Labour's Colonial Policy

This article is based on notes prompted by reading an interesting book, Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914-1964, by Partha Sarathi Gupta, published in 1975. I find it particularly of interest because it presents some original material from a time when the Labour Party will claim to have been 'socialist' in some sense. So, this article can be seen as an anti-nostalgia exercise! Things never were any good with this pro-imperialist party.

Gupta has extensive documentation of debates in the House of Commons, Labour Party conference speeches and policy recommendations from such bodies as the Fabian Colonial Bureau and the Movement for Colonial Freedom. He also gives examples of the racism of many leaders of the 'labour movement', especially regarding Africa. More important for my current purpose is that he highlights how Britain's plans for colonial development were always presented as being mutually beneficial, but were always based upon Britain's needs and in directions determined by the colonial rulers, not by the local populations.

The book is a dry read, and with a number of questionable views, for example that by the early 1960s 'social imperialist sentiment had been eliminated' in the UK (p. 393). However, it offers some striking comments and statements that illustrate the 'socialism in words' and 'imperialism in deeds' perspective of the Labour Party in the 1940s and 1950s that I will set out below. A good summary of Labour politics is given in Gupta's conclusion to a chapter on 'Colonial reforms':

"A large body of opinion inside the [labour] movement was representative of 'little Englanders', who were preoccupied with social transformation at home and anxious to avoid military and political engagements abroad. In moments of crisis a social imperial syndrome became active. Though it was originally noticed mainly among those trade unionists who were least affected by socialist ideas, the imperialist bias displayed by Bevin in general [Ernest Bevin, Labour's staunch anti-communist Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951] and by John Strachey over the groundnuts affair [see below] showed that persons with a Marxist background could slide easily into a social-imperialist position once they became pre-occupied with building socialism in their own country only." (pp. 346-347)

Despite the little Englanders being 'anxious to avoid military and political engagements abroad', Gupta does not mention that there was no labour movement opposition to Britain's military efforts to re-establish its own and other European colonies after 1945, possibly because these used Indian and recently defeated Japanese troops against local nationalists in Asia, and hardly any British troops. But, I will turn attention to the more direct British dimension of colonial economic exploitation.

The first example is John Strachey. Named in House of Commons records as Evelyn Strachey, MP for Dundee, and with the more elaborate nomenclature on his birth certificate of Evelyn John St Loe Strachey, he was an outcome of Eton and Oxford and an itinerant politician (see his Wikipedia entry) with successive socialist, Mosley, Communist, anti- and pro-Keynesian views. He was also a Minister of Food and a Secretary of State for War. Despite these dizzying turns, throughout his life he remained a consistent British nationalist. In a January 1948 House of Commons debate on the Colonial Development Corporation bill, he concluded:

"I should like to end this discussion by striking this note, that by one means or another, by hook or by crook, the development of primary production of all sorts, in the Colonial areas, Colonial territories and dependent areas in the Commonwealth, as well as generally throughout the world, in far more abundant quantities than exist today is, it is hardly too much to say, a life and death matter for the economy of this country."

This perspective was behind his support for the infamous groundnut scheme in Tanzania, then called Tanganyika. Britain's plan to plant groundnuts in an unsuitable region with idiotic technology turned into a loss-making fiasco and was abandoned. However, while this is often seen as a dumb development project, the basic notion behind it receives less attention: it was to use cheap labour in the colonies to grow products that would feed the British back home, and so reduce the need to import from outside the Empire. This would avoid paying in US dollars for some food supplies when there was already a shortage of dollars in Britain's reserves. Instead, the producers of Tanzania would receive payment in terms of a devaluing sterling.

The groundnuts scheme was only one case of colonial exploitation, realised or planned. More importantly, Britain had a number of marketing boards that were monopoly buyers of the commodity output of its colonies, and limited the development of any processing operations so that they received at best, and usually below, the world market price for the raw commodity. House of Commons Parliamentary debates always argued that a 'fair price' was being set, and that the buying operation carried risks to Britain's finances. But the buying prices were always set at below what the market price turned out to be. Furthermore, the surpluses from selling these products on the market always ended up in sterling balances based in London banks! This was how the system worked.

In a May 1951 debate on the West African Marketing Boards, one Labour MP, the Rugby and Oxford educated barrister, Richard Acland, made the following comment as part of a longer apologia:

"Firstly, the prices in the long-term contracts made by our Government were perfectly fair prices, there being genuine arguments at the time of the contracts to suggest that world prices for the crops might have fallen. But in fact that has never happened and the opposite has always taken place. To give an example: We are purchasing West African palm oil at £94 a ton, when the same oil on the free market has been fluctuating from £134 to £210 per ton."

What a stroke of luck that no West Africans were listening! Just in case they were, he denied that the amounts concerned were of any significance.

This is not to say that Labour MPs were being too truthful, and not forward-looking enough. How forward-looking, to see the way in which British imperialism's economic stresses could be solved so that we could have a 'Jerusalem builded here', on the backs of the colonies, is shown in the next quotation. Harold Wilson, a future Labour Prime Minister, had this to say in the House of Commons when Labour was in opposition in February 1953:

"There are very many schemes that can earn and save dollars and we want to know about them. There is copper in Rhodesia and Uganda; zinc and lead in Nigeria and tin in Uganda and British Honduras. We have to face the working out of the tin reserves in Malaya, before many years are over. There is, too, bauxite in Jamaica, manganese in India and South Africa, tungsten in Uganda, beryllium in India and columbium in Uganda. I am sure that these things are being considered by the Foreign Secretary, and what we should like to know at some convenient time—I would not press him to answer in detail tonight—is what is being done to press on with these schemes.

"Perhaps the most important step in the Commonwealth development [sic!] would be for the Government to work out now a wide-ranging geological survey of Colonial Territories ... I do not think that anyone in the House would deny that the answer to all our dollar problems may well be found 200 or 1,000 feet below the soil in the Colonial areas, and a really imaginative geological survey might possibly solve a lot of our problems over rather a long time."

The economic policy in the colonies, now given the honeyed description of 'Commonwealth' rather than Empire, was to meet British imperialism's requirements. That is not a surprise for critics of imperialism, but let me leave you with a sickening Labour socialist conclusion. Recognising that the Empire, sorry, Commonwealth, may not persist on the same footing, noting the colonies' contribution to the Sterling Area balances and expressing a desire that colonial peoples have a better future, Jennie Lee, wife of Aneurin Bevan, the Labour left saint, had this to say at Labour's Annual Conference in October 1956:

"We have to work for the day when there will be a higher standard of living here, a higher standard of living in the colonies, and when as free and friendly nations they will want us to be their bankers." (p. 376)

She was ahead of her time. The City of London today is the biggest centre of global banking, despite Britain having a much worse current account deficit than when she was speaking. British imperialism found other ways of appropriating the value of what others produce.

Tony Norfield, 7 December 2014

Origins of the UK Welfare State

The golden age of the British Labour Party was the 1945-51 Labour government. So it is worth noting some little known aspects of its policies to cast some light on the political background to the modern day resurgence of ‘Corbynism’. Highlights of this administration in British popular consciousness are the introduction of the welfare state, establishing the NHS and a pension system. While there were economic problems in spending on welfare, since the UK was essentially bankrupt in 1945, the Labour government rose to the challenge. How did they do this? By using British imperial power!

One of the 1945-51 Labour government’s priorities was to maintain Britain’s imperial role. For good measure, this also included re-establishing French and Dutch colonial power in Asia, as a sign that the status quo ante could be revived in Burma, Malaya, Vietnam, Indonesia, etc. Using colonial Indian troops and Japanese troops to bring this about highlighted British politicians’ pragmatism and flair. Who else would have come up with the idea of defeating anti-colonial nationalists with soldiers both from a colony and from a recently defeated imperialist power? A stroke of imperial genius![1]

Although these events might seem to be an unfortunate foreign policy to liberal souls, having nothing to do with progressive social policies at home, in fact the two things were closely linked. Just look at how the new welfare state was financed.

Britain’s finances in 1945 depended upon foreign loans in 1945 amounting to £2,100m, or a massive 20% of GDP (note that £1 used to be worth something in those days). Of this sum, £1,100m was from the US. It was not exactly enthusiastic about Labour’s spending plans, but it was happy that the Brits were playing a necessary role worldwide in suppressing ‘communism’. For example, apart from the colonial efforts, think of Britain’s role in the defeat of Greek radicals and establishing a military dictatorship after 1945. So, history will record that the US played a role in funding the setting up of the UK welfare state! Another £250m was from Canada, which was both politically close to the UK and had done well out of the Second World War. Significantly, Britain’s colonies ‘lent’ £750m through the financial mechanism of the Sterling Area that gave them no choice but to do so. These were borrowings by Britain whose international value was reduced when sterling’s exchange rate against the US dollar fell in later years.[2]

After 1945, the welfare system quickly became unaffordable on the basis of Britain’s economy, especially when Labour increased defence spending during the Korean War. Apart from charges for prescriptions of medicines, something that led to ructions in Labour’s ranks and the resignation from government of Labour saint Aneurin Bevan in 1951, it also led to several years of rationing goods even more stringently than during the war. Above all, it prompted ever more nefarious plans to milk the colonies for economic resources in addition to the previous Sterling Area financial rip offs. Details on the former are set out in my article on this blog, 'Labour's Colonial Policy', 7 December 2014.

That is some of the historical background to typical Labour ‘progressive, alternative’ policies. It is based on using Britain’s privileged position in the world economy to deliver benefits to the British populace, completely consistent with Britain’s imperial role and nothing that could be described as a socialist view of policy in the world economy, far less anything that is anti-capitalist.

Jeremy Corbyn may know the history, in which case being a longstanding, proud member of the Labour Party raises a few questions. If he does not know the history, then it would reflect the more widespread arrogance, all appearances to the contrary in his case, of assuming that the rest of the world owes the Brits a living.

Tony Norfield, 8 October 2015

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[1] I am not making this up. See Christopher Bayley and Tim Harper’s book, Forgotten Wars: the End of Britain’s Asian Empire, Allen Lane, London, 2007.

[2] There are few studies of these embarrassing (for Labour loyalists) events. One accessible source, written from a pro-capitalist market, although strikingly critical, perspective, is Edmund Dell, A Strange Eventful History: Democratic Socialism in Britain, Harper Collins, London, 1999, especially Chapter 7.

The Good Old Days

With the British ruling elites tearing themselves apart over foreign policy these days (regarding the European Union), I thought I would take a brief look back into happier times. Here are some choice quotations from major politicians and newspapers that stressed how much Britain’s position in the world produced big benefits.

First, Winston Churchill in April 1929. He is talking in Parliament about the City’s revenues, and its role as a global broker, as well as the big returns on British foreign investments:

“The income which we derive each year from commissions and services rendered to foreign countries is over £65,000,000, and, in addition, we have a steady revenue from foreign investments of close on £300,000,000 a year, 90 per cent of which is expressed in sterling. Upon this great influx there is levied, as a rule, the highest rates of taxation. In this way we are helped to maintain our social services at a level incomparably higher than that of any European country, or indeed of any country.”

Note that both kinds of revenue do not all come from the colonies, at least not directly, and most will have derived from transactions with and investments in other major countries. Nevertheless, such revenues were important for social services even before the post-1945 ‘welfare state’. I give an updated, contemporary assessment of these in my book, The City.

After 1945, the British Empire was somewhat diminished, as was its investment and dealing revenues. However, these remained important. As Ernest Bevin, the Labour Foreign Secretary, put it to the House of Commons in February 1946, stressing the importance of imperial stability as well as the revenues coming from the Empire:

“When I say I am not prepared to sacrifice the British Empire, what do I mean? I know that if the British Empire fell, the greatest collection of free nations would go into the limbo of the past, and it would be a disaster. I know, further, it would mean that the standard of life of our constituents would fall considerably.”

This concern about the ‘standard of life’ of British constituents was a key point for Labour’s social imperialism, and tallied with the views of the arch imperialist Churchill.

The importance of the Empire was also stressed in major UK newspapers at the time, for example in noting how US dollar-based earnings from the exports of commodities from Malaya (later Malaysia) were important for keeping Britain’s Sterling Area financial system in place:

“It is Malaya’s dollar earnings which keep the sterling area afloat.” (Manchester Guardian, 13 December 1950)

and

“Malaya is Britain’s biggest source of American dollars.” (The Times, 9 June 1950)

Malaya, of course, did not have access to these dollars, which were deposited in London, and from which, in general, only the UK and the ‘white’ dominions could draw. Malaya saw its funds translated into (depreciating) sterling and had to use this sterling to buy British goods.

Professor W Arthur Lewis summed it up in a Financial Times article, ‘The Colonies and Sterling’ in 1952:

“Many Colonies must sell their produce to Britain at prices below the world price, and, through exchange control, must buy from Britain at prices above the world price, or pay an ever-increasing sum into the Bank of England, because Britain will not deliver goods in return for what she receives.

“Britain talks of colonial development, but on the contrary, it is African and Malayan peasants who are putting capital into Britain. … The British colonial system has become a major means of economic exploitation. …

“The Colonies are exporting far more than they import, and are building up large balances. They cannot get all the imports they need, especially of capital goods, and their development programmes are in consequence retarded. They are in effect paying Britain for goods which she does not deliver.”[1]

His only error in this was to say that the colonial system ‘has become’ a major means of exploitation, whereas it had always been one. Other examples of Britain’s colonial exploitation post-1945 are given in my articles on Labour’s colonial policy and on how the welfare state was funded in 1945.

Tony Norfield, 18 July 2018

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[1] Cited in R Palme Dutt, The Crisis of Britain and the British Empire, Lawrence & Wishart, 1953. The Manchester Guardian and Times quotations are also from Dutt. The remainder are from Hansard.

The Geometry of Imperialism

I have a globe on my desk. One of the tell-tale signs on such maps of the world is not the pink colour of colonies of the British Empire. That is so passé, and these maps are no longer published. Instead, the significant feature is the number of lengthy straight lines on the parts of the global map covering Africa and the Middle East. While there are straight lines elsewhere, these are the ones that stand out, the ones relating most clearly to the division of colonies in this region by the main European imperial powers.[1]

The straight lines are the product of colonial power that divided areas of influence, irrespective of the different ethnic and social groups that lived in them. The ruling groups in Arab countries were then determined by their relationship with the influential imperialist powers; Israel was, in a more complex way, established as a tool of imperialism to overlook the potentially less obedient Arabs. This means that political issues in these regions cannot be solved within the ‘countries’ concerned. A stable political deal between the different groups has not been established by agreement between them; rather the ascendancy of a particular group has been supported by imperialist influence. This is the basis for civil war, especially when the interests of imperialism change and the formerly leading group no longer has its previous power and support. Then a fragile peace, or a just-acceptable degree of terror or oppression, is no longer sustainable.

In this context, I recommend that you read the linked article/interview that gives an excellent account of the current situation in Syria. This shows, although implicitly, how solutions to the problems in a particular country cannot be resolved within that country, especially when these affect the balance of forces in the region and the interests of the imperialist powers.

Tony Norfield, 13 June 2012

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[1] Just look on Wikipedia for the histories of the formation of African and Middle Eastern states. Britain and France are the main players, with a small role played by Italy, though many decisions on the continent were taken to limit German influence before World War 1. A topic not covered in these otherwise useful details is the way in which Britain’s colonial policy exacerbated ethnic and religious tensions, often with the classic policy of backing the minority faction in a country because they would be more dependent on the external power for support. One would not expect Wikipedia to be able to give a decent account of the role of Israel as a tool of imperialism.

Five Years

Below is a record of the articles and posts on this blog since its inception five years ago on 22 May 2011, although excluding those posts that were just advertisements for other events. The title of the article usually gives an indication of the content, and searching down this list will give a quick means of finding my analyses of various issues.

Tony Norfield, 22 May 2016

18 May 2016, Cocytus Brexit

13 May 2016, Britain's Financial Machinery

10 May 2016, Vice Interview

4 May 2016, Tax Havens in the Imperial Network

29 April 2016, Elaboration

25 April 2016, Economic Power & Corruption

22 April 2016, Fundamentals

20 April 2016, Going Underground

11 April 2016, Book Launch

8 April 2016, A New Crisis Acronym: Brexit

6 April 2016, Offshore? Tax Haven? A Matter of Definition

6 April 2016, 'Offshore' Centres and Tax Havens

1 March 2016, Elsewhere

20 February 2016, The Brexit Vote

5 February 2016, Saving the Whale

1 February 2016, Capitalism, Imperialism, Profit and Finance

25 January 2016, The City: London & Power of Global Finance

22 January2016, Oil Prices, Equity and Debt

14 January 2016, Jerusalem. No, the One in England

13 January 2016, Saudi Arabia and Imperialism

9 December, The Wisdom of Social Media

2 December 2015, The Dogs of War

14 November 2015, Developing Marxist Theory

6 November 2015, Poppy Militarism

27 October 2015, A Modest Proposal for Solving the Tax Credit Crisis

25 October 2015, Bank Nationalisation?

8 October 2015, Origins of the UK Welfare State

27 August 2015, Women and Society

26 August 2015, British Media

25 July 2015, Labour 'Leadership' & British Politics

7 July 2015, Imperial Hypocrisy and Greek Debt Data

28 June 2015, Greek Lessons

12 June 2015, Making Things Does Not Make You Smile

10 June 2015, History and Change

3 June 2015, FIFA and World Power

10 May 2015, A Deeply Conservative Country

29 April 2015, Imperialism and Social Democracy (reply to Anonymous)

22 April 2015, The Dead Sea

20 April 2015, Euro Labour Costs

11 April 2015, Immigration and the Imperial Mentality

9 April 2015, Britannia Needs a Trident

26 February 2015, Jack Straw, Social Hero

5 February 2015, Body Language: Germany, ECB, Greece

22 January 2015, Europe Gets Even More QuEasy

20 December 2014, How Much Do Santa's Helpers Get Paid?

14 December 2014, Bush and the Brazilians

7 December 2014, Labour's Colonial Policy

12 November 2014, Rosetta and Ebola

28 October 2014, Hard Road

26 October 2014, Moribund Capitalism

14 October 2014, Absolute Airheads

11 October 2014, Financial Trouble

9 October 2014, The Wages of Sinn and the Euro crisis

25 September 2014, Obama at the UN

24 September 2014, T-Shirt Economics Update

20 August 2014, Palestine, 'Israel' and Justice

16 August 2014, The Scotland Debate

8 August 2014, The Moon Dog Cannot Bark

20 July 2014, Ukraine, Gaza, Imperial Hypocrisy

15 July 2014, BRICS Building

6 June 2014, Bitcoin: A Digital Alternative?

3 June 2014, Robots and the Organic Composition of Capital

10 May, Pfizer's Bid for AstraZeneca

16 April 2014, Marx and the Princess

2 April 2014, Rational Paranoia

27 March 2014, The Tactical Unity of Thieves

25 February 2014, Ukraine & the EU

6 February 2014, A Brief Note on Scottish (British) Imperialism

3 February 2014, US Rate of Profit, 1948-2012

6 January 2014, Capitalist Production Good, Capitalist Finance Bad

14 December 2013, Imaginary Power

13 December 2013, Sitting on the Dock of the Bay

29 November 2013, Destroying the Evidence

30 October 2013, Cameron's Sharia Bond & British Parasitism

22 October 2013, Bad News for British Finance

15 September 2013, Information Flows

31 August 2013, Saudi vs Syria: Imperial Policy Crisis

23 August 2013, The Australia-Hong Kong War of 1994

22 August 2013, Understanding the Syrian Situation

21 August 2013, The Economics of Spying

19 August 2013, Monopoly #2

23 July 2013, Unto Us a Child is Born

17 June 2013, 99% vs 1%, or 40% & 50% vs 10%?

14 June 2013, Monopoly

9 May 2013, Cats, Dogs & People in the Imperialist World Economy

22 April 2013, Reflections on Reinhart & Rogoff

22 March 2013, UK FDI Profits

4 March 2013, A Private Chat About Provoking a War

23 February 2013, Running Out Of Rope

26 December 2012, Churchill, Keynes, Gold & Empire

4 November 2012, Union Jacked

1 November 2012, Index of Imperialism - Amendment

3 October 2012, The City of London: Parasite of the World Economy

14 September 2012, Ben and the Flood

12 September 2012, Imperial Balances

3 September 2012, Idealism & Debt

27 August 2012, Debt, Society, History, Morality & Imperialism

19 August 2012, Deep Crisis

18 August 2012, Tattoo Nausea

31 July 2012, Olympic Imperialism

30 July 2012, Rate of Profit, Finance & Imperialism

21 July 2012, Global Working Class

19 July 2012, Loving Lehmans

2 July 2012, Fixing LIBOR

29 June 2012, Merkel's Money

13 June 2012, Geometry of Imperialism

27 May 2012, Bankiarupt

22 May 2012, Stubborn Facts

1 May 2012, Imperialism by Numbers

24 April 2012, The Commodities Business

2 April 2012, The Circuit of Capital

22 March 2012, The Composition of Capital

18 March 2012, Eurocentric Angst

13 March 2012, The Number of the Beast

20 December 2011, Europe's Crisis Measures

12 December 2011, Cameron, Merkozy & Europe

3 December 2011, Imperialism & the Law of Value

23 November 2011, Bunga Bunga Bund

8 November 2011, Law of Value vs Berlusconi, Papandreou

24 October 2011, British Imperialism Today

21 October 2011, Capitalism & Slavery

7 October 2011, Steve Jobs: Apple Monopolist

5 October 2011, Dimensions of Dollar Imperialism

22 September 2011, It Can Always Get Worse

21 September 2011, Operation Twist

20 September 2011, Collaborate Against Imperialism

15 September 2011, Darling, We Have a Crisis

7 September 2011, Capitalists Don't Like Markets

5 September 2011, Capitalist Crisis, Keynesian Delusions

25 August 2011, Bank Profits & Leverage

22 August 2011, Libya is for Everyone?

16 August 2011, US Constitution: 'We, the Capitalists'

8 August 2011, Debt & Austerity

6 August 2011, US Credit Downgrade

4 August 2011, Pirates of the Caribbean: Sugar & Slavery

2 August 2011, Foxconn & Organic Composition of Capital

1 August 2011, Tea Party Antecedents

26 July 2011, The Real US Debt Problem

22 July 2011, The Euro Deal

15 July 2011, The Murdoch Mafia

5 July 2011, Anti-Bank Populism in the Imperial Heartland

1 July 2011, Ireland’s Imperial Tithe

24 June 2011, Origins of the Greek Crisis

7 June 2011, Value of Labour-Power & Wage Differentials

4 June 2011, What the ‘China Price’ Really Means

2 June 2011, Winston Churchill Told It Like It Was

29 May 2011, America’s War with China

22 May 2011, The Economics of British Imperialism

Indian Boots on the Ground

Britain’s exploitation of India up to Partition and ‘independence’ in 1947 went much further than extracting investment and trading revenues and dominating its economy. Just consider the British Indian Army, established under British government control in 1858 after it took over from the East India Company. Manned by colonial Indian subjects, this force was critical for British imperialism’s many battles. In wars large and small, especially those outside Europe, against national liberation movements, uncooperative populations and rival powers, Indian troops greatly boosted the numbers of those who would fight and die for it.[1]

Prior to 1914, British armed forces had largely been used to police the Empire. Since Napoleon early in the 19th century and the Crimean War with Russia in mid-century, there had been little or no direct conflict with other major powers. British policy was to depend upon alliances with others, rather than to maintain a large standing army itself. So it was important to be able to draw upon a force of colonial troops when needed, including for the policing of the British Raj.

Important though they were for British power, Indian troops commonly faced racial discrimination, were looked down upon by white officers and were often used as cannon fodder, while also being given worse grade arms and equipment than regular British troops. Attractive as a cheap military resource for the Brits, these men could nevertheless see enlistment in the army as a reasonable option. There was regular pay and regular food, something not always available in the Indian economy dominated by British Empire interests – as became brutally clear with the Bengal famine in 1943.

Extra battalions

At the start of World War One in 1914, British army regular forces numbered less than 250,000, but they had grown to 3.8 million by 1918, including reserves, helped by conscription after volunteers proved insufficient. Over the same period, the British Indian Army grew from around 150,000 to more than one million, of which some 700,000 served overseas, making it a valuable additional force. This latter army fought in Ypres, Loos, Neuve Chapelle and Gallipoli, and in Mesopotamia (roughly corresponding to Iraq today), Palestine, Egypt and East Africa.

Although troop numbers fell back in the 1920s and 1930s, the Second World War and its aftermath saw a further utilisation of Britain’s Indian Army. Battle locations during the war included in North Africa (Tunisia, Libya and Egypt) and Europe (Italy, especially). A good book on this period notes that, in early 1942, “264,000 Indian troops were serving overseas, including 91,000 in Iraq, 20,000 in the Middle East, 56,000 in Malaya and 20,000 in Burma.”[2] By later that year, the Indian army had recruited another 600,000 men, and by the end of 1942 it stood at almost 1.55 million. Another 280,000 were recruited in 1943. By 1945, it had grown to some 2.5 million. This compared to 3.5 million in the British army you will more commonly read about.

Indian troops were, of course, used by the British to push back Japan’s wartime incursions into India itself. But the downside for the Brits in the early 1940s was that many Indian prisoners of war (held by the Axis powers) were ready to switch sides and join versions of the anti-colonial Indian National Army. Japan, in particular, made efforts to attract these forces.

Ahead of India’s independence, the Brits had to be a little cautious, but that did not prevent them from using Indian troops to help put down anti-colonial movements in Malaya, Vietnam and Indonesia. These were efforts by the much-lauded ‘socialist’ Labour Government to restore not just the British, but also the French and the Dutch to their former status. To add to the outrage, Britain also used just-defeated Japanese troops for the same purpose!

Despite demobilisation after 1945, by April 1946, “the Indian army still had two brigades in the Middle East; four divisions in Burma; three divisions in Malaya; four divisions in Indonesia; one division in Borneo and Siam (Thailand); a brigade in Hong Kong; and two brigades in Japan.” A division comprised roughly 10-15,000 men, and a brigade roughly 1,500-3,500 men.

Oh well, that’s enough about soldiers.

Tony Norfield, 24 July 2018

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[1] The points below focus on Indian troops, but one should note that the British also used African troops and Chinese labourers in their war efforts. France also made great use of its African colonies. A good book detailing these points for the First World War is David Olusoga’s The World’s War: Forgotten Soldiers of Empire, Head of Zeus, 2014.

[2] This, the later quotation, and most of the information on Indian troop numbers, are taken from Srinath Raghavan, India’s War: the Making of Modern South Asia, 1939-1945, Penguin, 2017. For the post-1945 period, also see Christopher Bayley and Tim Harper, Forgotten Wars: the End of Britain’s Asian Empire, Allen Lane, 2007. A good online source for the history is here.

Winston Churchill & British Imperialism

 

 

Even patriotic Brits know that their hero Winston Churchill did not win World War 2 or fly a Spitfire. What they, and others, may not know is how his statements often shed a clear light on British imperialism. From Britain’s reliance on colonies, to the political rationale for giving the working class some welfare services, Churchill’s rhetorical flourishes in speeches, newspaper articles, and deliberations with his peers, illuminate things all too often absent from contemporary political consciousness.

The text cited below is in chronological order. Information is taken from many sources,[1] including articles previously on this blog and from other material I have put onto Twitter and Facebook. But it should not overtax the modern attention span. I do not claim or aim to cover everything, and will give a few lines of context where these might be helpful.

When all of these statements were made, except one, Churchill had a senior position in the British government of the day, or had even been Prime Minister. They are not just the musings of a random reactionary and empire enthusiast.

 

Social welfare and a stake in the country, 1909

Social welfare measures have often been introduced by the ruling class to boost loyalty to the state, apart from the need to have a reasonably healthy and educated workforce. It has worked in rich countries. Here is Winston Churchill backing unemployment benefits in a Daily Mail article from August 1909:

“The idea is to increase the stability of our institutions by giving the mass of industrial workers a direct interest in maintaining them.

With a ‘stake in the country’ in the form of insurances against evil days these workers will pay no attention to the vague promises of revolutionary socialism.”

 

Splendid colonial possessions, 1914

In a comment to his British Cabinet colleagues in January 1914, Churchill noted:

“We are not a young people with an innocent record and a scanty inheritance... We have engrossed to ourselves an altogether disproportionate share of the wealth and traffic of the world. We have got all we want in territory, and our claim to be left in the unmolested enjoyment of vast and splendid possessions, mainly acquired by violence, largely maintained by force, often seems less reasonable to others than to us.”

 

Colonial terror, 1919-1921

This is his support for the RAF's request to use mustard gas in Mesopotamia (today’s Iraq):

“I do not understand this squeamishness about the use of gas ... I am strongly in favour of using poisoned gases against uncivilised tribes. … Gases can be used which … would leave a lively terror and yet would leave no serious permanent effect [!] on most of those affected.”

Unfortunately for the RAF, no gas bombs were available at that time (April 1919). Churchill had already used most of them against the Bolsheviks! But he did find some later for use in Mesopotamia, in 1920 to help put down a rebellion. I would add that the RAF was also seen as a good, inexpensive means of putting down colonial revolts and encouraging tax payments with machine guns and regular bombs, not just gas.

And here is his opinion on using gas to subdue Afghanistan, in May 1919:

“The objections of the India Office to the use of gas against natives are unreasonable. Gas is a more merciful weapon than [a] high explosive shell … The moral effect is also very great. There can be no conceivable reason why it should not be resorted to.”

In line with his general view of the world, he only thought such gas was ‘hellish poison’ when used on white people, eg British soldiers in the First World War.

 

Gold Standard, Imperial status, 1925

Britain returned to the gold standard in 1925, in a move roundly condemned by JM Keynes. But Keynes, always wanting to be a helping hand for British imperialism, gave no indication that he understood the logic of the move. Churchill, by contrast, was very clear in his comments at the time:

“If we had not taken this action, the whole of the rest of the British Empire would have taken it without us, and it would have come to a gold standard, not on the basis of the pound sterling, but a gold standard of the dollar.”

And

“I have only one observation to make on the merits. In our policy of returning to the gold standard we do not move alone. Indeed, I think we could not have afforded to remain stationary while so many others moved. The two greatest manufacturing countries in the world on either side of us, the United States and Germany, are in different ways either on or related to an international gold exchange. Sweden is on the gold exchange. Austria and Hungary are already based on gold, or on sterling, which is now the equivalent of gold. I have reason to know that Holland and the Dutch East Indies – very important factors in world finance – will act simultaneously with us today. As far as the British Empire is concerned – the self-governing Dominions – there will be complete unity of action. The Dominion of Canada is already on the gold standard. The Dominion of South Africa has given notice of her intention to revert to the old standard as from 1st July. I am authorised to inform the Committee that the Commonwealth of Australia, synchronising its action with ours, proposes from today to abolish the existing restrictions on the free export of gold, and that the Dominion of New Zealand will from today adopt the same course as ourselves in freely licensing the export of gold.”

 

Pro-Italian fascism, against ‘beastly’ Leninism, 1927

Here is a page from Ponting’s book on Churchill's trip to Italy in 1927:

So much for Churchill being the steadfast anti-fascist!  

 

Britain’s imperial parasitism & the welfare payoff, 1929

On 15 April 1929, Churchill spoke in Parliament about the City’s revenues, and its role as a global broker, as well as the big returns on British foreign investments:

“The income which we derive each year from commissions and services rendered to foreign countries is over £65,000,000, and, in addition, we have a steady revenue from foreign investments of close on £300,000,000 a year, 90 per cent of which is expressed in sterling. Upon this great influx there is levied, as a rule, the highest rates of taxation. In this way we are helped to maintain our social services at a level incomparably higher than that of any European country, or indeed of any country.” (Hansard)

(Other related information here)

Note that both kinds of revenue noted in the quotation above do not all come from the colonies, at least not directly, and most will have derived from transactions with and investments in other major countries. Nevertheless, such revenues were important for social services even before the post-1945 ‘welfare state’. I give an updated, contemporary assessment of these in my book, The City.

 

Britain’s colonies and its status in the world, 1939

This is from Churchill’s address to West Indies sugar plantation owners! It is cited in Peter Fryer's book, Black People in the British Empire, 1988, Pluto Press:

The ‘cradle to the grave’ welfare state, state ownership, NHS, etc, 1943

These are excerpts from a 1943 speech from Churchill as Prime Minister during World War 2. The measures introduced by the Labour Government from 1945 were largely prefigured in this address.

 

Thanks for the bomb, 1952

To finish with a bang, here is Churchill as Prime Minister again, thanking the Labour Party for its efforts in making the UK a nuclear weapons power:

“All those concerned in the production of the first British atomic bomb are to be warmly congratulated on the successful outcome of an historic episode and I should no doubt pay my compliments to the Leader of the [Labour] Opposition and the party opposite for initiating it.” Hansard, 24 October 1952

 

 

Tony Norfield, 18 October 2021

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[1] Where not otherwise indicated, the quotations are taken from Clive Ponting’s excellent book, Churchill, 1994.

A New Crisis Acronym: Brexit

What are the Brits doing?* On June 23 they will vote in a referendum on whether to remain in the European Union, an organisation of European countries to which they have belonged since 1973. It is rare for a marriage of more than forty years to break up, especially by the decision of the partner that had asked twice for betrothal. Of course, these are relationships between countries, not people. Yet the UK-European relationship will be affected even if the UK votes ‘Remain’ rather than ‘Leave’, just as if a partner had decided to sleep in a separate room in the same home. To examine the UK decision, this article reviews some key events in the historical relationship and the unusual position of the UK as a European power.

Many writers in Britain have considered UK Prime Minister Cameron’s decision to call a referendum on EU membership to be simply his way of dealing with dissidents in his Conservative Party. After all, big business opinion, which all major parties in the UK follow, is largely in favour of the status quo, even if many Conservatives hate the EU. Referendums on any issue, let alone a major foreign policy question, are also rarely held in the UK. Normally, Parliament makes the decisions and this is a convenient set up for the ruling groups. The decisive part of Parliament is staffed by those voted in by the public (the House of Commons), but the elected candidates are almost all chosen by the ruling parties, who are in turn influenced by the established interest groups and by corporate lobbying. In addition, there is the common feature of modern democracy: in the 2015 general election, the ruling Conservative Party was voted for by barely a quarter of the full electorate – just 37% of the 66% of those eligible to vote who put their mark on the ballot paper.

A referendum on Britain’s EU membership has the advantage of being a popular vote. But the reason a possible British exit from the European Union has become a referendum question, not something to be determined alone by the Mother of Parliaments, is that there is a big enough, although still a minority, dissident opinion among British elites that sees continued EU membership as a bad idea. So the decision will be guided by the collective ‘wisdom’ of the masses – who are guided in turn by the cajolery of the rival Remain or Leave factions. Each of these factions, ironically, includes both supporters of trade union rights and proponents of untrammelled business exploitation.

A key issue at stake in the referendum is the position of Europe in a crisis-stricken world. Losing the UK, the second largest EU economy accounting for 16% of the area’s GDP, would be a blow to longstanding European plans to build a bloc that could compete with the US and others. It would add to the many self-generated problems of European capitalism and could also encourage others to head for the exit, since the UK would have set a precedent. Lieutenant-General Ben Hodges, head of the US Army in Europe, has even said he was worried about a potential risk to NATO: the EU could start to unravel just when it needed to ‘stand up to Russia’. However, my focus here is on the rationale behind the UK vote and that comes down to whether it is in the interests of the UK to maintain its current relationship with other European countries. Nobody would suggest that on a Leave vote there would be a collapse of UK-EU trade and investment deals. These are too extensive to reverse. But, nevertheless, there is a question of where the better prospects lie, inside the EU system or outside. I will assess how the UK vote could play out, starting first with a historical overview UK-European relationships.

Changing relationships

Readers might be surprised to learn that Winston Churchill was in favour of a ‘United States of Europe’ in 1946. This view of a resolute British Empire loyalist is less of a surprise when one realises that the proposed union did not include the UK! After all, there was then an Empire to run and Churchill was mainly concerned with getting some stability on the war-ravaged European continent. Even by 1957, when the Treaty of Rome was signed by West Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries, the six founding members, to set up the European Economic Community (EEC), Britain took no real part in the discussions, being much more focused on economic links with the Empire/Commonwealth. However, later the Commonwealth faded in economic and political importance and British capitalists became increasingly open to doing more deals with the rest of Europe.

Britain first applied to join the EEC in the early 1960s. France’s President Charles de Gaulle vetoed this application because he thought that Britain could not be trusted as a loyal member of the new European (and, in some respects, anti-American) project. Apart from de Gaulle’s annoyance with the Brits about frustrating some of France’s earlier colonial plans, in Syria and elsewhere, he was most worried about their US links, most visible in the Polaris nuclear missile deal in 1962.

Nevertheless, Britain’s interest in the EEC did not diminish. It was encouraged by an attraction to a faster growing market in Continental Europe at a time when its Commonwealth economic relationships with former dominions and colonies were not paying off. By the early 1970s, the time was right for another application to join, one that was accepted as the other European countries had by then become more open to having the UK as a partner. In 1973, the UK Parliament made the decision to join under the Conservatives and, under the following Labour Government, a 1975 popular referendum ratified this, by 67% to 33%. At that time, British radicals denounced the EEC as a capitalist plot. Instead, many of them advanced the ‘alternative’ of restoring trade deals with the Commonwealth. They failed to mention that this was just a different kind of capitalist plot.

Back in the 1970s, the British economy was uncompetitive, crisis-ridden and dogged with high inflation, large external trade and public spending deficits and a falling currency. In some respects, plus ça change, etc. But then, by comparison, the EEC looked like a shining beacon of prosperity. Well, at least the other six members up to 1973 were generally doing better than Britain, although they were also hit by economic crises. Being a more integrated part of a ‘European’ economy also looked likely to give a brighter future for the UK. Trade between member countries was growing strongly and was likely to continue to do so, given falling constraints on internal trade that would boost the internal market, a common tariff on imported goods from outside the EEC and an expanding membership. By 1993, the EEC had been renamed the European Union and had twelve member countries, while others were waiting in the wings for accession to what was the most attractive regional club.

More European holidays for the Brits, helped by cheaper transport links and the introduction of some interesting Continental food and drink into the questionable British diet (with French and Italian wine now widely available on supermarket shelves!), helped consolidate a less insular popular opinion and a more favourable British attitude to the EU. This also affected the opinion of the labour unions and the left wing of the Labour Party. In the early 1970s, they were anti-EEC. Under what was to be four successive Conservative governments, with three dominated by Margaret Thatcher from 1979, the unions and the left wing warmed to Europe. A key event was when they applauded the labour-oriented rhetoric of the President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, at the 1988 annual conference of the Trades Union Congress.

Despite being an implacable defender of British sovereignty, UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, nevertheless signed the EU’s Single European Act in 1986. The Act set out plans for a single European economic market and at the same time codified closer European political cooperation. British business liked the first part, and was less happy about the second. But the two parts came as a package, so the deal was done.

UK-European ‘cooperation’ went further by 1991-92, but this time there were limits set by the interests of British capitalism. This period was critical for establishing the later euro exchange rate system, the economic and financial rules for becoming a member of it, and the obligation of EU member states to eventually join the system. In February 1992, the Maastricht Treaty set the foundations and the UK government response was striking. It rejected many regulations that favoured workers’ rights, and made sure to get an ‘opt out’ from the social and employment rules in the negotiations. Above all, it got an agreement whereby it was not obliged to join the future euro single currency. (Some of the ‘social chapter’ opt out was later amended by the 1997 Labour government, but the current dispute with junior doctors over hours worked and salaries indicates that not much had really changed.)

As an aside, it is worth noting a little remarked upon deal that helped Britain secure its exemptions from the Maastricht Treaty’s general rules. The UK agreed with Germany that the EU should recognise Croatia as a political entity. This recognition of a German area of interest exacerbated political conflict between Croats and Serbs in the former Yugoslavia. It helped spark the ensuing Yugoslav civil war and was a reminder of how the costs of deals between the major powers are often paid for by others.

Break points

This closer, though still tense, UK-EU cooperation was undermined by a political-economic upset. A turning point was when the Conservative Government decided in 1990 to join Europe’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). While EU politicians generally saw the ERM as a glide path into the later euro system, Britain’s membership of it was quite clearly only for tactical reasons. The British government’s aim was to use the ERM to stabilise the value of sterling while at the same time it was able to cut domestic interest rates to help stimulate the British economy. Less than two years afterwards, a relatively weak UK economy put downward pressure on the value of sterling in the ERM. Sterling was pushed to the lower limit of the system, given the contrast between the UK and the strongly growing Germany economy, which was still being boosted by the reunification of the West and East of the country in 1990.

It soon became clear that there was little political support among ERM members, especially Germany, to prevent the value of sterling dropping below permitted levels. One big problem was that the other ERM members had played no part in deciding those levels; the decision on the exchange rate for sterling within the system was just announced by the UK Treasury over a weekend. By contrast, most key decisions on running the system had been made after agreements between the major countries. That point was related to me by an official of the Germany's central bank, the Bundesbank. As a result, the UK government ended up spending billions from the UK’s foreign exchange reserves to prevent a drop below the ERM limit and to defend its policy, including raising interest rates sharply. It failed, and made George Soros (in)famous in the news media as a successful hedge fund currency speculator. Sterling left the ERM in September 1992 and slumped in value, but UK interest rates were cut again.

Not long afterwards, the UK economy recovered as did the value of sterling. The political lesson learned was that Britain was better off outside a system dominated by other European countries, where it would have more room to decide policy. These events tempered the enthusiasm of pro-EU elites, encouraging those who came to be called ‘euro sceptics’. This term encompassed not only those against the UK’s possible membership of the euro exchange rate system, introduced in 1999, but also those more fundamentally against the UK’s membership of the EU. No longer was this latter group made up only of nostalgic Empire loyalists; it had a wider following. Perhaps ‘Europe’ was not such a good economic-political alliance for British capitalism after all.

Deciding to avoid a decision

By the mid-1990s, British policy makers began to realise that they might have even bigger issues with the EU. The 1957 Treaty of Rome included a pledge, capitalised as the objective to achieve EVER CLOSER UNION. British government strategy was to avoid this ‘closer union’ dimension that would restrict its freedom of manoeuvre. In the early period of the UK’s EEC membership, that did not seem to be much of a problem. Such political dreams usually come to nothing. But it did become a problem in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty and the unification of West and East Germany. That was why the UK government worked hard to get its ‘opt outs’ from the Maastricht Treaty, but there were longer lasting strategic problems too.

If the major continental European countries were now to become ‘unified’, that would probably mean with Germany as the principal power and deciding force. That would likely still be true if the UK joined the euro system, since its ability to create a counterweight in an alliance with France, or with other countries, was far from certain, given the many rivalries between them. But if the UK did not join the euro system, then the euro member countries might develop even more independently and challenge British interests in trade and finance.

In such a dilemma, the classic British compromise diplomacy came to the rescue under the Labour government from 1997-2010. There would be no outright rejection of the euro, which would have cemented the UK’s position as being outside the European project. Instead, there would be a conditional agreement to join at some indeterminate point in the future. This was summed up in the Labour government’s ‘Five Economic Tests’ on whether joining the euro would be in Britain’s interests. These tests were posed as an objective, neutral assessment of the potential economic costs and benefits, ones that could change over time and lead to a decision to join the euro system. However, they left plenty of room for a political judgement, and it was clear that the fundamental political decision was No.

European problems in a wider world

Membership commitments of the EU and the euro are different, but related. The EU is the total 28-country grouping, within which 19 countries are members of the euro exchange rate system. From being a pole of economic and political attraction up to the 1990s – Austria, Sweden and Finland joined in 1995 – there are few rich countries lining up to join the EU today. This is not because the list of rich regional countries has been used up; Switzerland and Norway are still available. It is because only poorer nations, like Turkey, Albania and Serbia, would see strategic political advantages in EU membership and also some likely funds from its development programmes. The richer European countries who are not EU members want to retain a degree of independence in their policy making. If they chose now to join the EU that would imply putting themselves on course to join the euro system. Given its recent disastrous economic history, such a decision would make as much sense as walking across a six-lane highway with your eyes closed.

Economic trouble – stagnant growth and high unemployment – has strengthened anti-EU sentiment in many countries. This has increased support for new political parties, such as the UK Independence Party, and longer-standing ones, such as the Front National in France. Adapting to these new challenges, the established parties in many countries have also become more nationalistic and anti-immigrant. One of the principal election pledges of the Labour Party in the 2015 vote was to impose more ‘Controls on immigration’. In the poorer countries, anti-EU views have often reflected popular frustration at how what once looked like hopes of a better future in the rich man’s club have been dashed by the economic crisis. The refugee crisis, with many hundreds of thousands of people trying to escape turmoil in the Middle East, North Asia and Africa, has added to the nationalistic mood in Europe, especially in those countries directly impacted, such as Greece and Hungary.

It is this kind of prospect for Europe that has led British policy makers in recent years to shift their attention elsewhere. This has opened up a more non-EU perspective. One particular focus of UK interest has been China. In early 2015, the UK was the first western power to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. This move annoyed the US government, but led several other US allies, from Europe to Australia and South Korea, to do the same thing. Britain has also made strong efforts to attract Chinese financial business to help boost trading for the City of London, including making it easier for Chinese banks to set up in London and, in October 2014, issuing the first Chinese renminbi-denominated sovereign bond by a foreign government. In addition, Britain has been at the forefront of attracting inward Chinese direct investment and also building up a business in Muslim ‘sharia’ finance, further showing that there are interesting prospects outside a stagnant Europe.

The UK’s Brexit vote

Opinion polls in the UK have been treated warily since they badly predicted the outcome of the May 2015 UK general election. Most polls showed a neck-and-neck race between the Conservatives and the Labour Party, showing the likelihood of some kind of coalition government including the smaller Liberal Party or the Scottish Nationalists. In the event, the Conservatives won outright. Recent UK opinion polls on the Brexit referendum have also been quite close, although with the ‘Remain’ option usually in the lead. Nevertheless, it is interesting that for those actually betting money on the outcome, rather than responding to a telephone or online poll, the probability of the UK staying in the EU has recently been estimated at around 70%, although this has fallen back somewhat.

The majority of business opinion, and the formal opinion of the major political parties, with only minority dissension, is for the UK to stay as a member of the EU, despite most of the parties complaining about the EU and wanting to see changes. In late February, Prime Minister Cameron claimed to have secured the relevant changes to prevent EU rules from constraining British ‘freedoms’ in long-winded, late night negotiations with his European counterparts. His effort reflected a concern of the British establishment that future European political decisions could work against British interests. The bigger picture he fought for was to try and ensure that the UK would not be bound to follow any moves towards political union and would have safeguards against financial regulation being imposed on the City of London by the euro group of countries (basically meaning France and Germany).

That was a matter of big power strategy. The smaller, more squalid, picture was based upon a more narrow, nasty bias against migrants from the EU. It was to restrict in-work benefits for new arrivals from the EU for up to four years and scale back child benefit for workers whose children remain abroad. Cameron had initially wanted to do this for all migrant workers, around one million in the UK, but faced opposition from East European states, the source of most of those receiving such benefits. These workers are often low-paid and British capitalism has benefited handsomely from them in the past, both being heavily involved in opening up Eastern Europe to exploitation and in attracting cheap labour, often highly skilled, to work in Britain for low wages. But this episode illustrates how even hard-line, ‘free market’ capitalist policies will adapt to popular anti-immigrant sentiment. This has occurred, even though the political agenda in Britain has moved on somewhat from any problems the low wage ‘Polish plumber’ might be causing for the job prospects of British workers to the question of a disaffected Muslim population.

British government immigration policy often gets complaints from businesses that want to attract employees from non-EU countries and who have to jump through more costly hoops to get the relevant status. It has also limited the ability of British educational institutions, which have become ever more commercial, increasingly resembling expensive hotels that aim to attract foreign tourists, into the English-speaking imperium. But there is nevertheless an upside from this restrictive immigration policy. As in other major countries, it keeps national, patriotic sentiment in line. We claim to protect you, so that you will fight for and support us.

The Brexit referendum is erected on this British establishment self-serving edifice. The vote is not about people deciding their future; it is about the best strategy for British business in a troublesome world. It will have no effect on the exploitation of ordinary people, except perhaps on the particular form that it takes, not that any such form will be less onerous. British policy, decided by successive British governments, has been prominent in undermining workers’ rights, so it is especially absurd to cast a ‘Leave’ vote as being somehow a progressive move against reactionary European policies – on austerity or anything else. My view on the referendum is to abstain, and I have a vote. This is not because I think the debate is irrelevant. On the contrary, this article is a contribution to the debate. It is because neither of the ‘Remain’ or ‘Leave’ options offered in the vote represents a better alternative. It is a delusion to pretend that they do. My view instead is to try and set a good example and show that you do not have to accept what you are given.

Tony Norfield, 8 April 2016

*: This article first appeared in the New York-based BrooklynRail journal, in the Fieldnotes section on 6 April.It is an extended discussion of my earlier piece on this blog covering the Brexit vote.

Eric Hobsbawm’s 20th Century Self-Censorship

Eric Hobsbawm was a famous Marxist historian and member of the Communist Party who died in 2012. Recently I read his autobiography, Interesting Times: A Twentieth Century Life, first published in 2002. He overcame Cold War-inspired barriers to his early career and contributed much to our understanding, so his story looked to be fascinating. Instead, it was rather dull. What struck me as most interesting was interesting for bad reasons.

Not to be accused of quoting out of context, I will cite a relatively long passage of text. It occurs in Chapter 17, ‘Among the Historians’, on pages 291-292, and discusses post-1945 developments in historiography:

“Explosive subjects such as Russia, especially in the twentieth century, and the history of communism were, of course, ideological battlefields, although the debate was one-sided, since the orthodoxies enforced in the Soviet Empire crippled both their historians and their interpretations. If one was a serious Soviet historian, the best thing was to stick to the history of the ancient East and the Middle Ages, although it was touching to see how modernists rushed to say (within the constraints of the permissible) what they knew to be true every time the window seemed to be slightly opened – as in 1956 and in the early 1960s. I myself became essentially a nineteenth century historian, because I soon discovered – actually in the course of an aborted project of the CP [Communist Party] Historians’ Group to write a history of the British labour movement – that, given the strong official Party and Soviet views about the twentieth century, one could not write about anything later than 1917 without the likelihood of being denounced as a political heretic. I was ready to write about the century in a political or public capacity, but not as a professional historian. My history finished at Sarajevo in June 1914.

“Luckily, I abstained from twentieth century history until it was almost over, but it went against the grain of the historiographical movement, which was away from the remote past and towards the present. Until well past 1945 ‘real’ history finished, at the latest, in 1914 after which the immediate past reverted to chronicle, journalism or contemporary commentary. Indeed, since the archives remained closed in Britain for several decades, it simply could not be written to the standards of traditional historians. In most countries, even the nineteenth century had not yet been fully absorbed by academic history departments, except by the economic historians. The great historiographical debates had not been about it, although political radicalism, not least in the form of a new passion for labour history, now drew attention to an era which had been seriously neglected by historians in a number of countries. Even in Britain, until the 1960s politicians, serious journalists, relatives and essayists wrote the biographies of the great figures of Victorian Britain, not the professors. Nevertheless, the gap between past and present narrowed, perhaps because so many professional historians had actually been involved in the Second World War.”

While these are interesting biographical details, they are also an apologia for a lack of intellectual integrity. Hobsbawm starts out by noting the key point, Soviet censorship of dissident political views. Then he notes his capitulation, but tries to support his stance by arguing that, because ‘the archives remained closed’, he could not have analysed the post-1914 period until the late twentieth century ‘to the standards of traditional historians’. Ah yes, those ever so incisive and objective traditional historians!

Notably, his Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991, was first published in 1994. In its Preface, he makes the same basic point as in the later autobiography, distinguishing his ‘professional historian’ scholarly position from those cases where he wrote about post-1914 events in ‘other capacities’. There he also says: ‘I think it is now possible to see the Short Twentieth Century from 1914 to the end of the Soviet era in some historical perspective’ (p ix). This is the telling point: he could now exercise his historical scholarship on the post-1914 period because of the end of the Soviet Union in 1991!

In one book, Revolutionaries, published much earlier in 1973, Hobsbawm does cover post-1914 developments in a number of ‘contemporary essays’. But there his Preface makes the point that ‘speaking as a historian, these are not fields in which I would claim professional expertise’. His essays were written in a general style, and one that would be safe from political censure.

Hobsbawm’s argument about ‘closed archives’ meaning that historians cannot analyse a historical period to a sufficient standard is just ridiculous, especially so for the UK. Yes, more information of all kinds may well surface in future, and possibly it will provide a different perspective. But neither that future information, nor the present sources to analyse, need necessarily be the government’s officially released archives. Nor is one only limited to ‘chronicle, journalism or contemporary commentary’. Let me take one example from the supposedly barren, pre-1991 days of insufficient material.

In 1975, Partha Sarathi Gupta published a book on the labour movement in Britain, a topic close to Hobsbawm’s favoured subject area. Gupta was a professor of British and European history at Delhi University and president of the Indian History Congress, who died in 1999. His book, Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914-64, was published by Macmillan as part of the Cambridge Commonwealth Series. So he was well within the realm of the ‘traditional historians’. Gupta’s focus was not on the British working class as such, although he makes a number of pertinent comments on its political outlook. Instead, the book focuses on ‘the attitudes and policies of the British Labour Movement towards the British Empire and Commonwealth’.

Gupta recognises a limitation due to British government records after 1945 being closed at the time he was writing. However, he still makes a thorough analysis of the available private papers and public documents. The latter for the post-1945 period include House of Commons debates, statements by policymakers and advisers, and records from the conferences of the major political parties. Having read Gupta’s book only a few years ago, I was not aware of anything that has since emerged from the ‘archives’ to question his basic conclusions written some three decades earlier. My citation from his work is in an article on Labour’s colonial policy, on this blog.

I do not blame the late Eric Hobsbawm for the weak analysis of (British) imperialism after 1914. Yet it is a pity that someone of his abilities could not have applied himself more effectively, and much sooner, to this subject.

Tony Norfield, 7 July 2017