Showing posts with label Google. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Google. Show all posts

Friday, 11 December 2020

Airbnb's As and Bs


 

You would think that in a capitalist market one person’s million dollars would count the same as another’s. After all, money is the measure of all things, as is shown by the nonsense of putting a price on carbon emissions, or by economists judging how much you value having access to water by the price you would be prepared to pay for it. But in the mechanism of imperial finance, such equality does not hold.

This is most clearly shown in what is allowed by the powers that run the financial system. For example, the US makes sure that its dollar-dominated international banking network only accepts or pays funds from companies or countries that do not face its many sanctions. That is evident to those who read the news media. What is far less obvious are the ways in which, even among the rich, and even within the US itself, the financial system offers other means of reinforcing the inequality of wealth and power.

Take Airbnb’s recent sale of shares on the market in its IPO. The company raised around $3.7bn by selling a small stake in its ownership via 51.55 million so-called Class A shares, and that valued the whole company at around $47bn. A big jump in its shares from the offer price of $68 to around $140 gained market news attention, but a more interesting story was in the background, one that concerns what a Class A share represents.

Class inequality, even among capitalists

As I have pointed out before in reviews of Google, Facebook and other Big Tech companies, contrary to common prejudice, Class B is better than Class A. The A shares give the holder just 1 vote each. By contrast, Airbnb’s B shares have 20 votes each. This is an extreme divergence, even by Google/Facebook standards, where the B/A ratio is 10/1. The B shares were not on sale, and they are principally held by the company’s three founders and an American ‘venture capitalist’ firm, Sequoia Capital.[1]

So, the 51.55 million A shares have that many votes, while the more than 300 million B shares have around 6 billion votes! It also implies that no matter how many further share offers there are of A shares, it is very unlikely that the small number of holders of the B shares will ever lose control of the company.

I should add here that I don’t care about this. I just want to point out a growing practice that favours monopolistic control of business resources, and one that gets little coverage.

More usually, the news media will focus on other things, such as the elaborate schemes employed by such companies to avoid taxation. Recently there has also been discussion of the monopolistic barriers to entry set up by such companies, and the ‘buy or bury’ tactics used by Facebook and others.

By contrast, this is a more hidden feature of the contemporary capitalist markets that flagrantly contradicts notions of ownership implying control. It is nevertheless quite consistent with the other aspects of the monopolisation of economic power seen today.

 

Tony Norfield, 11 December 2020



[1] There are also Class C and H shares, also with no voting power, but these are not relevant to the points made here.

Tuesday, 11 December 2018

Marxist Corporate Compendium


Over the past year or so I have published a number of articles here on big corporations, mainly those in the technology sector, and I thought it might be useful to put the sources for these in one list. Also listed below are three presentations I have made on the relationships between the big technology companies, the financial system and imperialism. Unfortunately, technology funds have been diverted into things like drone surveillance, dog walking, ride-hailing and killer robots, so technology has not progressed far enough yet to facilitate turning these items into greetings cards. Nevertheless, the list below might offer some readers of this blog a useful diversion over the holiday period.
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Articles

Alibaba
Amazon
Apple
Berkshire Hathaway
Facebook
Google
Softbank

also

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Presentations



Tony Norfield, 11 December 2018

Wednesday, 21 November 2018

Amazon, Google & Big Tech’s Productivity Paradox


Whatever you may think of the multi-billionaire founders of Amazon and Alphabet-Google, [1] there would seem to be one undeniable fact about their companies: they have massively improved productivity. Amazon has an e-commerce system that delivers very efficiently; Google has revolutionised Internet search. Yes, there is quite a list of undeniable negative facts too – poor working conditions in Amazon ‘fulfilment’ centres, the hoovering up of personal data by Google, how each company’s rise to power has upended the economics of other businesses, and much else besides. But the productivity benefits of their services seem unimpeachable. It lies behind Amazon’s increasing share of the consumer market and Google is now used in around 90% of Internet searches. Nevertheless, a closer look at these tech giants shows that all is not what it seems.

Productivity and the market

Being more productive is a good thing, or at least it should be. It means producing with fewer resources – less time spent working, travelling or waiting to get the same output, using raw materials and other inputs more efficiently, and so on. In the framework of the capitalist market, however, this can have all kinds of bad repercussions. Rather than society being able to be better fed, in better health, with more leisure and time to enjoy life, the burden of work for some increases while others are made unemployed, lives are disrupted and the benefits of productivity go to a few.
Apologists for capitalism may accept this point, but would argue that the market system encourages all kinds of innovation and, while there are some unfortunate side effects, in reality it is only this kind of system upon which progress for society as a whole can be built. That perspective leaves out many things, not least capitalism’s propensity for wars and destruction, the monopolisation of the world’s resources by a few powerful companies and governments, and the oppression of hundreds of millions of people for whom being part of the capitalist world economy more often means a ticket for the treadmill rather than a path to progress.
But I will leave such damning truths for now. I will also give insufficient attention to how invention is most commonly a social phenomenon, even one backed by state resources, not a bright spark from a lone genius. Or how innovation is ever more dominated by rich capitalist companies that buy into ideas to help them build or sustain a monopolistic position in the supposedly competitive market. I won’t even discuss how the slump in Alphabet-Google’s and Amazon’s share prices since the summer will give them problems with investors, since, like Facebook, they have a policy of paying no dividends. Instead, I want to uncover the peculiar features of productivity at two of the Big Tech giants.

Google’s advert stream

Despite Alphabet’s forays into robotics, artificial intelligence and ride-hailing, the company’s business still very much depends on advertising revenues from Google.[2] The non-Google business, termed ‘Other Bets’ in its accounts, generated barely 1% of sales revenues and made a loss of $3.4bn in 2017. By stark contrast, the Google ‘segment’, including YouTube and other items such as cloud computing, registered an operating profit of $32.9bn on revenues of $109.7bn in 2017.
Within the Google operation, the importance of advertising revenues has fallen from around 99% of the total up to 2007 to around 85% now. This reflects both the company’s increased difficulties in boosting such revenues and how cloud computing, money from selling apps and Google Play have become more significant. Even a monopolist has to diversify! Google’s advertising numbers are nevertheless key for the conglomerate’s business and are likely to remain so for years to come. Examining these and other related data brings out important aspects of corporate productivity – with all the caveats attached to that term indicated in the previous section.
It is instructive to look at Alphabet as principally a company that sells adverts. Its ‘output’ is then how many adverts it sells.
This output can be assessed in two ways: by simply looking at the advertising revenues and by counting the adverts themselves. However, there are no figures available for the latter. Instead, one has to adopt the philosophical view that something only exists when it is experienced and, in this case, more specifically, when someone ‘clicks’ on the advert. Alphabet goes further than this and, as befits a capitalist corporation, reports changes in the total number of clicks on the adverts that a company must pay for. Annoyingly, it does not give totals, only percentage changes, but it does also note the change in the ‘average cost per click’, in other words, the average price it receives from the clicks that have taken place.

Google's Clicks

I have trawled through Alphabet-Google’s accounts and noted the annual changes in the total paid clicks and the average cost per click since 2005. It was not necessary to go back any further to bring out the main features, leaving aside the serious threat to my sense of well-being that this would have entailed. The picture is clear: a very big rise in paid clicks and a fall in the average cost per click. So, a huge increase in ‘productivity’, as the volume of output has risen while the unit cost has dropped.
Of course, selling more adverts at a lower cost is not what a normal person would call being more productive. But this is the capitalist market view, not an assessment of what may be good for society. That view means discarding social values in favour of market values, where the magic of the market is also responsible for downward pressure on the prices charged for the adverts. Fortunately for Alphabet-Google, the result of the more adverts/lower costs trend has been a strong growth in total revenues from adverts, reaching nearly $111bn in the year to end-September 2018, compared to around $50bn five years before. Unfortunately for the company, the pace of this revenue growth has faltered in recent years and there are other metrics more commonly followed by capitalist markets that do not augur so well for it.
Take another type of productivity measure, one that compares revenues or operating profits with the property and equipment assets the company holds. Such assets are the fixed capital needed to generate the returns, and one would expect that a larger volume of investment would lead to increased revenues and profits. They do, but at a slowing pace. This can be seen in how the ratios of revenues and profits to fixed assets have fallen, as illustrated in the next chart.
At the end of 2006, Alphabet-Google held $2.4bn in property and equipment assets. Ten years later, at end-2016, that had multiplied to $34.2bn. By the end of September 2018, less than two years later, it was more than 60% higher again at $55.3bn. Total revenues and operating income grew much more slowly, so the lines in the chart show a fall. A similar picture holds for revenues and income compared to the company’s expenditure on research and development. Alphabet-Google’s R&D is very high, at close to $20bn in the year to end-Q3 2018, taking up 15% of revenues and measured at 76% of operating income. But the R&D expenditures have also risen much faster than either revenues or income.

Google's Operating Income & Sales Revenues versus Fixed Assets

Amazon’s anomalies

My previous review of Amazon’s business (here) noted that it had surprisingly little profit for a burgeoning tech giant, and that much of its growth in sales revenues and profits had come from its cloud computing arm, Amazon Web Services (AWS), not from its widely known e-commerce operation. I must admit to wondering why Amazon had continued to expand outside North America, given persistent and widening losses. However, the latest data show that these International losses have finally begun to narrow. They were a little over $2.4bn in the year to the end of the third-quarter 2018, down from a $3bn loss in 2017. That may be enough to keep in place Amazon’s ambition to take over the e-commerce world, although the parcel delivery operation outside the US has so far looked more like an expensive branding exercise for AWS’s dramatic growth.
Amazon’s operating income (loss), 2015-2018 ($ million)[3]

2015
2016
2017
Year to Q3 2018
North America
1,425
2,361
2,837
6,708
International
(699)
(1,283)
(3,062)
(2,419)
AWS (Amazon Web Services)
1,507
3,108
4,331
6,473
Total
2,233
4,186
4,106
10,762
Amazon’s latest figures show a sharp rise in sales revenues and operating income. These are mainly from North America, and were boosted by Amazon’s purchase of Whole Foods Market in August 2017. At the same time, revenues and income from AWS are continuing to grow very rapidly. It could also be that the international e-commerce business will finally benefit from Amazon’s big investments. It will need to in order to turn around what are surprising trends in operations from a company that would otherwise appear to be the epitome of cost cutting.
Take Amazon’s ‘fulfilment centres’, for example. These are the enormous warehouses of goods, not only staffed by low paid workers, but also full of amazing technology and robotics to optimise selection, packaging and delivery, together with algorithms to minimise the paths taken. One would expect that the costs of running these would increase as the sales business expands. But, at the same time, these costs should not rise as quickly as sales, since economies of scale would kick in. Nevertheless, Amazon’s accounts show that the costs of these fulfilment centres have risen faster than Amazon’s net sales. In 2009, fulfilment centre costs were $2bn, which was 8.4% of net sales that year. The proportion had risen to 14.2% by 2017, when such costs were $25bn, and it was higher still in 2018.
It would be difficult for a new entrant into this market to outcompete the Amazon machine. Yet the rising ratio of costs to net sales revenues raises questions about how productive these centres really are. Is their efficiency exaggerated in the minds of those who only see the robots, the disciplined workforce and the smooth running system, and who ignore what all this costs?

Where some of it happens ...

One reason for the increase in costs compared to sales revenues is due to Amazon opening lots of extra fulfilment centres worldwide – see the information on these centres here. This will incur costs before they are fully operational and generating extra sales. Another reason lies in the distinction that must be made between a physical, productive efficiency and the value of the goods delivered. Unfortunately, Amazon provides only sporadic details on this topic, as on others, so a view cannot be properly verified from data in their accounts. Nevertheless, the information available suggests both that the volume of throughput at fulfilment centres – the number of items, parcels, etc, per day – has risen sharply, and that the cost per item or parcel has fallen steadily. So, physical productivity has increased, as one would have expected.
That has not been translated into higher net sales revenues when measured against the costs of these centres, not only because of the rapid expansion in the number of these centres, but also because Amazon has reduced the average prices of the goods to its customers. This might seem a strange thing for a capitalist company to do, but it is an explicit part of Amazon’s strategy of building volume and increasing its share of the market.
An example to support the view that average prices have fallen is that in 2017 the value of consolidated net sales rose by just over 30%, to $178bn. In the same year, shipping costs rose by 34% in 2017. The volume of deliveries likely rose by even more than 34%, given that Amazon continues to pressure delivery companies to cut their fees.

Amazon passes on the costs

This price cutting strategy is a risk for Amazon’s profits, but that risk is reduced if it can pass on the pressure to its suppliers! This is something it has been very effective at doing.

 Amazon's Costs as a Percentage of Net Sales
Most of the expenses that can be measured against net sales – such as the investment in technology, fixed assets or administration – have been rising, just like those for the fulfilment centres. One item has not: the cost of sales. This number is principally made up from what Amazon pays the suppliers of the consumer goods it sells and is the largest expense item. The cost of sales was $112bn in 2017, 63% of the total value of consolidated net sales of $178bn. That percentage has fallen steadily from nearly 78% in 2010, dropping to just 58% in the third quarter of 2018.
This rapid fall in the cost of sales relative to total sales has kept Amazon’s e-commerce show on the road. The gap between the two numbers represents Amazon’s gross profit, from which it can fund other things. It reflects Amazon’s power as a platform for selling consumer products, a power that has grown dramatically in recent years and which allows it to force other companies to deliver its goods more cheaply.

Productivity and profitability

Investing more and undertaking R&D is what one would expect a productive capitalist company to do. What Alphabet-Google and Amazon may not have expected is that this would go alongside an increasing difficulty in producing extra revenue and profits. The two companies work in different ways, but the trend for each is similar. Their ‘output’ costs per item (of adverts or shipped goods) have fallen, but the scale of necessary investment to bring this about has risen faster than sales revenues and profits. It is perhaps stretching the interpretation of company accounts a little too far to see in this a tendency for their rate of profit to fall as the company multiplies up the scale of investment. Nevertheless, the figures for Alphabet-Google do show a distinct drop in both operating income and total revenues compared to its fixed assets.

Amazon's Sales and Operating Income vs Fixed Assets


A similar picture is true for Amazon (see the previous chart). Between 2004 and 2008, its net sales were more than 20 times the value of its fixed assets. By 2015, the ratio had fallen to just five times, hitting a low of 3.6 in 2017. There has been only a minimal recovery since as Amazon’s sales revenues have jumped by just a little more than the jump in fixed assets held. In the case of operating income versus fixed assets, there has also been a trend decline for Amazon. The ratio was 1.8 in 2004, falling to 0.6 in 2010 and 0.1 in 2015. That ratio has also recovered a bit in the most recent period as profitability improved, but was still only around 0.2.
Each company is a Big Tech giant, though Alphabet-Google’s business machine sells advertising slots while Amazon’s started out only selling more efficiently what others had produced. Each has tried to diversify operations, using the vast resources made available to them by their respective monopolistic positions. Each brings out the peculiar manner in which capitalist corporations boost ‘productivity’, one that is anti-social, given the effects on society at large. They are part of the imperialist world market and play a role in its domination of society, but, unfortunately for them, they cannot escape the constraints on profitability.

Tony Norfield, 21 November 2018


[1] The original Google company was reorganised, and from October 2015 it became part of a conglomerate, Alphabet Inc. In September 2017, a shell company was set up, XXVI Holdings Inc. The Google segment of the business remains by far the largest component of the overall operation, and that will be the main subject of this article.
[2] For a fuller account of Alphabet-Google, see my previous blog review here.
[3] Business accounting definitions can be tricky to follow, but note that Operating Income is defined as Net Sales minus Operating Expenses minus Stock-based compensation and other items. Also, Net Income is defined as Operating Income minus Non-operating income/expense, Provision for income taxes and Equity-method investment activity, net of tax.

Monday, 22 October 2018

Big Tech & Global Finance


Last week I attended a two-day DECODE Symposium in Barcelona on digital capitalism. It was an interesting and informative conference, with speakers giving perspectives from Europe, Asia, North America and South America. One somewhat predictable theme of comments from many Europeans was their concern that Europe, or their ‘own’ country, had a weak position in modern developments. They seemed to be more worried about US and Chinese competition than about how imperialism channels technical progress into an oppressive system of exploitation. For those interested in this topic, I would recommend taking a look at the readings listed on the DECODE website here. Over the next week or so, videos and presentation material from the Symposium should be available on the same site.
My talk at the Symposium was on the subject of ‘Big Tech and Global Finance’, the slides of which are reproduced below:

































Note: the table on page 9 was corrected on 19 November to give the correct years, 2015-2017















 Tony Norfield, 22 October 2018

Friday, 20 October 2017

Dimensions of Economic Power: Today's Key Corporations

The images below are from a lecture I gave at SOAS, London University, on 18 October. This was part of a series organised by the SOAS Economics Department, and my lecture covered the forms taken by corporate power today, focusing on Apple, Google/Alphabet, Facebook, Amazon and Alibaba.

The lecture was a little longer than planned because the projector repeatedly turned itself off, probably due to a loose cable! Both the 45 minute lecture and the following 30 minute discussion can be heard here.

You are welcome to make use of the slides, although do cite the source of the information you use.*

Tony Norfield, 20 October 2017

Note *: The images below have my name, the lecture title and the date running through them because on previous occasions some websites had simply used my lecture slides with no attribution.





















Sunday, 1 October 2017

Google Eyed


The Hoover Company’s vacuum cleaners once so dominated its market that people often still describe using any make of vacuum cleaner as ‘hoovering up’. Similarly, people ‘Google’ information from the Internet, even if they do not use Google. The only difference is that Google’s dominance of the Internet search market is far greater than Hoover had ever achieved with its vacuum cleaners. Earlier this year, Google’s search engine had an astonishing 92% of the market, with Bing, the next in line, owned by Microsoft, having barely 3%. This underpins its position as the world’s second largest private company by market capitalisation, at a massive $670bn on 29 September, and backs its seventy offices in forty countries. [1]
Google’s success in Internet search has been based on its speed and efficiency, things that have been supplemented by its maps and other products such as Gmail and Youtube. As with other Internet-based companies, these services are free to use, but come with a downside: as you use them, you build up a personal profile within Google’s system. This not only ends up delivering different search results to you than other people would get. More importantly, for Google at least, your profile is also used as a marketing tool for companies advertising their products.
Worldwide advertising expenditure last year was just under $500bn, with 36% of that, nearly $180bn, being taken up by digital adverts. Of the digital advertising, Google and Facebook together account for 54% of the global market, with Google the bigger player of the two, and alone accounting for more than half of the US market. Digital advertising is growing faster than for ‘offline’ advertising on television, radio and in newspapers, helping boost the value of Google on the stock market.

The Google base

Entering popular vocabulary has its commercial benefits. They have expanded this company so much and given it economic power so that it has changed its corporate structure twice in the past two years. In October 2015, Google was reformed as Alphabet, a holding company that had Google as its main component, the one acting as an umbrella company for its Internet operations. In September 2017, Alphabet created a new holding company, XXVI Holdings Inc, which now holds the Google operation and others. The rationale for these moves is varied, and will reflect its expanded operations and business strategy, but I will not cover this further. The Google Internet operation remains the predominant business, providing 99% of revenues, so is the relevant one to investigate
Google operates differently from Facebook. Facebook has two billion users signed up worldwide,  people who have supposedly given it their personal details, including their age, gender and location, and likely others, including their friends, relations and interests. Google, however, works at a more abstract level. It uses all aspects of a person’s Internet searching to build a profile that can be sold to advertisers.
Given that it also owns Youtube and Gmail, among other things, its ability to delve into an individual’s inclinations go well beyond simply figuring out if you might be in the market for a particular product. However, the vast volume of data at its disposal also argues against the notion that it is monitoring what an individual person is doing. It handles more than three billion searches per day! Of course, it could hand over your information to the state security services, like other Internet companies.[2] But its modus operandi is to use its huge mountain of data to feed the machine that offers advertisers on its system a likely audience of many millions of people.
In 2016, 88% of Alphabet’s total revenues – $79.4bn out of $90.3bn – came from advertising. These advertising deals, although generating larger revenues than for Facebook, ‘can be terminated at any time’. This shows a similar business vulnerability to Facebook, and one that has not been allowed for by capitalist markets. As usual, these markets find it difficult to imagine how a company that delivers your Internet ‘daily bread’ might be hit by a new trend among Internet users to use gluten-free products or switch from bread completely.

New technology

Developments in information technology have facilitated the growth of the Internet giants, but they also force these companies to move beyond their traditional revenue sources to maintain their prominent position. Who knows how the market might develop? So they buy up potential rivals – often using their own shares as the means of payment when the bill gets beyond a few hundred million dollars.
This is a game where bright sparks in the relevant area of technology advance what looks like an innovative application and wait for a Google, or Facebook, or Amazon, or Alibaba, or whoever, to show up with an attractive bid for their business, in the process making them multi-millionaires or better. Google has bought more than 200 technology companies from 18 countries since 2001, although most were from the US. These forays were into online advertising software, travel technology, artificial intelligence, facial recognition, visual search, robotics, photography, video, map analysis, mobile devices and many other fields. The reported value of these takeovers is some $30bn, and likely closer to $40bn, or more, allowing for the undisclosed amounts paid in many deals.
One of the Google takeovers reflected its links with the US security establishment. This was of Keyhole Inc in 2004, a company owned by the CIA-linked In-Q-Tel. Keyhole specialised in satellite mapping software, funded by the CIA, and went on to become Google Earth in 2005.
Such takeovers are one way in which an existing monopolist is able to use the financial system to consolidate and extend its market power. This is just as well for Google, since it recognises that getting extra revenues from its traditional search business is under threat.

Revenues, profits and no dividends

As a relatively new business, Google/Alphabet has had strongly growing revenues and net income. Both nearly doubled in the four years to 2016: revenues to $90.3bn and net income to $19.5bn. But this kind of growth is necessary for a company that, as a matter of policy, has never paid any dividends to holders of its common stock and does not plan to do so. Capitalist investors in Google/Alphabet shares must be satisfied with the growth of the business if they receive no direct income from it, hoping that such growth will encourage the share price to rise. In other words, the capital gain from just holding the shares must look good enough to offset the lack of income from them.
So far this has worked. From around $160-170 in early 2009, the share price rose to just over $1000 by June 2017, and was still around $960-970 last week. Nevertheless, the prospect for future rapid revenue growth does not look as good. The Google/Alphabet 2016 annual report notes that advertising revenues from Youtube ‘monetise at a lower rate than traditional desktop search ads’ and that ‘we generate our advertising revenues increasingly from mobile and newer advertising formats, and the margins from the advertising revenues from these sources have generally been lower than those from traditional desktop search’.

Larry and Sergey gave Mark some ideas

Google/Alphabet has some similarities to other Internet-related companies. The lack of dividend payments and reliance on capital gains through a rising share price matches what Facebook and Amazon do, although Amazon was ahead of Google with the ‘initial public offering’ (IPO) of its shares in 1997, compared to Google’s IPO in 2004. The Facebook IPO was in 2012. However, Google appears to have set the precedent for Facebook’s ownership/voting structure.
The two main founders of Google were Larry Page and Sergey Brin, former PhD students at Stanford University in California. While they had to attract funds from other investors by issuing shares, they still ended up maintaining control of the company. Now they may own only around 12% of the total stock, but that includes the most important shares – the ones with the special extra voting power. In the same way as Facebook, some years later, they own most of the 'Class B' shares, which have 10 votes each and are held by the company’s initial founders, compared to the A shares with one vote and the C shares with no votes at all.[3] Hence, ‘Larry and Sergey’ together control around 57% of the voting power of all shares in the company, despite owning barely one-eighth of the total shares outstanding.
Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg has also built a big personal mountain with other people’s money. He alone controls 60% of his company's votes while owning less than one-third of the shares, a feat enabled by him having a big chunk of the B shares that also give 10 times the voting power of the A shares!
You would think that people with loads of money to invest would have the nous to recognise that B might be better than A. Maybe they do, but the B shares are not traded on the stockmarket, so capitalists wanting to get in on the action can do little about it if they are not one of the founders already owning B shares. They can only buy the A or C shares. To the extent that they realise that C is worse than A, this is currently reflected in a discount of just 1-2% for the zero-vote C shares compared to the one-vote A shares. But that small discount also shows how money capitalists are mainly bothered about getting a return on their investment – in this case via share price gains only – rather than really wanting to get involved in voting on, so deciding, what the business actually does.

Conclusion

This article completes my review of some of the world’s major corporations. Probably. Earlier articles have covered Alibaba, Amazon, Apple and Facebook, each of which is currently among the top six or seven world companies by market capitalisation. What they all have in common is their distance from what is normally considered to be the productive sphere of the economy, the one producing goods and services that people need.
That may seem incorrect or unfair. After all, Apple produces smartphones, among other things. However, Apple’s ‘production’ turns out to be more a way to design a set of products that others produce and that it can sell within a monopolistic and tightly controlled marketing structure, one buoyed by a huge financial operation. Alibaba and Amazon are more simply in the commerce business, acting as a platform for selling what others make and taking a cut from the producers, although Alibaba has a big subsidiary in finance, while Amazon is also big in cloud computing services. Google/Alphabet, like Facebook, has provided Internet services to attract advertising revenues, with their ‘raw material’ provided by the users of their systems. All these companies also build on their resources to branch out into other areas.
What they have in common too, with the exception of Alibaba, is that they are based in the US. The predominance of the US as a home for these top companies is based upon its large, relatively prosperous population. It offers both a big market in which a ‘start up’ can evolve into a major corporation and a ready supply of very rich individuals able to advance money to what looks like a good idea – and one that will enrich them further. Even today, the US accounts for nearly half of Google/Alphabet’s revenues. Here is one mechanism by which existing privilege helps secure future privilege. Alibaba’s China has a much bigger population, but this is offset in many respects by the relative poverty of its audience.
These reviews should offer some insights for those interested in analysing imperialism today. Hopefully, they will also be of interest to the more general reader who wants to find out how the world economy works.

Tony Norfield, 1 October 2017

Note added late on 1 October: the above text has been amended in some places more clearly to express what I wanted to say, although no point has been changed.


[1] This is the market capitalisation for the Alphabet holding company, not just Google. See below for the company links, but the key point is that Google accounts for the vast bulk of Alphabet’s revenues. In what follows below, I will use the term ‘Google’ to refer to Alphabet’s core business in Google, unless otherwise stated.
[2] The official statement is: “Google cares deeply about the security of our users’ data. We disclose user data to government in accordance with the law, and we review all such requests carefully. From time to time, people allege that we have created a government ‘back door’ into our systems, but Google does not have a backdoor for the government to access private user data.”
[3] At the end of 2016, there were only 67 ‘holders of record’ for the Class B shares, compared to more than 2,000 for each of the Class A and Class C shares. Outstanding shares held were: A, 294.2m; B, 48.9m and C, 344.7m.

Wednesday, 28 June 2017

'Open Sesame' on Alibaba


China has been the ‘workshop of the world’ since the late 20th century, providing cheap products to global markets, especially to the richer countries. Alibaba is now becoming recognised as an important addition to China’s economic prowess, although in the sphere of commerce rather than in production.
Alibaba’s business has been focused domestically upon the huge and growing Chinese market. It has been able to fend off Google and eBay, important US competitors. It has also benefited from funding by Goldman Sachs and Yahoo – who both provided much-needed cash in its early days – while managing to avoid their control of its operations. Now Alibaba is in a strong position to expand into other countries. So, rather than being prominent only as a big player in one big (Chinese) market, Alibaba could become a major global player too. When commerce is the core of a company’s business, then huge volumes are critical for generating revenues. Alibaba has been able to get these, helped by being based in China, a country with a strong government and also with the largest national population.
Here I do not plan to discuss all of Alibaba’s operations or its historical development.[1] Instead, I want to use the example of Alibaba to weigh up China’s economic challenge to the established order, when imperial economic power today takes on a much more commercial and financial form.

Millions and billions

Alibaba’s operations can most easily be summarised as a combination of Amazon, eBay and Paypal. But that understates the scope of its business as it expands into other areas. Nevertheless, the limit on seeing it as a global giant is that more than three-quarters of its commerce-based revenues derive from China, as does basically all of its profit. Its newer segments of business – including cloud computing, digital media and entertainment – are running at a loss, subsidised by the China commerce revenues.
In terms of stock market capitalisation, the main company, Alibaba Group Holding, was worth $365bn on 26 June. This was not so far behind Amazon’s $475bn value, especially if one also includes the separately managed Ant Financial arm (formerly known as Alipay) estimated at around $60bn. Alibaba’s profitability was also much higher than Amazon’s in the latest financial year, at $6.0bn versus Amazon’s $2.4bn for net income after tax and net interest payments.[2]
Alibaba started out as a business-to-business middleman, facilitating buying and selling, but this failed to generate much revenue. Now retail business (business-to-consumer) dominates its commercial operations. Hundreds of millions of Chinese use its systems to shop online, sell goods and make online payments. Alibaba has two retail sites: Taobao, selling products sold by smaller scale Chinese-based companies; and Tmall, which has attracted three-quarters of the world’s top 100 brand-names to sell into the huge Chinese domestic market. Although China is a poor country, 1.4 billion people and a growing middle class consumer base make it an attractive market for all global corporations.
Merchants on Alibaba’s Taobao site get a free listing; on Tmall, these bigger sellers pay an annual service fee, plus commissions on their sales ranging from 0.4% to 5.0%, depending on the product. However, revenues from these sites derive mainly from companies buying extra marketing services that Alibaba’s system provides, including its analysis of consumer activity to target advertisements. In this respect, it follows what other established companies do, like Amazon, Google and Facebook.
In the year to 31 March 2017, Alibaba had a huge volume of business: 454 million active buyers on its retail platforms and, in March 2017, 507 million active users of its mobile services. This potential for economies of scale is fundamental for a commercial operation, and one that helps Alibaba’s expansion into other countries.
The relatively low retail revenue per buyer deflates the importance of these numbers, and reflects low average Chinese incomes: just $36 per active buyer in retail revenue per year and $26 per person from mobile-based services. Nevertheless, a growing revenue per person multiplied by a very large and increasing number of buyers and users in China leads to big and rapidly rising total revenues. Alibaba’s China-based commercial revenues rose by 40% in the year to March 2017, reaching some $18 billion.
Helped by this position in a market US business would like to penetrate, Jack Ma, the principal founder and the controller of Alibaba, was the first foreign businessman to meet US President Trump in January this year. Playing up to Trump’s ‘America First’ policy, Ma promised that he could add one million jobs in the US if its small companies joined its commercial platform, Tmall, to sell their products into the Chinese market. This no doubt appealed to Trump, but it would also help Alibaba boost its revenues outside China, when its foreign revenues have so far been largely dependent upon regional Asian countries.

Ownership and financing

The ownership and control structure of Alibaba is murky or, more charitably put, difficult to pin down. The Alibaba Group Holding company was registered in the Cayman Islands in June 1999, and there is, in addition, a system of contractual links between its many subsidiaries. Good luck in working your way through its 303-page 2016 annual report, with 74 of them giving ‘Notes to consolidated financial statements’.
Jack Ma started out by being moderately generous with his offering of a (very) small stake in the fledgling company to the initial group of employees, but had later to divest a much larger share of it to important early backers and suppliers of funds. More or less the first was Goldman Sachs, which lent Alibaba $3.3m and later sold its stake very profitably for around $22m, although much too early to realise dramatically higher returns. Sometimes you just cannot be greedy enough.
Another important supplier of early funds was Yahoo, which still maintains a stake after later reducing its holding. The biggest backer of Alibaba, however, was Japan’s Softbank, which has built an important share. According to the 2016 annual report, Jack Ma owned 7.8% of Alibaba Group, other directors owned 4.7%, Softbank had 32% and Yahoo had 15.4%. However, this understates Ma’s position.
At first sight, the ownership numbers would imply that Jack Ma has little control over the company. However, this conclusion is questioned by an important deal, one ostensibly made to get around Chinese government restrictions on foreign ownership of non-financial companies. This was when Ma took control of Alipay.
In the early 2010s, almost all of the payments made through the Alibaba commercial system were transacted through its subsidiary Alipay, which handled $700m per day in transactions. Alipay had an ‘escrow system’ for security of payment, whereby funds were transferred to the seller only after satisfactory delivery of goods to the buyer. This payment system proved very attractive to users, especially given inefficient Chinese bank payments and the low use of credit cards in China, since it improved the chance of getting your money back after being delivered poor quality goods. Although Alipay itself did not necessarily make any charges directly, and so was not an important source of funds to the main company, it was nevertheless a key part of the Alibaba operation, important for keeping the buying/selling/services business model ticking over.
In 2011, news emerged – buried in a quarterly Yahoo earnings report – that Jack Ma had taken control of Alipay in the previous year or two and had transferred it out of the Alibaba group. The price paid by the company owned by Jack Ma was roughly $51m for a business that was seen as then being worth around $1 billion. This was done through a so-called Variable Interest Entity (VIE) structure, something that other companies have also used to get around China’s regulation of foreign ownership of companies licensed to operate payment systems in the country. However, whatever the motivation behind the deal, it meant that a VIE company largely owned by Jack Ma would now control a key Alibaba-related business.[3] After its expansion into other areas, Alipay is now Ant Financial. Today it is estimated to be worth very much more.
Such deals may have been a reason for Hong Kong’s stock exchange to reject the initial public offering (IPO) of Alibaba shares on the public capitalist market, although it appears that the most important issue was the favoured voting positions of Alibaba’s founding shareholders that were seen as being detrimental to new shareholders in an IPO. The New York Stock Exchange nevertheless accepted the deal, no doubt encouraged by the potentially lucrative transaction fees. In September 2014, the IPO sale of some shares in Alibaba Group Holding (ie minus Alipay) raised a record $25bn, with reported fees amounting to some $300m.

Alibaba and Ant Financial

Alipay was renamed Ant Financial in 2014. Based on its 2016 round of fundraising, which brought in China’s sovereign wealth fund and other state institutions, it has been valued at $60bn, but there is no detail of costs and revenue flows in Ant Financial’s 2016 report. Nevertheless, it is certainly big. Ant Financial performs more than 150 million payments per day, 10 times the volume for Paypal; it is the world’s third largest cash management service, lends money to small businesses and offers insurance services.
Alibaba’s own annual report shows the following key fact: 37.5% of Ant Financial’s pre-tax income is due to Alibaba (although I have not been able to find what that income might be!). There are also many other flows of income between the two groups, with Alibaba paying Ant Financial for bank processing costs and operating costs – roughly $760m in the 2016 financial year – and the latter paying Alibaba royalties, fees for software technology and for other services. The impression given in one table of transactions is that Alibaba pays Ant Financial more than it receives, roughly a net $350m in the 2016 financial year, but that will probably exclude the share of pre-tax income Alibaba gets from Ant Financial. More information on the latter’s business will be published when it eventually lists its shares on a stock exchange, an event expected to happen by 2019. In the meantime, both companies are continuing to expand into other markets and other countries with acquisitions and cooperation deals, including in the US and Europe.

Alibaba and global corporate trends

The company’s name comes from the story of Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves, one of the ‘Arabian Nights’ tales. The hero, Ali Baba, finds out the command ‘Open Sesame’ for the cave in which the thieves have hidden their stolen treasure. Jack Ma chose the name as something that would both be recognisable in global markets and encourage consumers to think that they too could find treasure. In the same way, the name of one of the company’s original sites, Taobao, means ‘searching for treasure’ in Chinese. But the company name is more revealing than might have been intended about Alibaba’s business.
In economic terms, Alibaba is not itself stealing or receiving stolen goods, although through its powerful mechanism it is taking a cut from the commercial transactions taking place, including through selling its advertising services. In this, it is at one with key developments in the world economy over the past few decades: don’t produce anything; instead take a share of the value that others have produced by managing the markets in which they operate!
Monopolisation of commercial relationships has been a fundamental feature of global corporations, so much so that most of the leading companies by stock market capitalisation these days are ones that have a strong commercial power, rather than being powerful producers. For example, Amazon is now worth more on the stock market than ExxonMobil, and so is Alibaba. Apple Inc, the world’s largest company in these terms, has the largest capitalisation of a private company, but does very little production itself and relies on its domination of supply chains for assembly and its consumer market power – one should also note its use of the financial system.[4] Alibaba’s business model fits with these important trends and it could well develop into another of these powerful global companies, supported from its strong domestic base in China.

Tony Norfield, 28 June 2017


[1] For more detail on these I would recommend Duncan Clark’s book, Alibaba: The House That Jack Ma Built, Ecco, 2016, and this article by Louise Lucas, ‘Alibaba bets on do-it-yourself globalisation’, Financial Times, 23 May 2017.
[2] Alibaba does not have Amazon’s system of warehouses for delivering many of its online ordered goods, which saves it some costs. Instead, it delivers most goods within China through the ‘warehouse and delivery network partners’ of its 47%-owned affiliate, Cainiao, which employs 1.7 million delivery personnel and operates in more than 600 cities in China.
[3] See Duncan Clark’s book, pp219-224.
[4] See my review of Apple’s business here.