winston Churchill, declared himself in favour of ‘national compulsory insurance for all classes, for all purposes, from the cradle to the grave’ as part of his attempt to secure a solid national consensus of all classes.
It may surprise readers familiar with the story that the 1945 Labour Government invented the National Health Service, and broke the mould with state ownership of national assets, that Churchill also said in the same speech that ‘we must establish on broad and solid foundations a national health service’ and that there was ‘a broadening field for State ownership and enterprise, especially in relation to monopolies of all kind’. To underpin his endorsement of a national consensus, Churchill praised the Labour Party’s coalition government Minister for Labour and National Service, Ernest Bevin, for ‘the practical absence of strikes in this war compared to what happened in the last [ie in World War One]’. The rationale for Churchill’s support of welfare spending for the working class was that for Britain ‘to keep its high place in the leadership of the world and to survive as a great power that can hold its own against external pressure, our people must be encouraged by every means to have larger families’. Supporting more education spending, he added that the ‘future of the world is left to highly educated races who alone can handle the scientific apparatus necessary for pre-eminence in peace or survival in war’.[1]
Other articles on this blog have shown how, in the post-1945 period, Labour Governments continued in this pro-imperialist outlook, using exploitation of the colonies to help fund their national welfare spending to benefit the domestic working class.[2] But this perspective is not of only historical interest; in the same way that imperialism – a system of privilege and domination in the world economy – is not confined to the colonial period.
The Brexit debate shows that the British working class wants not so much a better deal within the existing system, but a return to the previous post-war consensus.[3] This perspective is not only far from being any challenge to capitalism; it supports Britain’s privileged position within the world system of power from which the working class had benefited. Brexit has risen in popularity because the domestic working class has faced the problem that British capitalists have benefited greatly from their increased links to the world economy, including an influx of cheap workers, less so from the more ‘home grown’ operations, so British workers have felt neglected. That is why Wetherspoons, a UK and Irish pub chain, very dependent upon local business links, is one of the few large UK companies to be pro-Brexit.
From the perspective of the British working class, the call for Brexit is a call upon the British state to keep to its previous compact with the workers for what can be presented as a fair, national deal. (Incidentally, the British left has the same approach to economic and political problems) Widespread complaints such as this may work to some extent, shifting the balance of the government’s policy tactics. For example, the collapse of Tata Steel Europe’s UK operations in the lead up to this troublesome EU referendum led to some government measures to delay the inevitable. However, the game is up. Whether Britain leaves the EU or not, capitalist companies will not turn their back on the world market and the relevant calculations. Neither will the UK government pretend in its policies that there is no capitalist crisis to deal with.
Above all, the British working class cannot explain to itself why the British ruling class has broken its previous agreement to deliver national welfare, and why it has turned its back on its natural supporters in favour of seeking better profits in international market dealings. That is why its anger is real and solid, although its political economy remains crap because it cannot understand why what used to work before does not work now. Simply belonging to a rich, imperialist country does not mean that you necessarily get a decent share of the rich pickings.
Awkward Moments for UK Policy
Now take a step back and ask yourself why the Conservative Party, the unabashed defender of big capital and the super-rich, has got itself into this mess, which now witnesses senior ministers attacking the Prime Minister’s stance for ‘Remain’. The simplistic view is that there were Conservative Party divisions that had to be resolved by Cameron calling a vote on EU membership, or that Conservative votes were being threatened by the rise of UKIP. But, while true, this story hides a more telling, political problem suggested by what has already been explained.
If a political party is openly ruthless in enforcing capitalist market discipline on everyone, unfortunately for the ruling class that is no way to win the necessary popular support to get elected. Instead, a broad base of loyalists has to be built, one of the annoying features of universal suffrage. The need to have a broad base of support is the reason we still find many ‘one nation’ Tories, why successive Conservative governments did not reverse the post-1945 welfare state reforms and why Prime Minister Cameron still claims to defend the National Health Service. But this creates political difficulties when popular opinion in the UK turns against what is evidently the best policy for British imperialism, ie staying in the EU.
US President Obama, a wide range of other US and European politicians, together with the IMF, OECD, etc, etc, have declared that they favour the status quo, as do the majority of British corporations and the leaderships of the main UK political parties. The logic here is that the existing pattern of world power relationships would be upset, unpredictably and possibly dangerously, if any major country tried to strike out on its own.
At risk is the EU itself, which could well see other countries heading for the exit, undermining an economic and political project that has been decades in the making. Neither is this a good environment for other agencies of imperial rule that have been in place since the late 1940s, the UN and NATO. These could be faced with new questions on who is a key member and why, or who has voting rights on the UN Security Council.
A Referendum Dispute Between Loyalism and Imperialism
At first sight, a vote for Brexit might look to be the more progressive option, because it would help undermine the established structures of power in the world. Many UK voters disagree, noting that it would also give credence to a set of policies that would be driven by reactionary pundits and politicians. The problem with these views is that they do not understand how the debate is between a pro-imperialist populace and British imperialism. That is why the debate lacks any content and there are few substantial differences between the respective positions.
The ‘Leave’ side is not against developments in world capitalism. The bulk of its votes will come from a working class that has sided with imperialism and would like the British state to return the favour, backing up its privileges against others in the world economy, as in the good old days. The ‘Remain’ side too argues for no change to world capitalism, and will attract those who fear an upset to their current economic circumstances. The former expresses complaints against the status quo, wanting an exit in which they think changes could be implemented within the imperial system; the latter thinks the status quo is acceptable, although it might be amended somewhat within the imperial system.
How can complaints about capitalist market discipline be resolved in a crisis-ridden world economy, if the complainers want to keep the system that enforces that discipline, and especially the imperial privileges that accrue to one of the leading powers? If the complainers understood this problem, then progressive politics would be in with a chance. However, that is not the case in the UK, or in a number of other rich countries where the working class is loyal to its powerful state. Instead, the political logic is for pro-imperialist policies to win the day.
If you want to oppose the depredations of capitalism and imperialism, then please do so, but this is not what the Brexit debate is about. Above all, remember the classic revolutionary phrase: ‘the enemy is at home’.

Tony Norfield, 16 June 2016


[1] To emphasise this point, note that Sir William Beveridge, the main early planner of the UK welfare state – not the UK unions or the Labour Party, or pressure from them – was a collaborator of Churchill’s and supported by him, even though Churchill had doubts on committing to spending when it was not clear it could be afforded. The most that could be said for the 1945-51 Labour Government is that it implemented a more generous welfare system than had been envisaged by Beveridge, although that was paid for by loans from the US and by exploiting the colonies! A transcript of Churchill’s BBC broadcast in March 1943 is available at http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/1943-03-21a.html.
[2] For example this article.
[3] I will not cover this point further here, but for further information I recommend a book on the history of the Labour Party by Edmund Dell, A Strange, Eventful History: Democratic Socialism in Britain, HarperCollins, London: 2000. A Labour right-winger, Dell also spells out, in ways one rarely finds from the left, the consistently pro-imperialist and state-‘socialist’ nature of the British Labour Party, something that was consistent with the political outlook of their electoral constituency.

Wednesday, 2 December 2015

The Dogs of War: Syria and the Middle East


International crises can have the effect of making clearer what is going on in the world. At least, that is a potential benefit, although it is one not likely to be used by those who would prefer not to see. Today, the UK political position has become clear with a large majority of 397 versus 223 members of the British Parliament being in favour of bombing Syria. This article looks at the background to why the British government is aiming to get more involved.
The most important reason behind UK Prime Minister David Cameron’s campaign to bomb Syria is that he does not want the UK to be left out of the running when a new carve up of the region occurs. That means bombs, and bombs mean prizes![1] Cameron’s rationale is that this is an attack on IS/ISIS/ISIL/Daesh to ‘protect the UK’, because the UK cannot allow its ‘defence’ to be left up to ‘other countries’. Further, Cameron raises the rhetorical question of what will the UK’s other allies think of the UK if it cannot come to the aid of its ally, France, when France has asked for assistance. For example, what about Britain’s allies in the Gulf, including Saudi Arabia, on which many commercial and financial deals depend? The key issue for the British state is that game changing political moves in the Middle East involving Syria and Iraq should not take place without Britain properly being in the game. All those networking opportunities and deals that could be done – but only if you are recognised as a player.
This underlying rationale is cloaked in implausible arguments about defending national security against IS, ignoring, as usual, that the UK has on innumerable occasions trampled on the security of others around the world. Just to mention the Middle East, how about recalling when the Royal Air Force bombed Iraqis in the early 1920s, both to repress revolts and to encourage them to pay their taxes, let alone the bombing of Iraq and Libya in more recent years?
A big problem for all the major powers is that the ‘country’ boundaries that they had drawn, especially in the Middle East, but also in Africa and elsewhere, have no legitimacy. All countries or nations are political inventions that depend for their stability on some form of political agreement, or acquiescence, among the population that exists within its boundaries. This ‘national’ set up can be quite fragile, even in what might look like established states, such as Belgium, Spain and Italy. Most strikingly, even the three-century old political deal between England and Scotland was questioned by Scotland’s independence referendum. How much more fragile are the lines in the sand drawn by external powers in the oppressed countries of the Middle East less than a century ago. Even more damaging was the way in which colonial powers often established reactionary regimes that had little popular support and depended upon the colonist’s military force – a specialisation of the Brits. This often underpinned a repressive society, one that was both defended by the ‘democratic’ imperialist powers and one that liberal critics from these powers would criticise as being backward and reactionary, while ignoring their own country’s role in the proceedings. All this prevented a legitimate political power developing within the ‘national’ borders.
The focus of most attention in the news media these days is on IS. Something this group of brutal, militant jihadis would not want to recognise is that western powers have given backing to Sunni-based regimes in a number of countries, particularly those in which much of the population is not Sunni. Neither would it want to recognise that the key opposition to western rule in these countries has been from secular nationalists – ones whom they have often opposed on religious grounds, while being in the pay of the major powers! However, the main problem IS causes for the major powers today is that it does not accept the national barrier between Syria and Iraq. Some historical examples show that they have a point. The existing national lines are not, as one might say, ‘God given’.
Before 1918, much of what we now call the Middle East was part of the Ottoman Empire, run by Turkey. It was mainly organised on a regional level, with the main objective being to have a local administration that would pay duties and taxes into the centre, Istanbul. These regions were often multi-ethnic and multi-religious. The largely Sunni Moslem ruling centre had no significant prejudice or discrimination against Christians, Jews or other versions of Islam, as long as they paid their taxes and did not cause trouble for the Empire.
After the First World War in 1918, and even before it ended, the UK and France planned to carve up between themselves Turkey’s colonies in the Middle East. A key deal between the two countries, subsequently modified in favour of the British, was the infamous Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916. This was the deal over which Lawrence ‘of Arabia’, the British intelligence officer fighting with the Arabs against the Turks, had his pangs of conscience about betraying Arab nationalists. Not worrying too much about this problem, however, was the British Prime Minister of the time, the Liberal Herbert Asquith. He said ‘if … we were to leave the other nations to scramble for Turkey [ie its wider empire] without taking anything for ourselves, we should not be doing our duty’.[2]
In this context, the UK took over and invented the modern boundaries of Iraq in the early 1920s, out of an area that, more or less, had been called Mesopotamia by classical scholars. By 1926, Britain had edged out France and added the Mosul region (now called the Nineveh Province) to the new Iraq, which was under its domination, after large potential oil resources were discovered there. Britain had far less interest in Syria. It had already manoeuvred to get the Palestine Mandate from the League of Nations, so having access to Eastern Mediterranean coastal ports and a means to protect the hinterland to the Suez Canal. Basically, the British left the Syrian region to French imperialism, which also allowed France’s division of Syrian and Lebanese territory. Arab nationalism’s plans post-1918 for a ‘Greater Syria’, incorporating most of the previous areas, were then stymied. As part of the new arrangements, in 1921 Britain made Faisal, a capable but trusted collaborator, the King of Iraq, as long as he dropped his previous claims to rule Syria. Britain had a dominant role in Iraq for decades afterwards.
The UK also invented the country now called Jordan in the early 1920s. Initially called ‘Transjordania’, it was made up from part of the area awarded to the British with the League of Nations’ Palestine Mandate. This area was a place in which they could place their Hashemite stooge, Abdullah, the incompetent older brother of Faisal, and keep him out of trouble (especially trouble with Saudi Arabia). Their rationale was mainly to have a military base in a strategic area and with a compliant country ruler, although that meant subsidising him more than they had bargained for.
As is often forgotten these days, there had been several attempts to construct Arab unity in the Middle East region, even after the challenges to the Ottoman Empire during and immediately after World War One. These were often undermined by internal rivalries between different governments, the most recent being the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria, in 1958-61.
A big problem in all this also comes for Israel, the least legitimate state of all in the region, one that is based not on imperial line drawing after 1918, but in 1948, and also upon the theft of land beyond these artificial borders. Of course, Zionists like to claim that Palestine is theirs, ‘a land with no people, for a people with no land’. But while Palestine was not previously a ‘nation’, being part of the Ottoman Empire, the racist, absurdly ethnic definition of being a Jew common to the Zionist outlook, something that dates from 19th century European racism, can still less invent its own ‘nation’ in this area, one that its aggression extends to ever wider borders. When boundary lines are being redrawn by IS, or being pushed back by the major powers, can the undisturbed extension (even ‘internally’) of Israel’s borders continue? No wonder the voluble Israeli government has kept relatively quiet on this issue!
The US role in the Middle East is paramount, but clearly not in anything that can be considered to be ‘control’. Russia has been a relatively new element, also militarily involved, with its aim being to support Syria, where it maintains a seaport, and also to prevent itself from being enclosed by the ever-expanding NATO forces surrounding its borders. Problematic for the US, this has undermined the influence of the supposedly overwhelming power of the US military, although the US will attempt to push Russia to agree to its aim of regime change in Syria. France, like Russia, having been attacked by IS, but having lost much influence in Syria, wants to re-establish an interest there, and determinedly bombs Syria to exact revenge. Its efforts nevertheless kill many civilians and Hollande’s firepower only highlights how fragile is his own domestic political support.
As for the UK, the government pretends that there is a pliable 70,000 group of rebels to oust Syria’s Assad. It may even give them almost ‘democratic’ credentials, but the main thing is that they will bend, at least a bit, to British interests. After all, showing British flexibility, British official flags were set at half-mast for the death of that other great leader, Saudi King Abdullah in January 2015, as a sign of the lucrative defence, commercial and financial deals with the right kind of regime.
Jeremy Corbyn, leader of the Labour Party, is in a more tricky position. He has had a consistent view that he is against the UK military bombing of Syria, although he also thinks that it would be OK if the United Nations legitimised such an imperial policy. He considered that the decision to go to war was a ‘most serious, solemn decision’, but then refused to exert any leadership discipline over his MPs votes, with no threat of sanction if they disagreed with him. I cannot say I was surprised, since he has found it possible to belong to the pro-imperialist Labour Party for more than three decades. The farce here is that a Labour MP voting for the Conservatives austerity measures would have faced party sanctions, whereas, if an MP votes to bomb Syria, that is a matter of conscience.

Tony Norfield, 2 December 2015

(note: some later rephrasing of  text, 6 Jan 2016)


[1] I am too polite to mention that Dave’s first foray into military matters, teaming up with French President Sarkozy to encourage US and ‘allied’ intervention in Libya, has not turned out that well.
[2] This and some other details are taken from an informative and well-written work by John Keay, Sowing the Wind: The Seeds of Conflict in the Middle East, John Murray: London, 2003.

Monday, 22 August 2011

Libya is for Everyone?


These are some factors to bear in mind when assessing the fall of Gaddafi’s regime in Libya:

1. The European powers are now best placed to gain influence in Libya, especially Britain, which had already led the way in rehabilitating Libya back into the imperialist fold under Gaddafi. Britain’s BP had already struck oil and gas exploration deals with the regime in 2007 – its ‘single biggest exploration commitment’.[1] Alongside this, the LSE (latterly dubbed the ‘Libyan School of Economics’ after the Saif Al-Islam fiasco) was busy mentoring the Libyan elite in the wonders of ‘governance’. This was no doubt encouraged by the UK Foreign Office in order to gain influence over a new generation of rulers.

2. Libya is a rentier state, with the main spoils from energy revenues going to Gaddafi and his clan. There was normally enough left to distribute to other clans to keep them quiet; if not, then political repression kept the regime in place. However, political unrest grew after the Arab spring, which appeared to open up the possibility of regime change to Gaddafi’s disparate clan rivals. Gaddafi was fine for Britain and other powers while he was unchallenged and was becoming a stable partner. Post-Tunisia and post-Egypt, he was not.

3. The Libyan Investment Authority had been responsible for investing surplus oil funds and had assets valued at over $50bn in mid-2010. Before the sanctions on Libya earlier this year, it had already been suckered by western banks into loss-making bets on things like Société Générale shares and investments promoted by Goldman Sachs, and others, that lost almost all their value. Apart from the potential oil and gas revenues, control or influence over these funds will also be of great interest to western powers.

4. The NATO attack on Libya was initially promoted by Britain and France. Starting out under the usual false flag of ‘humanitarian intervention’, it quickly became an overt means of promoting regime change by backing one side in a civil war. The Libyan rebels in Benghazi quickly fell into the arms of western powers, with British intervention to open up ‘discussions’ being prominent. Since the end of July, the National Transitional Council has had an ambassador in London, after the expulsion of Gaddafi’s staff. The British have also been releasing previously-frozen Libyan funds held in London to finance the NTC. Today, the Financial Times reports that Britain’s office in Benghazi (!) has deployed a UK-led ‘international stabilisation response team’ to back up the NTC and ‘a separate British team is helping to build command and control capacity and assistance including communications kit and police training’.[2]

5. The US provided most of the firepower for the attack on Libya, but has effectively been sidelined by the British and the French. Italy, busy with the Berlusconi show, has had little role, despite being the previous colonial power and having extensive economic and financial relationships with the country. Over 20% of the Libyan Investment Authority’s $6bn equity investments are in Italian companies, eg Unicredit and ENI.

6. So far, Libyan events look like a big success for British imperialism: regime change to a more pliant group, big deals ahead, and at a cost of less than £300m for the military budget. But the ‘new Libya’ will still be fought over by the other powers, and the US will be unimpressed with spending $1bn to subsidise British strategy.

In the early hours of this morning, speaking on the Libyan opposition's TV network, Mahmoud Jibril, chairman of the NTC said ‘Libya is for everyone and will now be for everyone’. He meant that all Libya’s people would now participate in building the country, but the real message for imperialism is that Libya is now up for grabs.


Tony Norfield, 22 August 2011


[2] See ‘Cameron welcomes Gaddafi retreat’, Financial Times, 22 August 2011.

Thursday, 2 June 2011

Winston Churchill told it like it was ...

A nice quotation from Churchill on British imperialism/colonialism, in a comment to his British Cabinet colleagues in January 1914:

"We are not a young people with an innocent record and a scanty inheritance... We have engrossed to ourselves an altogether disproportionate share of the wealth and traffic of the world. We have got all we want in territory, and our claim to be left in the unmolested enjoyment of vast and splendid possessions, mainly acquired by violence, largely maintained by force, often seems less reasonable to others than to us."
(cited in John Darwin, 'The Empire Project', Cambridge 2010, p268 - a good book, incidentally!)

The frankness of the remark contrasts with modern day imperial use of 'human rights', etc, as a cover for their actions. However, the comment was in private discussion with his peers. The statement was made some six months before the start of World War 1, in full awareness of imperial rivalry.

Of course, Churchill spent most of his life trying to maintain Britain's control and enjoyment of its vast and splendid possessions.

Sunday, 29 May 2011

America’s war with China


(This is reposted from earlier, to correct some infelicities of style and some minor inaccuracies.) 

“Today, we’ve shown that our governments can work together, as well, for our mutual benefit … And that includes this bit of news: Under a new agreement, our National Zoo will continue to dazzle children and visitors with the beloved giant pandas."
President Obama’s toast to President Hu and the Chinese delegation at a state dinner in Washington DC, 19 January 2011

Obama’s welcome for another extended loan from the Chinese – this time, two giant pandas for another five years – says more about America’s problems than he might realise. The US is finding itself with less to offer than the Chinese, and it is unlikely relations between the two countries will be smooth enough to accommodate the pandas in five years’ time. While America is head, missiles, jets and shoulders above all its rivals, China is catching up fast. Fast enough for China to be the centrepiece of US military and economic planning. This article reviews the key elements of the rivalry between the US and China, and the analysis suggests that the rivalry will lead to some form of war. Under imperialism, that is how rivalry plays itself out. This is not a prediction of direct war between the US and China in the year 20XX. It is a prediction that the economic tensions between the US and China cannot be resolved through cooperation between the two powers.

1. Who’s the biggest on the block?

China’s global economic status has risen dramatically. In April this year, the IMF predicted that China’s economy would overtake the US by 2016, or panda renewal time. Although there were arguments about the method used for projecting this outcome, nobody could doubt that a country growing around 10% per year, more than three times as fast as the US, would catch up pretty quickly.[i] It is this prospect, and the growing Chinese ‘footprint’ in the global economy, which worries the US. Never mind that per capita income in the US would remain higher than in China for a much longer period. Even that comfort for the US would be at risk if the economic privileges it holds as the main imperialist power came under threat.

2. US-China trade symptoms

The US has had a trade deficit every year since the mid-1970s, long before China became a key player in the global economy. But today China provides America with a vast array of cheap imports that keeps living costs and company wage bills down. US corporations operating in China import a lot of the goods. The imports also boost the profits of the importing companies, like giant retailer Wal-Mart. However, US politicians are far from seeing trade with China as a blessing. Instead, like Butch Cassidy & the Sundance Kid, the all-American robber heroes look down from the hilltop at the hostile trackers who cannot be shaken off, fearing for their lives, and they ask themselves: “Who are those guys?”

Last year, trade with China alone was responsible for 42% of the US deficit in goods: $273bn out of a total of $647bn. The percentage has doubled from a decade earlier. On top of the trade flows, there are other big payments crossing the Pacific. The most striking is that China gets around $46bn per year in interest payments from the US government, because China owns a large mountain of US Treasury debt. Even the business deals that usually provide the US with valuable foreign income – services payments and direct investment revenues – don’t help much in the case of China. Add all these payments up and the result you get is that China accounted for nearly two-thirds of the US current account deficit in 2010, or $302bn out of $470bn. This is up from a fifth in the year 2000.

American politicians moan about ‘unfair trade’, but the reality is that they are losing the competitive war with this adversary.[ii] Even though the total US deficit has now dropped – the recession cut demand for imports and the weaker dollar helped exports - net US payments to China have barely fallen (see Chart 1). This shows how much the US has become dependent on Chinese imports. More worrying for US economic pride is that in 2010 the biggest US export to China in 2010 was soybeans, while the biggest import from China was computers![iii]

This does not mean the US has become a peasant society, having to export agricultural commodities to make a living. Nor does it mean that China has become Silicon Valley. But you get the impression that this can’t go on much longer. When America’s domestically-owned auto industry is bankrupt, when a major electronics corporation (GE) makes half its revenues from financial services, when its principal IT companies (Apple and Microsoft), pharmaceutical and oil companies all rely on monopolistic premium pricing, when its banks are dependent on the continued global status of the US dollar and huge government guarantees, and when they all stand, sponsor forms ready, for a share of this year’s $685bn of Pentagon funds, the image of a vibrant, dynamic US capitalism is as real as Homer Simpson’s work ethic.

Chart 1: US current account deficit, 1999-2010

Source: US Bureau of Economic Affairs, author’s calculations.

3. Not best friends

America’s worries about China have been building slowly. Just after the Second World War, the US was in a dominant position, with overwhelming military and economic power. The European imperialist countries and Japan were defeated or decisively weakened. They were brushed aside as America began to set up a new system of domination. But the US strategy did not achieve its goals in Korea. As hard as they could try, the US only managed a stalemate in the Korean war of 1950-53, because the northern part of the country was backed by China.[iv] America still smarts from the defeat. Ever since, the US has had a problem with China, the country that could prevail with manpower despite lacking in firepower.

Fast forward to the present, beyond the Nixon-Kissinger rapprochement with China in the 1970s, and the old US-China problem is revisited today in a more challenging form. In the past couple of decades, China has been the world’s fastest growing economy, with an ability to deliver vast volumes of cheap exports to the rest of the world. China has also made use of the cash from its trade surpluses in order to invest abroad. For example, China’s government now owns a staggering $3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves that are invested in foreign bonds (roughly half in US Treasuries alone). If all the dollars China owns in its reserves were dollar bills, and these bills were placed end-to end, they would reach a distance from here to the sun and almost back again. I don’t suggest that you try doing this, nor that China’s expanding space programme is going to try it either. But the huge reserves are how China earns tens of billions from foreign interest payments from the US and other countries.

However, it is not the Chinese ownership of US Treasuries or other assets that concerns America. This is partly because the yields are low, and also because the interest and principal payments, ultimately, are at the discretion of the US. America relies on the old dialectic of debtor-creditor relations: ‘Owe the bank $100,000 – your problem; owe the bank $1,000, 000,000,000 – the bank’s problem’. US research has also shown that the appetite of foreign central banks for US bonds has allowed US long-term interest rates to be as much as 1% point lower than they would otherwise have been. This has reduced funding costs and mortgage rates for the debt-ridden republic. Furthermore, the US is not that worried that China would ‘dump’ US Treasuries, leading to a collapse of the dollar and higher US interest rates. It realises that the odds are stacked against this because China would be devaluing its own assets.

What we have seen instead of a rush to the exit is that China has slowly reduced the risk it has to US dollars in its rising foreign exchange reserves. It has also switched its investments into more strategically valuable and lucrative areas. China has reduced its dollar risks through buying other currencies than the US dollar and by hedging against the risk of a fall in the dollar’s value.[v] It has also used several hundred billions of dollar assets to recapitalise its banking system. Most decisively, the money has funded its expansion overseas. It is the latter course of action that has caused alarm for US imperialism.

China has been scouring the world for raw material resources and has done deals with dozens of countries to take a stake in future supplies. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States has often pushed China back from buying US companies, including stopping a bid for Unocal, the US oil group, in 2005. But many developing countries see advantages in getting cheap Chinese finance, development assistance and what the London Financial Times calls China’s “grand infrastructure-for-resources deals”.[vi] These are the kinds of attractive deals that have not been forthcoming from the major powers, least of all the US. Alongside raw material supplies, such deals build strong political relationships for China.

In 2010, China bought some $55bn of foreign assets, including outright acquisitions and taking a share of companies, especially in the fuel and raw materials industries. The pace picked up in 2011, with about $15bn of deals in the first quarter alone.[vii] By March 2011, the Financial Times could quote US Secretary of State Clinton’s frustrated statement to a Congressional hearing:

“Let’s just talk, you know, straight realpolitik. We are in a competition with China. Take Papua New Guinea: huge energy find ... ExxonMobil is producing it. China is in there every day in every way, trying to figure out how it’s going to come in behind us, come under us … I might also mention China has about a $600m development programme for these Pacific island nations. And what do we have in a response? Zero.”[viii]

It was not only Papua New Guinea, and it wasn’t just oil, that risked falling under growing Chinese influence. The Wikileaks-released US embassy cables from recent years have showed US diplomats fretting about Brazil, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Algeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Sudan and Kazakhstan, among others. The cables did not appear to mention the 75 Chinese companies and 30,000 workers in Libya. In another leaked cable, the US assistant secretary of state for African affairs opined: “China is a very aggressive and pernicious economic competitor with no morals.” The moral integrity of the US is, of course, taken for granted.

4. A bigger splash

In early May this year, on one of those late spring days in Washington DC that has birds singing in the trees and the imperial machine refining hypocrisy to ever more noxious levels, the little noticed third annual US-China Strategic & Economic dialogue took place. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, proclaimed: "China and the United States face a wide range of common regional and global challenges … How our two countries work together to meet those challenges will help define the trajectory, not only of our relationship going forward, but the future peace, prosperity, and progress of the world."[ix] Beneath the vacuous abstractions, this had the air of a mafia don inviting in a rival for a business discussion, worried that the old division of territory was breaking down and that there could be ‘misunderstandings’.[x]

The US is all too aware that China’s growing strength represents a ‘security’ threat to US interests as well as an economic one. A special China Economic and Security Review Commission every year provides the US Congress with an examination of all the current issues. The November 2010 report was 324 pages long, covering US-China economic relationships (mainly US indebtedness to China), China’s ‘growing air and conventional missile capabilities’, its activity in Asia (especially in relation to Taiwan) and examples of China’s ‘cyber attacks’ on the internet. The report pointed to the ‘intensification of a number of troubling trends’. It worried most about China’s improved military capability:

“Beijing has expanded the PLA Air Force’s focus in recent years from solely concentrating on territorial defense operations to now include extraterritorial offensive operations … Beijing has also strengthened the PLA’s ability to conduct conventional missile strikes … As China’s air and missile modernization efforts progress, Beijing’s ability to threaten US forward deployed forces and bases in the region is improving. Any PLA missile strikes and air raids against US bases, if successful, could force the temporary closure of regional US bases and inhibit the US military’s ability to operate effectively in East Asia.”[xi]

China is far behind the US in military power, but it is catching up fast here too. The US seeks to hold back growing Chinese influence, trying to make the most of tensions between China and other countries worried by its rise, especially in Asia. But they have to put up with the mockery from a new global power that taunts them. Back in 2008, after the financial crisis had hit the US and shortly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, Gao Xiqing, president of the China Investment Corporation, the $300bn sovereign wealth fund, in an interview with an American journalist said: “The simple truth today is that your economy is built on the global economy. And it’s built on the support, the gratuitous support, of a lot of countries. So why don’t you come over and … I won’t say kowtow, but at least, be nice to the countries that lend you money.”[xii]

Being laughed at is bad enough when you are used to being the top dog. What makes it worse is that China’s rise is an important factor undermining America’s ability to direct global politics in its own interests. From sanctions against Iran to dealings with African, Asian and Latin American countries, China offers an alternative to US power that the US will find it ever harder to live with.

5. Conclusions

Most media reports focus on the US-China trade deficit as the key issue. But the deficit is a sign of the relative economic decline of the US, and this is the real problem for America. The dollars America pays for its excess imports, or as interest on its endless borrowing, are dollars that are not available for power projection. The irony is that American military spending has been financed, at least in part, by Chinese buying of US government securities! But China’s appetite for this kind of ‘investment’ has slumped. Instead it is buying up real overseas assets and resources directly with the revenues it earns. It is going to get harder for the US to borrow to maintain its status, and it is going to get harder still to stop shrinking relative to China. Already, the American cash available for bribes and persuasion now looks puny compared to China’s, and a deal that offers ‘infrastructure for resources’ looks far more attractive to many countries than the US-led model of growth that imploded with the financial system in 2007-2008.

This is a recipe for some kind of war between the US and China. That is a deliberately vague phrase, because there are many opportunities for conflict and it is not possible to highlight which one might trip the wire, or how a conflict might start, whether directly, or very indirectly, through proxies. Each power can use its many allies and relationships around the globe to cause trouble for the other: America has (had?) lots of allies; China is building many more. But a minimum kind of trouble is already being produced: the implicit denial of access to resources that comes with bilateral deals and investment links. This not so very far away from the next step: closing off an economic territory to others by force of arms, as was prevalent in the 1930s and before 1914. As one US Congressman put it in a 2007 report to Congress on China: “The PRC’s air and naval forces have dramatically improved their capabilities to extend the battle space beyond Chinese territorial waters and [are] increasingly focused on anti-access and area-denial capabilities.”[xiii]

In common with all other US reports, this one also characterises China as the potential aggressor. The US by contrast is considered to be using its naval and other military bases around the world to advance the ‘peace, prosperity, and progress of the world’, as Clinton might say. This rather overlooks the fact that the US had foreign direct investments worth $4,303 billion around the world at the end of 2009, not far short of 20 times China’s $230bn.[xiv] But the establishment of this US footprint on the global economy is considered ‘natural’. To challenge it is an aggressive disruption of common sense, law and agreed institutions, while China’s growing footprint is an intrusion on the imperial territory and will likely soon be described as a threat to ‘world peace’.

Even though China’s military is currently well behind the potential destructive power and scope of America’s, that China might restrict or inhibit US operations in even a few areas is a serious threat since it challenges the image of America’s global omnipotence. Report after report, from almost every institution or department of the American government, testifies to the obsession with the rise of Chinese influence and power. You don’t have to be a catastrophist to think that this will not end with more smiling exchanges of pandas.

Tony Norfield, 29 May 2011



[i] See the discussion (15 February 2011) by Professor John Ross on relative US-China growth rates and assumptions that lead to a central prediction of 2019 for when the US economy will be eclipsed by China’s. http://ablog.typepad.com/keytrendsinglobalisation/2011/02/the-central-date-for-china.html
[ii] The regular US complaints centre on the proclaimed ‘undervaluation’ of the Chinese currency, the factor supposedly responsible for the US deficit in trade with China and the loss of domestic jobs. This topic will be examined in another article, but it is worth noting that the US has freely used currency manipulation itself since the 1970s to try and gain competitive advantage.
[iii] In 2010, US exports of soybeans were $10.8bn and accounted for 11.8% of goods exports, the largest category of export listed. US imports of computers from China amounted to $39.3bn, or 10.8% of total US goods imports, also the largest category. In addition, China exported $28.2bn of computer accessories, peripherals and parts to the US. Statistics are taken from the US Bureau of Economic Affairs international database.
[iv] The Soviet Union’s support for China at this point was a key factor dissuading the US from using nuclear weapons against China in the Korean War.
[v] China is generally believed to have had around 90% of its foreign currency reserves in US dollars in the early 2000s. Since then the proportion has fallen to more like 60-70%. A bit over half the US dollar assets are Treasury securities; other dollar assets mainly comprise Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bonds. The euro, especially, but also sterling, the Japanese yen, the Canadian and Australian dollars have made up an increasing proportion of currency reserves. China’s hedging of some US dollar currency risk has been done through Chinese banks overseas, mainly using currency options, so that even if underlying dollar bond assets are not actually sold, there is less damage from a fall in the dollar’s value.
[vi] Tom Burgis, ‘China builds friendships downstream in its Nigerian oil feeding frenzy’, Financial Times, 17 May 2010.
[vii] Helen Thomas, ‘China lights a fire in global dealmaking’, Financial Times, 5 April 2011
[viii] See ‘The China syndrome’, Financial Times, 3 March 2011.
[x] The fear of ‘misunderstandings’ is pervasive in a number of US political reports on relations with China. Many recommendations from these reports argue for dialogue with and questions to Chinese counterparts to ensure there are no misunderstandings. However, it is patently clear what China is doing and what the US does not like. It does not take much understanding. The most that can be said for such recommendations is that they might help neutralise a ‘mistake’ that otherwise would lead to war. Meanwhile, each side is preparing for a future conflict.
[xi] It is almost amusing that the report can talk about the extensive US military bases abroad, but see the existence of these as nothing worthy of question. See the ‘2010 Report to Congress of the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission’, p5. http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2010/10_annual_report.php
[xii] James Fallows, ‘Be Nice to the Countries That Lend You Money’, Atlantic Monthly, December 2008. http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/12/
[xiii] See p215, ‘China’s Military Modernization And Its Impact On The United States And The Asia-Pacific’, http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2007/report_to_congress.pdf
[xiv] The data here are taken from ‘World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low Carbon Economy’, United Nations Conference on Trade & Development, July 2010, available on their website.